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Max Horkheimer’s mature works on theology and Schopenhauerian metaphysics 
have been portrayed by subsequent critical theorists as an illicit regression from his 
earlier social theory in a two-fold sense.  First, his concern to reflect on empirical 
experience is replaced with speculation regarding intelligible concepts, i.e. concepts that 
do not arise from observation on the basis of sense-intuition but are rather products of 
“pure” reason (God) or the imagination (Schopenhauer’s will).  Second, his advocacy of 
the Enlightenment as an emancipatory political project is replaced by its skeptical 
critique.   
I argue that this consensus radically misunderstands the concerns animating the late 
Horkheimer insofar as his reflections on intelligible concepts are both intimately related 
to a continuing concern with empirical inquiry, as well as an outworking of his 
commitment to the realization of the Enlightenment.  The argument is presented in 
three related movements.  In the first, I interpret Horkheimer’s oeuvre in terms of his 
pervasive interest in developing a materialist logic.  I begin by outlining his early 
understanding of thought as a form of inquiry for embodied social subjects (chapter 1), 
before noting how, in his mature theorizing, this account serves as a basis for a 
presentation of the relationship between various kinds of inquiry and the practice of 
social critique (chapter 2).  In the second, I contend that Horkheimer’s critique of 
instrumental reason is best understood as congruent with this materialist logic, not as a 
speculative departure from an earlier concern with empirical inquiry.  I begin by 
examining Horkheimer’s empirical analysis of how historical changes in the basic 
institutions defining political economy in modern life affect the reasoning habits of 
subjects (chapter 3).  I then turn to his diagnosis of the way such changes affect the self-




In the final movement, I present Horkheimer’s turn to theological concepts of the 
intelligible as a therapeutic response to this alienation.  First, I examine his 
understanding of the content of theological concepts as well as how such concepts may 
be preserved in a form appropriate to modern life (chapter 5), and conclude by 
illustrating his own attempt at such a retrieval in his late reflections on the Jewish liturgy 
(chapter 6).    
In the conclusion, I note that this interpretation offers a constructive challenge to 
philosophers concerned with the tradition of critical theory.  On the one hand, 
Horkheimer articulates what would be required for the fulfillment of the Enlightenment 
project in terms critical theorists will recognize as their own, by offering an account of 
the social practices that are necessary for the self-determination of the subject.  Yet his 
presentation contests a fundamental axiom of such theorists regarding the role 
intelligible concepts ought to play in seeking this goal.  Horkheimer defends an account 
of the significance of the liturgy for practices of reasoning that is quiet foreign to such 
theorists.  Instead of setting liturgical reasoning over against a militantly “secular” 
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Inquiry and the Intelligible: 
Interpreting Horkheimer’s liturgical turn 
 
Central to the identity of contemporary critical theorists is an account of the 
intellectual development of the original director of the Institüt für Sozialforschung, Max 
Horkheimer.  Second-generation theorists draw upon a history of his thought to 
illuminate a central question guiding their own research, “what is the normative 
standpoint of critical theory?”1  Horkheimer’s movement over the course of his lifetime 
as a theoretician has often been presented by such theorists as a three-fold attempt to 
answer the “normativity” question, the failure of which serves as a foil situating their 
own contemporary efforts.  The root of this interpretive approach may be traced to 
Helmut Dubiel’s monumental study, Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung: 
Studien zur frühen Kritischen Theorie (1978).2  An investigation of subsequent literature 
demonstrates that dependence on Dubiel’s study is ubiquitous among those who have 
attempted to interpret and develop Horkheimer’s original project.3   
                                                
1 Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 222.  Richard Wolin similarly notes in “Critical Theory and the 
Dialectic of Rationalism,” New German Critique, no. 41 (Spring-Summer 1987): 23, “The problem of a 
viable normative foundation for critical theory is clearly at the heart of the most vital contemporary 
debates concerning the legacy of the Frankfurt School.”  The discussion of “grounding” in treatments of 
Horkheimer’s early essays is symptomatic of this interest in normativity.  For instances, note John Duane 
Abromeit, “The Dialectic of Bourgeois Society: An Intellectual Biography of the Young Max Horkheimer, 
1895-1937” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2004), 457, 465-467; Thomas McCarthy, “On 
the Idea of a Critical Theory,” in Critical Theory, by David Cousins Hoy and Thomas McCarthy (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 27; Axel Honneth, “Max Horkheimer and the Sociological Deficit of Critical 
Theory,” trans. Kenneth Baynes, in On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives, eds. Seyla Benhabib et. al. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 187; Hauke Brunkhorst, “Dialectical Positivism of Happiness: 
Horkheimer's Materialist Deconstruction of Philosophy,” trans. John McCole, in On Max Horkheimer, 87; 
John Grumley, History and Totality: Radical Historicism from Hegel to Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1989), 
162. 
2 Helmut Dubiel, Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung: Studien zur frühen Kritischen Theorie (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978).  I will reference the English translation: Theory and Politics: Studies in the 
Development of Critical Theory, trans. Benjamin Gregg (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1985). 
3 John O’Neill and Thomas Uebel, “Horkheimer and Neurath: Restarting a Disrupted Debate,” European 
Journal of Philosophy 12, no. 1 (April 2004): 99, n. 19, use the language of “canonical” to describe the 
reception of Dubiel’s work among critical theorists.  For explicit instances of dependency, note: 
Habermas, “Remarks on the Development of Horkheimer’s Work,” trans. Kenneth Baynes and John 





In this dissertation, I propose to offer an alternative heuristic to Dubiel, which, I 
shall argue, better captures the central concerns of Horkheimer’s mature work.  To set 
the stage, I shall first outline Dubiel’s interpretation.  Then I will discuss its development 
by subsequent theorists in a review of the state of contemporary research on the 
“normativity” deficit supposedly characterizing Horkheimer’s critical theory.  Finally, I 
shall outline the alternative I propose to defend in subsequent chapters.   
Dubiel describes the development of Horkheimer’s theory as passing through three 
distinguishable stages: a “materialist period” (1930-1937), a “Critical Theory period” 
(1937-1940), and a period in which theory served as a “mental preserve” for the 
members of the School, by which he references the turn of the school towards 
philosophy and away from empirical research (1940-).  Each of these periods, notes 
Dubiel, embodies distinct approaches to understanding the relationship between 
philosophy and the sciences,   
Whereas the materialist period considered philosophy the integrating medium of 
interdisciplinary theory construction (and sought, programmatically, the unification 
of philosophy and science), and, whereas the Critical Theory period took Marx’s 
economic critique as the orienting, paradigmatic unity of philosophy and the 
specialized sciences, in [the] third period philosophy is a mental preserve, a critical 
island, an encapsulation resistant to the instrumentalized Zeitgeist.  Philosophy 
defines its role as one of resistance to the specialized sciences.4 
   
In the first period, according to Dubiel, philosophical reflection and empirical research 
have “reciprocal functions” for Horkheimer.5  By this, Dubiel means that theoretical 
formulations both guide and in turn are modified by inquiry, so that “[t]he specialized 
sciences…provide an empirical corrective to philosophy.”6  In the second period, 
Horkheimer understands the relationship between philosophy and science in a one-sided 
                                                                                                                                       
Baynes and John McCole, in On Max Horkheimer, 388-389, 408 n. 3, 409 n. 4; Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and 
Utopia, 152. 
4 Dubiel, Theory and Politics, 95.  For similar formulations, note 9-10 and 105-106. 
5 Ibid., 106 





fashion: Marx’s economic theory is privileged as a presentation of the whole which 
determines the meaning of the otherwise indeterminate findings of the specialized 
sciences.  Finally, in his collaborative work with Adorno, most notably in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1944), Horkheimer abandons the specialized sciences altogether as 
examples of an instrumental form of reasoning that must be resisted root and branch by 
the theorist.  
It is hard to overestimate how foundational this portrait has been for subsequent 
interpreters of Horkheimer.  Theorists may differ with Dubiel on the details of his 
account, yet rarely do they question the fundamental premise that Horkheimer turns 
away from empirical inquiry and towards speculative philosophy and theological 
metaphysics in his mature work.  In each of the following four influential interpreters, 
the central premise of Dubiel’s original account, his portrayal of the late “philosophical” 
Horkheimer as a turn away from the early “empirical” Horkheimer, is left in place, 
despite the careful attempt of several theorists to critique other details of Dubiel’s work.   
Questioning Dubiel’s division between Horkheimer’s “materialist” and “critical 
theory” phases, Martin Jay has examined the sharp division between Horkheimer’s 
“early” commitment to scientific inquiry and his “later” privileging of a Marxist 
philosophy of history, noting that, as late as “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937), 
Horkheimer wrote as if a “totalistic knowledge of society could still be gained through 
the interdisciplinary methods promoted in [his] 1931 inaugural address [as the director 
for the Institut für Sozialforschung].”  Yet Jay concludes that once “the essential 
incoherence” of the idea of a possible totalistic knowledge of the whole became evident 
in the face of the overwhelming failure of proletarian class-consciousness to emerge, 





repository of negation.”7  While Jay questions the downplaying of empirical inquiry in 
the second of Dubiel’s two periods, the idea that Horkheimer eventually shifts from 
empirical study to abstract philosophical speculation in order to ground his social 
critique is reaffirmed. 
In stark contrast to Jay, Hauke Brunkhorst argues that from the outset of his career 
Horkheimer implicitly relies on a rationalist account of universal human interests that 
should organize society.  These human interests, notes Brunkhorst, are ultimately 
inextricable from a metaphysical account of human nature.8  Thus, Brunkhorst goes on 
to suggest, the early Horkheimer was not as committed to the dialectical 
interpenetration of theory and inquiry as Dubiel had originally thought.  On the one 
hand, he coupled an emphasis on the empirical social sciences with a “nominalistic” 
critique of metaphysics.9  On the other, his account of universal human interests drew 
on a philosophical anthropology which was nothing if not metaphysical, the idea of 
“humanity’s universal longing for happiness and fulfillment,” a concept which lent “a 
peculiarly normative force” to Horkheimer’s early critique.10  Thus his writings are 
“eclectic and inconsistent in the 1930s.”11  Brunkhorst concludes that Horkheimer’s 
work was never, from its inception, consistently committed to empirical inquiry over 
against philosophical speculation.  The shift from empirical to rationalist concepts is 
                                                
7 Martin Jay, “Positive and Negative Totalities: Implicit Tensions in Critical Theory's Vision of 
Interdisciplinary Research,” in Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from America to Germany 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 110.  The rupture in the verum-factum principle supposed 
by the idea of class consciousness is often understood as the cause for Horkheimer’s turn to a pessimistic 
philosophy of history in the 1940s: Habermas, “Development of Horkheimer’s Work,” 52, 54; Michael 
Löwy, “Partisan Truth: Knowledge and Social Classes in Critical Theory,” in Foundations of the Frankfurt 
School of Social Research, eds. Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tar (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1988), 
302; Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, 150, 156; Dubiel, Theory and Politics, 85-86. 
8 Brunkhorst, “Dialectical Positivism,” 87.  For a similar argument, see earlier interpreters such as David 
Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 
198 and Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, 153.    
9 Ibid., 76-77. 
10 Ibid., 87. 





presaged in his earliest work, thus the claim that he increasingly abandoned such study, 
is, if anything, more plausible than Dubiel’s presentation suggests. 
Turning to the “critical theory” period, the present director of the Institut für 
Sozialforschung, Axel Honneth, develops Dubiel’s understanding of the “critical theory” 
period as characterized by empirical analysis that is over-determined by theory.  
Honneth argues that Horkheimer’s Marxist philosophy of history relies upon a reductive 
conception of the human as homo laborans that neglects the findings of sociology.12  Thus 
he reaffirms Dubiel’s claim that Horkheimer increasingly relies on philosophical 
concepts to the exclusion of his early commitment to social scientific inquiry.    
Before turning to the fourth interpreter I wish to examine, I shall offer a concluding 
observation on the previous three.  There is near universal agreement, exemplified by 
Jay, Braukhorst, and Honneth, that what Dubiel terms the “third” period in 
Horkheimer’s work embodies a retreat away from empirical study to philosophy.  The 
contours of this turn, are widely agreed upon by subsequent interpreters.  In the 40s, 
they argue, Horkheimer inverted his former commitment to Marx, turning with Adorno 
to ground social critique in a negative philosophy of history.13  Some add to this that his 
“turn” is initiated only after an abortive attempt to defend pre-critical metaphysics in 
Eclipse of Reason.14  While this later nuance illustrates that Horkheimer’s reflections on 
                                                
12 Honneth, “Sociological Deficit,” 187, 191.  I shall discuss Honneth further in chapter 1, section 1.   
13 For the standard description of Horkheimer’s turn from an interest in empirical research in the 30s to a 
speculative philosophy of history in Dialectic of Enlightenment, note Dubiel, Theory and Politics, 81, 92-93, 95-
96.  For other rehearsals, note Grumley, History and Totality, 178 and Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, 
Marxism, and Modernity (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 83.   
14 For the claim that Eclipse of Reason signals Horkheimer’s embrace of Enlightenment rationalism as well 
as the approbation of antique metaphysics, note: Hans Joas, “An Underestimated Alternative: America 
and the Limits of ‘Critical Theory,’” trans. Jeremy Gaines, in Pragmatism and Social Critique, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 82; Stefan Breuer, “The Long Friendship: Theoretical Differences 
between Horkheimer and Adorno,” trans. John McCole, in On Max Horkheimer, 265; Georg Lohmann, 
“The Failure of Self Realization,” 407; Richard Wolin, “Dialectic of Rationalism,” 39-45.  Some trace this 
rationalism back as early as “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937): John O’Neill and Thomas Uebel, 
“Horkheimer and Neurath,” 92-94; Michael Löwy, “Partisan Truth,” 298-302; Herbert Schnädelbach, 
“Max Horkheimer and the Moral Philosophy of German Idealism,” trans. John Torpey, in On Max 





philosophy are not uniformly pessimistic, it simply corroborates Dubiel’s claim that 
Horkheimer departs from empirical inquiry in favor of speculative metaphysics in the 
40s. 
Turning finally to Horkheimer’s mature reflections on theology and Schopenhauer, 
Jürgen Habermas forwards what may be termed a “fourth” period as a kind of 
addendum standing in continuity with Dubiel’s heuristic.  In his influential essay, “To 
Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile Undertaking,” 
Habermas notes that in the 60s and 70s Horkheimer turns finally to an account of 
theological metaphysics which, he claims, provides a standpoint from which to judge the 
viscidities of history.  This turn is not distinguished sharply by Habermas from 
Horkheimer’s earlier appeals to pre-critical metaphysics (in Eclipse of Reason) and negative 
philosophy of history (in Dialectic of Enlightenment).  Rather, Habermas presents it, as we 
shall see, as the natural terminus of Horkheimer’s turn away from empirical inquiry.15   
Now we are in a position to understand how this narrative of Horkheimer’s various 
“periods” serves the central question informing subsequent generations of critical 
theorists regarding the “normative foundations” of critical theory.  Horkheimer’s 
movement away from empirical inquiry in search of a metaphysical account of the 
grounds of social critique contrasts neatly with the self-understanding of subsequent 
theorists, who present their own “post-metaphysical” solution to the problem of 
                                                
15 Habermas, “To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile Undertaking: 
Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer,” in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, 
trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 133-146.  For various rehearsals of this 
interpretation, note Stephen Eric Bronner, Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 74; 
O’Neill and Uebel, “Horkheimer and Neurath,” 93; Jay M. Bernstein, “Critical Theory - the Very Idea: 
Reflections on Nihilism and Domination,” in Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical 
Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), 24; Breuer, “The Long Friendship,” 276; Timothy Tessin, “The 
Frankfurt School,” Philosophical Investigations 19, no. 4 (October 1996): 336; Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism, 
and Modernity, 210; Brian J. Shaw, “Reason, Nostalgia, and Eschatology in the Critical Theory of Max 
Horkheimer,” The Journal of Politics 47, no. 1 (February 1985): 161; Tom Bottomore, The Frankfurt School 
(London: Tavistock, 1984), 30, 41; Martin Jay, “Max Horkheimer and the Retreat from Hegelian 
Marxism,” in Marxism and Totality: the Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984), 219; Held, Introduction, 198-199; Dick Howard, The Marxian Legacy (New York: 





justification against the foil of the late Horkheimer.  Minimally, subsequent theorists 
signal by the elusive term “post-metaphysical” that the normative grounds they seek are 
empirical in a way which is qualitatively different from Horkheimer’s own mature 
theorizing.  Thus, for instance, in the conclusion to his aforementioned interpretive 
essay, Habermas draws a distinction between his own work and Horkheimer’s which 
turns on the kinds of grounds to which both appeal in order to repair the normativity 
deficit.  While Horkheimer increasingly appeals to intelligible ideas like God to anchor 
the normativity of his claims, Habermas notes that his own work makes a more modest 
appeal to the necessary form of speech acts, thus anchoring normativity in an 
empirically observable feature of human communication, 
The ideal moment of unconditionality is deeply rooted in the factual processes of 
communication because validity claims are Janus faced: as universal, they outstrip 
every given context; at the same time they must be raised and gain acceptance here 
and now if they are to sustain an agreement capable of coordinating action.  In 
communicative action, we orient ourselves to validity claims that we can raise only as 
a matter of fact in the context of our language, of our form of life, whereas the 
redeemability implicitly co-posited points beyond the provinciality of a given 
historical context.16   
 
Interestingly, the distinction which Habermas traces between himself and the later 
Horkheimer in this passage is equivalent to the distinction he postulates elsewhere within 
Horkheimer’s own work, between the early Horkheimer and the later Horkheimer.  The 
early Horkheimer’s “sublation (Aufhebung) of philosophy in social theory,” notes 
Habermas, “constitutes an original, anti-Heideggerian response to the ‘end of 
metaphysics.’”  The later Horkheimer, however, turns in the 1940s to a metaphysically 
inflected “negativistic philosophy of history.”17  It should be no surprise that Habermas 
identifies his own project as a continuation of the interest in empirical inquiry 
                                                
16 Habermas, “To Seek to Salvage,” 145-146, his emphasis. 
17 Habermas, “Remarks on the Development of Horkheimer’s Work,” On Max Horkheimer: New 
Perspectives, trs. Kenneth Baynes and John McCole, eds. Seyla Benhabib, Wolfgang Bonß, and John 





characterizing the early Horkheimer, thus demonstrating the aforementioned 
importance of reflection on Horkheimer to the self-understanding of subsequent critical 
theorists.18   
The difference between the early and mature Horkheimers, as well as between the 
mature Horkheimer and Habermas, is, according to Habermas, fundamentally related to 
the kind of standpoint they offer the critic.  At issue is not how normativity relates to 
history or whether one should query the transcendental basis of human activity as a 
ground for social critique.  Rather what is at issue is simply the type of standpoint to 
which critical claims should appeal.  In understanding critique as an appeal to the 
preconditions of the empirical practice of communication, there is thus no difference, 
Habermas thinks, between his own and Horkheimer’s account of what critique requires, 
only a difference in the empirical status of the diverse standpoints to which they appeal.   
Contemporary critical theorists, we may conclude, uniformly distinguish 
Horkheimer’s early interest in a materialist account of empirical inquiry from his late 
concern with philosophy, as if in the former Horkheimer emphasizes the historical and 
empirical conditions which situate thinking, whereas in the latter he fixates on various 
metaphysical entities that are not actual objects of experience.  This division underwrites 
the broader attempt by such theorists to distinguish their own empirical account of the 
basis for normative critique as “post-metaphysical,” by contrast to more traditional 
metaphysical appeals to intelligible ideas.   
I shall argue that this interpretive consensus fundamentally distorts the continuity 
underlying Horkheimer’s development, as well as misunderstanding the central focus of 
his mature work.  Horkheimer is consistently concerned throughout his work with the 
importance of empirical study and the relationship of historical and empirical conditions 
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to concepts.  Rather than abandoning this concern in his mature work, it is the implicit 
dichotomy supposed by the notion of the “post-metaphysical,” the idea that concepts 
like God may be sharply contrasted with concepts arising from empirical observation, 
which Horkheimer wishes to question.  Far from a departure, Horkheimer’s late 
reflections on the meaning of “intelligible” concepts are thus intimately related to his 
continuing concern with practices of empirical inquiry.   
This contention is defended in three related sections.  In the first, I interpret 
Horkheimer’s oeuvre in terms of his pervasive interest in developing a materialist account 
of thought (or a materialist “logic”).  I begin by outlining his early understanding of 
thought as a form of inquiry for embodied social subjects, before noting how, in his 
later theorizing, how this account serves as a basis for a presentation of the relationship 
between various kinds of inquiry and the practice of social critique (chapters 1-2).  Far 
from departing from empirical analysis for a form of philosophical speculation, I shall 
thus argue that both his early and mature work may be fruitfully read as attempts to 
develop an account of the relationship between empirical inquiry and cognitive 
reflection.  In the second, I build on this contention, demonstrating that Horkheimer’s 
critique of instrumental reason is best understood as congruent with his materialist logic, 
not as a speculative departure from a concern with empirical inquiry.  First, I examine 
Horkheimer’s empirical analysis of how historical changes in the basic institutions 
defining political economy in late modern life affect the reasoning habits of individual 
agents (chapter 3).    Then I turn to his diagnosis of the way such changes bring about a 
form of alienation that is pervasive in modern life (chapter 4).  In the final section, I 
present Horkheimer’s turn to theological concepts as a therapeutic response to the 
alienation arising from these changes.  I begin by examining his understanding of the 





concepts may be preserved in a form appropriate to modern life (chapter 5), and 
conclude by examining his own study and retrieval of the significance of the Jewish 
liturgy (chapter 6).     
Horkheimer’s mature attempt to question the distinction between concepts which 
are the products of “empirical” experience and those which are products of “pure” 
reason or the imagination, the distinction which underlies the notion of later theorists 
that their conceptualization of normative grounds is post-metaphysical in a way 
Horkheimer’s mature theory is not, is an element of his thought which repays 
examination at the present time.  Habermas has recently attempted to articulate an 
account of the relationship between public reasoning and religion which reflects his 
claim that the West is a “post-secular” society.  As they respond to this attempt to 
describe the public role of religion in society, theologians and critical theorists would do 
well to attend to Horkheimer’s own account of the relation between theological 
concepts and public reasoning.  I will return to describe how Horkheimer’s work may 






Affect and embodiment in thought: 
Horkheimer’s early reflections on a materialist logic 
 
In this chapter, I shall present Horkheimer’s materialist understanding of thought as 
a practice of inquiry.  I will first situate his reflections on empirical inquiry in relation to 
his understanding of the justification of social critique (1), before developing his account 
of the relation of affect to the preconditions and object of inquiry (2).  Finally, I will 
note how he employs this understanding of thought as a pattern of inquiry to repair 
forms of reflection which elide the relation between thinking and affect (3).  This will 
illustrate that the early justification of Horkheimer’s theorizing is not inextricably tied to 
his understanding of a Marxist philosophy of history, as is often supposed.  It will also 
offer a rejoinder to the commonly-held assumption that he increasingly abandoned 
empirical inquiry and embraced philosophical speculation in essays after “Traditional 
and Critical Theory” (1937).   
1. Horkheimer’s conception of thought as a practice of inquiry 
It is often supposed that Horkheimer privileges Marx’s philosophy of history in 
order to provide a theoretical standpoint for his critique in the wake of the empirical 
dissolution of the proletariat.19  The consequent construal of humans as homo laborans by 
Horkheimer and his easy equation of the emancipation of “productive forces” with 
human emancipation misunderstands, according to second-generation theorists, both 
the fact that coordinated social action is a precondition for emancipation (humans are 
intersubjective agents, not simply producers), as well as the socially mediated basis for 
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any norms governing an emancipated society (norms are not simply implicit in 
maximally efficient production but are determined through communication).20   
Yet I shall illustrate that, for Horkheimer, particular concerns motivate and direct 
the use of concepts by a theorist in relation to already-existing contexts of empirical 
inquiry.  The concepts in a philosophy of history thus do not provide, for him a self-
contained rational standard by which practices in every historical form of life may be 
judged (such as “practices inhibiting production are necessarily irrational for humans qua 
homo laborans”).  Rather, underlying his appropriation of Marxism as a philosophy of 
history is a more basic conception of the relationship of empirical inquiry to the justified 
use of theoretical concepts.      
Two distinct lines of textual argument illustrate this.  I will summarize them and 
then develop them in turn.   
First, Horkheimer is explicit that a Marxist philosophy of history is a falsifiable 
theory motivating inquiry.  Interpreters have sometimes noted that a kind of fallibilism 
is implicit in his concern for historically sensitive empirical research.21  Yet this empirical 
sensitivity is typically presented as a “supplemental” second-order commitment in 
relation to the “primacy” of his philosophy of history.22  This may well describe the way 
Horkheimer relates the more stable elements of theory to its nuclear components.  For 
instance, he readily admits that “changes” in the empirical object of his study “do not 
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University Press, 1989), 28-29 and John Duane Abromeit, “The Dialectic of Bourgeois Society: An 
Intellectual Biography of the Young Max Horkheimer, 1895-1937” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 
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mean a shift to a wholly new outlook, as long as the age itself does not radically change” 
but rather require “a reassignment of degrees of relative importance to individual 
elements of the theory.”23  Yet however true the distinction between a core and a 
periphery within Horkheimer’s theory may be, such distinctions do not translate as 
readily as interpreters have assumed into Horkheimer’s account of the way the 
justification of a theory relates to empirical inquiry.  As I shall demonstrate, the idea that a 
“philosophy of history” is a first-order commitment justifying Horkheimer’s social 
critique fundamentally mistakes the way he relates his theorizing to empirical inquiry.   
Second, when justifying his critical theory, Horkheimer draws on his own materialist 
account of thought as practice of inquiry.  Interpreters have recognized Horkheimer’s 
interest in a materialist understanding of truth, noting, for instance, that Horkheimer 
attempts to “deontologize and detranscendentalize the notion of truth” in essays such as 
“On the Problem of Truth” (1935).24  Yet this commitment is not typically understood 
as fundamental to his own attempts to formulate the justification of his theory.  For 
instance, McCarthy notes that while Horkheimer at times appears to model a pragmatic 
understanding of the basis of theory by rooting it in the practical interest to end 
suffering and promote happiness, “too often [he] formulates that interest in terms of the 
holistic representations with which the Marxist tradition abounds.”25  Ultimately, 
concludes McCarthy, even his “pragmatic” presentations of this interest run aground on 
a covert metaphysical supposition, for he takes the desire to end suffering to be a 
universal moral intuition existing as an “independent variable prior to and unaffected by 
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Thomas McCarthy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 10. 
25 Ibid., 17.  Cf. McCarthy, “The Idea of a Critical Theory and its Relation to Philosophy,” in On Max 





social relations.”26  Both his holistic representations and his appeal to practical interests, 
McCarthy concludes, reflect his “tendency … to equate rational justification with 
ultimate grounding of some sort.”27   
Yet surely it is not inconsequential that Horkheimer relates the substantive 
arguments presented in “Traditional and Critical Theory” – including both his appeals to 
a Marxist philosophy of history and claims regarding his interest in ending suffering – to 
“the logical structure of the critique of political economy” which he outlines in his 
reflections on justification in “On the Problem of Truth.”28  He thus portrays his logic 
as lying at the heart of his own understanding of the method he employs to justify his 
theorizing.  I shall illustrate in this chapter the way Horkheimer’s appropriation of the 
categories of Marxist political economy and his appeal to affective interests are both 
intimately related to the account of inquiry which he outlines in “On the Problem of 
Truth.”  
1.1. The function of Marx’s philosophy of history in Horkheimer’s early theorizing 
In the early essay “History and Psychology” (1932), Horkheimer’s Marxist 
proclivities come to the fore as he articulates the contradiction between the forces and 
relations of production as the key concept defining “the economic conception of 
history,” which he unreservedly advocates.29  However, after asserting that “the 
economic conception of history completes the shift from metaphysics to scientific 
theory,” Horkheimer notes the following caveat, 
This conception of history can be transformed into a closed, dogmatic metaphysics 
if concrete investigations of the contradiction between growing human capacities 
and the social structure—which reveals itself in this connection as the motor of 
history—are replaced by a universal interpretive scheme, or if that contradiction is 
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inflated into a force that shapes the future as a matter of necessity.  If, however, this 
conception of history is understood as the correct theory of the known historical 
process, though still subordinate to the epistemological problem of theory as such, it 
constitutes a formulation of historical experience consistent with contemporary 
knowledge.30 
 
It is recognized that Horkheimer in the 30s resists treating Marxism in a deterministic 
manner by critiquing the idea that its predictions follow a “necessity” divorced from the 
revolutionary practice of subjects.31  However, in this passage he notes two further 
cautions about how Marxism as a theory may be misunderstood.  First, empirical studies 
must be allowed to throw the interpretative theory motivating the studies into question; 
thus, “concrete investigations” motivated by the economic “conception of history” 
cannot be replaced by a “universal interpretive scheme.”  Second, the object of theory is 
not immutable; thus, one cannot rule out in advance that the diagnostic capacity of the 
theory may become obsolete as its object, in this case “economic crises,” changes.32  
This is enough to illustrate that Horkheimer understands the Marxist philosophy of 
history as a falsifiable theory whose justification is contingent upon its deployment in 
particular contexts of inquiry.  
However, he adds to this the enigmatic assertion that a philosophy of history should 
be “subordinate to the epistemological problem of theory as such.”  He elaborates this 
important caveat at some length, 
It is above all in this sense that the concepts of the economic theory of history 
distinguish themselves from the metaphysical: they attempt to mirror the historical 
dynamic in its most definite form, but offer no view of the totality.  To the contrary, 
they contain points of departure for further investigations, the results of which 
affect the theory itself.  
…The theoretical claim that the historical action of human beings and human 
groups is determined by the economic process can only be validated in detail by way 
of the scientific elucidation of the modes of response characteristic of a definite 
historical stage of development.  It remains unknown precisely how structural 
economic changes that affect the psychic constitution prevailing among members of 
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different social groups in a given period transform their overall life expressions 
[Lebensäusserungen].  Thus the claim that the latter depends on the former contains 
dogmatic elements that seriously undermine its hypothetical value for explaining the 
present.  The disclosure of psychical mediations between economic and cultural 
development certainly allows us to maintain that radical economic changes 
precipitate radical cultural changes.  Yet it may lead not merely to a critique of the 
conception of the functional relations between the two, but indeed to a 
strengthening of the suspicion that the sequence may be changed or reversed in the 
future.  In that case, the priority of economics and psychology with respect to 
history would have to change.  Moreover, it then becomes clear that the conception 
of history under discussion here considers the hierarchy of the sciences and thus 
also its own theses—as well as the drives of human beings themselves—as falling 
within its purview.33 
 
For Horkheimer, Marxist categories do not provide a self-contained foundation (a “view 
of the totality”), but rather allow a point of departure that is, in turn, testable in terms of 
concrete empirical investigations.  The results of such inquiry may react back upon 
existing formulations and “affect the theory itself.”  As an example, he notes the 
Institute’s own concern for social psychology as a discipline that is useful for explaining 
the failure of proletarian class consciousness.  To dogmatically maintain, Horkheimer 
notes, that cultural changes are determined solely by economic conditions makes 
impossible any attempt to empirically trace the present failure of class consciousness to 
emerge in the face of repeated economic crises, thus dogmatically sealing off “the 
economic theory of history” from any kind of testing or modification.  He then reasons 
from the hypothetical possibility that the decisiveness of elements of culture may 
supersede the economy as a motor of history to an epistemological rule: the taken for 
granted “hierarchy of the sciences” itself, as well as the theory motivating inquiry must 
be open to alteration on the basis of the empirical study of the object of theory.  From 
his earliest writings Horkheimer thus articulates the falsifiability not merely of peripheral 
elements of an otherwise stable philosophy of history, but of the philosophy of history 
itself, and does so in terms set by an understanding of empirical inquiry.  
                                                





1.2. Horkheimer on justification: the relation of truth-claims to contexts of inquiry 
 By noting that the Marxist philosophy of history is “still subordinate to the 
epistemological problem of theory as such,” Horkheimer references, however obliquely, 
the relationship between empirical contexts of inquiry and theoretical concepts.  Yet he 
does not reflect at length on this relationship until “On the Problem of Truth” (1935).  
He begins the essay by presenting two opposing ways of relating normativity and 
historicity, before noting that both share a faulty premise,   
Is there really only the choice between acceptance of a final truth, as proclaimed in 
religious and idealistic schools of philosophy, and the view that every thesis and 
every theory is always merely ‘subjective,’ i.e., true and valid for a person or a group 
or a time or human beings as a species, but lacking objective validity?34    
   
On the one hand, there is a view of truth that relies on the practice of the specialized 
sciences as its model; consequently, it construes all validity claims as relative due to the 
viscidities of historical experience.  On the other hand, there are various forms of 
metaphysics, which claim that their vantage point on the whole allows the subject to 
judge the meaning underlying the flux of discrete experiences.35  Despite their 
differences, both kinds of thought share in common the notion that historicity and 
normativity are mutually exclusive. 
 Horkheimer notes that this commonality arises from a misunderstanding of 
concepts the two share in common.  Each portrays concepts as reflections of objects in 
the world.  But concepts are better understood, notes Horkheimer, as actions for 
embodied subjects.  If concepts are recognized as activities which respond to existing 
affective states and social relations, then judging the truth of such concepts has to do 
with more than whether they reflect reality.  Rather, the truth of concepts consists in 
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whether they allow subjects to rearrange their already existing relationships with reality 
in such a way that their affective desires and interests are better satisfied,   
To conceptualize a defect is … not to transcend it; concepts and theories constitute 
one moment of its rectification, a prerequisite to the proper procedure, which as it 
progresses is constantly redefined, adapted, and improved.  
An isolated and conclusive theory of reality is completely unthinkable.  If one 
takes seriously the formal definition of truth which runs through the whole history 
of logic as the correspondence of cognition with its object, there follows from it the 
contradiction to the dogmatic interpretation of thought.  This correspondence is 
neither a simple datum, an immediate fact as it appears in the doctrine of intuitive 
immediate certainty and in mysticism, nor does it take place in the pure sphere of 
spiritual immanence, as it seems to in Hegel’s metaphysical legend.  Rather it is 
always established by real events and human activities.  Already in the investigation 
and determination of facts and even more in the verification of theories, a role is 
played by the direction of attention, the refinement of methods, the categorical 
structure of the subject matter—in short, by human activity corresponding to the 
given social period.36 
 
Concepts are thus understood by Horkheimer as moments of human activity that intend 
to reflexively delimit and then address an irritation or accomplish a desire.  
Understanding concepts as a form of activity enables one to recognize that the 
“correspondence” between concept and object is always qualified by a socio-historical 
context, as well as by the particular projects of historically situated agents.  Thus 
correspondence cannot simply be a matter of the reflection of objects.   
Horkheimer’s contention is thus that only when one abstracts concepts from such 
qualified contexts of inquiry does the dichotomy between normativity and historicity 
emerge.  If, by way of contrast, thinking itself arises in relation to contingent affective 
states and is oriented towards historical practices, if, that is, it presupposes an already 
existing state of affairs that sets its contours and limits, then truth should be understood 
as similarly qualified, as bearing a relation to this antecedent context.  In sum, 
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Horkheimer wishes to claim that the concept of truth, may not be abstracted from the 
historical conditions which situate and delimit the emergence of other concepts: “a static 
system of propositions about reality, indeed, any relation of concept and object not 
historically mediated, no longer appears meaningful as an idea.”37  The question of truth 
is rather, do concepts enable a subject to act regarding objects of concern in a way that 
satisfies the conditions motivating such activity?  Concepts change as their various 
subjective preconditions change (e.g. human affect, practical purposes and interests), 
and as the objects they establish relations to change (e.g. existing socio-historical 
relations), yet this contingency does not mean that concepts cannot be judged as true or 
false, only that such judgments will always depend upon the preconditions and goals 
presupposed by particular contexts of inquiry.   
In a striking example that applies this understanding of justification to a Marxist 
philosophy of history, Horkheimer draws an analogy between theory and a medical 
diagnosis, 
If it is true that a person has tuberculosis, this concept may indeed be transformed 
in the development of medicine or lose its meaning entirely.  But whoever makes a 
contrary diagnosis today with the same concept, not in terms of a higher insight 
which includes identifying this man’s tuberculosis, but simply denying the finding 
from the same medical standpoint is wrong. … There are at present various 
opposed views of society.  According to one, the present wretched physical and 
psychological state of the masses and the critical condition of society as a whole, in 
the face of the developed state of the productive apparatus and technology, 
necessarily follow from the continued existence of an obsolete principle of social 
organization.  According to others, the problem is not the principle but interference 
with it or carrying it too far or a matter of spiritual, religious, or purely biological 
factors.  They are not all true, only that theory is true which can grasp the historical 
process so deeply that it is possible to develop from it the closest approximation to 
the structure and tendency of social life in the various spheres of culture.  It too is 
no exception to the rule that it is conditioned like every thought and every 
intellectual content, but the circumstance that it corresponds to a specific social class 
and is tied up with the horizon and the interests of certain groups does not in any 
way change the fact that it is also valid for the others.38 
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In the case of Horkheimer’s example one may, of course, query whether the different 
social theories he outlines are attempts to resolve the same irritant, and thus assume an 
analogous context of inquiry.  If one grants that premise, however (or appreciates, for 
the sake of argument, that Horkheimer took this to be the case), then his account of 
justification is clear.  Even if current ways of diagnosing social relations become 
obsolete due to future changes in their object and even if the irritants they are intended 
to resolve cease to exist, such contingencies do not negate that, given they suppose a 
context of inquiry in common, one may distinguish the best diagnosis from inferior 
ones.  Historical contingency and consequent fallibility do not trade-off with 
normativity.   
 Influential interpreters have suggested that Horkheimer’s emphasis on the practical 
nature of truth is hopelessly circular,  
In the essays of the 1930s purely immanent critique stands in tension with 
Horkheimer’s hopes for social progress.  Indeed, to say that there is ‘tension’ 
between his theory of truth and his practical theory is a vast understatement.  
Horkheimer is apt to speak of truth in entirely practical terms as that which 
promotes the overall rationality of society or as what is politically progressive. But of 
course determining what is ‘more rational’ or ‘progressive’ requires criteria. How one 
is to go about grounding such claims without an appeal to truth is not obvious and 
requires additional argument that Horkheimer never provides.39 
 
However, Horkheimer’s claim is that “truth” depends upon already existing contexts of 
inquiry and is thus related to the contingent experience of affective states (for the 
subject) as well as already existing social practices (the object).  Such contexts situate 
what statements regarding the goal of theory mean (i.e. what it might mean to make 
society “more rational”), as well as the conditions under which a theory’s “truth” may be 
tested.  Horkheimer wishes to question whether the idea of “truth” makes sense apart 
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from such contexts.  Thus while it is true that his critique does not appeal to criteria 
other than those which would be involved in a “purely immanent critique,” the idea that 
his critique fails because of this assumes the idea of truth he wishes to question.  
Similar to his argument in “On the Problem of Truth,” the introduction to 
“Traditional and Critical Theory” is devoted to a critique of the idea that theory merely 
establishes “a relation between the simple perception or verification of a fact and the 
conceptual structure of our knowing.”40  While traditional theory is content to treat 
“knowledge and action as distinct concepts,” and thus to allow a “dualism of thought 
and being”/“separation of thought and action,”41 for Horkheimer thought is a way of 
acting for the subject that always already bears a relation to existing embodied states and 
social practices.   
Horkheimer thus concludes the opening section of “Traditional and Critical 
Theory” by noting, 
The reception, transformation, and rationalization of factual knowledge is the 
scholar’s special form of spontaneity, namely theoretical activity, whether there is 
question of as detailed as possible an exposition of a subject as in history and the 
descriptive branches of other special disciplines, or of the synthesis of masses of 
data and the attainment of general rules as in physics.  The dualism of thought and 
being, understanding and perception is second nature to the scientist.42 
 
Horkheimer calls this kind of theoretical activity the scholar’s special form of spontaneity 
to indicate that what “traditional” theory often treats as the paradigmatic activity 
defining thinking is actually only a particular kind of activity among others.  Scientific 
detachment is a legitimate kind of thought activity for subjects.  Yet if such detached 
“insight,” the subsuming of sensory experience in terms of apt descriptive categories, is 
taken as a model for thinking itself, then the activity of thought is limited to the 
“determinative, ordering, unifying function” which is wrongly understood as “the sole 
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foundation for all else” with the result that “towards it all human effort is directed.”43  
Detached description may be a useful form of activity in order to accomplish certain 
historical goals, such as the effective control of natural contingency, but it may also 
inhibit other thought activities for which such detachment is a liability. 
Traditional theory is thus problematic not only because it fails to recognize the 
conditioned and interested nature of cognition, but also because it has a reductive 
understanding of the way such concepts relate to the spontaneity of embodied subjects.  
It is interesting that Horkheimer cites the example of a historian in the above passage, 
one who clearly recognizes the conditioned nature of thinking, as epitomizing the 
reduction of thought to one particular form of spontaneity.  If one equates 
Horkheimer’s argument with a recognition of the historically and materially conditioned 
nature of thought, it becomes evident that a crucial aspect of his interest is missed: he 
wishes to treat scientific description as one form of spontaneous activity for embodied 
subjects among others.  Further, the passage signals that he is not advancing an abstract 
critique of the observational processes of the sciences as such, but rather critiquing a 
mistaken description of what both scientific activity and thought themselves are, which 
treats detached observation as characteristic of thinking instead of as one form the 
activity of thinking may take among others. 
Towards the latter half of “Traditional and Critical Theory,” Horkheimer notes that 
he wishes to discuss “the difference in … logical structure” between traditional and 
critical theory, and it is at this point that he refers readers to “On the Problem of 
Truth.”44  Echoing considerations we have just outlined, he notes, “The primary 
propositions of traditional theory define universal concepts under which all facts in the 
                                                
43 Ibid., 198. 





field in question are to be subsumed.”45  Instead of exclusively engaging in critique, 
however, he highlights similarities between traditional and critical theory, “The critical 
theory of society also begins with abstract determinations; in dealing with the present era 
it begins with the characterization of an economy based on exchange.”46  Another 
parallel, he notes, is that, “In both types of theory there is a strict deduction if the claim 
of validity for general definitions is shown to include a claim that certain factual relations 
will occur.”47  Thus for instance, critical theory postulates that “existent capitalist society 
… derives from the basic relation of exchange”48 as well as that “an exchange economy 
must necessarily lead to a heightening of … social tensions.”49  This kind of a predictive 
claim regarding factual relations can, Horkheimer thinks, be verified.  Thus critical 
theory and traditional theory alike use concepts intended to reflect the present state of 
social relations and deduce future states of affairs. 
These parallels, however, are a foil against which a more basic differentiation can be 
made.  Horkheimer continues, “The relation of the primary conceptual interconnections 
to the world of facts is not essentially a relation of classes to instances.”50  Though it 
includes descriptive concepts and predictions, critical theory does not simply reduce the 
relationship between concepts and objects to the detached subsumption of instances 
under classes and the prediction of future states.  It involves a third kind of judgment 
besides the descriptive and predictive.  Horkheimer thus continues, “The critical theory 
of society is, in its totality, the unfolding of a single existential judgment,” and he implies 
that it is the self-awareness of this existential judgment, a judgment regarding society 
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that determines the significance of descriptive and predictive judgments for the theorist, 
which sets critical theory apart from traditional theory.51   
The idea that critical theory is, at its most basic, an “existential judgment” has caused 
significant confusion.  Many have taken Horkheimer to be advocating a commitment to 
Marxism based primarily on an otherwise ungrounded ethical intuition.52  Yet 
Horkheimer is using the term “existential” to denote, not a subjective “value” 
commitment per se, but rather a type of judgment for a subject.  In a note intended to 
explain what is meant by “existential,” he clarifies, 
There are connections between the forms of judgment and the historical periods.  A 
brief indication will show what is meant.  The classificatory judgment is typical of 
prebourgeois society: this is the way it is, and man can do nothing about it.  The 
hypothetical and disjunctive forms belong especially to the bourgeois world: under 
certain circumstances this effect can take place; it is either thus or so.  Critical theory 
maintains: it need not be so; man can change reality, and the necessary conditions 
for such a change already exist.53 
 
The first two forms of judgment are subsumptive, insofar as they each exemplify “a 
relation of classes to instances,” although they differ in the way they understand how 
instances are subsumed.  In the first case, instances are judged as reflective of a static 
subject-independent reality (Horkheimer asserts this to be the form of judgment 
characterizing pre-modern ontology).  In the second, instances are judged after being 
subjected to the scientific method, so that predictive “laws of nature” are inferred from 
controlled observation (Horkheimer takes this to be a form of judgment characterizing 
the new sciences).  Both of these have in common that they do not understand 
judgment as a way of changing relations between the subject and the object.  Concepts 
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are rather understood as mirrors, either of metaphysical truths regarding the whole or 
invariable laws of nature.  Critical theory, by contrast, understands judgment as a form 
of activity which intends to “change reality.”   
This interpretation of an “existential judgment” commends itself insofar as it 
presents such judgment in a way congruous with Horkheimer’s understanding of 
concepts as forms of activity in “On the Problem of Truth” as well as at the outset of 
“Traditional and Critical Theory.”  Yet it raises a further ambiguity, for Horkheimer has 
already noted that classificatory and hypothetical judgments are also forms of activity, 
insofar as they are social practices for subjects.  Why does he distinguish the 
“existential” from these types of judgment, instead of, for instance, noting the two as 
variations of it?  The reference to history provides the answer: Horkheimer is not merely 
contrasting different kinds of judgment but also noting the way various forms of 
judgment are characteristic of particular historical moments.  Just as “bourgeois” 
hypothetical judgments incorporate what was once understood as the primary model for 
cognition (the contemplation of the object in the medieval form of life), so critical 
theory understands the classificatory and hypothetical forms of judgment in terms of its 
model, cognition qua activity.   
 Although Horkheimer draws on Hegel and Marx to describe the way concept use 
develops in relation to historical practices, he wants to clarify that the way critical theory 
envisions categories is also distinct from these models: though concepts have a genetic 
relation to historical social practices, their development is not determined by historical 
stages in a progressive or unilinear fashion (either through the self-realization of Geist, or 
the rising self-consciousness of the proletariat),   
The conceptual development is, if not parallel at least in verifiable relation to the 
historical development.  But the essential relationship of theory to time does not 





construction and successive periods of history; that is a view on which Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Mind and Marx’s Capital, examples of the same method, are in 
agreement.  It consists rather in the continual alteration of the theoretician’s 
existential judgment on society, for this judgment is conditioned by the conscious 
relation to the historical practice of society.54 
 
Concepts as forms of practical activity develop, notes Horkheimer, as they are 
appropriated by the subject self-consciously in relation to socio-historical practices, 
which the subject intends to alter.  He thus attempts to understand the evolution of 
conceptual judgment in relation to the activity of subjects in a way that differentiates his 
own thinking from metaphysical forms of thought that suggest a rational idea underlying 
the movement of history.    
 Horkheimer repeatedly argues in various polemical contexts that thought becomes 
distorted when it is abstracted from either the affective states or the social and historical 
conditions that form contexts of inquiry for subjects.  In order to demonstrate this, we 
will first examine Horkheimer’s positive account of the way affective embodiment and 
empirical experience relate to thought.  Then we will develop his critique of the 
abstraction of thought from either of these preconditions: affective embodiment 
(exemplified by neo-Kantianism and positivism), or empirical experience (exemplified by 
Lebensphilosophie).  This will illustrate that Horkheimer draws upon an understanding of 
thought as a form of inquiry not simply when seeking to justify his own use of Marxist 
categories but also in attempts to differentiate his own theorizing from its primary 
competitors.      
2. Affect and Thought 
2.1. Affect as a precondition of thought 
In an early aphorism on Leibniz’s Monadology, Horkheimer notes that affective states 
– worry, joy, anxiety, yearning, and particularly suffering – color and shape every sensual 
                                                





experience a subject has of its environment.  In so doing, he expresses a leitmotif of his 
theorizing: the concepts of theory are always shaped by certain embodied conditions 
anterior to, yet motivating, reflexive cognition, which we may term preconditions of 
thought,       
A philosopher once compared the soul to a windowless house.  Men relate to each 
other, talk to each other, deal with each other, persecute each other, yet they do not 
see each other.  But because people have ideas about each other, the philosopher 
explained them by saying that God had placed images of the others in the soul of 
each individual. … It is not my impression that man’s knowledge of others comes 
from God.  Instead, I would say that those houses do have windows but that they let 
in only a small and distorted segment of events in the outside world. 
But this distorting effect is not so much a consequence of the peculiarities of the 
sense organs as of the worried or joyful, anxious or aggressive, slavish or superior, 
sated or yearning, dull or alert psychic attitudes which constitute that ground of our 
life against which all other experiences stand out, and which gives them their specific 
quality. … 
I know of only one kind of gust that can open the windows of the house wider: 
shared suffering.55   
 
Horkheimer characterizes the affective preconditions which shape experience as a 
“ground of life” that serves as the background against which particular experiences 
“stand out,” by which he means that particular experiences become distinct for an 
embodied subject in relation to already existing affective states that color its orientation 
towards the whole.  Horkheimer thus likens affective states to “windows” which shape 
and form the way intuitions of the outside are received by a subject.  Embodied affects 
are thus preconditions for explaining the subject’s way of relating the concrete 
particulars of its experience.  Affect gives such experiences “their specific quality.”   
 Horkheimer draws on a particular kind of vocabulary and we do well to remember 
his philosophical training in German idealism: to speak of a “ground of life” against 
which specific qualities of experience stand out is to gesture towards that enigmatic 
intuitive experience of the manifold which is itself presupposed by the synthesizing 
                                                
55 Horkheimer, “Monadology” (1926-1931), in Dawn and Decline: Notes, 1926-1931 & 1950-1969, trans. 





determinations of the understanding.  Affective states are the subject’s self-awareness of 
its own embodiment as a part of the manifold.  Put otherwise, the subject experiences 
affect as a sign that it stands in continuity with and is dependent upon its environment.  
Joy, desire, longing, and fear are thus intuitive ways that fragility and (dis)continuity with 
one’s context are first felt by subjects.  Subsequent distinctions and determinations 
presume, respond to, and are shaped by this continuing affective experience of relational 
unity.  The form thought takes is not merely inconceivable without an account of the 
forms of intuition or the determinations of the understanding (Kant), it is equally 
inconceivable, maintains Horkheimer, without an account of its affective preconditions.  
If the former signify the subject’s self-awareness that it is distinct from objects of its 
cognition, the latter signify its continuing recognition that it stands in relation to such 
objects.  
Despite utilizing ideas informing Lebensphilosophie, Horkheimer is not claiming that 
such affective states are related to ready-made norms for subjects, nor is he setting them 
over against the determinations of the understanding (as if the latter corrupts the 
former).56  Rather, he notes that affective states are meaningful because of the way they 
situate and direct the cognitive mediation of the understanding.  There is thus a refusal 
to separate affect and cognition as if either the former provided access to some intuitive 
“reality” beneath the empirical conditions determined by the faculty of the 
understanding, or as if the latter could be understood as detached from the desires of an 
embodied subject.   
Horkheimer, further, refuses to equate affect as the unified experience of some 
Volk; in this early aphorism, he recognizes the unique particularity of the many ways 
particular subjects experience the whole – some with anxiety, some with joy, yearning, 
                                                





fear, etc.  As Horkheimer will put it elsewhere, reflecting the convergence of his 
materialism with Schopenhauerian nominalism, “Only human beings themselves—not 
the ‘essence’ of humanity, but the real human beings of a definite historical moment, 
dependent upon each other and upon outer and inner nature – are the acting and 
suffering subjects of history.”57      
Cognitive determination thus arises in relation to embodiment and exists in a 
symbiotic relationship with it, which can be altered by the disruption of affective states.  
“Shared suffering” notes Horkheimer, is the most fundamental reason why a subject’s 
existing knowledge of the world is altered.  Thought as an activity of inquiry is thus 
intimately related to alterations of embodied states.  In a contemporaneous aphorism, 
Horkheimer develops this claim, noting that the idea, “there is such a thing as pure 
disinterested striving for truth,” can be tested by the following “thought experiment,” 
One should abstract from one’s love for others, one’s thirst for recognition up to 
and including its most sublime manifestations, one should radically destroy in 
thought the possibility of any and every kind of desire and thus of any pain or joy, 
one should imagine a total lack of interest in the fate of society and all its members 
so that not only no love or hatred, fear or vanity, but not even the tiniest spark of 
compassion, let alone solidarity, remain.  One should, in other words, play the role 
of the dead that appears as a ghost (although with the difference that one is not only 
impotent like a ghost but also without any tie to past or present so that one would 
not even have reason to haunt anyone or anything). 
 
The result of the thought experiment, he concludes, is that “one will discover that … 
there sets in a disquieting indifference to any sort of knowledge whatever.  The world 
looks as the female body does to the old man whose drives are dead.”  To conceive of 
knowing without suffering, desire or, at the least, attachment to existing relationships is 
to reify cognition into something other than an activity for an embodied historical being.  
This abstraction, Horkheimer concludes, “is a philosophical delusion.”58 
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In his first major work, “Beginnings of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History” 
(1930), Horkheimer develops his understanding of the relation between theory and 
embodied subjectivity by contrasting the philosophies of history given by Machiavelli 
and Hobbes with Vico’s The New Sciences.  Both Machiavelli and Hobbes, he notes, claim 
that one may infer invariable social laws from human history by discerning a constant 
human “nature” manifest in the apparent viscidities of various epochs.  This is used by 
both to legitimize the power of the state as a solution which best fits needs arising for 
humans so construed.   
Horkheimer appreciates these thinkers for relating material need to the development 
of cultural life,  
Culture’s advance, and indeed its very emergence, both have material causes … all 
life conditions relating to work in the end are not based upon an ideal origin, but 
rather are driven by material need.  Even morality … is derived from social 
conditions that are themselves determined by need.59  
 
Yet while both take themselves to be deducing a-historical descriptions of human 
nature, they are actually describing the way material need disturbs and informs the social 
practices of their particular form of life.  The inference from a particular historical 
mediation to a universal constant (human nature) pays no attention to the way social and 
historical contexts situate inquiry,   
For both of them, any true science, not only mathematics and natural sciences but 
also the science of mankind, remained distinctly separate and independent from 
history. … This metaphysics fancied that it could make the real world—and with it 
the essence of mankind—accessible without any fundamental historical research to 
support it.60     
 
Machiavelli and Hobbes thus portray their activity on the model of the natural sciences, 
as a practice of observation and inference which generates knowledge in the form of a-
historical universal laws.   
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They understand religion, by contrast, as a web of prejudicial superstitions that 
hinder free inquiry.  Following Vico, however, Horkheimer notes that this is a mistake.  
There may be no “simple juxtaposition of ‘Reason’ and ideology,”61 he notes, because 
“the intellectual life of individuals is bound up with the life process of the social body of 
which they are a part and which determines their activity.”62  By way of example, he 
notes that rather than understanding “medieval religiosity” as an ideology which retards 
unprejudiced observation, one needs to recognize that “knowledge and ideology remain 
fairly undifferentiated within this religiosity, which in point of fact is the form of 
medieval reason—though this is revealed only by an examination of the whole social 
dynamic.”63  Horkheimer thus recognizes that what is treated by early moderns as 
prejudice is in fact the shape observation and inference have taken in a past form of life.  
“Reality is not a solid object, nor is consciousness a blank mirror which, as the 
Enlightenment would have it, could either be fogged up by the hot air of the ignorant or 
the malicious or polished by those who possess knowledge.”64  Thus to object to 
tradition as such, as if it were intrinsically opposed to knowledge, is a mistake.  For there 
is no comprehension of the significance of sensation as such unmediated by socially 
accepted accounts of the whole, which facilitate (or hinder) inquiry in historical forms of 
life.  If it is possible to retrospectively distinguish previous forms of “ideology” from 
modern reasoning, it will not be because one relies illicitly on a socially mediated 
account of the whole while the other frees itself from any such account.  The critic 
must, at the least, acknowledge this continuity between the two.   
In contrast to Machiavelli and Hobbes, Vico is thus praised by Horkheimer for 
understanding that knowledge of the human cannot be disentangled from the various 
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historical ways the origin and goal of the human has been understood by past forms of 
life, as if such knowledge disclosed a-historical essences.   
Human self-knowledge is only possible when based on an analysis of the historical 
process in which humans act, and not on the basis of mere introspection as 
subjective idealism has always held.  Economy, state, law, religion, science, art—all 
these particularly human creations originated in history: not from isolated 
individuals, but rather from the relationships among these individuals.65 
 
For Vico there can thus be no sharp division between a modern science of humanity 
and pre-modern ideology, for art and religion are forms of socially embedded mediated 
knowing, “Vico is far from wanting to understand the process of artistic and religious 
creation as the conscious or even intentional recasting of a given reality that was 
previously unideological.”66  Rather than obscuring or recasting the truth about the 
human “in-itself,” religion was thus a “necessary and primitive form of knowledge, one 
that provides modern science with its roots.”67  Here then is Horkheimer’s early 
understanding of how one may distinguish between the “truth” of previous forms of 
knowledge and the contemporary practice of the sciences.  Retrospectively, one may 
argue that an earlier account of the meaning of the whole is penultimate (“primitive”), 
insofar as it is unable to facilitate the goals that earlier practices of inquiry set for 
themselves in a way that is as satisfactory as a later account, due to some inhibiting 
feature.  Horkheimer will have reason to revisit and modify this early understanding, but 
we will leave aside for the moment this important discussion of its adequacy.              
Horkheimer concludes his comparison by noting that while Vico emphasizes the 
social mediation of knowledge, he does not disconnect such mediation from its concrete 
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relation to material needs, “Like Machiavelli, only much more logically and deliberately, 
Vico begins with the premise that human creations are to be explained by the notion of 
necessity, or, more precisely, by their origin in material conditions.”68  While Vico 
recognizes, in contrast to Machiavelli and Hobbes, that needs are always expressed in 
ways mediated by the self-understanding of social agents in a form of life (there is no 
knowledge of “need” as such), he does not ignore that social practices cannot be 
properly understood if abstracted from the biological and instinctual interests of the 
embodied subjects who participate in them.  Science should thus be understood as 
arising in relation to both the socio-historical self-understanding and embodied interest 
of particular subjects.  Vico notes that moderns go wrong:  
(1): When they treat reasoning as simply a product of social practices with no 
connection to embodied needs, or 
(2): When they treat “reality” as something which may be known apart from socially 
mediated accounts of the whole. 
We are now in a position to understand how Horkheimer’s appreciation of Vico relates 
to his understanding of affect as a precondition of thought. Vico grasps both that 
reasoning relates to the needs of embodied individuals (its “material” axis, i.e. 1), as well 
as that reasoning as a social practice is learned in a community with already existing 
socio-historical practices of explanation (its “social” axis, i.e. 2).  Comparing this with 
Horkheimer’s early notes on affect, we may observe that while the first axis repeats his 
claim that thinking relates to that which is not “pure” thought (embodiment), the 
second axis delimits what is meant by “thinking” (it is a learned social practice).  Thus, 
for instance, pre-modern “ideology” and modern science are two forms reasoning may 
take for embodied subjects as learned social practices in different historical forms of life. 
                                                





Horkheimer thus notes at the conclusion of the essay that “language, art, religion, 
and metaphysics” may not be abstracted from the “natural instinctual social processes” 
out of which they arise, and treated as simply a “voluntary and conscious act of human 
reason.”69  Reasoning arises in relation both to “natural instinctual” needs (i.e. the 
“material” axis), as well as to already existing “social processes” (i.e. the “social” axis).  
Put succinctly, such practices are forms of activity for embodied social subjects.   
In relating embodiment and sociality, Horkheimer does not separate them or 
privilege one as more basic than another, but notes that both are properly basic, 
mutually related conditions of thinking.  Humans thus have a two-fold pre-existing 
relationship to their environment, as embodied and as social.  Thought does not precede 
the relationship, but arises when it becomes an object of self-conscious cognitive 
reflection for a subject.  The affective experience of subjects arises in relation to this 
intersection between embodiment and sociality and is the initial symptom which 
motivates this self-conscious reflection.  Affect, we may say, registers an experience of 
destabilization in the metabolism that exists between a subject’s embodied needs and its 
social habits.  It thus invites cognitive reflection.  Yet affect also constrains such 
reflection, and we will now examine Horkheimer’s understanding of the way this occurs 
in his early essay “Materialism and Metaphysics” (1933).        
2.2. Affect and the tasks of thought 
If reasoning is understood in a way unrelated to embodiment, then it may be 
possible to conceptualize the whole, referred to by Horkheimer as “unconditioned 
reality.”70  Indeed, the conceptualization of the unconditioned, he notes, is the central 
task of the metaphysician.  There are numerous ways of making the unconditioned 
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intelligible through conceptualization.71  In each case, however, the concept of the 
unconditioned provides the theorist with a vantage point for understanding the meaning 
of the whole, from which they can infer the value of given acts insofar as they reflect an 
“adaptation of empirical human life to that intelligible ground … which philosophy 
succeeds in grasping.”72  He concludes, 
Ultimate reality is regarded as normative … not only in those systems where the 
religious origins of the dependence relationship still show in the form which the 
precept takes, but also in all cases where harmony between the individual’s existence 
and its ground as discovered by metaphysics is regarded as valuable.73 
 
Metaphysicians thus comprehend the unconditioned as an object which may be 
conceptually expressed, and use such conceptualization as basis for guiding practical 
action. 
If, however, reasoning assumes and responds to already existing embodied states 
and social habits, then attempts to justify or change social practices need not begin with 
reflection on the unconditioned.  Such reflection is not ruled out of court a-priori.  
However, it is only useful to the materialist insofar as it relates to the subject’s attempt 
to resolve an affective state arising in relation to social practices it has taken in hand.  
Thus, while “metaphysics usually has its gaze fixed on ‘the structural unity of this one, 
great, unknown reality to whose questions we have no answer’ … for the materialist 
such a unity is habitually neither starting point nor goal.”74  It is not the case, clarifies 
Horkheimer, that materialism in its various manifestations does not have hypotheses 
about questions such as the nature of reality.  Yet such hypotheses only become 
conscious objects of reflection for the materialist as they relate to concrete irritants in 
already existing practices for subjects.  They may stand in the background of inquiry; 
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however, they are not typically the primary object of its focus.  For the materialist wishes 
to describe, not how contingent practices correlate to the unconditioned, but rather why 
they cause dissatisfaction for the ephemeral subjects who inhabit them,    
For the materialist, judgments which embrace all reality are always questionable and 
not very important, because far removed from the type of activity that generated 
them. … The materialist regards an error as the more pardonable the further 
removed it is from the particular circumstances which are of practical importance 
for him in a given situation; his opponents, on the contrary, are usually the more 
concerned, the more the error touches on principle.  Principle, as we said, can be of 
very great important for the materialist too, but the reason for this is not to be 
found in the nature of the principle as such.  The importance arises not from the 
theory alone but from the tasks which at any given period are to be mastered with 
the help of the theory.75  
 
Precisely because materialism is a descriptive and diagnostic practice intended to 
highlight and then fix existing patterns of living, Horkheimer views it, first, as pursuing a 
different kind of question than metaphysics, “Any treatment of materialism is misguided 
… which is interested primarily in metaphysical questions.”76   
For the materialist, the question of first importance is practical, e.g., “why are 
subjects in a form of life dissatisfied when they participate in this social practice”?  Thus, 
“The materialist tries to replace the justification of an action with an explanation of it 
through an historical understanding of the agent.  He regards the justification as an 
illusion.”77  Horkheimer does not mean to suggest by this rhetorical flourish that no 
justification may be offered for an action.  Thus he later clarifies, “Justifications may 
indeed be quite appropriate in a particular society for particular actions, but only to a 
particular authority and not because of some unconditional order of things.”78  What he 
wishes to deny, rather, is that one must appeal to a correspondence between a practice 
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and an intelligible order in order to measure the normativity of the practice, as if the 
alienation of subjects were an insufficiently basic reason for practical action.   
Yet Horkheimer has already admitted that the materialist could become interested in 
investigating notions of the intelligible whole, if such notions are related to a practical 
context of inquiry.  This raises an interesting question: what if the affective relation of 
subjects to their practices is disrupted due to changes in the prevalent conceptions of 
the intelligible informing their practical life?  In such a case, the practical problem under 
inquiry might require the theorist to revisit conceptualizations of the intelligible.  The 
materialist would not then be concerned to appeal to the intelligible to justify action, but 
would rather investigate the practical relationship between existing intelligible 
explanations and the social practices and affective states which they enable.  We shall 
return to this question in examining Horkheimer’s mature work.   
In sum, the starting point of the materialist is failed social practices which have led 
to discontent in the agents who inhabit them, and the goal of the materialist is “the 
alteration of those conditions which cause unhappiness.”79  What counts as an 
explanation for the present suffering causing “unhappiness” as well as its successful 
“alteration” may only be defined hypothetically ahead of an inquiry into the conditions 
of dissatisfaction, and will differ historically depending on which subjects and practices 
are under consideration.  Thus, Horkheimer explains that “this goal took on a different 
shape in varying historical situations,” for “the practical requirements of concrete 
problems affect, in turn both the content and the form of materialist theory.”80  Having 
noted an outline of Horkheimer’s early materialist logic, focusing in particular on how 
embodied affect serves as a precondition and constraint for inquiry, I will now 
investigate how he employs this understanding in his contemporary context.  
                                                






3. The repair of distorted forms of thought 
In a claim which has become ubiquitous in the interpretive literature, Dubiel notes, 
“In its earliest years the Frankfurt Circle defined the relation between philosophy and 
science as one of programmatic indifference.”81  By “indifference” he means that 
philosophical reflection did not alter the autonomous practice of scientific inquiry, but 
merely “integrated” its independent findings.82  In a discussion of Horkheimer’s early 
research program, Dubiel specifies that philosophy integrates by organizing the 
questions scientific inquiry will pursue around a theme, “The decisive role of 
presentation – as here performed by the philosopher – is to treat concepts and 
hypotheses of organizationally and cognitively distinct disciplines in such a way that they 
can be related to each other with respect to a central theme.”  An example of such a 
theme might be “the anthropological conception of man as an unchanging being.”  A 
particular science then “transforms” the theme into a set of research questions, which it 
pursues using the observational methods appropriate to it.83   
In later reflection, by contrast, Dubiel notes that Horkheimer comes to understand 
“Marx’s economic critique as the orienting, paradigmatic unity of philosophy and the 
specialized sciences.”84  Philosophy no longer directs scientific inquiry to “themes” 
which it may have otherwise ignored, and then lets the scientist loose to use her 
methods with impunity.  It now explicitly critiques the detached practice of the sciences 
as reflective of a reified society.  The social scientist is subjected to critique insofar as 
she views her object as a detached spectator instead of a participant that may constitute 
it.  In an influential development of Dubiel’s work, Seyla Benhabib thus notes, 
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Horkheimer moves from an ‘externalist’ to an ‘internalist’ critique of science and 
theory: the primary object of his attack is not the uses to which science and theory 
are put in society, but the manner in which the concepts, constructions, and 
scientific operations of traditional theories reproduce a distorted image of the social 
reality.  The question can no longer be a unification of philosophy and science, nor a 
mere utilization by critical theory of the results of the specialized sciences.  
Philosophy asserts its right against the sciences in its capacity as ‘critique.’85  
   
Horkheimer’s method, according to Benhabib, changes qualitatively: he subjects the 
practices of the sciences themselves to critique.  Consequently, his theory increasingly 
relies upon speculative philosophical concepts divorced from empirical content.    
By contrast, I wish to demonstrate that Horkheimer is interested in critiquing the 
reification of the object by the sciences from the outset of his work.  That is, he does 
not begin with a view that accepts the sharp division between subject and object, 
observation and participation, as constitutive of the scientific method, only later to 
become increasingly critical of such “science” as a product of an alienated society.  
Rather, in his early work he suggests a different definition of a scientific practice: it 
arises as a response to the embodied interests of subjects and reflects upon practices 
which are objects of concern for such subjects.  It is never disinterested (or “pure”) 
observation or testing, but inevitably observes and tests in terms of a socially and 
historically situated context of inquiry.  Consequently, the notion that Horkheimer 
increasingly came to abandon “science” for “philosophical critique” may well 
misunderstand a central question he was concerned to address in his work, namely, what 
should a materialist account of science as a form of inquiry entail?  Instead of assuming 
a definition of what “science” is and what acceptance or rejection of it must require 
prior to probing Horkheimer’s essays, let us first examine his attempts to define science 
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in terms of a more basic category, as one practice of inquiry among others for an 
embodied social subject.       
I will present four case studies which display Horkheimer’s criticism of ways of 
theorizing that abstract cognition from affective embodiment.  This will illustrate how 
he relates his understanding of thought as a form of inquiry to the task of theorizing 
itself and demonstrate that he does not set philosophical speculation over against 
empirical inquiry in his work in the 30s, as is supposed by Dubiel and Benhabib.  
3.1. Horkheimer’s inaugural address as director for the Institut für Sozialforschung    
Horkheimer begins his inaugural address, “The Present Situation of Social 
Philosophy” (1930), by investigating the idea that various forms of social theory are self-
contained Weltanschauungen rooted in non-verifiable values (“articles of faith”),  
Now it is precisely in this dilemma of social philosophy – this inability to speak of its 
object, namely the cultural life of humanity, other than in ideological [weltanschaulich], 
sectarian, and confessional terms, the inclination to see in the social theories of 
Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Max Scheler differences in articles of 
faith rather than differences in true, false, or at least problematic theories—it is in 
this dilemma that we find the difficulty that must be overcome.86 
 
Horkheimer characterizes this way of interpreting a multiplicity of social theories as a 
“dilemma” because it ends the ability to offer comparative judgments regarding their 
truth.  The dilemma is artificially resolved by contemporary social philosophers, he 
notes, in two diametrically opposed, yet mirroring, approaches to theory.  On the one 
hand, there is a form of “material sociology which must investigate the specific forms of 
sociation” but “has nothing to say about the degree of reality or about the value of these 
phenomena,”87 which Horkheimer earlier alludes to as a form of positivism in which 
“everything is exhausted in mere facts [Tatsächlichkeiten].”88 On the other, there is “social 
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philosophy” in which “there can be ultimate positions but no generally valid truths that 
are woven into broad and variegated investigations,” which Horkheimer describes, 
obliquely referencing Lebensphilosophie, as “the arbitrary ordainment of a new meaning for 
society, the state, law etc.”89   
The mistake that produces these mirroring distortions is the abstraction of 
theoretical “ultimate” positions and concrete empirical “investigation” from a concrete 
context of inquiry.  Horkheimer is intent on giving an account of the way in which the 
concerns informing ultimate positions direct inquiry so that particular studies may be 
synthesized in terms of those concerns; yet he is also concerned to give an account of 
the way concrete empirical research conducted on the basis of such concerns alters and 
informs the concerns that give rise to it.  He thus couples the two emphases, “Chaotic 
specialization will not be overcome by way of bad syntheses of specialized research 
results” (that is, by a situation in which the interests of theory are insulated from 
alteration on the basis of the results of inquiry), “just as unbiased empirical research will 
not come about by attempting to reduce its theoretical element to nothing” (that is, by a 
situation in which the synthesizing of various studies is misunderstood as pure 
description apart from the concerns informing inquiry).  In contrast to both of these 
scenarios, Horkheimer continues,    
This situation can be overcome to the extent that philosophy—as a theoretical 
undertaking oriented to the general, the ‘essential’—is capable of giving particular 
studies animating impulses, and at the same time remains open enough to let itself 
be influenced and changed by these concrete studies.90  
    
On the one hand, theory concerns itself with questions regarding “the degree of reality” 
or “the value” of the present social whole for its members.  This concern offers 
“animating impulses” to inquiry.  Theory postulates interests, teleological ends, and 
                                                






hypotheses regarding how such interests and ends might be realized by a subject’s self-
conscious activity.  On the other, it is “influenced and changed by … concrete studies” 
into its object of inquiry; the concerns of theory and its hypotheses are not hermetically 
sealed off from the object of inquiry.   
 Positivism and various self-enclosed Weltanschauungen share in common the fact that 
they separate theory from a concrete context of inquiry.  In the case of the former, 
theory is separated from the interests, ends, and hypotheses embodied in reflection on a 
practical context, i.e. the preconditions of inquiry.  In the case of the latter, theory is 
separated from its empirical object of study, that by which the tenets of competing 
theories regarding interests, ends, and the activities that realize them may be tested.  
This, in sum, is what Horkheimer means by claiming both evidence a lack of “dialectical 
penetration.”       
 In several essays published between 1932-1937, Horkheimer investigates various 
prominent forms of theory and argues in a parallel fashion in each case that a given 
alternative to his theory abstracts from either the affective states of subjects that are the 
preconditions of inquiry (in the case of neo-Kantianism and positivism), or from the 
empirical experience of subjects that is the proper object of inquiry (in the case of 
Lebensphilosophie).  Each theory misconstrues inquiry as something other than a social 
practice for embodied subjects, and Horkheimer in each case suggests ways of 
correcting this mistake by reintroducing a relation to either affective embodiment or 
empirical testing that has been elided.  We will first examine his critique of neo-Kantian 
rationalism and Lebensphilosophie in “On Bergson's Metaphysics of Time” and “The 
Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Society” (both written in 1934), before turning to 






3.2. The critique of Neo-Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie 
In his essays comparing Lebensphilosophie with various forms of rationalism, 
Horkheimer traces a dichotomy characterizing social philosophy in 1930s Weimar.  On 
one hand, he notes, stand various schools of thought that hold that reasoning, 
understood broadly as the ordering and subsuming of sensuous experience using 
concepts, renders the world more intelligible, while affect risks obscuring the proper 
functioning of reasoning.  For Horkheimer’s purposes, this sensibility may be 
understood broadly, including both those who believe such concepts arise exclusively 
from experience and those who believe certain concepts to be given a-priori (though we 
will focus particularly on his interaction with neo-Kantian idealism).  On the other, he 
continues, stand various adherents to Lebensphilosophie, who privilege the access to reality 
given vis-à-vis affect and intuition, and argue that discursive concepts distort the 
subject’s immediate relation to reality.   
Both sides are astute, he maintains, in noting the others’ flaws.  Thus Horkheimer 
delights in Henri Bergson’s criticism of the way in which scientific concepts have 
become abstracted from their origin in practical life and transmogrified by “dogmatic 
philosophy” from one way of presenting reality, which is instrumentally useful for 
subjects, into depictions of reality in-itself.91  Concepts are, Horkheimer affirms, 
practical ways of grasping a prior manifold of intuition for a historical subject.  Yet 
Horkheimer also appreciates Heinrich Rickert’s critique of Lebensphilosophie’s alternative 
emphasis on intuitive immediacy.92   Even if conceptualization abstracts for practical 
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reasons from a prior experience of intuitive immediacy, this abstraction may not be 
conflated with a distortion of such immediacy.  Rather experiences of the manifold can 
only be comprehended and acted upon by embodied social subjects through conceptual 
determination.  Horkheimer neatly summarizes his appreciation and critique of both 
schools by quoting Hegel’s Logic.  Lebensphilosophie privileges a true element of thought 
which neo-Kantianism suppresses, for “analysis ‘really transforms the concrete into an 
abstract.’”  There is an affect-inflected embodied intuition of the manifold prior to 
cognitive determination, which judgment mediates by highlighting certain relations 
between intuitions among a myriad of others.  Yet in contrast to the neo-Kantians, “It 
fails to grasp … that ‘that division must take place’ if comprehension is to be possible at 
all” (such determination is unavoidable if subjects wish to understand and act in relation 
to the manifold).93   
Developing this argument, Horkheimer notes that each side commits three errors.  
First, both privilege an aspect of thought, either affective intuition or discursive 
reflection, as the exclusive conduit for true knowledge.94  Second, each misunderstands 
the resultant knowledge as an a-historical depiction of reality, thus as knowable by any 
given subject.95  Third, and most important for our purposes, each fails to appreciate the 
way affect and conceptual determination are related in the act of thought.  Horkheimer 
wishes to argue that to abstract conceptualizing from affect like the neo-Kantians 
misunderstands how the latter motivates and constrains thought as an activity of 
interested inquiry.  Yet to abstract affective intuition from conceptualizing like the 
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lebensphilosophen mistakes how concepts enable the satisfaction of affective states through 
the diagnosis and alteration of existing practices.  We will now examine this third claim. 
Our interpretation differs from a typical approach to situating Horkheimer in 
relation to his contemporaries, and the difference is important.  This approach argues 
that, however appreciative Horkheimer may have been of certain elements of 
lebensphilosophie, his “basic strategy is to reclaim aspects of rationalist idealism” as 
contrasted with forms of irrationalism like “Lebensphilosophie” and “the vitalism of 
Bergson and Klages.”96  I will maintain, however, that Horkheimer’s ultimate goal is 
neither to critique irrationalism nor to retrieve particular aspects of rationalist idealism, 
but rather to demonstrate that both forms of thought are inverse ways of 
misunderstanding how affect and conceptualization relate in the activity of thinking.  
This misunderstanding short-circuits the reflective critique of social practices and may 
be repaired, Horkheimer thinks, by his own understanding of a thought as a form of 
inquiry.        
Horkheimer wants to maintain, against the exclusive privileging of cognitive 
determination, that cognition is inseparable from affective preconditions.  He thus 
attacks any sharp Kantian distinction between “concepts” which rationally order sense-
experience, and sensuous “intuitions,” the way sense-experience is received by 
embodied desiring subjects,  
Thought—as an active yet completely empty form—is supposed to bring forth ‘the 
world’ from the sensuous material of knowledge. …  
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This rigid juxtaposition of the two principles, out of whose combination the 
world is supposed to emerge is every bit as much a mystical legend as irrationalistic 
metaphysics itself.97 
 
Repeating the idea from “Materialism and Metaphysics” that thought begins in the 
middle of already existing relationships and practices, Horkheimer emphasizes the way 
needs motivate and direct cognitive reflection on already existing social habits and 
relationships, “The entire process of developing … a [dialectical] construction … is 
guided not merely by the object but by the level of intellectual development and the 
conscious and unconscious strivings of subjects as well.”98  Summarizing this 
understanding, Horkheimer notes in a crucial passage, “thought as activity … is in no 
way merely opposed to outlook and feeling, but rather, takes up the immediately given 
only in true contexts.”  Hegel’s dialectic, he continues, illustrates “in the thought process 
itself conditionality, limits and lacks in its own forms.”99  Thought thus cannot be reified 
as a self-sufficient or self-enclosed activity of the mind.  It arises, as an activity for 
embodied humans, in relation to affective feelings and desires.  Lebensphilosophie thus 
properly fronts the affective or intuitive elements of thought elided by neo-Kantians. 
If the central problem with separating cognition from affect is that a preconditions 
of the use of concepts is lost to sight, separating affect from cognition forgets the fact 
that the formulation of concepts is a reflective activity that intends to satisfy the 
affective states of the subject.  In order to illustrate the nuances of Horkheimer’s way of 
                                                
97 Horkheimer, “Rationalism Debate,” 226.  This is a consistent theme in Horkheimer’s early thought.  
Stirk, Max Horkheimer, 112, thus notes that as early as his habilitationschrift, Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als 
Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie, Horkheimer subjected “the gap between concepts 
and sense impressions” to sustained critique.  Cf. Abromeit, “Dialectic of Bourgeois Society,” 104, 109, 
115-116, n. 70, who notes the same concern in Horkheimer’s dissertation, Zur Antinomie der teleologischen 
Urteilskraft, as well as his early lectures in the history of philosophy. 
98 Horkheimer, “Rationalism Debate,” 240-241.  So closely knit are need and thought that Horkheimer 
concludes, “A god is incapable of knowing anything because it has no needs” (242). 





framing this latter objection to lebensphilosophie, one may begin by examining his 
appreciation of Bergson’s critique of the concept as reductive.100   
Horkheimer notes that one cannot understand the concept of the will without 
grasping the embodied subject whose will it is.  This necessarily includes an account of 
the subject’s relation to the world (the “physical” objects of the will to which the subject 
stands in spatiotemporal relation), the intuitive sense-experiences of this world (which 
Horkheimer terms in the following passage the “idea” of it), concepts (the subject’s 
reflection on these intuitive experiences, which Horkheimer terms “representation”), 
and the spontaneity of the subject (the way a subject applies the concept in relation to its 
already existing social and material life).  Even this preliminary list illustrates that the 
concept “will” depends upon a double movement of abstraction and negation.  To reach 
the concept, one must begin by abstracting certain features from a living whole 
(embodied subjectivity in relation to the world), “Neither will nor idea nor 
representation nor physical mechanism can be understood as that which they are 
without the consciousness that, and how, they have been notionally removed from the 
living psychological events in which they form, in turn, a particular unity.”101  Then one 
must contrast the resultant abstraction with other similarly abstracted aspects of this 
living whole, “The determinate meaning of a concept is founded not through itself 
alone, but just as much, by the principle that limits it.”102  The concept of will is thus not 
only a partial grasping based on an abstraction from what was originally a whole; further, 
even the concept as abstracted cannot be comprehended in its fullness but only partially 
through negative contrasts with other similarly abstracted concepts.   
                                                
100 He expresses the same appreciation for Lebensphilosophie generally in Horkheimer, “Rationalism 
Debate,” 232-238. 






Horkheimer thus agrees with Bergson’s conclusion that “abstracted traits of events 
are never identical with real parts,” and further that “their mere setting together 
therefore never reflects the original life of the object.”103  Both abstraction and 
definition through negation signal moments in which life is comprehended by a subject.  
This is why there can be no knowledge of “life” in-itself through discursive concepts.  
Bergson’s insight, Horkheimer notes appreciatively, should lead to the “overcoming of 
metaphysics” because if concepts necessarily involve a moment of abstraction and 
negation, then, “all systems that place any concept in a fundamental position as a single 
principle that is supposed to contain all reality within itself [have] to fail as a result.”104   
The question Horkheimer raises is whether, because mediation is always selective 
and partial, a  double removal from “life,” it exclusively foreshortens and erases 
meaning, distorting or emptying the particularity subsumed under it.  This claim, he 
notes, does not itself follow from a correct understanding of the way concepts abstract.  
Bergson’s insight that one cannot abstract and then determine the object without 
fundamentally foreshortening its meaning is, Horkheimer notes, itself too abstract.  It 
treats the activity of conceptualization as a set of steps detached from subjectivity.  One 
must rather attend, he argues, to the social and historical situation of the subject, which 
informs the sorts of reasons it has for using concepts or forming new ones.  If one 
could “reverse” the abstraction involved in conceptualization to recover the qualitative 
particularity of the original intuitions from which it abstracts, one would not merely 
have the addition of innumerable particularities but the loss of something, “Since the 
formation of concepts is not merely a process of exclusion, but has in each instance a 
tendency determined by social and individual impulses and interests, in turn, the reversal 







from concept to reality doesn’t represent only an addition of peculiarities.”105  Concepts 
do not merely abstract from the particularity of intuitive sensuous experience.  They are 
ways subjects choose to relate to such experiences on the basis of their interests and 
desires as these relate to existing social practices.  A surplus of meaning arising from the 
embodied desire and intentionality of the subject is thus added to any mere 
representational ordering of intuitions in conceptualization.   
Horkheimer’s remarkable claim is that, similar to the neo-Kantians, Bergson 
assumes a view of concepts which abstracts them from the responsive activity of 
subjects to affective states.  While concepts are understood by the adherents of 
Lebensphilosophie as reductive forms of description, as if in the grammar of life they 
simply stood in for nouns or adjectives, Horkheimer suggests that they be conceived as 
verbs, which shift with the social terrain the subject inhabits as ways of accomplishing 
socially-mediated purposes in response to embodied needs.  Bergson’s rejection of 
conceptual thought is thus based on the false conflation of concepts with the way they 
are misconstrued in “closed” systems, as preceding affective states and existing practices 
instead of arising in reflection upon them as an activity of a subject.  Bergson thus 
critiques, not conceptuality, but a reification of conceptuality (the “frozen forms” of what 
is actually “a living act”).  Horkheimer notes, 
Without thereby giving away the knowledge contained in them, all theories are 
always to be adapted again to reality by means of reflection on their own 
preconditions and on the developing moments of the object. … This entire 
intellectual social activity connected to practical tasks is called thought; ordering is in 
reality only an aspect of this, and the products of ordering – concepts and judgments 
fixed on symbols – are only frozen forms of this living act. … By equating, in 
accordance with the worst parts of traditional logic and epistemology, conceptual 
thinking with the establishment of closed systems and leaving out of consideration 
its real function in the historical process, Bergson misconceives its truth and arrives 
at the erroneous belief that there is a capacity for truth existing besides thought and 
a myth which is to be formulated besides conceptual knowledge.106    
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Horkheimer thus understands concepts as the expression of dynamic subjectivity, not 
the constitutive parts of a self-enclosed process of cognition, but one way the subject 
qua embodied social organism relates to its environment.  While Bergson is thus right 
that concepts and judgments are abstracted from “life,” it is equally the case that they 
too cannot be separated and reified into something other than “life”: they are the 
activity of a subject intent on resolving practical tasks in terms of its interests and 
desires.     
One can use Horkheimer’s understanding of thinking as a living human act to repair 
the mistake held in common by “rationalists” (neo-Kantians) and “irrationalists” 
(Lebensphilosophie).  In contrast to rationalism, it is only as a part of a prior living process, 
as related to the needs, desires and interests of an embodied subject, that thought as 
objectifying or as “ordering” arises.  Without the affect arising from sensuous 
embodiment, there is no concept.  In contrast to irrationalism, intuition and affect are 
never experienced as such by subjects and do not reflect an intelligible meaning 
underlying historical practices, but are always experienced as reactions in relation to 
existing social practices as symptoms of the relationship between the subject and the 
practices it inhabits.  Horkheimer thus concludes by noting that “intuition and sympathy 
[play] just as much a role in thought as establishing and ordering;” yet “as soon as these 
moments do not reflect themselves in their real function, changing according to the 
social situation, and instead are split up into a single and absolute method, their results 
become just so many phantasies and ideologies.”107  The concept qua living act may not 
be abstracted from either its relation to intuitive “affect” or cognitive “ordering” 
without losing its intelligibility as an activity for an embodied subject. 
                                                





3.3. The critique of positivism 
In “The Latest Attack on Metaphysics,” Horkheimer exclusively addresses a 
philosophy which models itself after the natural sciences, and there can be little doubt 
that the prominence of the essay, coupled with its exclusive focus on “positivist” 
interlocutors, has led to the interpretation we have already explored, which construes 
Horkheimer’s work in the 30s as culminating in a radical turn away from the sciences.  
Careful attention to the essay, however, reveals that this common interpretive trope 
obscures Horkheimer’s intention.  For he begins his argument in “Latest Attack” by 
outlining his interest in critiquing two understandings of inquiry.  While he goes on to 
focus on the first, his claim regarding a second should suggest a broader frame within 
which the essay should be evaluated.   
The first understanding of inquiry, Horkheimer notes, believes “that science is the 
only possible form of knowledge,”108 insofar as “only … purified experience in the strict 
sense it has received in natural science, is called knowledge.”109  This definition turns on 
the ambiguous term “purified,” but in a subsequent contrast between this kind of 
inquiry and classical empiricism, Horkheimer clarifies his meaning.  Despite 
understanding “science as a human product in a purely individualistic sense” (instead of 
recognizing its genesis in relation to social practices), classical empiricism still “contains 
at least this dynamic element—the relation to a knowing subject.”  Positivism, by way of 
contrast, “disregards this relation altogether, even in its theory of the origin of concepts 
and judgments.”110  Horkheimer will thus focus in this essay on a way of understanding 
inquiry that abstracts description from what we have termed its affective precondition, 
the interests and desires of embodied subjects.   
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The second form of inquiry, he continues, engages in “the deprecation of science as a 
mere intellectual technique answering to subordinate considerations of human 
existence.”111  It thus claims that empirical investigation is unimportant, insofar as one 
may possess knowledge of the whole antecedent to and apart from such inquiry.  
Horkheimer lists as examples of this kind of inquiry various forms of metaphysics 
including “Lebensphilosophie.”112   
One must not pass lightly over the fact that Horkheimer turns to a critique of 
positivism only after situating it carefully in terms of a broader program involving the 
critique of two divergent ways concept-use is related to inquiry.  Further, he situates this 
caveat within a substantial introduction, in which he notes several examples of how the 
descriptive practices of science and metaphysics sit uneasily with one another.  Yet he 
concludes that this incompatibility illustrates problems with metaphysics.113  Horkheimer 
thus situates an interest in critiquing a particular philosophical explanation  of the 
significance of the natural sciences in terms of a clear indication of his preference for 
practices of empirical inquiry over metaphysical speculation.  This introduction fits the 
pattern we have repeatedly seen in the other essays we have investigated: while 
Horkheimer critiques various ways of abstracting practices of inquiry from embodied 
subjectivity, nowhere does he draw the implication from this that a rejection of 
empirical inquiry, broadly, or any of the sciences, in particular, is necessary.  Further, he 
consistently portrays his own efforts as attempts to articulate a theory which he self-
consciously contrasts with speculative metaphysics.  On the basis of this introduction, 
the prominent idea that the essay signals a rejection of “features of Horkheimer’s own 
early materialism” in favor of “the reautonomization of philosophy and the increasingly 
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radical criticism of science” should thus appear very questionable.114  The particular 
interpretive issue at stake in the examination of the essay is whether Horkheimer’s 
skepticism regarding the abstraction of cognition from affect in contexts of inquiry 
signals skepticism regarding the practice of scientific inquiry itself or rather a critique of 
one way of understanding such inquiry.  
As we noted at the close of the previous section, Horkheimer claims that without 
affective desires regarding already existing social practices, there is no concept.  He 
considers the seminal error of positivism that it does not attend to the necessary 
relationship between cognitive judgment and affective desire.  For the positivist, he 
notes, “to know is neither to believe or hope.”115  Later he develops this claim in relation 
to the critical theorist’s interest in emancipation,  
When an active individual of sound common sense perceives the sordid state of the 
world, desire to change it becomes the guiding principle by which he organizes given 
facts and shapes them into a theory.  The methods and categories as well as the 
transformations of the theory can be understood only in connection with his taking 
of sides. … Right thinking depends as much on right willing as right willing on right 
thinking.116 
 
Highlighting the mutual relationship between knowing, desiring (or what Horkheimer 
terms “to  believe or hope”), and willing is simply another way of expressing that 
conceptualization is an embodied activity.  Positivists, by contrast, equate “true” 
concepts with accurate representations of physical realities.  Thus they “regard corporeal 
things in their pure state (that is, completely abstracted from subjectivity and from 
human praxis) as concrete realities.”117  For Horkheimer, however, there is no conceptual 
knowledge of such physical states, only immediate sense-experiences.  Horkheimer, as 
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we shall see, applies Kant’s term for transcendental realists to this perspective, calling it 
“uncritical.”  Rather, corporeal objects are first experienced as a series of sense-
intuitions which are then made “concrete” for the subject by the double abstraction 
involved in conceptual determination.   
This does not mean, of course, that the intentional bracketing of the agent’s 
perspective is always illicit, so long as such bracketing is understood as a kind of social 
practice which intends to address particular needs of historical agents. Horkheimer thus 
offers an instructive caveat,  
The idea of radically eliminating the subject … from the process of cognition 
generally … is itself a principle of research that stands in need of careful restriction.  
The belief that this principle is essentially applicable in every moment of history 
leads, of necessity, to an unhistorical and uncritical conception of knowledge and to 
the hypostasis of particular methods of procedure employed by natural science.118 
 
The agent neutral descriptions facilitating physics, for instance, are a useful social 
practice.  Abstracting from particulars (e.g. the particular subject doing the investigating 
and the qualitative particularities of the objects under investigation) when inquiring into 
natural phenomena renders a form of universalizable knowledge that addresses certain 
needs of historical subjects.  Horkheimer’s critique is not that scientists engage in such 
abstraction, but that positivists mistake the activity of abstraction, itself an intentional 
“social practice” regarding objects, as if it were an immediate description of corporeal 
objects.   
Already in “Notes on Science and the Crisis” (1932), Horkheimer claims that the 
scientific practices which lead to such universal validity claims are themselves results of 
an exercise of historical subjectivity, “The separation of theory and action is itself a 
historical phenomenon,” he notes, so that “the reasons which justify rejecting the 
pragmatist theory of knowledge and relativism in general, do not lead to a positivist 
                                                






separation of truth and action.”119  In the previous passage from “Latest Attack,” he 
concludes similarly.  “The empiricist,” following the model of physics, “states that the 
meaning of all concepts of science is determined by physical operations.  He fails to see 
that the concept of the corporeal, in the sense peculiar to its use in physics, involves a 
very special subjective interest, involves, indeed, the whole of social practice.”120  After 
misunderstanding the social practice of physics, the positivist continues by making this 
misunderstanding a model for all other practices of description, thus leading to what 
Horkheimer terms an “unhistorical conception of knowledge.”  Horkheimer’s point is 
thus not to critique the procedure employed by the natural sciences itself, but rather to 
understand it aright as a historically situated social practice.   
Horkheimer concludes the essay by noting emphatically that he is not objecting to 
the activity of abstraction itself, “The endeavor of scientific research to see events in 
their more general connections in order to determine their laws, is a legitimate and 
useful occupation.”  What he is objecting to is rather a “confusion” which “occurs if 
effort or action is reified as merely a state or event and is never grasped as the specific 
structure of the subject-object relation.”121  This formulation reflects precisely 
Horkheimer’s understanding of concepts as forms of activity, reflected consistently, as 
we have seen, in his essay on truth, his repair of forms of rationalism and irrationalism, 
and his way of conceiving of science as a social practice. 
This is instructive for correcting recent evaluations of Horkheimer’s critique of 
positivism.  O’Neill and Uebel, for instance, make the following distinction, which they 
take to be a decisive refutation of Horkheimer’s critique of Otto Neurath in “Latest 
Attack,” 
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Logical empiricism is compatible with reflection on the sciences of a naturalistic 
kind, reflection that draws on the wider sciences, where science is being used in a 
broad sense to include any systematic empirical inquiry, including everyday empirical 
knowledge.  In the work of Neurath the social and historical context of the sciences 
and role of social factors in the acceptance of scientific belief did form a central part 
of such reflection.122   
 
But Horkheimer does not deny that certain forms of positivism, including Neurath’s, 
may allow reflection on the social and historical “conditions of knowledge” which 
situate the practice of the sciences.  His argument does not regard the scope of the objects 
which positivism interrogates, but the way positivists understand the role of the subject in 
conceptualizing any object.123   
Horkheimer’s interest in developing a materialist account of thought as a practice of 
inquiry is pervasive in his early work.  I have argued that careful attention to this interest 
illustrates that the ubiquitous claim that Horkheimer shifts from a concern with the 
empirical sciences in the early 30s to a posture that eschews the sciences in favor of 
speculative philosophy later in the decade mistakes his consistent critique of one way of 
understanding the social practice of scientific inquiry with a critique of scientific inquiry 
itself.  In the next chapter, I will note the way this materialist understanding of thought 
is developed by Horkheimer in his later essays.  This will set the groundwork for 
understanding how his late reflections on instrumental reasoning and his turn to 
theology exemplify his understanding of thought as a pattern inquiry.
                                                
122 O’Neill and Uebel, “Horkheimer and Neurath,” 85. 
123 Horkheimer writes to Adorno in correspondence regarding the essay’s forthcoming publication, A Life 
in Letters: Selected Correspondences, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2007), 94, “The elimination of the concept of the subject to which you refer in your 
last letter is a main theme in my plan.”  In the essay itself, “Latest Attack,” 145, he makes this explicit in 
relation to Neurath, “Everything designated by idealism as idea and end and, by materialism, as social 
practice and conscious historical activity, is related to science essentially as objects of observations and not 
as constitutive interests …, insofar as empiricism concedes them to be conditions of knowledge at all 
(Otto Neurath).”  He thus explicitly notes that Neurath allows the investigation of the historical and social 
conditions situating scientific practices, but notes that this does not repair a mistaken approach to the 







Inquiry and critical research: 
Social theory and empirical inquiry in Horkheimer’s mature work 
As we noted in the introduction, the focus of Horkheimer’s work in the 40s is often 
understood to shift from “a historically informed theory of society” to “a radical critique 
of reason” which “denounces the intimate connection between reason and 
domination.”1  Explaining this distinction, Habermas notes that in the 30s, “Horkheimer 
sought the sublation (Aufhebung) of philosophy in social theory,” and held that 
“transformation into the social sciences offered the only chance of survival for 
philosophical thought.”2  This language about the “transformation” of philosophy into 
the social sciences describes Horkheimer’s attempt to translate perennial questions in 
the history of philosophy into terms that allow them to become objects of research for 
the social sciences.  To take one such example of “translation,” in his inaugural lecture 
Horkheimer notes, 
The project of investigating the relations between [the economic life of society, the 
psychical development of individuals, and the changes in the realm of culture] is 
nothing but a reformulation—on the basis of the new problem constellation, 
consistent with the methods at our disposal and with the level of our knowledge—
of the old question concerning the connection of particular existence and universal 
Reason, of reality and Idea, of life and Spirit.3 
 
One wonders, of course, what gets lost in translation when there is a proposal to 
translate the concept of “Spirit,” say, into the “economic life of society.”  Leaving aside 
this necessary question for the moment, it is sufficient for our purposes to note 
Habermas’ argument.  Horkheimer’s early philosophical work, however broad-ranging 
                                                
1 Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on the Development of Horkheimer's Work,” trans. Kenneth Baynes and 
John McCole, in On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives, eds. Seyla Benhabib et. al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1993), 54. 
2 Ibid., 50. 
3 Max Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social 
Research” (1930), in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings, trans. G. Frederick Hunter et. 





its survey of philosophical topics, comes to rest firmly in an empirical analysis of social 
practices. His work from the 40s, by contrast, is untethered from this empirical concern.  
For Horkheimer, notes Habermas, “The hope that there is a dialectical tension within 
the historical process itself … proved empty.”  Consequently, in his essays and 
monographs from the decade, “the only goal is to break out of the continuum of 
history” such that “historically observable tendencies lose any serious interest.”4  In this 
analysis, Habermas does not depart from the basic typology outlined by Helmut Dubiel 
in his now standard Theory and Politics,  
Whereas [Horkheimer’s] materialist period considered philosophy the integrating 
medium of interdisciplinary theory construction (and sought, programmatically, the 
unification of philosophy and science), and whereas the Critical Theory period took 
Marx’s economic critique as the orienting, paradigmatic unity of philosophy and the 
specialized sciences, in this third period philosophy is a mental preserve, a critical 
island, an encapsulation resistant to the instrumentalistic Zeitgeist.  Philosophy 
defines its role as one of the resistance to the spirit of the specialized sciences.5 
 
I have already raised critical questions about the distinction drawn by Dubiel and 
Benhabib between Horkheimer’s treatment of the sciences in the “materialist” and 
“critical theory” periods of his work.6  I shall now turn to the relationship (or lack 
thereof) between philosophy and the sciences in Horkheimer’s work from the 40s.  
What is striking about Habermas and Dubiel’s account is its tidiness.  As is well 
known, Horkheimer continued to author reflections on empirical method as well as 
various research studies throughout his mature career.  These studies exist alongside a 
series of philosophical reflections on the shape reasoning has come to take in late 
modern life.  At issue, therefore, is how to relate “the empirical” and “the philosophical” 
Horkheimer.  Habermas and Dubiel express a standard approach in the secondary 
literature: Horkheimer’s empirical essays in the 40s and 50s are, at best, adiaphorous, 
                                                
4 Habermas, “Development of Horkheimer's Work,” 54. 
5 Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1985), 95. 





appended uneasily to a body of work otherwise characterized by metaphysical 
speculation.  They support this argument with reference to a survey of four works: “The 
Authoritarian State” (1940), “The End of Reason” (1942), Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1944), and Eclipse of Reason (1947), and in so doing, follow a way of selecting texts which 
has become typical in the secondary literature.7   
In this chapter I shall investigate several of Horkheimer’s texts from the 40s and 
early 50s that are left to the side by this interpretive consensus, and argue that they 
demonstrate Horkheimer’s development of his early account of a materialist logic.   In 
subsequent chapters, I then return at length to the “standard” texts with new eyes.  This 
difference in method is intended to reconsider what precisely is peripheral and what is 
central to Horkheimer’s mature theorizing.  I shall argue that the standard account 
misunderstands the significance of both the “empirical” and “philosophical” aspects of 
Horkheimer’s later work, as well as their relationship to each other.  In this chapter and 
the next, I begin by re-considering the place of Horkheimer’s empirical studies in his late 
theorizing.  This chapter outlines the mature development of his early understanding of 
thought as a form of inquiry, now situated in an account of the research activity of the 
social critic.  The next argues that this mature account governs his attempts to repair 
diagnostic failures in his earlier understanding of political economy and the family.  In 
the final three chapters, I turn to re-examine the content of his late philosophical and 
theological reflections in the light of these empirical studies.       
                                                
7 Habermas, “Development of Horkheimer's Work,” 53-58.  Reflecting this focus, Dubiel, Theory and 
Politics, 88, notes, “The most concise formulation of theory development in the 1940s is Dialectic of 
Enlightenment of 1944 [which Dubiel pairs with Eclipse of Reason]; yet the themes developed there are already 
intimated in the writings of Horkheimer and Adorno as early as 1939, and most clearly in Horkheimer’s 
essay ‘Reason and Self-Preservation’ [this essay is known to English audiences by its original title, “The 





1. Horkheimer’s late research methodology (I): 
“Critical research” as a form of induction  
 
1.1. Horkheimer’s logic: 
On the relation of induction to contexts of inquiry 
  
In a concise series of notes published in 1941, Horkheimer explicitly reflects upon 
“the prevailing methodological viewpoints” of “critical social research” in an attempt to 
explain several axioms directing researchers at the Institut.8  He advances, in some detail, 
a claim regarding the relation of practices of research to a theory of the social whole, 
through an analysis of how critical researchers should regard induction.  Critical 
research, he notes, accepts in common with the social sciences that “social concepts are 
‘inductively’ formed.”9  Yet he proceeds to define induction in a unique way.  Critical 
researchers accept  
the hypothesis that society is a “system” in the material sense that every single social 
field or relation contains and reflects, in various ways, the whole itself.  
Consequently, an intensive analysis of a single relation or institution that is 
particularly representative of the prevailing pattern of reality may be far better able 
to develop and grasp the nature of the pattern than would an extensive compilation 
and description of assorted facts.  The “pervasive” character of our society, the fact 
that it makes its peculiar relations felt in every nook and cranny of the social whole, 
calls for a methodological conception that will take account of this fact.  Categories 
have to be formed through a process of induction that is the reverse of the 
traditional inductive method which verified its hypothesis by collecting individual 
experiences until they attained the weight of universal laws.  Induction in social 
theory, per contra, should seek the universal within the particular, not above or 
beyond it, and, instead of moving from one particular to another and then to the 
heights of abstraction, should delve deeper and deeper into the particular and 
discover the universal law therein.10 
 
Horkheimer characterizes his way of relating particular practices to the whole as a 
“hypothesis.”  Following his language, one might call it the “pervasiveness” hypothesis 
because his inductive method is based upon the premise that certain practices uniquely 
permeate and characterize modern society.  The thesis regarding pervasiveness is a 
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Bronner and Douglas Kellner (New York: Routledge, 1989), 264. 






“hypothesis” because it is a fallible interpretation of empirical experience which both 
informs and then is tested by inquiry, a contingent reality known a-posteriori, not a 
necessary feature of social life as such.  In certain societies, singularly pervasive practices 
may not exist at all, or may exist in a qualitatively different way than in this one.     
For Horkheimer, method is thus shaped from the outset by its historical object of 
reflection.  The most basic logical axiom of his inductive theorizing, the ability to infer 
from a description of particular practices an analysis of a rule governing the social 
whole, is not presented as a basic postulate known a-priori, but is presented as a 
hypothesis about the form of reasoning appropriate to the contingent shape 
contemporary society has taken.  A critical logic responds to an already existing set of 
experiences and corresponding concerns as an experientially informed pattern of 
inference intended to diagnose and resolve an already existing irritant motivating inquiry.  
As Horkheimer argues in a later aphorism entitled “Spirit,” “content has significance in 
the meaning of an intellectual structure,”   
Expression cannot truly be detached from what is expressed. Only in abstract 
science, and even there only where it is mere execution whose meaning is tacitly 
presupposed, can form and content be separated without becoming something else.  
Logic in itself is untrue, as is everything that merely needs but lacks it.11 
 
As this illustrates, for Horkheimer, a difficulty like Hume’s problem of induction 
testifies to the dependency of patterns of reasoning on already existing social practices: 
induction is only problematic if one supposes that the relation of part to whole 
established by inference is not contingent (and thus is based on something other than a 
“hypothesis” arising from experience).  For a materialist understanding of induction, 
however, the various patterns of inference detailed in logics arise from historical social 
relations and reflect back upon them, thus beginning in the middle of an already existing 
                                                
11 Horkheimer, “Spirit” (1959-1960), in Dawn and Decline: Notes, 1926-1931 & 1950-1969, trans. Michael 





set of practices as a mode of reflective activity for a subject.  The form of induction 
proper to critical research thus cannot be abstracted from an experience of the already 
existing social whole, nor from concerns which motivate the theorist. 
1.2. Two forms of induction: 
Distinguishing critical and traditional forms of research 
 
Rather than focusing in detail on a materialist account of logic, Horkheimer 
describes in his “Notes” how the particular method of induction used by the critical 
theorist is distinguished from another closely related method for relating part to whole.  
This contrast illustrates both his understanding of the object of critical inquiry as well as 
the way the descriptions rendered by such inquiry facilitate critique.  It is thus decisive 
for understanding his late essays.   
Horkheimer notes two different ways of conceiving of concepts (which he also 
terms “categories” or “laws”) formed through induction, that rely on two alternate ways 
of conceiving of the object of inductive inquiry.  For Horkheimer, concepts formed 
through induction may be understood:  
(1): As the reflection of a set of experiences of objects; in this case, concepts are taken to 
name associations between what Horkheimer terms “individual experiences” or 
simply “assorted facts.”  
(2): As the reflection of the experience of a social relation between subjects regarding 
objects; concepts are then taken to name what Horkheimer terms a “social field” or 
more simply a social “relation.”   
Horkheimer connects these two views of what is referenced by a concept with two 
corresponding ways of conceiving of the kind of inquiry conducted by research.  One 





(1’): As an inquiry into “assorted facts” that yield observations regarding their 
common marks.  Horkheimer terms this the “traditional” method (alluding to his 
earlier essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory”).  In this case, the observation of the 
marks that a set of particular “facts” has in common determines the content named 
by the concept. 
(2’): As an inquiry into the social relation(s) that are expressed by already-existing 
historical concepts. This yields observations regarding a social relation: how the 
relation expressed by the concept takes on its character, and in turn shapes other 
such relations, as well as the way subjects inhabiting the relation participate in and 
are affected by it.  In this case, one may gradually make explicit other social relations 
and experiences of inhabitants that are implicitly related to the particular social 
relation(s) a concept names.    
The first way of understanding induction, Horkheimer notes, treats a claim about a 
pervasive practice (like competition between social agents) as a hypothesis about 
assorted facts making up reality.  One confirms or denies such a hypothesis by accruing 
a certain quantity of empirical experiences that corroborate or refute the hypothesis, and 
once one has attained a certain threshold of experiences one may take the hypothesis to 
be a “law.”  Thus, “the traditional inductive method … verified its hypothesis by 
collecting individual experiences until they attained the weight of universal laws.”  In the 
second way, a description reveals aspects of the meaning of the concept qua social 
relation, though one cannot, per definitionem, plumb the depth of a given relation, for to 
do so would be to have perfect knowledge of the social whole of which it is a part (thus 
to be a god).  This is one reason for apparently mystical statements in the later 
Horkheimer, such as the following riposte that ends the aforementioned note on logic, 





of the mind both abstract and untrue, however true it may be.”12  Properly understood, 
this is not the negation of positive predication, let alone nihilistic pessimism, but a 
Hegelian recognition of the dependency of the truth of any concept on the historical 
and social mediations it expresses, coupled with a humility that Hegel did not always 
possess regarding the open-ended nature of the subject’s historical knowledge of such 
concepts.  
Horkheimer wants to sharply distinguish the second understanding of induction 
from the first.  The reason for this is evident: one cannot verify a hypothesis about 
social relations by compiling a certain quantity of facts, if what is meant by “facts” are 
experiences of corporeal reality.  For this already takes what is represented by the 
concept to be something other than a social relation: it explains as the marks of a 
corporeal “object” what the second form of inquiry wishes to explain as marks of social 
relations regarding an object.13  By contrast, Horkheimer argues in his “Notes,” 
“Induction … should seek the universal within the particular,” and again, “one must 
delve deeper and deeper into the particular.”  If the particular is understood as a 
corporeal “fact” about the world, then to speak of finding “the universal” within it is 
nonsense (for the universal is conceptually postulated by abstracting commonalities 
between particulars).  But if the particular is understood as an expression of social 
relations regarding an object, and research is understood as the attempt to trace out the 
various ways the relation referenced by the concept is mediated by and in turn 
exemplifies constellations of social practices characteristic of a social whole, then 
“delving” for the universal seems a fitting task for a researcher.   
                                                
12 Ibid., 197. 
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Another suggestive way of framing “delving” is as the attempt to represent what 
once appeared to agents in a form of life as a brute fact as the genesis of various 
historical and social relations.  As Horkheimer notes, “The process of forming these 
categories [on the basis of inductive research] must take into account the historical 
character of the subject matter to which they pertain, and in such a way that the 
categories are made to include the actual genesis of that subject matter.”14  This, it 
should be emphasized, is the task of tracing the social mediation of the taken for granted 
appearance of objects.  The point of the critical researcher is to enable subjects in a form 
of life to recognize themselves, their own desires, projects, and activities as social 
creatures, in the content of concepts.  For if concepts are understood as reflecting that 
which is entirely “over against” the subject, then agents that have become dissatisfied 
with social practices of mediation have no way of thinking about how they might 
reflectively alter them.      
In a later reflection on method entitled “Against Doctrines of Essence,” 
Horkheimer draws an instructive musical parallel that develops this point as well as 
making the emancipatory interest informing his reflections on conceptuality explicit,   
In the sphere of the concept, it is the same as in music.  What an element is only 
becomes apparent in its progression.  It is true that three successive, identical tones 
are not nothing but something.  But a three-part rhythm, something complete in 
itself, and the beginning of a Mozart melody, are two different worlds, and one 
should not believe that the former is really the fundamental, the “natural” one, that 
it serves better to define the “essence” than a definite melody. The error probably 
underlies almost all doctrines of essence, even if one tries to define man’s essence 
through his existence as an individual.  But for that very reason, the statement an 
abstract philosophical doctrine makes does not tell us very much unless the place 
and tone allow us to infer its inevitable political consequences.  One must know the 
entire melody.  That all thinking will thus always remain fragmentary is no objection 
to the demand that it be carried as far as possible.15   
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One might understand a “concept” as a particular reflection of one aspect of the 
“rhythm” of reality, as a common mark defining a set of objects constructed on the 
basis of repeated identical sensory experiences of objects.  Horkheimer does not deny 
that this has intuitive plausibility.  Identical sensory intuitions do form such rhythms for 
subjects.  Yet, to understand this as what a concept refers to is a mistake.  Concepts are 
not reflections of the “rhythm”; rather, they are reflections of the melody of various 
rhythms in relation.  This is why the introduction of a different affect or a different 
project can alter the melody (or appearance) of the sensory rhythm of the object.  This 
further clarifies, Horkheimer notes, why concepts of discrete “objects” or rhythms can 
only be understood in terms of broader social totalities that situate the activities and 
affective states which refract the appearance of the object.  Humans are not infinite, 
thus the knowledge contained in a given concept is limited, open to development, and 
falsifiable.  Horkheimer does not infer an abstract relativism from this: though the 
knowledge of the concept is always partial (for there is no final knowledge of the whole) 
and delimited (by various historical contexts of inquiry), this does not mean that there 
are not more or less accurate ways of understanding the content of concepts.  
The “general” concept sought by the critical researcher is therefore not a concept of 
the marks under which a whole set of “empirical objects” may be subsumed (as is the 
case in traditional induction).  This is crucial, as the concept is understood by 
Horkheimer here in a qualitatively different way than the object of critique often 
associated with the later work of Horkheimer and Adorno.  Horkheimer’s conclusion is 
not that concepts should be critiqued as essentializing the qualitative particularity of the 
object; rather, the concept is presented here as the outcome of critical research into 
social relations.  Horkheimer thus notes in a broader passage we will examine that if one 





into a multitude of empirical facts.”  Rather, a concept is general to the extent it 
describes a “given social configuration,” and further has been “related to the whole of 
the historical process of which it is an indissoluble part.”  A concept is thus “general” 
for the researcher when the particular social relation described by it has been traced with 
regard for the social practices constituting its appearance.  Here, in full, is how 
Horkheimer describes the process of analysis for a researcher which generates such a 
concept:     
The category is … led, by the very nature of its concrete content, to take in other, 
different sectors of the given social configuration and to follow out the genesis and 
import of its content within the social totality.  The general concept is thus not 
dissolved into a multitude of empirical facts but is concretized in a theoretical 
analysis of a given social configuration and related to the whole of the historical 
process of which it is an indissoluble part.  Such analysis is essentially critical in 
character.16   
 
Such a “general” concept is thus a desirable product of careful research generated by 
critical induction.   
To thus note, as Horkheimer does at the outset of this reflection, that he has a 
hypothesis about a pervasive practice, is not to claim that every particular social relation 
must be described in terms of the “marks” of that practice (in this case, let us say, that 
every practice must be described in terms of the marks of a certain form of economic 
“competition”).  That would be to conceive of the concept as a totalizing set of 
common marks to which all descriptions must necessarily conform.  Rather, it is to say 
that the researcher intends to investigate every particular practice in late capitalism as, in 
some way, conditioned by this practice.  This is not therefore an a-priori description of 
the totality sealed off from the practice of inquiry, but a “hypothesis” intended to guide 
the examination of particular practices, for the purpose of resolving what Horkheimer 
takes to be suffering arising from the “pervasive” practice.  
                                                





The distinction Horkheimer draws in these reflections is not, it bears repeating, 
between scientific observation (which only perceives the empirical “appearance” of 
objects) and philosophical speculation (which plumbs the depths of the “essence” 
underlying and uniting such phenomena).  He is not distinguishing two methods of 
knowing, the scientific and the speculative, but rather two ways of conceiving the object 
of inquiry.  Horkheimer does not advocate here speculation regarding essences that 
cannot be accessed by empirical inquiry, but rather a particular way of understanding the 
practice of inquiry itself.17   
That Horkheimer continues to understand his account as a properly reflective way 
of practicing the sciences, not as a speculative appeal to abandon them, is evident from 
his later note “On Scientific Theory,” 
The average empirical sociologist these days is totally naïve vis-à-vis the prevailing 
schematism.  Through the concept of “facts,” he posits as absolute both a form of 
perception which is conditioned down to the most insignificant detail, and all the 
conscious and unconscious interests which organize the world, and then calls 
“theory” the systematic presentation of these “facts.”  But such theory lacks self-
awareness.18 
          
The idea of making science “conscious” of itself is not an abstract negation of the 
sciences.  Rather, Horkheimer notes that the social practices of a given period, informed 
as they are by the interests, desires and common projects of agents (“all the conscious 
and unconscious interests which organize the world”) are a “schematism.”  The 
schematism does not generate the external world, but mediates the experience of it by a 
social subject.  In so doing, however, it constrains the form of its appearance, because 
the method, goals, and products of the sciences are intricately related to the former side 
of the subject-object relation, and are thus “conditioned” by social practices “down to 
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the most insignificant detail.”   A properly reflective science is one that refuses to take 
the products of the subject-object relation as reflections of essence or brute “fact,” thus 
enabling inquiry into the schema, and, by implication, allowing new disclosures and 
discoveries regarding the other side of the subject-object relation as a consequence of 
changes in social practices.    
1.3. Critical induction and the unification of the sciences 
In order to illustrate the centrality of this understanding of inquiry to Horkheimer’s 
late work, I will first note examples Horkheimer offers in his “Notes” regarding how a 
reinterpretation of the products of the various specialized sciences may be incorporated 
by a critical researcher in her conceptualizations of social practices.  In the next section, 
I will reverse this approach and illustrate Horkheimer’s understanding of the distinct 
contributions of two of the specialized sciences for research, noting the intimate relation 
of both sciences to the judgments offered by the critical theorist qua philosopher. 
In the midst of his account of critical research, Horkheimer notes a particular 
example, the sociological concept of “the masses,” to demonstrate what he means by 
the difference between traditional and critical approaches to concept formation.  He 
begins by noting that “abstract” categories formulated without socio-historical 
qualification have no place in the development of theory.19  With this caveat in place, he 
proceeds to note that the concepts employed by the theorist cannot be developed from 
either “quantitative analysis” of the atomized individuals making up the masses, or from 
a qualitative study of various types of “collective behavior.”20  He thereby frames his 
discussion of the way the concept of “the masses” should be understood in terms of 
two inadequate approaches.  In referencing “quantitative analysis” he alludes to the 
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survey approach pioneered by American sociologists.21  Amassing surveys of the discrete 
agents that make up a mass without analyzing the social and economic practices that 
shape and direct such individuals, often quite apart from their conscious awareness, 
artificially abstracts an analysis of an agent from an analysis of the social practices she 
inhabits.  In referencing “character types,” he alludes to the social psychology of neo-
Freudians like Karen Horney and Erich Fromm.22  While such social psychology does 
not presume the atomic individual as its empirical nodal point, it similarly abstracts the 
psychic dynamics of group interaction from the historical and social practices that 
qualify such interaction, referencing instead universal accounts of the “nature” of 
humans as such.23   
Following a pattern we observe in his early essays, Horkheimer does not frame the 
approach of the critical researcher as the abstract negation of either of these methods, 
but rather as a repair of a flawed presupposition they have in common.  If either 
approach severs an empirical object of analysis from its relation to social and historical 
practices, the goal of the critical theorist is to reverse this abstraction, interpreting the 
products of these specialized sciences in relation to their genesis in social and historical 
practices.   
Proper methodological usage must recognize that the masses are basically different 
at the different stages of the sociohistorical process and that their function in society 
                                                
21 For a depiction of Horkheimer’s interest in the method of American social scientists, note John Duane 
Abromeit, “The Dialectic of Bourgeois Society: An Intellectual Biography of the Young Max Horkheimer, 
1895-1937” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2004), 299-304.   
22 For a description of Horkheimer and Adorno’s relationship to Horney and Fromm, note Rolf 
Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 270-273. 
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Approach,” in Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease, ed. Ernst Simmel (New York: International Universities 
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is impossible to resolve the crises of occidental culture by simply going back to its human sources, even to 





is essentially determined by that of other social strata as well as by the peculiar social 
and economic mechanisms that produce and perpetuate the masses.24 
 
Understood in such a way, survey-analysis or an analysis of group psyches “may be an 
integral part of any attempt at a theoretical interpretation of the term.”25  The task of the 
critical theorist is thus to resituate a given analytic description in terms of her particular 
inquiry into a pervasive social practice characterizing the whole, in a way that does not 
neglect the unique aspects of the practice described by the various specialized sciences.  
This recasts the multiplicity of analytic descriptions offered by the various specialized 
sciences in terms of a unifying synthetic category (the concept of a “social practice,” 
which has various related aspects studied by the specialized social sciences), and a 
unifying context of inquiry, an irritation regarding a pervasive social practice which 
motivates the theorist in the synthetic activity of diagnosis and repair.  In a summary of 
the research method which would eventually produce Studies in Prejudice,26 Horkheimer 
thus notes that concepts derived from research into anti-Semitism as a social relation 
necessarily transcend the boundaries of the various specialized sciences used in empirical 
study, however much they may illumine various aspects of the social relation,  
For a year … the Institute of Social Research at Columbia University has been 
engaged in the study of anti-Semitism.  The longer the problem is studied, the more 
conflicting and the more profound do its implications appear.  It must be 
immediately acknowledged that an arbitrary division of social sciences into 
sociology, psychology, social psychology, and so forth, cannot be maintained.  Every 
concept used in our study of anti-Semitism has social, psychological, philosophic 
implications.27  
 
Minimally, we may thus say that Horkheimer’s late research activity stands in continuity 
with his mature reflections on a materialist conception of inquiry. 
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Horkheimer proceeds to outline in the “Notes” a concrete example of how the 
understanding of induction implicit in critical research might shape the development of 
a concept like “youth,” as distinguished from the approach of the particular specialized 
sciences.  He notes,  
The peculiar kind of induction we have just outlined makes the formation of social 
concepts an empirical process and yet distinguishes this from the empirical method 
employed in the specialized sciences.  For example, the concept of “youth,” 
denoting a particular entity in present-day society, is not a biological, psychological, 
or sociological concept, for it takes in the entire social and historical process that 
influences the mentality and orientation of youth and that constantly transforms 
these.  Consequently, our concept will assume different functions pari passu with the 
changing composition, function, and attitudes of youth within the shifting social 
pattern.  And owing to the fact that the concept is to be formed under the aspect of 
the historical totality to which it pertains, sociology should be able to develop this 
changing pattern from the very content of the concept instead of adding specific 
contents from without.   
In this way, the various categories will be integrative ones through their very 
content and may themselves serve as the basis for combining the experiences and 
results of the various special sciences without being impeded by their several fixed 
boundaries.28      
 
On the one hand, the concept of “youth” originates in a particular discipline, sociology, 
and “is to be formed under the aspect of the historical totality to which it pertains.”  In a 
similar way, from “photosynthesis” to “id,” every scientific practice produces concepts 
as a result of the unique focus of its inquiry.  What is referenced immediately by the 
concept may thus be descriptions produced by an observational practice (in this case, 
say, a sociologist’s survey).  Yet the “facts” captured in the survey are constituted and 
conditioned by a “social pattern” which they reflect: a factoid derived from a survey has 
its genesis in the social practices of historical subjects.  Consequently a particular 
concept like “youth” for a critical researcher may not be restricted to “a biological, 
psychological, or sociological concept,” for although it may originate in a specialized 
science as a result of a sociologist’s survey, the truth of “youth” as a concept for a 
                                                





critical researcher exceeds the way the specialized science portrays it.  Such portrayals 
present aspects of a “social and historical process” or a “social pattern” and it is this 
“process” or “pattern,” related as this is to pervasive practices constituting the social 
whole, which is, recall, the object of critical inquiry.  Instead of simply amassing various 
“instances” of a taken for granted fact without inquiring into the social relations 
generating the present immediacy of its repetitive appearance, the critical researcher 
must “delve” by examining the products of the specialized sciences as various aspects of 
a constellation of social relations.   
Horkheimer is emphatic that this activity is no less an “empirical process,” even 
though it may be “[distinguished] from the empirical method employed in the 
specialized sciences.”  The various products of the specialized sciences are no less then 
required in order to form an understanding of “youth” as the genesis of a constellation 
of historical and social practices.  For instance, the social relations that constitute the 
genesis of the concept “youth” are social relations for psychic and embodied subjects.  
An investigation of the concept of youth must therefore utilize various disciplines like 
psychology or biology.  The “facts” as they are presented by these corresponding 
disciplines, such as “rebellion against authority” or the adolescent “sex drive,” are 
important aspects of practices for embodied subjects that inhabit them, just as other sets 
of practices which condition the sociological concept of youth – like the contemporary 
form of the family– in turn help to determine how one is to evaluate psychological or 
biological concepts like “rebellion” and “sex-drive.”   
Each concept in a specialized science is thus not simply a reflection of “facts” in the 
world, but rather describes, under various aspects, constellations of social relations 
between subjects.  This is why Horkheimer notes that “the various categories” regarding 





integrative ones through their very content and may themselves serve as the basis for 
combining the experiences and results of the various special sciences.”  Horkheimer 
wishes to maintain that such research is a precondition for the critical judgment of the 
theorist qua philosopher.  Let us examine this claim.      
2. Horkheimer’s late research methodology (II): 
The specialized sciences in the service of social critique  
 
In the “Notes” a clear picture of how Horkheimer relates the concepts of the 
various specialized sciences emerges: the “inductive” method pursued by critical social 
research provides a basis for the unification of the sciences in a concrete context of 
inquiry because it relates them as explanations of various aspects of its object, social 
practices.  Attention may now be paid to how Horkheimer differentiates the uniqueness 
of the various sciences in relation to his understanding of this unity, i.e. his account of 
how different scientific forms of inquiry relate to different aspects of social practices, as 
well as how this research serves as a precondition for the judgments regarding social 
practices forwarded by the theorist qua philosopher.  We will focus on his treatment of 
psychology, sociology, and philosophy, for he takes these three to be the most pertinent 
disciplines for a critical theory of society. 
2.1. Alienation and Embodiment:  
Psychology and Critique  
 
Insofar as critique presumes that subjects have embodied desires and drives that are 
mediated by their social life in a way that fails to satisfy subjects, it requires:  
(1): A description of the way affective desires and instinctual drives are experienced 
by subjects inhabiting social practices.    
Psychology, Horkheimer notes, offers such a description: it notes the relation of 
embodied states to social practices.  For instance, in an essay entitled “Ernst Simmel and 





explaining practices which posits purely cognitive reasons as warrants underlying the 
social activity of the subject.  Horkheimer observes that he “dared look behind the cloak 
of lofty ideas and made it his task to trace back individual as well as social habits to 
primitive biological drives.”29   
Horkheimer thus frames the significance of Freud in terms of his account of 
principles of explanation for social activity.  Explanations offered by “lofty ideas” give a 
cognitive account of the meaning of the whole which justifies the habits of a subject to 
the subject.  For Freud, however, intelligible concepts of the whole do not serve as a 
sufficient explanation for the significance of a social activity.  Rather, he formulates a set 
of concepts that express a relation between the embodiment of subjects and their social 
activity, which is able to explain the alienation and dissatisfaction which subjects 
experience in their social life in a way not open to purely cognitive explanations.  Thus, 
“The conflict of … drives with the prevailing framework of civilization served him as 
the principle of explanation” in marked contrast to “not a few of the religious and 
philosophical entities which people like to offer as their motives.”30  Freud, notes 
Horkheimer, thus critiques all purely “intellectual superstructures” and “metaphysical 
hiding places of the mind,”31 insofar as they elide a relation between embodiment and 
sociality in their attempts to explain the significance of a subject’s experience of its 
practices to the subject in question.   
Freud’s attention to the disjunction between the embodied desire of the subject and 
her social practices is thus at the heart of Horkheimer’s appreciation of him.  While 
psychoanalysts, he notes, are often tempted to abide by a strict causal nexus between a 
self-enclosed account of an antecedent personality-disorder and the consequent shape 
                                                








reality has taken for a subject (i.e. they “derive the physical from the psychological”), 
Freud begins with what lies at the obscured intersection between embodiment and 
existing social practices.  The purpose of psychology is thus to understand the biological 
and instinctual reasons why a particular subject experiences alienation as it inhabits a 
social form of life.   
Freud’s approach was that of a materialist psychology.  Where Victorian ideology 
talked about the sublimity of love and proved callous to the suffering brought about 
by underlying instincts, Freud spoke about erogenous zones and used a physiological 
terminology.  His tendency to derive the highest values from material processes, to 
resolve the psychological into the physiological and even physical, is almost 
overlooked in the eagerness to derive the physical from the psychological.  This 
latter tendency, which forms one part in Freud’s work, has much less materialistic, 
critical implications, and therefore less detrimental consequences for prevailing 
ideologies.  Where Freud spoke of ‘Lebensnot’. i.e. of very material conditions as the 
basic cause of certain psychological conflicts, we are tempted to abide by ego-
weakness and other derivative complexes which are more easily accessible.32  
 
One must insist on an analysis of the embodied subject, Horkheimer holds (termed 
alternately the “material,” “physical,” or “physiological” aspect of subjectivity) if one is 
to offer an explanation for the alienation arising from a social practice, and psychology 
provides a necessary analysis of the relation between the subject’s embodiment and its 
sociality.   
It is tempting in reading this striking affirmation, as well as Horkheimer’s unabashed 
support for “the theoretical core of Freud’s work, his biological materialism” as well as 
his call “to stick to Freudian orthodoxy,”33 to interpret Horkheimer as simply regressing 
to the very kind of illicit immediacy which he is so critical of in earlier essays, by treating 
mediated social practices as ephemeral expressions of a basic biological essence.  This 
way of understanding his argument, however, mistakes his attempt to contrast Freudian 
analysis with metaphysics as forms of explanation for the alienation of the subject.  In 
studying Victorian patterns of explanation, Horkheimer notes, Freud refused to take 
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Victorian appeals to the idea of sacrificial “love” at face value as a sufficient justification 
for the suffering of subjects, and instead inquired into the relation between human 
embodiment and socially normative sexual practices.  Freud’s descriptive judgment 
regarding “Lebensnot” or the “material conditions” underlying “psychological conflicts” 
was an attempt to inquire into the concrete embodied antecedent of the mediated 
expressions of alienation already offered by agents regarding the social practices they 
inhabited.  His psychological analysis is thus not being praised here because it confirms 
philosophical intuitions regarding a biological immediacy underlying all social relations.  
Rather, it is being praised because it exemplifies a method of research into the 
intersection of biology and sociality: it offers a description of irrational states that 
explains them as arising from the way embodied subjects come to experience repressive 
social practices.  Horkheimer thus describes psychology in the essay as a practice which 
seeks to understand and explain embodiment, for the purpose of subjecting alienation to 
the rational self-reflection of the subject,  
While they [Freud and Simmel] made the irrational their subject-matter, they 
remained rationalists in the best sense of the word.  They believed that the spell of 
the irrational is due to the inward and outward repression, and that this spell would 
be broken if it became truly and fully conscious; they aimed at overcoming 
rationalizations by consequent rationality.34 
 
When Freud or his followers treat psychological “disorder” as something other than a 
symptom arising from the intersection of instinctual and biological needs and socially 
repressive practices, when they invert this by claiming that the physiological is 
symptomatic of (universal, thus a-historical) psychological types – an approach which 
indeed makes up “one part in Freud’s work” – they are, according to Horkheimer, 
inverting a proper form of inquiry.  Much better than such crass psychologism, he notes, 
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is Freud’s attempt to give a materialist account of the instincts and drives of embodied 
subjects.  In context, this is not because this materialism reflects a metaphysical 
anthropology of some kind, but rather because it treats psychological states as 
symptoms of a breakdown in social relations that can be further researched and 
understood through a practice of inquiry.  It offers a part of an explanation for why 
concrete historical practices have become problematic for the subjects who do them, 
instead of conflating the psychological states themselves as explanations for practices, or 
relying on a purely intellectual explanation that attempts a justification for such a state 
(like the Victorian construal of “love”).   
2.2. Alienation and Sociality: 
Sociology and Critique 
 
The suffering arising from a subject’s relation to its practices cannot simply be 
understood by focusing on the embodied desires and drives of the subject, but must 
offer an account of:   
(2): The various kinds of social practices which the subject engages in together with 
others, and which satisfy to a greater or lesser degree its embodied needs.    
Horkheimer understands the study of various practices as well as the institutions which 
sustain them, as the provenance of sociology.  
In an essay entitled “The Lessons of Fascism” (1950), in which Horkheimer details 
the importance of sociological analysis for understanding the rise of fascist states, he 
attempts to display the methodological relation of sociological research to the practice 
of psychology.  Echoing the critique of psychologism to which he alludes briefly in his 
essay on Freud, Horkheimer begins by noting that when the object of contemporary 
psychology, the psyche of the individual, is understood not as a symptomatic expression 





such life, psychology becomes a form of modern Stoicism.  It focuses on training the 
analysand to master her inward “affective impulses” and this mastery is consequently 
equated with the control of the subject over her external reality.  Thus with the 
origination of modern psychology in the 17th century,  
The theorist taught the individual self-consciousness and self-control so that he 
might gain an inward freedom while the realities of the external world kept him 
restrained and relatively unfree.  In the tragedy of Corneille, the hero’s mastery over 
himself is identified with his mastery of reality, while in Molière man’s dependence 
on his emotions and feelings, his “blind spots,” are the essence of the comical.35 
 
Instead of interpreting affective states as reactions arising from the intersection of 
embodied drives and social relations in society, thus as symptomatic of the need for 
changes in social practices, subjects were taught to reflexively retrain their affect and 
desires in order to accept the social practices they inhabited.  Yet the object 
psychotherapy treats, Horkheimer notes, is not primarily weaknesses in subjects that 
need to be better regulated or controlled, such as a chemical or mental imbalance.  
Rather, it should give expression to a symptom, expressing a relation of dissatisfaction 
between subjects and the social practices they inhabit.   
Similar to its progenitor, contemporary psychological description may also treat its 
objects of reflection not as symptoms of a relation between subjects and problematic 
social practices but rather as states “inherent” to individual subjects which cause such 
practices,  
The idea, tacitly rather than explicitly put forth in most cases, that psychological 
therapy is itself an adequate solution of social problems is hardly valid.  Behind that 
idea rests the basic hypothesis that the mass of people, the individuals as they are 
determined by their inherent psychological mechanisms, are the active effective 
agents who create international misunderstandings and ultimately wars.36     
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The falsity of this approach may be demonstrated empirically, Horkheimer thinks, “for 
we have before us the concrete experience of the fascist states.” 37  He proceeds to argue 
at length that fascism arose not as “the immediate expression of the circumstances and 
thinking of the common man,” i.e. as a result of what he terms an “inherent” condition 
moving German subjects towards collective action, but rather because of “economic 
and political configurations that followed their own intrinsic laws” quite apart from the 
self-conscious decisions of many of the subjects participating in them.38  Social and 
economic practices acclimated the population to manipulation; manipulation was not 
made possible due to an “internal” shared psychosis (exclusively imputable, say, to 
discrete agents qua German).   
Thus psychological descriptions should not be taken to refer to a trait inherent in 
subjects, but rather to relations formed between embodied subjects and the social 
practices they inhabit.   Yet if understood as symptomatic of such relations, the products 
of psychological evaluation should not themselves be discounted, “To say that 
psychology cannot solve social problems by itself,” Horkheimer asserts, “is not to say 
that it cannot make a contribution.”  Rather, when such descriptions “are placed within 
their proper setting, they assume very real significance.”39  Psychological inquiry is thus 
integral to theory, so long as the subject’s expression of its needs and desires is situated 
in relation to the particular social practices which facilitate or hinder them.  It is thus the 
goal of the sociologist to give an explanation of how the subject’s experience of its 
embodiment is mediated by its social form of life. 
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For Horkheimer, understanding the significance of psychological explanations aright 
thus requires a detailed understanding of the way the “internal” life of the subject is 
reflective of the place they inhabit in social relations, 
Various strata of modern society not only carry different weights in the historical 
dynamic, they also reveal qualitative differences in the character and personality 
structure of their individual members.  These differences become obliterated in the 
sweeping generalizations about aggressive instincts and their control, but they 
remain very real in society itself.  If they are neglected, we run the danger of 
replacing in our minds the real human beings in their world of conflicts by a 
fictitious type, a kind of universal man, or even the “neurotic personality” of our 
time.40   
 
While, in his essay on Freud, Horkheimer supports the attempt to inductively 
understand how instinct and desire relate to the way a historical subject experiences its 
practices, in this essay he critiques explicitly the idea that one can begin analytically with 
something like a vague concept of “internal” aggressive instincts as such.  Such an 
approach will inevitably produce a “universal” or “fictitious” construction, for to 
describe an aggressive neurosis is to refer to the way an embodied proclivity is mediated 
by a particular set of socio-historical practices.  One may still posit a psychological 
explanation for a subject’s aggressiveness or passive alienation; however, this must 
always be done in relation to a particular context of inquiry, as an attempt to explain 
why subjects inhabiting this social form of life have come to mediate instinctual drives 
in such a way, not, that is, as an excuse to look away from a concrete context of inquiry 
into a more speculative philosophical anthropology.  For the researcher, sociological 
description necessarily situates the use of psychological categories.  The way this relates 
to Horkheimer’s invocation of universals like “self-preservation” in his late work is 
worthy of careful consideration.   
                                                





When an ineluctably embodied aspect to human practices is postulated, one 
inevitably becomes involved in offering sets of descriptions about what it means for 
humans to be biological animals.  Such descriptions are universal in scope, inasmuch as 
they purport to describe certain families of traits which humans qua embodied 
organisms share.  For instance, a scientist can attempt an explanation of a set of 
biological processes common to humans in various social forms of life: all humans 
undergo birth and death.  This, of course, does not deny that the categories and 
explanations rely on a particular socially conditioned context of inquiry.  It is only to say 
that they make claims which are universal in scope.  The concepts used by psychology 
may be described in a similar sense.  Psychology, as a science concerned with how social 
practices affect embodied organisms, requires accounts of humans as embodied and not 
merely social beings in order to generate an explanation of certain states of alienation 
that arise from the way the subject’s embodied needs are mediated by social practices. 
Yet despite the universal scope of such concepts, the way Horkheimer proposes to 
use them is not totalizing, for as he notes they are not appealed to in order to give a  
“universal” description of the necessary forms of human social practices.  Human ways 
of mediating embodiment are diffuse and contingent on an infinite variety of particular 
social practices.  Rather, such universal concepts facilitate an expression of why these 
embodied subjects have come to experience a particular social practice in the way that 
they have in terms of their embodiment.  “Totalizing” concepts related, for instance, to 
instinctual self-preservation may thus be used to analyze more carefully a particular 
social relation as experienced by an embodied subject, not in order to abstract from the 
contingency and sociality of such mediation, but to better understand the way the 





or fallibility of such universal concepts, nor is it intended to abstract from concrete 
social relations; rather, it intends to explain how embodiment relates to sociality.    
The implications of this for understanding Horkheimer’s theorizing are crucial.  If 
one wants to critique a concept like “self-preservation” as “totalizing” in Horkheimer’s 
theorizing because it is universal in the sense just noted, Horkheimer would not 
recognize this objection as compelling.  For such universal concepts are necessarily 
entailed in the study of the kind of object a psychologist inquires into.  But if one wants 
to argue that such concepts are “totalizing” because of the explanatory weight they carry 
for Horkheimer, i.e. if one wants to make the claim that they are used by him to 
circumvent the analysis of particular social practices in favor of a speculative 
philosophical anthropology, he would surely protest.  He would likely counter that one 
can deploy universal descriptive categories without using them in a way that deflects 
attention from an analysis of a particular social practice (and, indeed, that one cannot 
but use such universal categories if the intersection between human embodiment and a 
social practice is the object of inquiry).  Not distinguishing between ways universal 
concepts may be deployed in a context of inquiry is a significant lacuna in interpretive 
scholarship on Horkheimer.  We will have reason to revisit it in our explanation of the 
concrete use of the concept “self-preservation” in Horkheimer’s analysis of late 
capitalist society.41  
2.3. Alienation and Truth:   
Philosophy and Critique 
 
Neither of the objects of study we have examined, embodied “drives” for 
psychology or “social practices” for sociology, may be understood by the researcher, 
Horkheimer thinks, unless placed in relation.  Embodied drives cannot be experienced, 
                                                





let alone satisfied, except in terms of the social practices a subject is already doing.  
There is no suffering and desire as such, only the suffering and desiring a particular 
subject experiences in relation to a socio-historical practice she inhabits.  Social 
practices, on the other hand, are always practices for embodied subjects. This is why 
subjects often experience alienation from a practice as a physical or psychological 
happening.   
Any attempt to understand one or the other aspect of a social practice without 
recognizing the way they mediate and condition one another is thus a form of 
reductionism.  Such reductionism spells the end of the possibility of critical inquiry.  For 
Horkheimer one never gets to the “bottom” of either of these aspects of a practice: any 
purported grasp of a drive-in-itself has mistaken its social mediation; any description of 
the subject as merely societal mistakes that a social practice is inhabited by an embodied 
agent.  As we have seen, Horkheimer does not think the theorist needs to postulate 
regarding a “bottom” to license critical inferences.  What she needs, rather, is a 
thorough grasp of how subjects reflexively relate to the practices they inhabit.  The two 
sciences we have outlined provide materials for such critical inferences.   
Yet how to relate the findings of these sciences is a question that exceeds the 
analytic practice of either. The question is synthetic: a particular research problem in a 
concrete context of inquiry precedes and facilitates the theoretical activity of relating the 
various sciences.  Various descriptions of a practice, if related well, allow a description of 
the subject’s relation to its practice that might serve as the basis for a diagnosis regarding 
a subject’s alienation and a hypothesis regarding how the practice might be altered to 
satisfy the subject.  
In order to understand Horkheimer’s account of this synthetic task and how this 





relation of the specialized sciences to thought about “truth.”  Horkheimer outlines this 
succinctly in a reflection towards the end of “Art and Mass Culture” (1941), an essay 
contemporaneous with his reflections in the “Notes,”   
What is to be deplored is not that scientific thought has replaced dogmatism, but 
rather that such thought, still prescientific in the literal sense, is always confined 
within the limits of various specialized disciplines.  It is wrong to rely on science so 
long as the formation of its problems is conditioned by an obsolete division into 
disciplines.  Economy of thought and technique alone do not exhaust the meaning 
of science, which is also will to truth.  The way toward overcoming positivistic 
thinking does not lie in a regressive revision of science, but in driving this will to 
truth further until it conflicts with present reality.  Illuminating insights are not to be 
found in high and eternal principles, with which everybody agrees anyway (who does 
not profess faith in freedom and justice!), or in the routine arrangement of facts into 
customary patterns.42   
 
Horkheimer presumes that the scientific method has replaced appeals to the self-evident 
authority of tradition as a means of justifying claims about reality in modern life, and he 
is careful to note that his critique of the practice of the sciences is not a call for a return 
to such pre-modern conceptions of authority.  Rather, he frames his work as a repair of 
modern scientific practice: he is disturbed that modern “thought” is “confined within 
the limits” of the various specialized branches of the sciences.  Each discipline, he notes, 
has its own particular “problems” into which it intends to inquire as well as its own 
particular “technique” for developing descriptions related to these problems.  For 
instance, Freudian psychology is concerned to understand the effect of the socially 
sanctioned mediation of instincts on the psychic states of subjects.  Alienation as it is 
experienced by the individual is essentially the “problem” it seeks to address.  And 
Freudian psychoanalysis has its own “technique” for investigating and describing such 
states of alienation.  None of this is itself problematic, Horkheimer implies, nor should 
we revert back “behind” the practice of such sciences to pre-modern descriptions of 
psychic states.   
                                                





But Horkheimer is disturbed when such circumscribed investigations and the 
descriptions they generate are understood as the only concern of the sciences.  So too, 
he notes, is the “will to truth.”  Yet the analytic practices of the various sciences do not 
judge the “truth” of a practice.  They can generate descriptions of particular aspects of a 
social relation, not make a judgment about how such aspects relate to each other in the 
life of a historical subject (thus, he notes, they are “pre-scientific”).43  As a result, it is not 
clear how they may inform practical judgment about how a subject should act in relation 
to the practices she inhabits.  One should, Horkheimer concludes, neither abandon the 
results of the analytic sciences by returning to metaphysical postulates, “high and eternal 
principles,” as the justification for critical claims, nor conflate the arrangement of facts 
“into customary patterns” (i.e. descriptions generated “within the limits of various 
specialized disciplines”).  Rather one must somehow “drive” science further in order to 
generate “illuminating insights.”   
While this passage does not offer an account of Horkheimer’s alternative to the two 
patterns of thought he critiques, the regression to metaphysical postulates and the 
conflation of specialized description with reality, it nevertheless illustrates clearly that:  
(1): The methodological space Horkheimer articulates would involve a synthetic task 
which incorporates the findings of the various special sciences, and 
(2): The synthetic task would relate the products of the analytic sciences in a way 
that would “illumine” social practices, or allow a subject to understand better her 
relation to the practices she inhabits, though how this is so is not specified in the 
passage.   
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Horkheimer is not interested in this passage in an abstract critique of the sciences.  
Rather, he wishes to claim that the various analytic sciences need to be related 
synthetically in terms of the critical task.   
This synthetic task is the work of the philosopher.  In a telling reflection on Freud’s 
relationship to the philosophical task, Horkheimer begins with the restatement of a 
premise we have already examined: Freud refuses to accept intelligible concepts as 
explanations for states of embodied alienation.  Yet this refusal to accept such 
explanations of alienation itself embodies a kind of philosophical commitment,  
Freud’s negative attitude against philosophical illusions is itself an expression of his 
unique approach to the decisive problems of life, an approach of the kind we may 
call philosophy.  Only we must understand the term philosophy in an 
unconventional way, free from connotations of an idealization of the gruesome 
realities of our world.  In contrast to such dubious teleological efforts of humanity 
there have always been other meanings of philosophy.44  
 
Freud’s posture towards the transfiguration of suffering, notes Horkheimer, should in 
no sense be conflated with an abstract negation of intelligible concepts as such.  For 
Freud shares with other Aufklärers a basic commitment to the ideas of reason, and it is 
on the basis of this commitment that he proceeds with his critique, “Science indeed was 
to replace metaphysics, but science as a philosophical force.  It should do away with 
metaphysical illusions such as prejudices and superstitions, but should carry over the 
basic concepts of rationality: truth, freedom, and justice.”45 
Some have wished to interpret passages such as this as straight-forward affirmations 
of a rationalism which understands truth as the adequation between social practices and 
intuitively known concepts of reason.  For instance, Löwy notes 
It seems that the ultimate foundation for values and the ultimate guarantee for the 
truth of Critical Theory is reason, as understood by the Enlightenment and by 
German idealism. … Horkheimer seems to be more reserved [than Marcuse] and 
some of his essays contain substantial criticisms of classical rationalism; but even 
                                                






there he explicitly claims that the reason (Vernunft) of Critical Theory is the inheritor 
of this rationalist tradition.46 
 
Yet if “truth” were a set of ratios between practices and self-evident intelligible 
concepts, the idea that one would need to question already existing “dubious teleological 
efforts” with the results of research, a basic premise of the essays we have just 
examined, would be nonsensical.  As Horkheimer outlines in his approbation of Freud, 
the psychologist begins with an account of suffering, whose principle of explanation is 
some form of metaphysics, a transfiguring “rationalization.”  Instead of accepting this, 
the psychologist inquires into the instinctual and social preconditions that have given 
rise to this expression, in order to render a judgment about what “suffering” signifies in 
terms of the fit between the instincts and desires of the embodied subject and the socio-
historical practices she inhabits.  Thus both the ideological content of rationalizations as 
well as the alternative fit which the Aufklärer seeks are themselves empirical discoveries.  
In affirming the relation of this scientific endeavor to the ideas of reason informing the 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer draws on a trope he developed earlier in his “Postscript” to 
“Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937).  In arguing that critical theory was the true 
inheritor of emancipatory Enlightenment ideals like truth, freedom and justice, he 
distinguished the shape this commitment had taken from the notion that these concepts 
were present for subjects as “pure” intuitions, “The dialectic theory does not practice 
any criticism based solely on ideas.  Even in its idealist form it had rejected the notion of 
a good-in-itself wholly set over against reality.  It does not judge by what is beyond time 
                                                
46 Michael Löwy, “Partisan Truth: Knowledge and Social Classes in Critical Theory,” in Foundations of the 
Frankfurt School of Social Research, eds. Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tar (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1988), 300.  For a rehearsal of interpreters that make this claim, note my description of stage 





but by what is within time.”47  Further, he had presented the idea that the content of 
such concepts – the standard to be adequated – was itself an immanent socio-historical 
judgment made by theorists, “Reason’s intuition of itself, regarded by philosophy in 
former times as the highest degree of happiness, is transformed in modern philosophy 
into the materialist concept of a free, self-determining society.”48  Thus Horkheimer 
presumes that the ratio held forth in the Enlightenment ideals between the present state 
of a practice and the fulfillment of the expectations of a subject regarding it is in fact a 
historical ratio, which must be discovered in the face of social and political obstacles.  
This truth is no less an ‘objective’ fit for subjects in society, however, for being 
historical.  Thus paralleling his discussion of the “will to truth” in “Art and Mass 
Society,” Horkheimer notes that Freud holds forth “the idea that there is something like 
objective truth, and that the ills of human existence are ultimately due to the perversions 
and deflections of that truth under the impact of taboos and other mental and extra-
mental forms of coercion.”49 
It does not follow from this that Horkheimer’s account of Enlightenment 
philosophy as a synthesizing discipline does not involve intelligible concepts, only that 
the justification of the truth of such concepts radically shifts from the coordinates of 
adequation as they are understood by the rationalist, and become contingent instead on 
historical investigation mediated by the contingent projects of subjects in a context of 
inquiry.  Demonstrating this is enough to repair Löwy’s claim that the embrace of 
intelligible concepts like a “free, self-determining society” or the “will to truth” 
                                                
47 Horkheimer, “Postscript,” 250.  For Horkheimer’s claim that critical theory is the inheritor of the 
Enlightenment, note the “Postscript” to “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Critical Theory 243-244; cf. 
“The Latest Attack on Metaphysics” (1937), in Critical Theory, 148-149. 
48 Ibid., 248 





contradict Horkheimer’s critique of rationalism offered elsewhere.  There is no 
contradiction in asserting both that:  
(1): The justification of intelligible concepts is never self-evident, so that such 
abstract concepts may be thrown into question by the experience of suffering in a 
way that requires inquiry (in this case, the adequacy of such concepts to explain the 
subject’s experience of alienation is at issue); 
(2): Intelligible concepts themselves are unavoidable in such contexts of inquiry (in 
this case, the notion that the self-realization of the subject is a historical goal that 
ought be pursued is supposed by inquiry into alienation).  Such concepts, as we will 
see in the following chapters, are never self-evident for Horkheimer, they are rather 
situated as mediated expressions of historical traditions.    
Put in terms of Horkheimer’s reflections, there is no contradiction between the claim 
that philosophy questions teleological justifications of alienation and seeks, in 
structuring the various practices of the sciences in relation to a discrete problem, to 
describe and repair the experience of alienation, and the claim that philosophy itself 
assumes teleological concepts like the goal of “self-determination” or “the will to truth” 
in this endeavor, concretely delineated in terms of particular historical contexts.  If 
inquiry begins in the middle of a set of commitments that are never merely descriptions 
of empirical states, we need not be surprised when Horkheimer claims both that one 
should utilize research in the sciences instead of explaining suffering by appeal to 
intelligible concepts and that the inquiry in which such research is utilized itself 
supposes a commitment to certain intelligible concepts.  This does not indicate 





In his reflections on Freud as a philosopher, Horkheimer summarizes and 
distinguishes two related commitments defining critical philosophical activity, which we 
may use to illustrate the relation of the philosopher to the specialized sciences,  
Philosophy means the ability to have new and genuine experiences, the power to 
overcome the hypnotic spell of current ideologies, to resist the deadening effects of 
daily routines on our organs of perception, and to open new horizons in our 
understanding of nature and humanity.  Both elements, the passion for truth and the 
capacity to raise the human mind [to] new levels (of understanding rather than of 
domination) are parts of the definition of philosophy.50 
 
The philosopher, first, questions the immediacy of contemporary reality, i.e., “the 
deadening effects of daily routines on our organs of perception.”  This supposes a 
commitment to interpret the results of the analytic sciences in a way that enables the 
subject to reflexively understand its own alienation.  It thus presumes a situation in 
which alienation is experienced as an irritant but not understood, and commits itself to 
synthesizing the results of the sciences in order to bring about the self-conscious 
understanding of the subject.  In so doing, it has “the capacity to raise the human mind 
[to] new levels of understanding” and the ability to reveal “new and genuine 
experiences.”  We may summarize this in terms we have outlined previously in this 
chapter by noting that the philosopher:    
(1): Synthesizes psychological and sociological analyses of the experience of the 
subject in order to illumine a subject’s own alienated relationship to its social 
practices. 
The second commitment of the philosopher situates this concern for inquiry into 
alienation in relation to a refusal to accept existing justifications for such alienation, i.e. 
“the hypnotic spell of current ideologies.”  One may well be committed to utilizing 
research to explain states of alienation, yet be directed in synthesizing the results of 
                                                





research by the supposition that such states are inevitable or necessary.  The critical 
philosopher, by contrast, is animated in her synthesizing activity by the belief that the 
alienation arising from a social relation is unnecessary and its justification vacuous.  In 
this context, to say that philosophy exemplifies a “passion for truth” over against the 
obfuscations of ideology is not to say it is committed to descriptive correspondence in 
some abstract sense that ideology is not, but rather to indicate that it is committed to the 
Enlightenment ideal of the self-satisfaction of the subject as an end-in-itself.  The 
philosopher therefore:  
(2): Synthesizes judgments regarding historical relations in a way that privileges the 
Enlightenment idea that the self-realization of the subject is a desirable historical 
possibility.  
Thus the inquiry of the critical philosopher both critiques certain uses of intelligible 
concepts and yet relies, in a distinct sense, on an intelligible concept of self-
determination which orients the ends sought by her inquiry.  This concept of self-
determination itself is justified by Horkheimer vis-à-vis an argument which depends 
upon a philosophy of history.  For our purposes, a discussion of this may wait until 
chapter 4.  
Having described Horkheimer’s understanding of critique as a practice of inquiry, I 
shall devote the remaining chapters to understanding how this is exemplified by his late 
critique of instrumental reason.  In the next chapter we will note the way he uses 
empirical research to analyze the object of his inquiry, the relation of changes in modern 
political economy to altered habits of reasoning.  We will then note the way he orients 
the findings of empirical practices in terms of a specific problem he wishes to diagnose 








State capitalism, the family and the social preconditions of reasoning: 
The genesis of instrumental reasoning 
 
I noted in chapter 2 that Horkheimer’s mature theorizing is often presented as a 
disappointed reaction to trauma, a shift away from his former concern with empirical 
study towards a speculative philosophy.  The particulars of Horkheimer’s account of 
political economy in the 40s are typically presented accordingly as a way-station on the 
road to a negative philosophy of history.  For instance, in an influential interpretation we 
shall examine below, Helmut Dubiel concludes that the theory of state capitalism, 
developed by Horkheimer in his essay “The Authoritarian State” (1940), and supposed 
by him throughout the 40s, provided him “with an economic justification for 
considering an economic analysis of society no longer necessary or even possible.”1  If 
in the previous chapter, I outlined Horkheimer’s development of his early conception of 
the relation of empirical research to social critique, in this chapter I will use this analysis 
to return to Horkheimer’s various essays on political economy and the family with new 
eyes.  I shall argue that Horkheimer understood his late “turn” away from Marxist 
categories not as a shift away from empirical and towards speculative concepts, but 
rather as an attempt to reformulate his original categories of analysis in the face of 
qualitative changes to their object of study.  I shall also illustrate that the shape of this 
late study follows precisely his mature reflections on research methodology.     
In the previous chapter, I noted that a basic axiom of this methodology is the 
“pervasiveness hypothesis.”  The hypothesis claims that the relationship between the 
dominate practices characterizing a social whole and the life of the individual can be 
uncovered by an examination of the micrological facets of the individual’s life.  
                                                
1 Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory, trans. Benjamin Gregg 






Following his analysis of the logic of this relation, Horkheimer focuses his mature 
research on two loci: a pervasive practice of political economy which shapes the social 
whole (analyzed in his essays on “state capitalism”) and an intimate aspect of the 
individual’s life which reflects this pervasive practice (analyzed in his essays on 
“authority in the family”).  Although, as we shall see, the two are typically treated 
separately in the literature, I shall illustrate that his reflections on both loci should be read 
together as an attempt to describe this two-sided relation between part and whole, 
specified as the impact of changes in the practice of economic competition on the way 
agents learn how to reason within the family.  In section 1, I begin by examining 
Horkheimer’s “shift” away from Marxist categories as a response to the empirical 
inadequacies which characterized his early understanding of the practice of competition.  
In section 2, I turn to the other side of this relation, his description of the impact of 
changes in political economy on the social practices of the family.   
This chapter addresses a constructive challenge to two distinct audiences, critical 
theorists who have focused their reading on Horkheimer’s essays on political economy, 
and feminists who have analyzed his essays on the family.  I shall briefly note what is at 
stake for both.  Critical theorists take for granted as axiomatic that the theory of 
Horkheimer and Adorno in the 40s supposes a “totalizing” premise, the notion that 
reasoning as such has openly become what it always secretly was: an instrument of 
domination in the service of self-preservation.2  Horkheimer, it is true, is concerned in 
                                                
2 In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA.: 
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reason as a tool “in the service of self-preservation gone wild” renders any rational critique of social 
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Telos no. 119 (Spring 2001): 97; Marianna Papastephanou, “Ulysses’ Reason, Nobody’s Fault: Reason, 





his reflections on political economy and the family to demonstrate the way the subject’s 
socially learned patterns of reasoning are altered by qualitative changes in the social 
whole.  Yet I shall demonstrate, first, that a careful reading of these essays illustrates that 
he does not wish to construe this qualitative change simply as the truncation of reason 
to an instrument of self-preservation.  Rather, his account of the way the subject learns 
to reason within the family distinguishes between the theoretical and reflective faculties 
of reason, which he portrays as having distinct ends and which he maintains are affected 
in distinct if related ways due to changes in the practice of competition characterizing 
late modern life.  Further, I shall demonstrate that he does not attempt to critique every 
theoretical use of reason in the pursuit of self preservation. Rather he distinguishes 
between ways of exercising the faculty which are suited to the modern goal of self-
determination, and ways which are not.  In describing Horkheimer’s empirical studies, 
my goal is thus to fundamentally reorient the way the object of his late reflections is 
understood, with a view to retrieving the significance of his philosophy for 
contemporary critical theorists. 
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I will also dialogue in section 2 with feminist interlocutors who deny that 
Horkheimer’s conclusions regarding the family can be defended by contemporary 
theorists in a form that is not repressive.  They offer three critiques:   
(1): Horkheimer portrays women’s non-instrumental concern for the family as a 
passive expression of feminine ontology, neither chosen nor retained in accordance 
with the active judgment of the woman, but possessed naturally and lost through 
machinations outside of her control.  Thus Horkheimer does not recognize the 
constitutive subjectivity of women.3    
(2): Horkheimer does not appreciate that the entrance of women into the 
marketplace allowed their escape from oppressive and violent relations of 
dependency within the home.  He does not consider the violence enforced by such 
relations of dependency as an object worthy of reflection.4   
(3): Horkheimer affirms patriarchal authority as a sine qua non of the internalization 
of values as ends-in-themselves.  He thus fails to recognize the thoroughly 
instrumental character of the internalization process itself.5   
Each of these critiques express a weakness of Horkheimer’s analysis that arises from his 
conflation of sociality with biology, a conflation which these authors rightly note must 
be repaired by any theorist who intends to recover the significance of his empirical 
                                                
3 Mechthild Rumpf, “‘Mystical Aura’: Imagination and Reality of the ‘Maternal’ in Horkheimer's 
Writings,” trans. Jean Keller and John McCole, in On Max Horkheimer, argues that there is an 
“undetermined distinction between prehistorical inheritance and socialization” in Horkheimer’s work on 
the family (310).  In particular, “The figures of maternal love that [Horkheimer] outlines … follow the 
logic of a linear cultural pessimism; they miss the reality of woman as an empirical ‘subject’” (317).  Cf. 
Patricia J. Mills analysis in Woman, Nature and Psyche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 111.  
4 Patricia J. Mills notes in Woman, Nature and Psyche, “[Horkheimer’s] concern with woman as mother, as 
she represents another reality to her son, overrides any concern with woman qua woman” (120-121).  She 
concludes, “There is no account of how [the son’s] dream was often a nightmare for woman who lived by, 
for, and through others” (121).  Cf. Rumpf, “Mystical Aura,” 320. 
5 Jessica Benjamin notes in “Authority and the Family Revisited: or, A World without Fathers?” New 
German Critique, no. 13 (Winter 1978): 53, that while “there may be real value in Horkheimer's assumption 
that the female principle of nurturance is reduced by the instrumentalization of motherhood,” 
nevertheless, “his explanation for this encroachment … does not seem viable” because he traces it to “the 






studies.  Several passages in his late work show a limited recognition of how this 
conflation confuses social analysis.  I shall thus use these texts at the end of 2.1 in order 
to point toward one way theorists interested in retrieving the central premises of 
Horkheimer’s reflection on the formation of reasoning practices may do so in a more 
defensible form.  It is also true, as (2) notes, that aspects of Horkheimer’s thought are 
simply indefensible.  For instance, the lack of a sustained critique of the domestic 
dependency relationship in his reflections in the 60s and 70s is unacceptable for any 
theorist concerned with recovering the Enlightenment goal of the self-determination of 
the subject.   
Yet the arguments employed miss important nuances in Horkheimer’s analyses.  My 
reconstruction of Horkheimer’s understanding of the relationship between maternal 
nurture and reflective reasoning will illustrate, for instance, that a portrayal of the active 
subjectivity of women in the midst of unjustified relationships of dependency is integral 
to his reflections on the family in the 30s and 40s (contra 1).  Further, I will argue that 
he did not equate his analysis of the entrance of women into the marketplace with the 
justification of past relations of dependency, but rather believed that he could feasibly 
critique both.  While the recognition and critique of such dependency is indeed eclipsed 
in the last two decades of his life, I will demonstrate that this is a marked shift from his 
earlier arguments in the 30s and 40s, which may be jettisoned without thereby losing the 
cogency of this analysis (contra 2).  Finally, I shall argue that the idea that Horkheimer 
conceived of the instrumental internalization of patriarchal authority as preserving a 
domain of “substantive” values misunderstands the central premises he wishes to 





engagement with this latter set of interlocutors involves a qualified defense of 
Horkheimer’s work on the family.6 
1. Marxist political economy and the comprehension of “transitional” states 
1.1. “Transitional States” and the diagnostic limits of Marx’s political economy    
Despite his nuanced emphasis on social psychology, Horkheimer understands 
economic practices as the engine of societal development in his early essays and 
construes politics as an ephemeral reflection of the economy.7  As early as 1937 in his 
“Postscript” to “Traditional and Critical Theory,” however, he notes of critical theory 
that “the dependency of politics on the economy has been its object, not its program.”8  
Marx’s theorizing does not address transitional states-of-affairs arising from the 
fulfillment of its own predictions: changes in the most basic economic practices of a 
society such as its “property relations,” “increased productivity” or even preliminary 
changes in the political sphere such as increased “social collaboration” cannot be naively 
conflated with the leap into freedom without an analysis of “the nature and 
development of the society in which all these particular developments are taking place.”9  
Even something as central to Horkheimer’s theorizing as the dependency of politics on 
the economy is thus not axiomatic.  In a time of transition between historical stages, the 
focus of theory may shift as this object of its reflection changes fundamentally.  Just as 
concrete historical events influence him to revisit the problematic concept of “class 
                                                
6 This “work on the family” is not monolithic.  In his essays from the 30s, Horkheimer predicts the 
sublation of the relations in the family in a more adequate and universal form with the advent of 
socialism: “Authority and the Family” (1936), in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell 
et. al. (New York: Continuum, 1999), 117, 124.  In his later essays, and particularly “Authoritarianism and 
the Family Today,” in The Family: Its Function and Destiny, ed. R.N. Anshem (New York: Harper, 1949), he 
continues to emphasize the relations of solidarity constituting the traditional family, yet no longer couches 
this in terms of a coming fulfillment but rather their steady erosion.  Nevertheless, parallels between his 
early and later works are evident.  We will draw upon his earlier essays as they illumine this later 
discussion.   
7 For instance, note Max Horkheimer, “History and Psychology” (1932), in Between Philosophy and Social 
Science: Selected Early Writings (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995), 117-118 and “Authority and the Family,” 
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8 Horkheimer, “Postscript” (1937), in Critical Theory, 251. 





consciousness” using the tools of social psychology in his earlier essays, so his analysis in 
“Postscript” does not signify a movement away from economic analysis, but is an 
attempt to properly comprehend the changing character of the economy as a part of an 
empirical whole in which “the transition remains indeterminate.”10  What is at issue is 
not a shift in analysis from one kind of practice (the economic) to another (the political), 
but rather an attempt to better comprehend an interrelated set of social practices that is 
in transition.  This stands in fundamental continuity with Marx, for “even in its most 
refined estimates” Marx’s Capital did not reify anonymous economic practices as self-
contained but focused on “the historical course of society as a whole.”11  Yet, 
Horkheimer asserts with equal vigor, “None of these elements is separable from the 
economic.”12   
In a development of this argument in “Authoritarian State,” Horkheimer thus 
asserts that both a scholastic appreciation of Marx’s theory as an object of historical 
significance to be appreciated (like a beautiful painting one might observe, not a tool for 
action), as well as a repetition that rehearses the “laws” articulated by Marx as a-
historical depictions of the future (as tools for action immediately fitted to the present 
apart from historical reflection), detach theory from the contemporary development of 
its object.  There are necessary limits to Marx’s original theory which are rooted in his 
greatest strength, the dependence of his reflection on a contingent, historical object,   
Part of the meaning of theory is the time at which it is developed.  The theory of the 
growth of the means of production, and of the task of the proletariat is neither a 
historical painting to be gazed upon nor a scientific formula for calculating future 
events. … If truth is perceived as property, it becomes its opposite and hence 
subject to relativism which draws its critical elements from the same ideal of 
certainty as absolute philosophy.13 
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12 Ibid., 250. 






      
Marx formulated historically dependent postulates which may continue to illumine the 
present shape of society, yet as fallible historical articulations, adequate to the historical 
social form to which they were addressed but in need of reevaluation and repair in the 
face of its development. 
Formulating the concrete implications of such methodological openness in the 
“Jews and Europe” (1939), Horkheimer thus notes, “The categories of political 
economy – exchange of equivalents, concentration, centralization, falling rate of profit, 
and so on – still have tangible validity, except that their consequence, the end of political 
economy has been attained.”14  This acknowledges that Marx provided diagnostic tools 
which accurately predicted the way economic functions would become centralized in the 
regulatory power of the state.  Yet in noting that “the end of political economy has been 
attained,” Horkheimer haltingly admits that the theoretical tools Marx provided for 
predicting this centralization do not continue to be adequate to interpret the subsequent 
institutional practices emerging from it.15   
Similarly, in “Authoritarian State,” Horkheimer notes that, for Marx, the crises 
leading to the collapse of capitalism are “defined by the market economy.”16  The 
assumption of continual competition between individual entrepreneurs thus framed 
Marx’s analysis of both the laws precipitating crises as well as the solidarity of alienated 
workers.  However, the practice of competition assumed by Marx as a given has in fact 
changed qualitatively.  A different “social structure,” together with “particular 
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Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas Kellner (New York: Routledge, 1989), 83.  Cf. “Authoritarian State”, 
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15 I am indebted to Peter Stirk for this interpretive point: Max Horkheimer: A New Interpretation (Hemel 
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tendencies” unique to it, now supports the productive metabolism of society.17  A new 
constellation of social practices characterizing institutions caught in “the transition from 
monopoly to state capitalism” thus requires renewed examination.18  This is particularly 
the case, if, instead of transfiguring transitional states as necessary precursors of some 
leap into freedom, the possibility is allowed that they may continue indefinitely.19  As we 
will see, for Horkheimer, “state capitalism” as a concept delineates institutional 
Tendenzen characterizing “transitional” states in a way that intends to repair limits in 
Marx’s political economy, not to replace such empirical concepts with speculative ones.       
1.2. “State capitalism” as a reparative concept 
To comprehend the importance of “state capitalism” in Horkheimer’s late theory, 
one must begin with its original formulation by Horkheimer’s confidant and Institut 
economist, Franz Pollock. Horkheimer’s claim that a new pattern in the relation 
between economic and political practices is emerging with “the transition from 
monopoly to state capitalism” depends on Pollock’s analysis.20  In his essay, “State 
Capitalism” (1941), Pollock concludes, “The replacement of the economic means by 
political means as the last guarantee for the reproduction of economic life changes the 
character of the whole historic period.  It signifies the transition from a predominately 
economic to an essentially political era.”21  This formulation is notably imprecise, as the 
word “economic” is used in two distinct ways.  Pollock speaks of “economic” means 
being replaced by “political” means, before noting that both of these means are related 
to “the reproduction of economic life.”  Thus he distinguishes narrow economic means 
                                                
17 Ibid. 97. 
18 Ibid., 96. 
19 Ibid., 97. 
20 For a description of Horkheimer’s relationship to Pollock, note Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: 
Its History, Theories and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 
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(the mediating practices of the market), from economic life in a broader sense (the 
metabolism existing between human productive practices and nature).   
Dubiel concludes on the basis of such passages, 
Adorno and Horkheimer found in Pollock’s theory the political-economic 
refinement of their own thesis (a refinement they themselves never accomplished), 
namely, that domination in highly developed, industrial societies no longer assumes 
an economic form, as in liberalism, but rather an immediately political form, as in 
the pre-bourgeois era.  Pollock’s theory provided them with an economic 
justification for considering an economic analysis of society no longer necessary or 
even possible.22   
 
This conclusion understands the definition of “economic” in the narrow sense Pollock 
outlines (economic means), and infers from the way such means are construed that 
Horkheimer entirely abandons an economic analysis of society.  But this is not the way 
Horkheimer would have characterized his own understanding of “state capitalism” in his 
essays on political economy.  While Horkheimer concedes in his earlier “Postscript” 
that, in transitional states, political mediations will gain a new “independence” from 
market mechanisms (thus making a claim regarding “economic” means in the narrow 
sense), at the same time he carefully qualifies that “none of these elements is separable 
from the economic” (thus making a claim regarding “economic” life in the broader 
sense).  Both Pollock and Horkheimer thus use “state capitalism” to refer to a qualified 
empirical claim: the historical shape of narrow “economic” mechanisms is changing and 
this has implications for the broader productive metabolism of society.  This, it may be 
noted, is by no means a shift away from a concern with economic practices in either the 
narrow or broader senses.  It is precisely Horkheimer’s attention to the concrete 
empirical realities of transitional states that challenges his attachment to Marxian 
political economy and motivates such changes in his theorizing.   
                                                





Much ink has been spilt about the debate that took place between Pollock and the 
other main economist at the Institut, Franz Neumann, regarding Pollock’s formulation of 
“state capitalism.”23  Rather than rehearsing the details of the discussion, a task that has 
been done and redone elsewhere, I wish to fix attention on one particularly salient 
moment in the debate, in which Horkheimer clarifies how he intends to use Pollock’s 
concept to guide his own theorizing.  What is so instructive about this moment is that 
Horkheimer refuses to understand the concept as simply descriptive of present states of 
affairs, in the way both Pollock and Neumann assume.  Rather, he proposes it as a 
testable hypothesis regarding the tendencies of institutions in transitional states that may 
direct future research into the qualitative way the experiences of economic practices are 
changing for subjects.  In other words, he interprets it as a way of repairing the limited 
diagnostic capacity of his former Marxian political economy.    
The essential point of dispute between Neumann and Pollock is whether a 
qualitative shift in the shape of political economy is occurring under the Nazi regime.  
They agree that the sign of such a shift will be when functions which had once been 
directed by liberal markets, such as:  
(1): The production of goods,  
(2): The contracting of labor for hire by businesses,  
(3): The variation of prices on the basis of supply and demand, and 
(4): The appropriation of profit by private owners,   
become directed by state regulation controlled by ruling political cliques.  There is also 
agreement between the two that regulation had indeed taken over the place formerly 
held by market mechanisms in (1)-(3).  They differ fundamentally, however, in how they 
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understood (4).  Neumann stresses the continuing role of private profits as an incentive 
for large businesses to control the regulatory power of the state, and notes that the 
private appropriation of profit has not been outlawed.  For his part, Pollock emphasizes 
that while private appropriation is still allowed, how the appropriated value is generated 
is almost entirely circumscribed by the interests of the cliques controlling state 
regulation.24  The closeness in proximity of the two positions illustrates that the question 
at stake for both is one of descriptive emphasis.25   
Horkheimer, however, refuses to treat the discussion as a disagreement regarding 
competing descriptions and construes the work of both theorists according to his 
interest in understanding the future shape of transitional states.  While he concedes that 
Neumann’s thesis is a (superior) description of existing practices in fascist Germany, he 
privileges Pollock’s work as an ideal type intended to allow theorists to project the 
direction which these developments will take.  Horkheimer thus writes to Neumann, 
As I have boundless confidence in your research on economic processes in 
Germany, I do believe your statement that Germany is not in a situation remotely 
resembling that of state capitalism.  On the other hand, I cannot free myself from 
Engels’s view that society is moving towards precisely that.  I must therefore assume 
that the approach of such a period very probably still threatens us.  And this seems 
to me to a great extent to prove the value of Pollock’s construct in providing a basis 
for discussions of a topical problem, in spite of all its deficiencies.26 
      
Pollock’s analysis thus presents, for Horkheimer, not simply a description but a 
diagnosis, the rudiments of a hypothesis for explaining developments in contemporary 
political and economic practices.  The concept of “state capitalism” does not answer the 
question of whether “profit”/“wages” (e.g. 4) still exist as an empirical motive for 
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economic agents.  Rather, it offers a hypothesis regarding tendencies in societies 
transitioning from monopoly capitalism to state capitalism, tendencies which will 
qualitatively alter the significance of “profits” for subjects in the future. 
We noted at the outset that critical research studies the detrimental impact of a 
“pervasive” practice characterizing the social whole on the embodied life of subjects.  
We are now in a position to note the pervasive practice Horkheimer wishes to examine, 
using the category of “state capitalism”: competition.  “State capitalism” explains the 
changing significance of economic mechanisms (Pollock’s economic means, e.g. 
profit/wages) for subjects inhabiting “transitional” states, in relation to the evolution of 
the basic “unit” of competition which constitutes the building blocks of political 
economy in such states (e.g. the constitutive element of Pollock’s economic life of 
society).  The continuing existence of wages and the profit motive are thus not denied 
per se by Horkheimer.  Rather, he maintains that the significance of such mechanisms 
for subjects is qualitatively changing due to transformations in the practice of 
competition characterizing the social whole. 
1.3. Competition and economic agency in “state capitalism”     
Horkheimer argues that while competition for profit continues to exist in late 
modern society, the basic unit of competition has qualitatively changed.  For instance, 
workers no longer compete in authoritarian states for the opportunity to earn a wage.  
What once counted as the goal of progressive movements, free and full employment, 
has, in fact, been nominally accomplished.  Yet in the process, what full employment 
signifies for workers has also changed fundamentally.  The ability of the worker to 
participate in the economic life of society is now dependent, not upon employment and 
the fluctuation of market cycles, but upon her identification with the party leader or 





human beings has not been broken.  Fear of unemployment is supplanted by fear of the 
state.”27  While “wages,” “profit,” and “competition” between various factions certainly 
continue as aspects of the metabolism of the life of society under fascism, their meaning 
for subjects is fundamentally altered.  The suffering meted out blindly by the business 
cycles of an erratic economy has been replaced by conscious and deliberate forms of 
targeting, “Previously, the economic fate was not only anonymous, it also took aim at 
the sinners and the elect without regard to human particularities; … . To that extent it 
was humane in its inhumanity.  In the Führer-state, those who are to live and those who 
are to die are deliberately designated.”28  In the fascist state, what was once understood 
as an irrational and arbitrary fate, in retrospect appears humane.    
Yet, lest one think this “qualitative” shift is simply concomitant with authoritarian 
governance, Horkheimer notes that the relation between worker and clique found under 
fascism is prefigured in the relationship between labor and industrial organizations, on 
the one hand, and the state, on the other, in the Weimar republic,  
The call to unite in trade unions and parties was carried out to the letter, but these 
organizations carried out not so much the unnatural tasks of the united proletariat, 
namely the resistance to class society in general, as that of submitting to the natural 
conditions of their own development into mass organizations. … 
… Monopolized industry … pushes the masses of workers into supporting 
passivity.  They have more to expect from the protection and assistance of the 
organizations than from their work.29   
 
The support of corporate organizations (whether in the form of unions or 
corporations), including adaptation to their organizational culture and obeisance to their 
commands, marked the difference between success and failure for the economic subject 
in Weimar.  Market cycles and their effect on the individual recede in importance for the 
worker, replaced by an interest in secure membership in such organizations.  In this 
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particular regard, subjects of both fascist and democratic states face a structurally similar 
situation: they depend for their self-preservation on the political constellations to which 
they belong.  These organizations themselves are the primary agents of competition, 
whose object is to influence the movements of the economy through the control of 
regulatory practices.   
It has often been noted that, in their analysis of the parallels between democratic 
and authoritarian forms of “state capitalism,” Horkheimer and Adorno downplay and 
misunderstand the significance of liberal procedural rights, as well as the tradition of 
public deliberation reflected in, for instance, American pragmatism, as these impact 
historical efforts to resist fascism.30  One may (and Horkheimer in his later work indeed 
does31) come to appreciate this significance without thereby denying the poignancy of a 
commonality which these reflections on state capitalism suggest.  This commonality has 
to do with the way subjects reason reflexively about their participation in the economic 
life of society.  Whatever other significant institutional and cultural differences between 
democratic and authoritarian forms of state capitalism obtain, the self-reflective 
reasoning of the subject in either form has undergone a change arising from a qualitative 
shift in the unit of competition that characterizes both.  This commonality, Horkheimer 
argues, can be usefully contrasted to the self-understanding of subjects in previous 
historical moments.   
Thus in the preface to an issue of Studies in Philosophy and the Social Sciences devoted to 
“State Capitalism” (1941), Horkheimer notes that in the early liberal period the middle 
class was populated by economic agents who each accumulated capital for their 
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individual endeavors.  Competition between such agents was conducted on the basis of 
their common assent to formal legal rules binding the practices of exchange.  This 
marked a striking decentralization when compared to late medieval institutions,  
During the nineteenth century private industry consisted of numerous individual 
entrepreneurs who in each country competed with likewise independent traders and 
bankers for social power.  The outcome of this struggle expressed itself in the 
relative size of the capital controlled by each of them.  Dominion over men and 
things was distributed among the members of this diversified social group according 
to the rules of exchange.  Power had become decentralized; it had been transferred 
from relatively well-organized privileged bodies to the multitude of proprietors who 
possessed no other title than their wealth and their resolve to use it.  The course of 
social production was the resultant of their respective business policies.  Seigneurial 
ordinances were replaced by anonymous laws and autonomous institutions, by 
economic, legal, and political mechanisms which reflected the size and composition 
of the nation’s industry.32      
 
Early modern competition allowed a kind of limited autonomy and self-direction for 
such individuals, evidenced both by the form of competition (“success” was not 
determined by secure membership in corporate bodies but centered rather on the 
activities of individual agents), as well as its object (the goal of competition was amassing 
surplus value not changing regulatory rules or otherwise pulling the reins of a planned 
economy).  This economic practice thus stands in marked distinction, Horkheimer 
notes, from late medieval practices of production in which “relatively well-organized 
privileged bodies” regulated the metabolism of society through “seigneurial ordinances.”  
Thus, in an initial attempt to theorize the contemporary transition in political economy, 
he draws a historical parallel between past forms of production and the contemporary 
form “state” capitalism is coming to take.   
Horkheimer recognizes, of course, that he is making a distinction of degree.  He has 
no wish to idealize the freedom afforded by early liberalism and recognizes that the 
“autonomy” afforded by market practices had been qualified on all sides by economic 
                                                





realities outside the control of the individual agent.33  Indeed, he notes, workers outside 
the middle class were not even afforded the minimal autonomy of the entrepreneur: they 
had only their labor to sell and the terms of exchange for this sale were out of their 
control.34  Nonetheless, a distinction may be drawn, he thinks, between the activity and 
goal of competition for members of the middle class in earlier and later forms of 
capitalism.   
This difference in competition profoundly impacts the way subjects reason.  In early 
modern life the character of the successful “bourgeois” individual is marked by the need 
for independent judgment regarding economic and social realities, as well as foresight 
related to the future well-being of himself and his family.  Contrasting what he terms the 
“passivity” characterizing individuals in the Weimar Republic to the earlier bourgeoisie, 
Horkheimer thus notes in “The End of Reason” (1942),   
Fifty years ago psychological experience, skillful argumentation, foresight in business 
were still instruments of progress in society. …  
…The liberty which the market offered to the producers, consumers, and their 
multifold intermediaries, although it may have been abstract and deceptive, had at 
least permitted a certain range of deliberation.35 
 
Weimar’s late bourgeoisie were no longer concerned with this kind of deliberation, 
“Only the already well-established section of the bourgeoisie is still really interested in 
the market.”36  The elective independence of the middle class individual had been 
eclipsed (as anachronistic) by identification with and response to the dictates of 
powerful and encompassing collectivities.  Thus subservience to the dictates of the 
leaders of the union and party, including the support of their values, practices, and 
various ideological slogans, becomes more decisive in the economic life of the subject 
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than independent judgment and reflection on the vicissitudes of the market had once 
been.     
The presupposition of this distinction between the early and late bourgeoisie is the 
continuing existence of the possibility for gainful employment, the personal 
appropriation of profit, and even entrance into the middle class as an ideal.  Though the 
Schein of profit accumulation remains, the Wesen of market practices, the way they reflect 
and constitute the life of the social whole, as well as the corresponding self-
understanding and reasoning practices of subjects experiencing that whole, is altered.  
Or as Horkheimer puts it succinctly, “competition assumed a different form” and “the 
transition affected culture as a whole.”37  Organizations such as the party, the union, and 
the corporation have become competing “subjects” in the altered economy and the goal 
of such competition centers on the control of the instruments of planning and the 
technical use of such to forward the particular interest of the competing group.  The 
preservation of the individual rests not on “independent” judgment or entrepreneurial 
activity vis-à-vis the cycles of the market but on her identification with such organisms.   
Far from signaling an excuse to retreat from empirical analysis, Horkheimer’s work 
in the 40s thus signals an initial attempt to theorize regarding the subtleties of 
transitional states.  He remains convinced in his late writing that the form and object of 
competition has changed decisively, and that this has significant implications for 
understanding the reasoning habits of subjects.  Perhaps the most decisive evidence for 
this is a late lecture he gives evaluating the contemporary significance of Marx, in which 
he returns to the central questions informing his appropriation of “state capitalism” in 
the 40s.  Telescoping the argument we have just outlined, Horkheimer notes in “Marx 
Today” (1968) that at the outset of the liberal period, the economic success or failure of 
                                                





the individual was mediated directly by success in “the struggle of competition,” “In the 
age of liberalism, the bourgeois understood economic progress to be the result of the 
competition of businessmen, manufacturers, and contractors of all kinds.  Efficiency in 
the struggle of competition was supposed to determine one’s fate.”38  Along with other 
bourgeois theorists, Marx assumed the individual as the self-interested unit of such 
competition.  Capitalists as well as workers are united as classes, according to him, 
because of the common interests individuals shared as a result of the productive 
process.  Thus the “concept of class preserves the concept of the individual, without 
making it thematic.”39  Marx predicted, of course, that the forming of classes would 
eventually lead to a situation where capital would become centralized.  Yet he conceived 
of the motor driving this centralization as competition between individual members of 
the bourgeois class.  However,  
In the twentieth century this centralization, this concentration of capital has 
prospered to the point that individual management is no longer characteristic for the 
major branches of trade and industry.  Corporations, no matter how much internal 
rivalry they may have, are directed by committees and boards.  Where a firm was 
once led by an owner who directed it quite arbitrarily for himself, his own name, his 
family, and heirs, the people and things he preferred, it is now controlled by 
directives that result from various external interests and tendencies.40   
 
If Marx was right in forecasting the radical centralization of capital, his prediction that 
this centralization would lead, first, to increasing misery, then to a leap into freedom, is 
based on a false premise: it supposes that competition will continue in an identical form 
as the centralization of capital progresses.  Marx thus continued to model competition in 
terms of the calculations of individual economic agents, even while theorizing about 
situations in which this kind of calculation would have been made obsolete by the 
concentration of capital.  Instead of assuming that a change in the form of the economic 
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“unit” engaged in competition (from the individual entrepreneur, say, to the 
multinational firm) would change the calculus of agents regarding their self-interested 
participation in economic life, Marx assumes the rationality characterizing competition 
between individuals as a constant in his equations, and then projects that this will lead to 
crises.   
This supposes that competition and economic agency are a-historical.  As 
Horkheimer notes, “With the economically determined restructuring that Marx called 
the centralization of capital, the essence of competition changes.  Quantity suddenly 
becomes quality.”41  The centralization of capital thus changes both the historical unit of 
competition as well as the reasoning of agents participating in economic life.  Individuals 
who once constituted the “proletariat” class do not remain the same as the economy 
centralizes: their self-interest changes as the subject of economic competition becomes 
collectives.  Instead of a monolithic class rebelling against the way the economic process 
shapes society, Horkheimer notes, the economic process “determines the essence and 
function of the individual as well as of society.”  He continues, “Competition has passed 
from individuals to groups of various sizes, which now function as subjects in the 
economy.  Employees and workers are also united in associations for economic and 
political action, which tend to follow the leadership of their staffs just as large 
corporations do.”42  In continuity with earlier essays we have investigated, Horkheimer 
notes that instead of rebelling, workers adapt in order to fit into the demands of various 
powerful organizations.43  Whereas the character of the early bourgeois was marked by 
self-reflective independence and “relative” autonomy, and had to be marked by such 
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qualities in order for the entrepreneur to compete successfully, the “late” bourgeois 
individual is passive and acquiescent in relation to the collectivity which represents its 
economic interests.  Consequently, any sharp distinction between the two classes must 
be questioned, “The inner logic of history points not merely to the abolition of class 
distinctions, but also of the differences between individuals who have been defined by 
the collective.”44     
If “the essence and function” of the individual shifts in adaptation to collectives that 
have become the new agents of competition, to continue to maintain the idea that 
competition will usher a leap into freedom is itself a form of idealism that mistakes the 
way the historical substance of concepts like “subject” and “competition” have changed 
and hypostatizes them apart from empirical analysis.45  It should thus be evident that to 
portray Horkheimer’s turn away from Marx as a turn away from empirical analysis 
towards speculative concepts actually inverts the reasons he offers for accepting the 
theory of state capitalism.  The essays we have just examined are not exercises in 
philosophical anthropology but rather trace the development of historical forms of 
competition.  In particular they describe the impact of this change on the reasoning 
habits of agents, a change Horkheimer will attempt to analyze in his micrological 
analysis of the family-unit.  
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2. The family and learned habits of reasoning 
2.1. Horkheimer’s understanding of the faculties of theoretical and reflective 
reasoning 
 
2.1.1. The relation between the faculties 
As I already noted in the introduction to the chapter, Horkheimer understands the 
family as a reflection of the social whole in miniature as well as the context in which a 
subject first internalizes habits of reasoning.  In his essays on the family, he thus 
describes how patterns of reasoning learned within the home inform the subsequent 
reasoning habits of subjects as they participate in the life of the whole, as well as the 
inverse of this relation, the way such habits are themselves influenced by (and reflect) 
changes in this whole.   
His account of changing patterns of reasoning begins with a description of how the 
justification of social relations occurs within the family.  There are two related patterns 
of inference, Horkheimer notes, that a subject may utilize to judge whether the authority 
presumed by a social relation in the family is justified.  One may take a relation to be 
justified because:  
(1): It ensures an extrinsic goal the subject happens to desire, like biological self-
preservation.  For instance, submission by a child to an (asymmetrical) relationship 
with a parent might be understood as rational inasmuch as it enables her physical 
protection or economic security.  Horkheimer correlates this with a form of 
theoretical (or instrumental) judgment. 
(2): It ensures the continuation of a relation desired for its own sake.  Thus a child 
may obey a parent because she takes pleasure in the relationship sustained by this 
fidelity and desires to reciprocate the parent’s love for her.  Horkheimer identifies 





Before discussing Horkheimer’s analysis of how these related forms of reasoning are 
practiced within the family, it is necessary to carefully situate this analysis in relation to 
his theoretical attempts to distinguish and relate theoretical and reflective reasoning 
elsewhere.  Indeed, although his essays on the family are not routinely linked to his 
reflections on the faculties of reason, they suppose and cannot be properly understand 
apart from them. 
In a passage concluding “The End of Reason,” Horkheimer makes an initial, halting 
attempt at the task of distinguishing (1) and (2),  
The age-old definition of reason in terms of self-preservation already implied the 
curtailment of reason itself.  The propositions of idealistic philosophy that reason 
distinguishes man from the animal … contain the truth that through reason man 
frees himself of the fetters of nature.  This liberation, however, does not entitle man 
to dominate nature (as the philosophers held) but to comprehend it. … Reason has 
born a true relation not only to one’s own existence, but to living as such; this 
function of transcending self-preservation is concomitant with self-preservation, 
with obeying and adapting to objective ends. … As the faculty of calling things by 
their name, reason is more than the alienated life that preserves itself.46 
 
The idea that reason analyzes relations in terms of how they function for the purposes 
of a subject’s self-preservation depends, Horkheimer notes, on a conception of an end 
which is pursued for its own sake.  In the case of instrumental reason, the end in view is 
biological preservation.  Yet this is but one end a subject may pursue among others.  
Horkheimer puts this awkwardly, noting that the “function of transcending self-
preservation is concomitant with self-preservation, with obeying and adapting to 
objective ends.”  A clearer way of stating this would be to note that both “self-
preservation” as well as judgments which purport to “transcend” it are “concomitant” 
inasmuch as they are related species of a broader genus: both are judgments that depend 
on teleological ends.  In the former case, what is judged is how well a subject’s relation 
to an object serves the extrinsic end of its biological preservation; in the latter, what is 
                                                





judged is the intrinsic satisfaction a subject experiences in relating to an object for its 
own sake.     
The various ends pursued by reason are always mutually related.  As we will discuss 
later, Horkheimer is adamant that there is no pursuit of biological preservation as such, 
any more than one may discern human “nature” apart from its cultural mediations.  The 
instrumental understanding of objects in relation to the self-preservation of the subject 
is thus always mediated in relation to other social ends that the subject privileges as 
desirable in-themselves.  Inversely, the subject’s continuing willingness to identify with 
social ends-in-themselves may not be abstracted from the subject’s embodied experience 
of its own needs and desires.  The embrace of a relation or experience as in-itself 
worthwhile assumes it is worthwhile for this embodied subject in terms of its self-
awareness of its own biological and psychological needs (the most important one of 
which, for Horkheimer, is self-preservation).  A mutually constitutive relation thus exists 
between both judgments because both are forms of activity for a social embodied 
subject.   
Though inextricably related, the two kinds of judgment may be distinguished by 
their ends.  Reflective reasoning focuses on what qualitatively distinguishes a particular 
sensuous experience from others as a privileged end-in-itself for a subject.  It names the 
value of an experience of a subject-object relation for the subject experiencing it, instead 
of the way this relation affects other extrinsic purposes for the subject.  The concepts 
this kind of judgment forms of an experience intend to distinguish the experience as 





from others.47  Reflective reason is thus a faculty which “calls things by their name” in 
an attempt to “comprehend” an object in its sensuous specificity.   
By contrast, in the case of instrumental judgment, an experience is described in 
relation to a unifying function which may be used to analyze all other experiences (no 
matter how differentiated they may otherwise be).  This latter kind of reasoning does 
not distinguish a particular experience from others, but rather relates a multiplicity of 
experiences to a single function.  Following the Kantian terminology familiar to 
Horkheimer, we may note that in the former case reason is exercised as a receptive faculty 
which intends to distinguish what he will term an “emphatic” experience of sensuous 
particularity, whereas in the latter case, it is a determining faculty, which relates an 
experience to others by highlighting the commonality they share which is useful for a 
particular function, such as self-preservation.48  
To illustrate the mutual relation of the two forms of judgment as well as their logical 
distinction, Horkheimer elsewhere uses the example of lovers,   
The lover loves the beloved as he sees her, and this expresses his own personality 
and history as it does those of the society to which he belongs.  What seems good to 
him in the beloved also denotes his own idea of the good and of the world as it 
should be.  But his conception of the good is also affected by the beloved.  There 
are people who can offer no resistance here and quickly adopt the qualities of their 
partner.  Experience in the emphatic sense is the productive, reflective process of 
the assimilation of the new that lights up in the other.49 
 
On the one hand, the relation of the lover to the beloved reflects historical concepts 
regarding the beautiful and the good which the lover holds in common with others who 
participate in her society.  These shared concepts are used by the lover to relate her 
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experience of the beloved to already existing patterns of living, informed as these are by 
her concern for various functions that are extrinsic to the particular relationship itself: 
her place in society and her secure advancement, her aversion to certain kinds of pain 
and her desire for certain kinds of pleasure as ends that the relationship might serve 
(etc.).  All of these functions are, in turn, related to her embodied self-interest and thus 
may themselves be subsumed under the most basic function determining instrumental 
reasoning, self-preservation.  The lover cannot rescind from the determining use of 
concepts in reasoning because they constitute what it means for the lover to be an 
embodied subject with a social history.  The experience of the particular beloved thus 
occurs for the lover in terms of such already taken for granted functions.   
On the other hand, however, the experience of the uniqueness of the sensuous 
particularity of the beloved is indeed part of what constitutes “love,” and this provides 
an example not merely of the subsumption of the particular in terms of already existing 
formations of functions, but of a “reflective” relation to an object that recognizes the 
new “light up” in it, i.e., that which is not immediately subsumable using existing 
categories.  It is in this sense that the lover loves the beloved not as an example of a rule 
but for his own sake.  Every aspect of their relation, their unique embrace, their mutual 
pleasure in shared life-experiences and projects, etc., signals a mutual recognition of the 
particular sensuousness of the other that posits this one as irreplaceable rather than a 
function of another end.  Horkheimer terms this experience in the “emphatic” sense.  It 
may also be understood fruitfully as experience from the perspective of the neophyte: 





constellations of social relations, it recasts them in light of its emphatic qualitative 
particularity.50  
Two implications follow from this example.  First, reflective judgment, much like 
theoretical judgment, has concrete social and material preconditions that affect the way 
it is exercised and its objects of concern, which change as social relations change.  Thus 
while Horkheimer notes that reflective reason is indeed “the faculty of calling things by 
their name,” it is not able, he continues, “to keep aloof from history and to intuit the 
true order of things, as ontological ideologies contend.”51  That is, while it is a form of 
judgment about a sensuous particular relation experienced for its own sake, it is still a 
judgment made by a subject who has been constituted with others in society by her 
participation in a shared social form of life.  In contrast to modern ontology, which 
conceives of a reflective judgment as a measurement of the intrinsic worth or beauty of 
a particular as measured by an intuitively experienced intelligible idea, Horkheimer 
claims that a reflective judgment signifies the intrinsic worth of a relation between a 
subject and an object as judged by a historically and socially situated subject.  
Horkheimer wishes to maintain that judgments regarding the intrinsic beauty or 
goodness of a state of affairs are ineluctable (without them no way of expressing 
qualitative uniqueness would be possible), yet he does not want to elide the relationship 
between such judgment and the particular historical subject having the emphatic 
experience.     
Yet one may distinguish the form of each kind of judgment.  Thus, second, although 
reflective judgment may not be abstracted from its socio-historical conditions, neither 
may it be equated with theoretical judgment, so that reason itself is reduced to a mere 
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faculty of subsumption.  In a study that presages the argument of “End of Reason,” 
“The Relation Between Psychology and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey” 
(1939), Horkheimer thus notes that he correctly distinguishes between two kinds of 
rational judgments, judgments regarding “the relationship between cause and effect” 
(which we have termed the “determining” judgments of the theoretical faculty of 
reason), and judgments regarding the relationship “between external and internal, whole 
and part” (“receptive” judgments characterizing the reflective faculty).52  For Dilthey, 
Horkheimer continues, “The knowledge of ourselves has as its object not only the 
stream of perceptions as psychic reality appeared to Hume or Berkeley, but the 
structural whole, ‘Strukturzusammenhang.’”53  In this recognition, notes Horkheimer, 
Dilthey “tried to overcome the sterility of experimental psychology which at his time 
had usurped the place of philosophy in European academic life” by presenting the idea 
“that our entire conscious and unconscious life could not be reduced to the, so to speak, 
blind, meaningless, qualitatively insufficient elements of traditional psychology.”54      
For Dilthey such intuitions of the meaning of the whole disclose that which is 
distinct from the causal nexus of appearances.  Thus a scientific analysis of the causes of 
an experience of the whole commits a category mistake.  But Horkheimer notes, in 
consonance with the second point just noted, that one may not infer from the 
distinction between kinds of judgment that reflective judgment is thereby opaque to 
empirical inquiry, as if it were based upon an “internal” intuition of the whole that might 
be distinguished from the empirical experience of particular conditions.   
While criticizing the lag between our concrete knowledge of man and scientific 
psychology, [Dilthey] persisted in the latter’s unfounded belief that valid insight 
must confine itself to the realm of the immediately given—the “données immédiates de 
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la conscience” which also play so vast a role in Bergson’s vitalism.  His idea of 
“Sinnzusammenhang” is an attempt to determine, with insufficient means, the concrete 
being of man by a positivistic restriction to the “given,” to the “data” of his so-
called inner life, whereas this concrete unity can be understood only by transcending 
those limits and conceiving man as a real element of a real world. … [T]he individual 
can never be built out of the individual himself.55 
 
Dilthey was incorrect, notes Horkheimer, to reify experiences of the whole as reflections 
of the “so-called inner life” of subjects.56  One should appreciate the distinction between 
the two kinds of judgment without thereby conflating their distinct form with distinct 
objects.  Rather than merely reflecting this inner experience, participation in a historical 
form of life itself shapes both the subject’s experience and its interpretation of the 
whole.  Judgments regarding the whole thus have a genetic relation to the social and 
historical practices subjects inhabit, including the social and economic practices whose 
study Dilthey assigned to the “sciences.”  Emphatic experiences that have become 
codified in the social practices of a community as taken for granted ends can thus be 
tested precisely by their continued impact on the embodied and social states of sensuous 
subjects.   
2.1.2. The faculties and empirical experience 
For Horkheimer, we may summarize, the basis that theoretical and reflective forms 
of judgment appeal to in order to license an inference regarding the rationality of a social 
relation is the historically and socially qualified experience of the relation had by the 
individuals participating in it.  Both kinds of rational inference thus involve a judgment 
about the fittedness of a social relation to this experience.   
When Horkheimer turns to analyze the family, he thus begins by contrasting this 
way of understanding the rationality of a social relationship with a view that supposes 
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that the rationality of the relation is based, not on a mediated judgment of the 
experience of the relationship, but on a natural or self-evident property of one member 
of the relationship.  When authority within the family is taken by the child to be a 
natural quality possessed by the father, not an attribute of a social relation which might 
be judged as more or less justified in a practical or derived sense, then its justification is 
disconnected from the way that subordinates in the hierarchy (i.e. mother and child) 
experience the social relation.    
In the consciousness of the present age, authority is not even a relationship but an 
inalienable property of the superior being, a qualitative difference.  Just as the 
bourgeois outlook does not regard the value of the material or spiritual goods which 
men daily use as a form of social relations but withdraws it from rational analysis as 
being either a natural property of things, or on the contrary, as a purely arbitrary 
appraisal, so it likewise conceives of authority as a stable quality (provided it does 
not, in anarchist fashion, deny it entirely).57  
 
The result of this, Horkheimer will claim, is that a social relation is “withdrawn” from 
rational analysis and treated as if it were a fact of nature (or “reified”).  By way of 
contrast, in his empirical studies, “Authority and the Family” (1936), and 
“Authoritarianism and the Family Today” (1949), Horkheimer attempts to judge the 
reasonableness of the relations in the family according to the experience of the subjects 
inhabiting them, in order to understand the way this prepares subjects in the family for 
judging other practices making up the social whole.     
As we will see, Horkheimer is concerned that:  
(1): The subject within the family no longer judges the value of ends-in-themselves 
in terms of its own embodied desire but rather conceives of them as immediately 
given apart from such experience (in the case of reflective judgment) (section 2.2); 
                                                





(2): The subject within the family no longer judges the deferral of its own 
gratification as instrumentally justified in relation to future ends it has taken as its 
own (in the case of theoretical judgment) (section 2.3). 
Both of these concerns regard how a subject relates its rational reflection regarding ends 
to its own experience, either its experience of the sensuous embrace of a relation for its 
own sake in the case of (1) or its experience of the instrumental deferral of its desire for 
the sake of a future realization of other ends in the case of (2).   
2.2. The maternal role and its changing relation to reflective judgment  
2.2.1. The maternal role as a reaction to patriarchal relations of dependence 
The early Enlightenment, Horkheimer notes, was a time when “the rights of the 
individual” were asserted against various claims to natural authority made by established 
institutions such as “feudal cliques, churches, and foreign potentates.”  For the subject, 
he continues, “The past was symbolized by hierarchic forms; the future, in contrast, by 
the individual uniting with his equals.”58  Thus Horkheimer understands early modernity 
as a time when authority was no longer treated as a quality inhering in natural 
institutions, but was rather understood as a social relation that could be judged as more 
or less reasonable by the individuals participating in the institution.59 
However, he continues, the history of how the public marketplace was freed from 
feudal authority is a history of freedom for bourgeois family units, not their individual 
members.  Feudal justifications of authority, though put to rest in the marketplace, 
continued within the confines of the family,   
The consequences of these historical events … by no means affected all the forms 
of social bondage of the individual. …  
[T]he birth of modern civilization emancipated the bourgeois family rather than 
the individual per se and thus carried within itself a profound antagonism from the 
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very beginning.  The family remained essentially a feudal institution based on the 
principle of “blood” and thus was thoroughly irrational, whereas an industrial 
society (though itself including irrational elements in its very essence) proclaims 
rationality, the exclusive rule of the principle of calculability and of free exchange 
following nothing but supply and demand.  The modern family owes its social 
significance as well as its inner difficulties to this inconsistency of society as a 
whole.60 
 
Subjects were increasingly able to challenge the claims of institutions regarding their 
own “natural” authority, yet inside the home the same claims to authority persisted in 
the subjection of woman and children to a “pseudofeudal, hierarchical structure” of 
“direct personal dependence.”61  The bourgeois family, this contradictio in terminis, thus 
marks a “profound antagonism” at the heart of modern life.    
Horkheimer thus recognizes that the claim to freedom for the individual implicit in 
the philosophy of the early Enlightenment was encased on all sides by contradictions.  
While laborers were freed from feudal bonds of authority, their agency was 
circumscribed because the conditions under which they could “freely” contract labor 
were set in advance by the managers of the means of production.62  Within the 
bourgeois family, meanwhile, women and children remained in a social position 
analogous to feudal vassals.  Freedom from heteronomous authority, to the extent it 
existed, was thus limited to the bourgeois father at the helm of a business or household 
economy. 
In order to understand what Horkheimer intends by his claim regarding the 
subjection of women, it is helpful to examine an extended note he authored, which 
appears in the “Notes and Sketches” of Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944).  In parallel with 
his later account in “Authoritarianism and the Family Today,” Horkheimer notes that in 
early modernity women did not have access to a commercial sphere freed from feudal 
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structures of authority.  Domestic life was thoroughly shaped by this violent exclusion 
from public life, as a series of reactions to subjugation,   
Woman gained admission to the world of mastery on behalf of the whole of 
exploited nature, but in a broken form. Subjugated, she mirrors her conquerors 
victory in her spontaneous submission, reflecting defeat back to him as devotion, 
despair as the beautiful soul, the violated heart as the loving breast.  At the price of 
radical exclusion from praxis and withdrawal into a charmed circle, nature receives 
homage from the lord of creation. … Through its masks it acquires the gift of 
speech; in its distortion it manifests its essence; beauty is the serpent which displays 
the wound where once the fang was implanted.  Yet behind man’s admiration for 
beauty lurks the always ringing laughter, the boundless scorn, the barbaric obscenity 
vented by potency on impotence, with which it numbs the secret fear that it is itself 
enslaved to impotence, to death, to nature.63       
 
Beauty, “spontaneous” submission and unconditional love are alike reactions that 
obscure their own genesis in oppressive dependency.  Expressions of matriarchal 
otherness were thus distorted masks, reflections not of feminine ontology as such, but 
of the alienated suffering of the woman mediated by the social relations of dependency 
characterizing domestic life.     
It is equally true, however, that this wounded maternal figure expressed a real 
protest against the dehumanizing effects of public life, not simply passive capitulation.  
There is a genuine sympathy and concern for the harsh conditions faced by the husband 
and son in the public marketplace.  Foreshadowing his later note in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer thus argues in “Authority and the Family” both that the 
woman is reduced to “subpersonal” status in the home as either a “sexual object” or a 
“domestic servant,” yet also that she expressed, “in sexual love and especially in 
maternal care” a desire for “the growth and happiness of the other,” so that “a felt 
opposition therefore arises between them and the hostile reality outside.”64 A fragile 
relation thus exists between two aspects of the early modern’s woman’s reaction to 
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oppression: it both expresses a genuine concern for the sensuous individual not as a 
“mere function” but as an end-in-itself,65 as well as disclosing in the very form which 
this concern takes the woman’s forced dependency.  Her expression of solidarity is 
genuine and yet inextricably marked by conditions of dependency (“defeat” is mirrored 
in her “devotion,” “despair” in her “beautiful soul,” the “violated heart” in “the loving 
breast”).      
For Horkheimer, maternal concern does not therefore simply serve as a 
contradiction to the mores existing outside the family.  The retreat away from the 
domination of the market offered to the husband by the woman itself exemplifies a 
previous, more direct, form of feudal oppression.  The situation of the woman parallels 
the experience of the laborer: despite the fact that partners choose each other “freely” in 
the bourgeois marriage, the man (like the employer) holds economic and social power, 
while the woman’s “free” choice is dictated in reality by heteronomous conditions of 
dependency.  Yet the activity of the woman is nevertheless portrayed by Horkheimer 
not merely as a form of quiescence, but as an act of solidarity.   
Rumpf notes that passages such as the following (from Horkheimer’s earliest essay 
“Authority and the Family”) support the claim that, for Horkheimer, the basis of this 
solidarity is not the active agency of the woman but rather her ontological constitution,  
To the extent that any principle besides that of subordination prevails in the modern 
family, the woman’s maternal and sisterly love is keeping alive a social principle 
dating from before historical antiquity, a principle which Hegel conceives ‘as the law 
of the ancient gods, “the gods of the underworld,”’ that is, of prehistory.66   
 
Rumpf concludes from this passage that, for Horkheimer, the maternal is a necessary 
trait of womanhood, “phylogenetically older than all conscious human laws.”67 
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Yet it is important to notice that Horkheimer prefaces this statement by observing 
that the modern expression of the maternal reflects a social principle, which is testified to 
by Bachofen, Morgan, and Engel’s anthropological theories regarding the existence of 
archaic matriarchal societies.68  He further places this principle in contrast to an equally 
universal characterization of subsequent patriarchal social relations, which “introduced 
mankind to class conflict and to the rupture between public and familial life.”69  Ignoring 
the Manichean tendencies of this jejune history for the moment, I wish to simply 
register that Horkheimer conceives of the maternal and patriarchal not as mere 
reflections of biology, but as mediated social practices.  Just as the instinctual responses 
of men are formed by patriarchal social relations and take on a distorted form due to the 
irrationality of the economic life of the whole, so too the woman is inhibited by the 
practices of the larger society,  
Because it still fosters human relations which are determined by the woman, the 
present-day family … contains an element of antiauthoritarianism.  But it must also 
be recognized that because of her dependence woman herself has been changed.  
She is, in large measure, socially and legally under the authority of the male and is 
seen in relation to him, thus experiencing in her person the law that prevails in this 
anarchic society.  In the process her own development is lastingly restricted.70 
 
Two conclusions are worth drawing from this.  First, as we noted in the introduction to 
this chapter, one should indeed question Horkheimer’s equation of the paternal and the 
maternal as mediations of male and female sexuality.  On this, Rumpf is entirely correct.  
Nevertheless, second, neither can it be denied that he treats the “maternal” and 
“paternal” not merely as expressions of biology but as social mediations: his claim regards 
how the man and woman’s instinct and embodiment are constrained or enabled socially.  
It is thus a mistake to infer from the fact that he wrongly construes the maternal social 
role exclusively as the mediation of feminine sexuality (or the paternal as exclusively 
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male for that matter) that he understands the agency of either the woman or the man as 
“passive” or unchanging.  The scope of “agency,” for Horkheimer, consists in how a 
subject learns to act upon its biological and instinctual need, and this can take a variety 
of forms either with or against the grain of societal norms.    
Elsewhere in his later writing this nuance is made explicit.  The contemporary 
expression of “maternal” concern as an unconditional love for the husband and child 
despite their economic utility is portrayed by Horkheimer as having its historical genesis 
not in the passive expression of feminine concern, but rather in the historically 
contingent “rebellion” of women against arranged marriages,   
The appearance of love as a social rebellion is probably the result of the negation of 
discipline, the rebellion against the interests of the family, against an order of 
relationships which had taken on the glow of sanctity.  As the exclusiveness of 
sexual surrender was no longer imposed from without but desired for the sake of 
the partner, sexuality was freed from a means-end nexus that had been transfigured 
as eternal custom.71 
 
Maternal concern is thus portrayed by Horkheimer as a historically-mediated 
phenomenon that has its most immediate socio-historical antecedent in rebellious 
practices of infidelity, not in the natural faithfulness of the woman to husband and child.  
He presumes that the present shape of the maternal is similarly historically mediated, 
and that it is a reaction of solidarity to a situation of oppression which the woman did 
not choose.  His interest is thus to situate the exercise of female subjectivity in relation 
to social conditions, and in so doing to avoid an account which would either deny the 
devastating effect of oppressive conditions of dependency on the woman or eclipse her 
agency in the activity of solidarity.    
                                                





2.2.2. The maternal role and the faculty of reflective judgment  
While the domestic sphere itself presupposes dehumanizing relations of subjugation, 
it is thus Horkheimer’s contention that the maternal reaction to this state of affairs 
exhibits a way of responding which recognizes and values the sensuous particular 
subject.  This response provides a set of experiences that offer a child the ability to 
reflect critically upon the conditions of subjugation that situate its own relationship to 
the mother.  As Horkheimer notes in the essay “Art and Mass Culture” (1941),   
If it is true that family life has at all times reflected the baseness of public life … it is 
also true that it has produced the forces to resist these.  The experiences and images 
which gave inner direction to the life of every individual could not be acquired 
outside.  They flash forth when the child hung on his mother’s smile, showed off in 
front of his father, or rebelled against him, when he felt someone shared his 
experiences—in brief, they were fostered by that cozy and snug warmth which was 
indispensable for the development of the human being.72    
 
Nascent in this passage is Horkheimer’s attempt to describe a relation in which the child 
as a subject is recognized not simply as a function but as an end-in-itself.73  The 
justification of the relationship for the child reflects this mutuality.  Just as the mother is 
concerned for her child apart from the child’s instrumental utility, the child seeks shared 
experience with her as its own reward and recognizes in her approval a sufficient reason 
for patterns of behavior.  Horkheimer’s claim is that this maternal relation, experienced 
and reciprocated by the child, allows it to relate to future experiences in like manner, 
opening up a kind of mimetic repetition that “resist[s]” dehumanizing social relations 
and is “indispensable for the development of the human being.”   
This claim is left implicit in the passage above, and I will turn now to its explicit 
development.  For Horkheimer, the maternal relation  
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(1): conditions the exercise of the reflective faculty (by developing the subject’s 
capacity to judge certain experiences as ends-in-themselves) (2.2.2.1.)   
(2): encourages the open expression of alienation in response to the coldness of the 
social whole (for instead of placing the worth of the individual in relation to the 
dominant social ends it serves, it inverts this logic by privileging the happiness of the 
individual as an end-in-itself ) (2.2.2.2.). 
2.2.2.1. The maternal, mimesis, and reflective judgment 
Many theorists reflecting upon Dialectic of Enlightenment presume that cognition and 
mimesis are two distinct and opposing practices for first-generation critical theorists, so 
that the instrumental domination over qualitative particularity embodied by the former 
may only be repaired by a turn to the imitation of such uniqueness embodied in the 
latter.74  Others, however, have noted that Horkheimer does not presume this 
antagonistic contrast in his reflections on the formative relationship between mother 
and child, but rather portrays mimesis as a necessary libidinal element in the formation 
of the capacity for inter-subjectivity, which is the social precondition for the activity of 
reasoning.  In this case, mimesis and cognition are related activities for a subject, in so 
far as the former is a necessary condition for the latter to develop.75  This understands 
mimesis and cognition as distinct activities, but relates them both to the historical 
development of the capacity for reasoning.  I wish to suggest a third approach to 
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Horkheimer’s late reflections, focusing on the relation between libidinal mimesis and the 
receptive judgments involved in reflective reasoning.  While theoretical cognition may 
simply be a posterior development that arises because the rhythms of libidinous mimesis 
have formed intersubjective agency, cognition understood as a faculty of reflective 
reasoning is not simply dependent upon the intersubjectivity shaped by libidinal mimesis 
but is, in fact, one way of expressing libidinous desire.  Reflective cognition is the self-
consciousness of a subject moved by the libidinal rhythm of desire in a mimetic 
relationship.  Thus the shape which the early experience of libidinal desire comes to take 
for a subject directly affects its capacity to reflectively reason as well as its actual 
reflective judgments regarding experience.   
The warmth of the early mimetic relationship with the mother both shapes the 
child’s receptive ability to have future sensuous experiences and models for the child a 
kind of judgment which identifies certain objects as ends to be desired for their own 
sake (indeed, these two aspects of the relationship are inextricable).  Because libidinal 
and cognitive elements are intertwined in such a way, if the child is separated from its 
libidinal object, and experiences this separation as the mother’s coldness or as reproach, 
this will have lasting effects on its ability to identify and embrace objects in the way 
supposed by reflective judgments.  Thus Horkheimer notes in “The Concept of Man” 
(1957),  
After the initial months, mother love, the thing everyone talks about but rarely 
describes in any precise fashion—becomes decisive.  Maternal love does not consist 
simply in feeling or even in attitude; it must also express itself properly.  The well-
being of the little child and the trust he has in people and objects around him 
depend very largely on the peaceful but dynamic friendliness, warmth, and smile of 
the mother or her substitute.  Coldness and indifference, abrupt gestures, 
restlessness, and displeasure in the one who attends the child can introduce a 
permanent distortion into his relationship to objects, men and the world, and 
produce a cold character that is lacking in spontaneous impulses.76 
                                                






While one may question the irreversibility of such trauma, Horkheimer’s central 
argument is that the ability of the subject to judge experiences as ends-in-themselves “is 
expanded by the possibilities opened up for identification and love.”77  Insofar as the 
receptive judgment of the desirability of an object is dependent on the subject’s learned 
practices of relating to its environment, a loving maternal influence which embraces the 
child as a pleasurable end-in-itself is a sine qua non for the child’s own development of 
the capacity to see the world as a place where such receptive embrace is possible, as well 
as that which schools the child how to distinguish which experiences should be taken as 
pleasurable-in-themselves.   
In a revealing biographical reflection on Horkheimer’s own relationship to his 
mother, he thus notes,  
My mother was a particularly affectionate and loving woman.  And if I have 
encountered something of the good and the beautiful in my life, and if that may be 
traced in part to my manner of living, then it is probably because in my home—
partly from my father, but above all from my mother—I learned about love 
mimetically.  Because one cannot learn what love is from what one is told; it can 
only be learned from the gleam in the mother’s eyes, from her love, from the way 
she speaks.78 
 
Horkheimer notes that the receptive capacity itself is not discursively learned (how could 
it be, for to attend to a teacher in such a way already requires the capacity), but is 
modeled or displayed by the way the mother attends to the child, from her facial 
expression, affective tone, and a variety of other forms of behavior.  The mimetic 
reception of this relation thus acclimates the child to encounter future experiences in the 
world as expressions of “the good and the beautiful” and thus as worthy objects of its 
love.     
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In one of his late interviews, he presents this formulation negatively, arguing that 
early fearful retraction from the mother is often preserved by adults as an affective state 
of anxiety which limits their willingness to risk emphatic experience.   
Without knowing anything of the infinite, we can recognize very well our own 
finitude.  Do we not … experience daily that we became as we are, we became 
through events, for which we are not responsible? 
Let me give you an example: If a small child stretches his arm out to his mother 
and the mother replies to this desire for her with an improper response, indifferent 
and cold, then that can decisively stamp the character of the child, his later behavior 
towards the world; then he is scarred and withdraws into himself.79 
 
Horkheimer’s way of framing the relation of mimesis to epistemological conditions of 
knowledge is instructive: one need not infer a metaphysical postulate like infinite 
knowledge as a background against which the limits circumscribing finite knowing are 
intelligible, nor, for that matter, is finite knowing limited simply because of the 
epistemological inaccessibility of objects “in themselves” (as the transcendental idealist 
might suppose).  Rather limits suppose a real withdrawal, a scarring, an act of coldness 
that marks the capacity of the child to embrace its world. 
Thus, at the pre-linguistic stage, no sharp distinction may be made between the form 
of a reaction as perceived by a child and its material content: the child learns to embrace 
a relation as warm or shrink away from it as hostile, what we might term “substantive” 
content about its social context, precisely from the form of the responses it learns to 
imitate in relation to its parents.  Whether the child has the affective capacity to 
approach an object, its states of desire or aversion, as well as its cognitive attempt to 
judge experiences as a neophyte, i.e. how it connects the content of its various 
experiences in order to adapt to its environment, are thus inextricably related at this 
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early stage.  The mimetic relation to the mother thus forms in the agent a capacity to 
have emphatic experience as well as shaping the content such experience will have for a 
subject.  Developing these insights in relation to the subject’s development, Horkheimer 
notes elsewhere that even the most elemental psychic reactions to one’s environment are 
themselves learned social practices.  The importance of this passage in demonstrating 
Horkheimer’s understanding of reflective reasoning as a socially learned practice not 
simply an “internal” faculty of cognitive self-reflection (as it is portrayed, for instance, in 
thinkers like Dilthey) warrants quoting it at length,      
In the first year of life, before the human being is able to reflect and to distinguish 
himself properly from his surroundings he is already in good measure being 
determined by society, right down to those aspects of his being which will develop 
only much later.  For among the capabilities which every man possesses as a 
biological being is the ability to assimilate and imitate.  His behavior and gestures, 
his tone of voice, his very walk are all an echo in the child of the ways of some loved 
and admired adult.  Psychic reactions are acquired, in the form if not their content; 
moreover if a rigid separation of form and content leads to error in the analysis of a 
work of art, how much more in the interpretation of human feelings!  Sadness and 
happiness, attention sought and given, shyness and devotion come into existence 
with the repetition of behavior and gestures, for, as Goethe says, “the outward is the 
inward.”  What we thoughtlessly ascribe to psychic heritage originates to a decisive 
degree in the impressions and reactions of earliest childhood, and is confirmed and 
modified by the circumstances and events of later years.  Whether a man is bent on 
promoting his ego or is capable of vital interest in objective situations and of 
dedication to men and things; … all this is not simply a matter of natural fact but is 
the outcome of a history.80 
 
In this passage, Horkheimer sounds a familiar leitmotif of his work on the relation 
between affect and cognition by noting that the inferences a mature subject draws 
regarding its environment arise from and are intimately related to affective states 
regarding the whole, like sadness, happiness, shyness, and devotion.  Yet here he adds to 
this that both related aspects of reasoning, libidinal affective states and patterns of 
inference, are learned by the subject as social habits, and thus they have a concrete social 
“history.”  Whether the subject experiences the world simply as a function of the self 
                                                





(i.e. as merely instrumental), or has a “dedication to men and things” (i.e. experiences 
objects of concern or devotion as worthwhile for their own sake), thus relates to a social 
precondition: how the subject has learned to experience the world in its early mimetic 
relationships.  
 While Horkheimer is adamant here about the importance of the maternal role, he 
recognizes that there may be surrogates for the biological mother.  In his biographical 
reflections he thus suggests that the love of his father had an influence on him 
structurally akin to the embrace of his mother (though admittedly to a lesser degree), 
and elsewhere he entertains the possibility that other social institutions, like the 
university, might be able to facilitate relationships between its members so as to 
compensate for a loss of intimacy in the home.81  This is a halting, partial recognition 
that the social role associated with the maternal instinct is not, in actuality, inextricable 
from the sex of the care-giver.  Developing this point at any length would have enabled 
Horkheimer to nuance his later accounts of the loss of the maternal, a point we will 
return to when we suggest a repair of his account below.   
2.2.2.2. The maternal, mimesis, and the transfiguration of an instrumental 
whole 
In a passage that complements the preceding reflections on the role of mimesis in 
shaping the reasoning capacity of the young child, Horkheimer notes that the institution 
of the family continues to train the subject as it matures to reason reflectively regarding 
its own relationship to the social whole.  Within the family, the subject is not judged in 
terms of its ability to “fit” into the predetermined ends reproduced by the economic 
forces shaping the social whole.  Rather, the whole is evaluated by the caring mother or 
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concerned lover in terms of the subject’s qualitatively particular pain or happiness.  
Instrumental judgments about the utility of the subject in its public activities are thus 
inverted and the contemporary shape of the whole reappears in a foreign form.  The 
sensuous individual thus learns to understand itself not as a function of the economic and 
social practices of the whole, but as the end served by them. 
The middle-class family, though it has frequently been an agent of obsolescent social 
patterns, has made the individual aware of other potentialities than his labor or 
vocation opened for him.  As a child, and later as a lover, he saw reality not in the 
hard light of its practical biddings but in a distant perspective which lessened the 
force of its commandments.  This realm of freedom, which originated outside the 
workshop, was adulterated with the dregs of all past cultures, yet it was man’s private 
preserve in the sense that he could there transcend the function society imposed 
upon him by way of its division of labor.  Seen at such a distance, the appurtenances 
of reality fuse into images that are foreign to the conventional systems of ideas, into 
esthetic experience and production. … [W]orks of art—objective products of the 
mind detached from the context of the practical world—harbor principles though 
which the world that bore them appears alien and false.82  
 
This comprehension of the whole “detached from … the practical world” inverts its 
valuation.  The family thus provides a space that privileges the experiences of the 
individual as interpretive keys to the meaning of the whole.  The subject, in turn, is 
taught to voice its alienation at the harshness of social forms, and such alienation, when 
given a voice, depicts a judgment regarding reality in different hues than is possible 
using the criterion of the public marketplace. 
The relation between the family and the artist is not merely analogous, for 
Horkheimer, it is causal.  When he defines aesthetic judgment in this essay as 
comprehension of “the beautiful as an object of disinterested pleasure,” achieved by an 
“atomic subject … without consulting social values and ends,”83 he does not thereby 
intend to imply that artistic genius alone serves as the precondition for such a sensuous 
recasting of the world.  This would abstract “personality” from social practices as well as 
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abstracting the individual agent from social relations.  Rather, a “genius” that recasts the 
whole in terms of the sensuous beauty of a particular ephemeral moment learns how to 
appreciate fragile experience for its own sake through the social practices of the family.  
The capacity to recognize, receive, and then recast emphatic experience is a learned 
social capacity, a practice with a concrete history. 
For instance, Horkheimer notes, in the face of imposed dependency the mother in 
previous forms of the family embraced the disenfranchised child as an end-in-itself in 
solidarity.  Thus she was able to teach the child to imagine the whole in terms of his 
own sensuous particularity.  In her forced dependency, she served as an intermediary 
that sheltered the child against a world that understood it simply as a function of 
instrumentalized ends instead of a sensuous end-in-itself.      
The mother, cut off from the community of the males and despite an unjustified 
idealization being herself forced into a dependent situation, represented a principle 
other than reality; she could sincerely dream the dreams of utopia with the child, and 
she was his natural ally whether she wished it or not.  Thus there was a force in his 
life which allowed him to develop his own individuality concomitantly with his 
adjustment to the external world.84 
 
Importantly, the two teleologies informing the exercise of reason which Horkheimer 
previously had described as in tension in “Art and Mass Culture” (1941), self-
preservation (“the hard light of … practical biddings”) and the pursuit of self-chosen 
ends (“other potentialities than [the child’s] labor or vocation opened for him”), are not 
placed in binary opposition to one another in this passage from “Authoritarianism and 
the Family Today” (1949), but are rather portrayed as related consonant ends which the 
individual may learn to order through rational reflection.  The shelter of the maternal 
relation, Horkheimer notes, does not negate the need for adaptation to the practical 
demands of reality, but rather enables a temporary rapprochement between such 
                                                





demands and the child’s self-recognition of its own sensuous particularity: it “allowed 
him to develop his own individuality concomitantly with his adjustment to the external 
world.”  It is not inconsequential that the attempt by the subject to situate its own 
sensuous judgment regarding ends in relation to the imperatives of the social whole has 
to be “developed.”  While the pursuit of self-preservation is always mediated, for 
Horkheimer, in relation to other social ends, the fittedness between other ends and such 
preservation cannot simply be assumed, but requires self-conscious reflective activity.   
Of course, the possibility of this rapprochement does not solely depend on the 
maternal relation.  Although it is a necessary condition for rapprochement, it is not 
sufficient.  Concrete historical conditions must actually exist which allow at least the 
possibility of an approximate fit between self-preservation and the pursuit of particular 
ends-in-themselves.  Thus, on the one hand, in “Art and Mass Culture” Horkheimer 
notes that the contemporary individual experiences alienation because the historically 
mediated split between the two seems impossible to bridge.  Yet, on the other, with 
equal insistence, he notes that the maternal relation at one point held forth the 
possibility of a fittedness between self-preservation and sensuous particularity of the 
particular subject.  We will explore in more detail how Horkheimer understands this past 
historical possibility in our discussion of the paternal relation.  For the moment it is 
important to note that what Horkheimer affirms is not the inevitability of reconciliation 
as such due to the influence of the mother, nor the impossibility of such reconciliation 
due to present historical conditions, but rather a possibility that is latent but blocked by 
adverse social conditions, which could be activated, ex hypothesi, if those social conditions 






Multiple ambiguities and problems with the above formulations should already be 
evident.  Horkheimer’s analysis focuses sharply “not on woman but on her children, 
specifically her sons.”85  Absent is any discussion of the way that the relationship to the 
mother teaches the daughter to acquiesce to or resist violent patriarchal structures of 
dependency.  Although Horkheimer references the forced dependency which subjugates 
the subjectivity of the woman in the home, he thus privileges male subjectivity in his 
analysis of the effects of this enforced dependency.86  We will return to this justified 
critique and suggest a possible repair in 2.2.3.    
2.2.2.3. Changes in the historical shape of the maternal role 
If it is true that the maternal influence is one of the decisive social antecedents that 
shapes subsequent public reasoning, as the social whole evolves and the maternal 
relation changes so too does the typical way individuals learn to reason within the 
family.  As he turns to relate changes in mimesis to the altered practices of the social 
whole, it is unsurprising that Horkheimer focuses squarely again on what he has termed 
the “pervasive practice” of political economy, competition.  As the unit of economic 
competition changes from the bourgeois household to corporate organizations, he 
notes, the family and, along with it, the individual’s adaptation to its social whole, 
changes markedly.  In the 19th century, solidarity within the family served the economic 
interests of bourgeois enterprise,  
The national economy of the nineteenth century … still included the functioning of 
the family as an economic unit.  Not only had the mechanization of the household 
not progressed so far as it is today—and even today it constitutes a residue of 
primordial economic forms—but women, children, and other relatives were 
necessary for the management of innumerable business units.   
In the Victorian age the artisan workshop still flourished, the small or middle-
sized enterprise was the predominant type of undertaking; the giant concern, the 
department store, and the retail sales organization of important industries were only 
in the making.  Business administration and management were not yet scientifically 
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regulated and planned.  Success in enterprise still depended to a great extent on the 
solidarity of the family.87 
 
In contemporary industrialized society, however, such solidarity is no longer required: 
the household is no longer a locus of the economy.  With the advent of the war 
economy in the early twentieth century, there was no longer either the economic 
necessity or the related traditional taboos enforcing the cohesion of the family.   
At least in times of war and preparedness industry offers millions of jobs for skilled 
and unskilled women, which means that work outside the house becomes 
respectable for them.  Rupture with the family therefore loses its terror for the girl as 
well as for the boy … Authority in the home assumes an irrational aspect.88        
 
Household economies are eclipsed as the basic “units” of competitiveness ensuring the 
survival of their members, thus one may break with patriarchal authority without 
entailing either economic ruin or social stigma.  For unlike in early modernity, domestic 
life is no longer tied in any intrinsic way to production.  As employees of corporations, 
the new “units” of competition, individual family members no longer require the family 
for the sake of their self-preservation.   
Horkheimer recognizes that such emancipation gives women hitherto unparalleled 
self-determination, a way out from under violent a-symmetrical relations of dependency.   
A good many of the evil effects of the old rigid bourgeois marriage—tyranny of 
husband over wife and children; the unhappiness arising from the fact that the 
marital relations, felt to be central, meant a whole series of abnegations—are 
avoided in the emerging situation; we need only think at the turn of the century of 
Strindberg’s Dance of Death.89 
   
This late passage is thus an (all too brief) recognition that the women’s entrance into the 
marketplace has substantially mitigated the oppression once faced due to previous 
relations of dependency (which parallels, it should be noted, the concrete freedom given 
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the modern worker who is released from the violent immediacy of feudal relations of 
dependency).   
Yet Horkheimer is less than sanguine about the implications this may have for 
relations between the mother and child within the family.  As the woman gains a new 
independence from the feudal authority of the domestic sphere, she faces the daily strain 
of being treated as a means for the end of economic productivity.  For her, this strain is 
all the more intense given her continued subordination to mediated forms of patriarchy 
in the market (as this is measured in wages and advancement), as well as within the 
home (her subordination to duties typically associated with a traditional domestic role 
continues).90  In the past, “her passive role, which nothing could justify, also enabled her 
to avoid reduction to object status” in the marketplace.  Yet today, she “is pushed more 
and more into work outside the home,” and this situation “makes new claims on her 
psychic capacities and interests.”91  For instance, in an inversion of his earlier analysis of 
the genesis of the artist, Horkheimer notes that the decision to be married is made today 
in accordance with what is economically advisable in terms of the dominant ends 
privileged by society,  
In marriage, the relations between partners must, above all, be rich in results, like 
those of teams in industry and sport.  If a marriage proves burdensome it can be 
dissolved, and a person may perhaps be more successful with a new partner.  Each 
partner is evaluated in terms of function, and this affects even the relations of the 
sexes before marriage, so that these relations become more uniform, more practical, 
less charged with momentous significance.92 
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Later, Horkheimer concludes, “each partner in the marriage (the very word ‘partner’ is 
significant) is evaluated even within the home according to the criteria that prevail in 
society at large.”93  The relation between man and woman no longer signifies:  
(1): A rebellion of individuals against the dominant practice of a noble’s consolidation 
of property, done on the basis of the value of the sensuous particularity of the 
beloved (the pre-curser of the bourgeois “decision” to marry),94 nor  
(2): A reserve apart from the marketplace where the husband dehumanized by the 
market or the physically weak child might be valued for its own sake (the early 
modern form of family life).  
It is no longer, that is, determined by a principle that inverts the dominant ends of 
property or production.  Rather, it presumes that: 
(3): Each agent measures the utility of their relationship from the outset in terms of 
the dominant practices reproducing society. 
While relations (1) and (2) embodied a form of solidarity, a recognition that the 
sensuous particularity of a subject stood in fundamental friction with dominant societal 
practices, in (3) this form of empathetic receptive judgment is being eclipsed in favor of 
a subsumptive theoretical judgment based upon the taken for granted interests already 
informing the marketplace. 
While Horkheimer maintains that the genesis of (1) and (2) is rooted in unjustifiable 
relations of dependency, he also notes that the maternal response to such oppression 
allowed an inversion of dominant practices, judged in terms of the sensuous needs and 
desires of the particular male individual: the lover in the case of (1), the husband and 
child in the case of (2).  However, as Horkheimer notes in his reference to Strindberg’s 
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Dance of Death, the original context which allowed such empathy as a response to 
patriarchy violently denied the woman’s own subjectivity.  In the present social whole, 
there is thus no “pure” standpoint from which to escape the agonistics.  The inversion 
of dominant public practices was itself rent with a fundamental contradiction: sensitivity 
toward the subjectivity of the father and male child reproduced amnesia towards the 
sensuous particularity of the wife.   
The repair of this subjugating amnesia is sometimes taken to be (3).  However, this 
also raises a difficulty, Horkheimer notes, for the price of entry into the marketplace for 
the woman qua economic subject, thus her escape from the violence enforced by 
patriarchal dependency within the home, is the expression of her subjectivity in the form 
which once enforced the marginalization of her own affective concern as well as 
dehumanizing other family members.  If the self-preservation of the wife depends on 
acclimating to a rationalized market, the way the maternal is mediated is thus altered: the 
woman’s concern for the child is no longer expressed as pity and compassion at the 
violation of alienated subjectivity, as attention to the sensuous particular.  It is now 
mediated as a desire to teach the child to adapt its sensuous particularity to the whole, to 
end lingering alienation and acclimate to the dominant practices of social life.  
Horkheimer notes,    
Not that she treats the child more brutally than in former times; just the opposite.  
The modern mother plans the education of her child almost scientifically, from the 
well-balanced diet to the equally well-balanced ratio between reprimand and 
friendliness, as recommended by the popular psychologist.  Her whole attitude 
toward the child becomes rational; even love is administered as an ingredient of 
pedagogical hygiene. … 
… The consequences reach into the most tender relations between mother and 
child.  She ceases to be a mitigating intermediary between him and cold reality and 
becomes just another mouthpiece of the latter.95 
 
                                                





Just as the spouses embrace each other not in rebellion against dominant rationality but 
according to calculations regarding the successful adaptation to it, so the woman’s 
concern for her children is mediated as the sensible recognition of a competitor in the 
marketplace: children must be acclimated to achieve a similar form of successful 
adaptation.  Yet if the empathetic embrace of the mother is required for the 
development of a reflective form of reasoning, and it is through enjoying this relation 
and learning to imitate it in a reciprocal return of love that the child develops both its 
sense of its own sensuous particularity as well as its ability to open itself to experience, 
the loss of this relationship atrophies the subject’s capacity to reason reflectively.    
Is the alternative, for Horkheimer, a regressive embrace of patriarchy?  In our 
introduction, we noted that Horkheimer’s late reflections have often been interpreted in 
this manner, as the nostalgic ruminations of a conservative critic of culture.  It is to this 
question we will now turn.   
2.2.3. The Janus-faced domestic sphere 
From his earliest writings on the family, Horkheimer privileges the domestic sphere 
as a place of retreat from the instrumentalized coldness of late modern life.  In the 
family, the social whole is seen as existing for the sensuous subject, and the cold 
teleology of the marketplace is inverted by this empathetic embrace.  In an apparent 
contradiction, Horkheimer is equally adamant in passages we have examined that the 
unconditional shape of this response is itself a mask: the appearance of “spontaneous 
submission” is actually itself the internalization of “subjugation;” the “loving breast” is 
actually a “violated heart;” the woman’s violent “defeat” is reflected back to society as a 
psychological disorder, internalized “despair;” she is “cut off from the community of the 
males” thereby “forced into a dependent situation,” and this is itself grotesquely 





obsolescence to the idealized maternal is also a mask, “Behind man’s admiration for 
beauty” lies “boundless scorn” and ultimately the threat of violence should the 
admiration be refused.  Thus an original relation of violence constitutes and shapes the 
genesis of reflective subjectivity.  The social precondition for recognizing the distortion 
of reification, the recognition of the relation between the sensuous concrete individual 
as an end-in-itself and its social practices, is itself formed as a reaction to an 
asymmetrical social relation that is construed as a “natural” immediacy.   
While I take these descriptions of the feudal violence characterizing relations of 
patriarchal dependency from an aforementioned note in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), 
we have examined parallel passages from a wide variety of essays such as “Authority and 
the Family” (1936), “Authoritarianism and the Family” (1949) and “The Concept of 
Man” (1957).  Thus two strands, the praise of the domestic sphere and its critique as an 
institution of patriarchal violence, sit side-by-side uneasily throughout Horkheimer’s 
reflections from the 30s through the 50s.   
How can Horkheimer persist in writing both?  As we have seen, the tension between 
the two is often relaxed by interpreters in favor of Horkheimer’s qualified approbation 
of solidarity within the family.  It is then inferred from this that he embraces a regressive 
conservatism that whitewashes conditions of dependency.  Mothers and daughters are 
thus understood simply as preconditions for the proper functioning of male subjectivity, 
not as subjects in their own right.  This leads finally to a situation in Horkheimer’s later 
writings in which he not only ignores, but actively justifies such dependency. 
Interpreters should indeed be suspicious of the regressive embrace of a patriarchal 
past.  Our investigation, however, suggests an alternative approach to understanding 
Horkheimer’s reflections, which clarifies what is of continuing value and what stands in 





(1): The reaction of women to a position of forced dependency in the patriarchal 
family evidences an actual sensitivity to the alienation of the child and spouse and an 
opposition to dominant practices in public life that dehumanize them. 
(2): The end of forced dependency:  
(2a): Allows the woman to exit relations of dependency, signaling an end to the 
oppressive semi-feudal mediation of gender relations,  
(2b): Allows the woman access to dominant market practices, encouraging a 
particular form of calculating subjectivity and discouraging an awareness of the 
particularity of sensuous subjects.  
One might infer from the fact that Horkheimer laments the form of subjectivity that 
women must embrace in order to gain effective entry into the market (i.e. 2b), that he 
accepts relations of dependency per se as a necessary evil.  Or one might infer that he 
does indeed hold that there needs to be an end to the dependency relation (i.e. 2a), while 
also recognizing that this end will itself reproduce a distinct kind of suffering, at least if 
it does not preserve the former concern for sensuous subjectivity in a distinct form.  
Inasmuch as this former concern is not preserved by 2b, one can note that it fails as an 
adequate preservation of what was humanizing in a past historical form (i.e. 1).   
In this case it would not be incompatible to hold both that (1) is in no sense justified 
and also that whatever its merits may be in rectifying past relations of dependency, (2b) 
is unsatisfactory due to the eclipse of a concern for sensuous particularity.  One may 
thus note that the present change in gender relations does not preserve a necessary 
regard for sensuous subjectivity as well as maintain that past relations of dependency 
should be negated.  The recognition that the present form of gender relations does not 
allow the preservation of a past concern with sensuous subjectivity would not then entail 





This best describes Horkheimer’s approach.  While he does speak of the family as 
“second-womb” or as a “harbor” from an instrumentalized world, his critique of the 
patriarchal genesis of the institution suggests that his argument should not be mistaken 
for a post factum justification of an oppressive history, nor as a judgment regarding the 
normativity of its modern bourgeois form. Horkheimer acknowledges the ways that the 
female psyche is marred by the oppressive relation of dependency.  Yet he also 
maintains that the maternal expression of love, as a form of marred subjectivity, is not 
merely the passive acceptance of this state of affairs.  Rather, it is understood as a way of 
reacting against the dehumanizing features of the market, which preserves a concern for 
the sensuous subject.  Horkheimer thus walks a fine line in the essays we have 
examined, acknowledging the way woman have been objectified and silenced by 
patriarchal practices, yet refusing to narrate their response to this state of affairs simply 
as passivity.  
By contrast, his later interviews in the 60s and early 70s do not focus with any 
sustained attention on the continuing way oppressive relations constitute domestic life.96  
Instead, he emphasizes the inadequacy of (2b) as a negation of (1), by pointing out what 
has been lost by the end of traditional family relations.  It is not that Horkheimer does 
not recognize the dissolution of the traditional maternal role as an advance over past 
relations of dependency.  On the contrary, as a previously quoted passage from “The 
Future of Marriage” illustrates, he continues to reference it explicitly as having corrected 
the “evil effects” of this dependency.  What remains troubling, however, is that he does 
not develop the possibility that this advance may be a factor offsetting, and even 
justifying, the suffering arising from the dissolution of traditional family ties.  The 
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passage thus comes as an afterthought at the end of an essay decrying various forms of 
suffering that arise because of the exit of women from domestic dependency.   
Thus while Horkheimer draws useful distinctions between the expression of 
maternal solidarity and its historical genesis in forms of patriarchal violence, and while 
he offers a compelling account of what the loss of this form of maternal reaction might 
mean for the development of the capacity to reason reflectively, he offers no reason why 
the contemporary negation of the feudal qualities of a past form of the family (2b) must 
itself be maintained, or how one might feasibly preserve a concern for the sensuous 
particular in a contemporary form of the family.  He is ambivalent about what aspects of 
the present negation must also be preserved in order to ensure that social relations do 
not regress.       
Horkheimer notes, in what may be taken as a programmatic statement of his mature 
theoretical work,  
If social progress is really to live up to its name, it must preserve what was good in 
the past.  To suppress the thought of the cost a culture pays for its new miracles and 
to adopt an official optimism is to be enslaved to an evil status quo. … It is true 
enough that a critical grasp of the present supposes insight into the injustice and lies 
of the past, and especially a knowledge of how earlier culture contradicted its own 
ideas … . It is also true, however, that critical theory, which we follow, gives 
unquestioned priority to existing reality as its object. … The demand that we 
construct a better social totality and develop in a positive way the new possibilities 
opened up by technology can be met only when our conscience refuses to rest easy 
with the disappearing freedom of the individual; the fact that such freedom was 
earlier limited to the bourgeois can make no difference here.97 
 
The fact that present practices rectify past injustice cannot eclipse the suffering which 
also arises from the way such practices erode the benefits of past historical forms of life.  
Yet the fact that freedom was limited in past forms of life does indeed affect the form 
which present social relations have come to take.  This latter fact requires equal 
recognition, and Horkheimer admits as much by noting that both “insight into the 
                                                





injustice and lies of the past” as well as an uneasy conscience regarding present advances 
is necessary.  Elsewhere, in “Authoritarianism and the Family” (1949) he even goes so 
far as to suggest programmatically, “If ideas, cherished through the centuries, are rigidly 
maintained against the course of history instead of being preserved by being developed 
and transformed, they finally are deserted by truth and turn into empty ideologies—
however strongly they may be sustained.”98  This would seem to require that one 
recognize in the present “course of history” a form of reaction against the suffering 
generated by past forms of patriarchal oppression, such that to preserve what was proper 
in past forms of life would require, not the affirmation of such traditional relations as 
such, but a recognition of the need for both their preservation (in certain regards) and 
their creative transformation (in others).  According to Horkheimer’s own 
understanding of the practical task of sublation, which requires both the preservation as 
well as the negation of distinguishable elements of historical social practices in order that 
they might be continued in a more adequate form in relation to the concerns of a 
contemporary form of life, his account of the family thus remains incomplete.  How 
might this lack in his theorizing be repaired?   
If Horkheimer had distinguished the “maternal” more clearly as a social category 
from sex as biological, this would have enabled him, minimally, to thematize what he 
hints at implicitly in several suggestive passages.  The maternal embrace, understood as a 
social practice between a parent and child, can be initiated with the child by caregivers of 
either sex as well as fostered by institutions other than the family.  Recognizing this 
would have allowed him to clearly affirm both the way current social relations attenuate 
the oppressive dependency fostered in traditional patriarchal families, and, at the same 
time, the cost of this development, the end of a concern for the sensuous particularity of 
                                                





the child, which must be addressed in evaluating changing social and institutional 
contexts.     
If it is true that society as a whole and not merely the nuclear family no longer 
contains a space for the recognition of sensuous particular individuals but is rather 
characterized by an “objective, generalized denial of nurturance,”99 an analysis of how 
the concern for the sensuous individual as an end-in-itself might be preserved in a new 
historical form is particularly pressing.  Horkheimer’s work, suitably repaired, remains 
relevant for theorists in two respects.  First, it demonstrates that the loss of this 
nurturance has profound implications for the formation of the reasoning habits of the 
modern subject.  Second, it suggests the need for institutional alternatives in which 
habits of reflective reasoning and judgment on the basis of sensuous experience may 
continue to be learned by the subject.  As we will see, Horkheimer’s own reflections on 
liturgical communities investigate one such alternative.  Finally, it is worth closing by 
noting that Horkheimer’s analysis does not differentiate between the male and female 
experience of maternal nurturance, and privileges the former as his model.  Any future 
attempt to address the issue of societal structures of nurturance must address this glaring 
omission.       
2.3. The paternal role and its changing relation to theoretical judgment  
In his essays on the family, Horkheimer wishes to examine the social and historical 
preconditions not merely of the reflective form of judgment but also its theoretical 
form.  Just as the ability to judge a relation as an end-in-itself is learned by the child 
mimetically via the maternal relation, so it learns the ability to judge relations as 
instrumental to its own self-preservation via the paternal relation.  Horkheimer begins 
his analysis of this relation by noting that the bourgeois son’s imitation of his father 
                                                





taught him to judge social relations independently.  From his father’s attitude towards 
the economic and social world, the son also came to learn a constellation of other 
virtues related to this independence like self-control, truthfulness, and thrift.  
The self-control of the individual, the disposition for work and discipline, the ability 
to hold firmly to certain ideas, consistency in practical life, application of reason, 
perseverance and pleasure in constructive activity could all be developed, in the 
circumstances, only under the dictation and guidance of the father whose own 
education had been won in the school of life.100  
 
This education prepared the son well for his role as a competitor in the liberal economic 
order.  Instead of conforming to the societal practices occurring around him as 
heteronomous forces, he learned to exercise reflexive judgment regarding how such 
practices impacted the interests of his family.  This also provided him with values 
against which he was able to measure the behavior of his father when “his practices 
contradicted his own ideology.”101  The imitation of the father as a model thus provided 
both the independent perspective as well as the ethical criterion by which the child was 
able engage in a critique of the social practices around him.  
The bourgeois son’s acceptance of his father’s authority is based, Horkheimer notes, 
on a rational calculation: insofar as the father equips the son with capacities which are 
instrumental to his success in the economy (and thus his self-preservation), recognition 
of the father’s authority is rational for the son.  The son thus learns how to practice 
what we have termed the faculty of theoretical reason in his relationship with the father.  
Yet it is important to clarify precisely what is deemed rational in this equation.  
Anyone who wishes to infer from the son’s obsolescence to the father a justification for 
the patriarchal structure of the domestic relation makes a mistake.  Horkheimer notes, 
rather, that one must make a distinction between the son’s judgment regarding the utility 
of his relationship to the father, and a judgment regarding the asymmetrical dependency 
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upon which the relationship itself is based.  The former is rational given the pre-existing 
situation of asymmetrical dependency, yet this situation itself is thoroughly irrational for 
the participants involved.  
The unmediated identification of natural strength with estimability in the bourgeois 
family operates as an educational factor with reference to the authority-structure 
characteristic of this society.  But another, likewise seemingly natural characteristic 
of the father operates in the same way.  He is master of the house because he earns 
or at least possesses the money. … [T]he fact that in the average bourgeois family 
the husband possesses the money, which is power in the form of substance, and 
determines how it is to be spent, makes the wife, sons, and daughters even in 
modern times “his,” puts their lives in large measure into his hands, and forces them 
to submit to his orders and guidance.  As in the economy of recent centuries direct 
force has played an increasingly smaller role in coercing men into accepting a work 
situation, so too in the family rational considerations and free obedience have 
replaced slavery and subjection.  But the relationship in question is that of the 
isolated and helpless individual who must bow to circumstances whether they be 
corrupt or reasonable.  The despair of women and children … the material and 
psychic exploitation consequent upon the economically based hegemony of the 
father have weighed mankind down no less in recent centuries than in antiquity, 
except for very limited periods, regions, and social strata.102 
 
On the one hand, Horkheimer notes, “rational considerations and free obedience have 
replaced slavery and subjection” in the family.  If one begins by taking the economic and 
domestic relations characterizing early modern life for granted, any male agent who 
wishes to thrive in the marketplace would be rational to submit to the authority of the 
father qua provider and educator.  Yet the father’s ability to play these roles arises due to 
the economic and social dependency of women in the home.  While it is rational for the 
son to recognize the resultant instrumental utility of the patriarchal relation, the 
dependency at the origin of this state of affairs is comprehended by him not as rational 
or irrational but rather as “natural”: it is not judged according to any standard, let alone 
that of instrumental utility.  Thus Horkheimer elsewhere notes, “In consequence of the 
seeming naturalness of paternal power with its twofold foundation in the father’s 
economic position and his physical strength with its legal backing, growing up in the 
                                                





restricted family is a first-rate schooling in the authority behavior specific to this 
society.”103  This societal behavior, Horkheimer notes, is actually irrational, it does not 
correspond to the self-interest of subordinate parties in society and is only continued 
because of existing force and the ideological notion that such social structuring is 
natural.  The dependency of the members of the family upon the father is similar 
structurally: it is a social relation masquerading as a natural given.      
Despite its irrational precondition, the resultant judgment regarding the economic 
rationality of the authority of the father for the son is nevertheless framed by 
Horkheimer in terms of a judgment of what we have termed “theoretical” reason.  
However, in his later work, Horkheimer often makes contrastive statements that appear 
to stand in no little tension with this construal of the functional (or instrumental) 
rationality of the paternal relation.  For instance he notes, “In earlier times a loving 
imitation of the self-reliant, prudent man, devoted to his duty, was the source of moral 
autonomy in the individual,”104 though today, “the child takes a realistic view” because 
“the socially conditioned weakness of the father, which is not disproved by his 
occasional outbreaks of masculinity, prevents the child’s identification with him.”105  A 
contrast is thus drawn in this later essay between the child who embraces the 
“substantive” moral commitments of the father out of love, and the child who is 
concerned exclusively with the instrumental end of self-preservation which the 
weakened father no longer serves.  This appears inconsistent with the earlier texts we 
have just examined, in which Horkheimer portrays the internalization of a father’s 
behavior by the son, not as an embrace of the former’s “substantive” values like honesty 
or autonomy as ends-in-themselves, but rather as a kind of instrumental reasoning 
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which embraces such ends for the sake of economic self-preservation.  This would 
appear to exclude, per definitionem, efforts to base the internalization of “substantive” 
moral judgments in the paternal relation.  On this basis, Benjamin concludes, “Despite 
his 1936 analysis of the father, in which he described obedience as a formal response 
demanded by a structural role rather than substantive behavior, Horkheimer returns [in 
his 1949 essay] to a positive image of the father.”106   
The argument that there is a contradiction between Horkheimer’s early and late 
reflections on the family rests on the idea that the loving imitation of the father by the 
son (which embraces “substantive” values for their own sake) and the calculated 
imitation of father (for the sake of “instrumental” self-preservation) are mutually 
exclusive motives for the internalization of paternal authority.  Yet I wish to argue that 
Horkheimer’s reflections on the paternal relation fundamentally challenge this 
dichotomy.  For Horkheimer in “Authoritarianism and the Family Today” (1949), the 
embrace by the child of a “substantive” value (such as autonomy) for its own sake as 
well as the child’s pragmatic concern to adapt to economic reality describe, not two 
opposed kinds of reasoning regarding the internalization of paternal authority, but rather 
two intimately related sides of the same process of internalization for a subject.   
Far from a paean to the traditional family as a preserve of pure “substantive” values, 
Horkheimer begins “Authoritarianism and the Family Today” by noting that the 
patriarchal dependency relation within the traditional family was once judged rational by 
its members precisely because of their instrumental concern with economic self-
preservation.   
The power of the father over related or unrelated members of the home, workshop, 
or manorial estate had always been based on the intrinsic necessity of the direct 
form of dependence for the life process of society. … The legal framework, by 
                                                





which the family is protected, receives its meaning from the social significance of 
what it protects.  A son’s future share in his father’s property had been as powerful a 
motive for obedience as disinheritance was a menace.107  
 
Despite the broadly common goal of household economies and emerging industries (the 
self-preservation of their participants), the household economy was qualitatively distinct 
from the emerging industrial economy, for within it a pre-modern form of loyalty 
continued to be economically rational for the self-interest of household members in a 
way it was not, for instance, in the case of a factory worker,  
In the sphere of manual labor and of numerous other functions in industry and 
commerce, society had reached a stage at which the direct and inviolable loyalty of 
the nonrelated members of the familia in the old sense, the slaves and serfs, could be 
replaced by the rational interest of the worker through the labor contract.108 
 
In stark contrast, 
 
Success in enterprise still depended to a great extent on the solidarity of the family.  
The sons of middle-class business men were, on the one hand, largely indispensable 
in their father’s trade and, on the other, unable to find an equally satisfying position 
outside it.  The daughters were needed in both house and shop.  Familial authority 
in the middle classes was halfway intact.109 
 
Thus the family preserved a place in which reasoning about self-preservation led to a 
form of solidarity, or identification with an organic totality en miniature.   
As economic productivity became increasingly divorced from household economies 
this economic basis for loyalty dwindled, 
With the disappearance of this essential factor, the respect of family members for 
the head of the house, their attachment to the family as a whole, and their loyalty to 
its symbols dwindled away. … What appeared as an individual disaster in the world 
of middle-class proprietors can be faced more quietly in a world in which everybody 
is an employee.110   
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Thus “rupture with the family … loses its terror” and “authority in the home assumes 
an irrational aspect” for both sons and daughters.111   
In saying it “assumes” an irrational aspect, Horkheimer wishes to contrast the past 
acceptance of the authority of the father, which judged his authority on the basis of the 
consonance between the family member’s own instrumental self-interest and the 
solidarity of the family, with a kind of judgment that accepts the authority of the father 
simply because of its overwhelming brute force as a natural immediacy, despite the fact 
that it has lost its rational utility.  Thus he notes that contemporary subjects inhabit “a 
world which adheres to familial authority after the inner substance of the family has 
been dissolved.”112  While subordination to the authority of the father in the family as a 
social unit continues, this relationship to the family whole is no longer consonant with 
or subjected to the judgment of the individual on the basis of its economic self-interest.  
The justification of such authority is treated as an innate “natural” quality of the father, 
or it takes the form of a simple capitulation to brute force.  Thus Horkheimer notes,   
As the family has largely ceased to exercise specific authority over its members, it 
has become a training ground for authority as such.  The old dynamics of familial 
submission are still operative, but they make for an all-pervasive spirit of adjustment 
and authoritarian aggressiveness rather than for a furtherance of the interests of the 
family and its members.113    
 
The justification of authority relations thus regresses behind its earlier form as a rational 
reflection on the importance of solidarity within the family for the realization of the 
interests of the individual.  What was once judged to be rational now appears as a 
natural heteronomous immediacy.   
For Horkheimer, following Freud, to participate in civilization successfully is to self-
consciously defer the immediate gratification of sensuous desires through a reflective 
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judgment that this deferral will not be indefinite, but rather will facilitate a future 
realization that comports with the subject’s attempt to realize a totality of its interests.  
To participate in civilization unsuccessfully, by contrast, is to simply suppress such 
desires without consciously ordering them in a rational way in relation to the 
anticipation of a future realization.  Desires for sensuous ends, if they are not taken up 
cognitively and ordered rationally in relation to future fulfillment, do not simply lie 
dormant.  Those who “suppress and abase nature,” instead of incorporating their desires 
into a judgment regarding future actualization, are increasingly tempted, notes 
Horkheimer, to “identify themselves with [nature’s] more powerful surrogates—the 
race, fatherland, leader, cliques, and tradition.  For them, all these words mean the same 
thing—the irresistible reality that must be honored and obeyed.”114  If the possibility of 
the fulfillment of the individual’s sensuous subjectivity is abstractly negated with no 
hope for fulfillment, the subject comes to identify with the powers enforcing this 
negation and envy those who appear to violate the taboo enforced by these powers.   
For our present purposes, we need not affirm this thesis regarding displacement.  
We outline it simply to note that for Horkheimer rational judgments regarding self-
preservation fundamentally involve the deferral and sublimation of desires.  Thus 
Horkheimer wishes to argue in “Authoritarianism and the Family Today” that a past 
form of the family shaped its members to reflect upon the deferral of sensuous desire in 
a rational manner which held forth the possibility of future realization, whereas late 
modern families acclimate their members to understand self-preservation as an activity 
requiring the brute suppression of desire.  This claim by Horkheimer is easily 
misunderstood.  For instance, Lohmann notes that “heteronomy,” for Horkheimer, 
“means preventing or sublimating … [sensual impulses, drives, and immediate 
                                                





inclinations] for the sake of other goals.”115  But Horkheimer does not equate the 
necessity of repression itself with heteronomy.  The question he raises is rather whether 
repression is rationally related to eventual fulfillment for a subject.  Forced repression 
that is not chosen by the subject with the goal of fulfillment in view is thus 
heteronomous, not repression per se.   
The late modern subject, notes Horkheimer, comes to accept that the justification 
for practices does not reside in its rational judgment regarding the utility of certain kinds 
of subordination for the eventual realization of its self-interest, but rather in the 
immediate strength of the forces supporting the practice.  Such subjects “are never 
rationally reconciled to civilization.”  Rather, “they bow to it, secretly accepting the 
identity of reason and domination, of civilization and the ideal, however much they may 
shrug their shoulders.”116  It is not that the authority of the father is being eroded that 
disturbs Horkheimer.  Rather, it is the fact that the family unit and the authority of the 
father still exist as a forced reality, but in a distorted form no longer connected to the 
rational judgments of its members.   
It is in this context that Horkheimer’s claims about the relation of paternal authority 
to “moral autonomy” need to be interpreted.  In the household economy, individuals 
recognize that their own well-being hinges on the economic success of the family unit.  
In this quite limited sense, they had a kind of “solidarity,” insofar as the individual 
recognized the family’s various particular interests and projects as reflective of their own 
self-interest.  The preservation of the individual was thus consonant with the interests of 
its family, its social whole en miniature.  It is regarding this context, a context in which 
corporate solidarity and instrumental self-interest coincide, that Horkheimer notes, “In 
earlier times a loving imitation of the self-reliant, prudent man, devoted to his duty, was 
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the source of moral autonomy in the individual.”117  In the context of a contrast between 
this period and a later form of instrumental reasoning, “moral autonomy” is thus not 
intended to signify an abstract embrace of substantive values per se, nor does it reference 
a value detached from instrumental concerns.  The loving embrace by the child of the 
perspective of the father does indeed signify its embrace of the well-being of the family 
as an end-in-itself.  But this embrace is understood by the child to be consonant with a 
judgment regarding its own instrumental self-interest.  Horkheimer thus does not wish 
to imply that whereas in a previous historical moment the father’s authority was 
internalized for substantive reasons, it is now internalized for instrumental reasons.  For 
solidarity is not put at odds by him with self-preservation.  His fundamental concern is 
with contrasting two different ways of pursuing instrumental concerns, not with 
contrasting instrumental concern with the concern for substantive ends.     
The sensuous self-interest of the particular agent is no longer identified as 
consonant with a solidaric whole; indeed, Horkheimer notes, the individual no longer 
makes a judgment regarding how its particular interests and concerns are reflected in a 
social organism at all.  Rather than a judgment that the deferral of immediate 
gratification is worthwhile for the sake of the future realization of such ends, self-
preservation has become a reflexive adaptation to powers understood by the subject as 
“givens” lying beyond the exercise of reason.  Or as Horkheimer puts it in another 
essay, the meaning of the pursuit of self-preservation itself thus changes,   
The unity of individual life has been a social rather than a natural one.  When the 
social mechanisms which made for this unity are weakened as they are today, the 
individual’s concern for his self-preservation changes its meaning.  What previously 
served to promote man’s development … living through memory and foresight, 
pleasure in oneself and others, narcissism as well as love, are losing their content.118 
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The unity of the individual, Horkheimer notes, is not constituted by a brute biological 
pursuit of survival.  Such “natural” needs are always already socially mediated, and it is 
this fragile and contingent mediation that structures what the activity of self-
preservation comes to mean for the subject.  In a previous form of life, the pursuit of 
self-preservation was indistinguishable for the subject from a judgment regarding the 
unique value which the history and intimate relations within the family had for the 
subject.  As an individual, the subject’s preservation related not only to its role in the 
productive capacities of the home, but also to its loyalties and the hopes it held in 
common with the particular others making up the whole.  Self-preservation was thus 
tied intimately to a particular experience of solidarity and was mediated as one end (the 
pursuit of physical survival) by a concern for the realization of other ends arising from 
social solidarity (held in common with one’s spouse, children, siblings, parents, etc.).119  
Yet, Horkheimer emphasizes, the social practice of self-preservation is no longer 
mediated for the individual by a reflection on its particular historical past as a thread in 
the tapestry of a household (“memory”), nor by reflections regarding the future 
preservation of the members of this household (“foresight”).  If the repression of 
immediate gratification required for self-preservation no longer has a genetic connection 
to the possibility of the realization of future ends held in common with others making 
up the social whole, but rather is understood simply as an exercise in adapting to ends 
determined opaquely by heteronomous forces, then the meaning of self-preservation has 
indeed qualitatively changed for the subject.   
Horkheimer thus offers an empirical analysis, not of the triumph of pure 
“instrumental” reasoning over pure “substantive” concerns, but of the evolution of the 
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subject’s way of reasoning regarding its own self-preservation.  Whereas once the 
individual recognized, if only implicitly, that its “self-preservation [could] be achieved 
only in a supra-individual order, that is to say, through social solidarity,”120 at present the 
consonance between individual interests and the goals held in solidarity with others as 
ends-in-themselves is thrown into question.  Indeed, the relation between the two is no 
longer consciously reflected upon by the individual, and self-preservation thus takes the 
form of mere adaptation to natural givens, a repression and not sublimation of desire, 
“Since the subjugation of nature, in and outside of man, goes on without a meaningful 
motive, nature is not really transcended or reconciled but merely repressed.”121  In this 
passage from Eclipse Horkheimer does not argue that the subjugation of “nature” is itself 
avoidable or even a moral problem to be resolved.  Rather, he presumes a counterfactual 
in which natural instinct may in fact be “subjugated” by a reasoning subject in terms of 
“a meaningful motive” and thereby “reconciled.”  The problem he wishes to diagnose 
by his discussion of the suppression of nature is thus not the use of the faculty of 
theoretical reason, but – quite the contrary – the lack of reasoned judgment regarding 
self-renunciation, and its mere acceptance on the basis of (supposed) natural givens.   
3. The relation of empirical study to the critique of instrumental reason  
A picture of changing habits of reasoning emerges from Horkheimer’s descriptions 
of the family which frames the reparative concern of his late theory.  In his reflections 
on the maternal relation, Horkheimer notes that the subject is losing its capacity to judge 
particular experiences as ends-in-themselves on the basis of its sensuous experience.  
Thus the question of how an end-in-itself comes to be taken by this subject as fitting in 
relation to its sensuous experience or how the interested individual comes to recognize 
the end as an end for it is lost.  Similarly, in his reflections on the paternal, Horkheimer 
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notes that the subject is losing its capacity to judge the deferrals and suppressions of 
gratification required for self-preservation in terms of a possible future satisfaction 
which it comes to identify as self-chosen.  Such repression is rather taken as an 
inevitable necessity, unattached to reflection or the future possibility of sublimation.  
Thus the question of how the particular self-preservation of this subject might be 
realized in a form it judges to be adequate is lost.  In each case, what is critiqued is the 
divorce of the theoretical and reflective patterns of inference from the judgment of the 
individual made on the basis of its sensuous experience.  Horkheimer’s ultimate interest, 
as we will see, is thus not to set one form of reasoning against the other but to critique a 
qualitative way that both kinds of judgment have been altered as the practice of 
reasoning has increasingly become disconnected from the self-conscious judgment of 
embodied subjects.   
For the theorist, notes Horkheimer in Eclipse, the task is thus to examine the 
historical “development” of the “cleavage” between the two as a symptom of a more 
basic abstraction of judgment from sensuous experience,122 in order to illustrate that the 
opposition between the two in its present form is not in-itself an a-temporal necessity 
but is dependent upon concrete changes in historical and social practices.  Thus the 
theorist prepares “in the intellectual realm” for the possibility of “the reconciliation of 
the two in reality.”123  Horkheimer does insist, it is true, that the two forms of reasoning 
have always stood in vital tension “in civilization as we have known it so far.”124  Yet 
insofar as this cleavage has a contingent historical genesis, he does not set this history 
over against the possibility that the two may be related by agents in the future in a way 
that better approximates reconciliation.   
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In Horkheimer’s late work, he terms the abstraction of the practice of judgment 
from the sensuous experience of subjects “instrumental reason.”  In what follows we 
will outline his therapeutic diagnosis of the alienation arising because of instrumental 
reasoning, before turning to examine his understanding of how liturgical communities of 







The loss of intelligible concepts and the possibility of sublation: 
The consequence of instrumental reasoning 
Horkheimer’s mature theorizing, from Eclipse of Reason (1947) until his death, is often 
characterized by interpreters as speculative, due to his governing concern with “intelligible” 
concepts.  By “intelligible,” I mean concepts that are not products of sense experience.  
There are various examples of this kind of concept one might draw from the history of 
philosophy, such as:   
(1): Ideas that are understood to be self-evident to reason (i.e. the innate ideas of the 
rationalists; Kant’s portrayal of the moral law as a “fact” of reason in the second 
critique),  
(2): Ideas that arise from the wild exercise of the imagination (i.e. Schopenhauer’s will),  
(3): Ideas that are the product of an inference from what is experienced to that which is 
not an object of possible experience (i.e. Aquinas’ five ways).   
“Intelligible” concepts may thus be broadly contrasted with “empirical” ones.  The portrayal 
of Horkheimer as fixated on the former fits the idea, which we have noted repeatedly in the 
secondary literature, that he turns away from a concern with concrete empirical research 
towards untethered metaphysics in his mature work.1   
Upon initial investigation, this portrayal of Horkheimer’s concern is not implausible.  In 
Eclipse, for instance, he appeals to the ideals of Enlightenment rationalism to justify his 
critique.  Similarly, essays and interviews from the remaining decades of his life reflect 
extensively on Schopenhauer’s metaphysics as well as various theological topics.  I shall 
demonstrate, however, that this presentation of Horkheimer’s late critical theory presumes a 
                                                 





qualitative difference between the “empirical” and the “intelligible” that he wishes to 
challenge and thus misunderstands radically the central concern animating his late work. 
Despite critiquing the idea that materialism is primarily a doctrine regarding the nature 
of reality, Horkheimer readily admits, in his early essay “Materialism and Metaphysics” 
(1933), that the materialist assumes claims about the totality which do not arise from  the 
discrete experience of any particular object.2  What distinguishes the materialist is not that 
she assumes such claims, but rather that such claims only become items of self-conscious 
interest for her insofar as they are related to the practical action of subjects.   
To the extent that materialists have in fact formulated such definitive statements as that 
everything real is material, these statements play an entirely different role in their 
teaching than in that of their opponents. … In most nonmaterialist kinds of thought, 
insights become more meaningful and have greater implications as they become more 
general, comprehensive, and definitive statements of principle.  It cannot be said that 
for the materialist the exact opposite is true (this would be the case only in extreme and 
therefore metaphysical nominalism).  But it is true that the measure in which general 
points of view become decisive for action depends on the agent’s concrete situation at 
any given moment.3 
 
As we hinted in chapter 1, if the loss of intelligible concepts has in fact impacted the self-
understanding of subjects, this would be a situation in which one might expect 
Horkheimer’s “materialist” to sit up and take note.  I wish to argue, in a careful 
investigation of his late work, that his reflections upon intelligible concepts are best 
understood in this light: his concern is not incompatible with, and is in fact framed by him 
in terms of, his account of thought as a practical form of inquiry.  I will begin by noting two 
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typical ways of interpreting Horkheimer’s mature treatment of intelligible concepts, before 
developing this alternative account. 
Second generation critical theorists have argued that Horkheimer is inhibited in his 
appeal to intelligible concepts by his inability to consistently jettison his early critique of 
metaphysics.  For instance, in his interpretive essay on Eclipse in the critical companion On 
Max Horkheimer, Georg Lohmann notes,   
Horkheimer sees [the concept of reason] preserved, in however distorted a form, in the 
‘great ideals of civilization—justice, equality, freedom’; ‘they are … the only formulated 
testimonies we possess.’  Philosophy is to secure for itself the rational potential of these 
ideas; though it denies their claim to ‘ultimate and eternal truth,’ it grants ‘that the basic 
cultural ideas have truth values.’  This view is contradictory.  If in critically examining 
the relation between ideal and reality philosophy can ‘transcend them’, then it may do so 
only when, on the side of the ideals, its criterion of truth is justified.  The ‘basic 
difference between the ideal and the real’ characteristic of this ‘true philosophy’ is at the 
same time a relapse into metaphysics.4 
 
In appealing to the “truth value” of intelligible concepts, Lohmann argues, Horkheimer 
assumes a basis for judgment that is beyond the vicissitudes of given historical experience.  
Yet he aporetically denies the “ultimate” unconditionality of such concepts that is entailed 
by this appeal.   
Horkheimer’s appeal is further complicated, it is often noted, by a simultaneous 
commitment to diametrically opposed presentations of the intelligible.  Habermas thus 
argues that Horkheimer’s late thought is characterized not merely by an inconsistent appeal 
to the intelligible; it may be fairly portrayed, further, as the advocacy of contradictory 
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presentations of the intelligible.  Horkheimer appears to blend a commitment to 
Enlightenment moral ideals (on the one hand) with a totalizing pessimism regarding reason 
(on the other).  This duality, notes Habermas, “could initially be taken to mean that in his 
late philosophy, an unresolved tension appears between motifs from two different phases, 
as if the more practical impulses of the 1930’s were fighting off the historical vision of the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment.”  Yet Habermas concludes that this view is “too simple.”5  
Horkheimer does not embrace Enlightenment ideals and a totalizing pessimism in open 
contradiction.  Rather, he is unable finally to embrace either, “The late philosophy is 
governed by a dilemma: Dialectic of Enlightenment cannot be last word, but it bars the way 
back to the materialism of the 1930s.”6    
This abandonment of the practical ideals of Enlightenment reason, Habermas will note, 
by no means turns Horkheimer away from a concern with intelligible concepts as such.  
Rather, Horkheimer’s turn to theology is motivated by a continuing search for a stable 
standpoint from which to critique instrumental reason in the wake of the failure of the 
Enlightenment,   
From what one can gather, the older Horkheimer did not return to religious faith, but 
religion now appears as the only agency that—if it could command assent—would 
permit distinguishing between truth and falsity, morality and immorality.  It alone could 
still grant life a meaning that transcends mere self-preservation. … 
That Horkheimer should invoke theology, even if only hypothetically, is only logical 
once the philosophy of history has not only lost its historical basis but, extended into a 
totalizing critique of reason, threatens to destroy its own foundations.  The older 
Horkheimer does not which to accept this, though he sees no way out.7 
 
I shall leave to the side the constructive significance of Horkheimer’s invocation of theology 
and return to it in the final two chapters.  At present, I wish to demonstrate that 
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characterizing Horkheimer’s reflections on the intelligible concepts of the Enlightenment as 
an inconsistent attempt to ground the normativity of his critique (Lohmann), or as a 
confused rejection arising from a negative philosophy of history (Habermas), both 
misunderstand the intention of Horkheimer’s mature work. 
Horkheimer often describes his late critical theory, we shall see, as the task of 
“preserving” historical concepts of the intelligible.  If intelligible concepts are understood as 
products of “pure” reason (inferences from empirical conditions to the unconditioned, e.g. 
theological metaphysics), or as products of “pure” intuition (imagined experiences of that 
which underlies all empirical conditions, e.g. Schopenhauer’s will), then to speak of 
“preserving” such concepts is nonsense.  One may speak of “preserving” concepts only if 
they are the sorts of items that may in fact be lost.  On the other hand, if concepts of the 
intelligible are practices of description which are learned socially, one may indeed speak of 
them being “lost” or “preserved,” insofar as they continue to have significance as actions 
for members of a given form of life.   
Horkheimer’s thesis is that changes in the habits of reasoning learned in the family have 
fundamentally altered how subjects reason regarding the intelligible.  This alteration, he 
argues, inhibits the continued use of such concepts.  In itself, this would not be worthy of 
examination, for historical concepts often fall out of use or take on qualitatively distinct 
meanings in different historical moments.  Yet a historical analysis of the way changes in 
reasoning regarding the intelligible have affected modern subjects reveals that a deep 
alienation results from this loss, and Horkheimer wishes to address this experience of 





By way of introduction, I shall outline this thesis regarding the loss of intelligible 
concepts and the consequent alienation of subjects in relation to Horkheimer’s empirical 
studies, and then examine how it is reflected in the form of his argument in Eclipse.  In the 
last chapter, we noted that Horkheimer’s studies convince him that modern subjects are 
increasingly acclimated to minimize the relationship between their particular experience as 
social embodied agents and their theoretical and reflective habits of reasoning.  This 
separation between experience and judgment, Horkheimer will note in Eclipse, is reflected in 
two opposing kinds of reasoning about intelligible concepts.  On the one hand, positivism 
(an expression of theoretical reasoning) abstractly negates such concepts as empty, insofar 
as they describe teleological wholes that are not objects of possible experience.  On the 
other, various revivals of metaphysics (expressions of reflective reasoning) affirm the 
content of intelligible concepts, yet understand this content in a way that separates it, as an 
immediate intuition of the whole, from the subject’s experience of empirical conditions.  In 
both cases judgment regarding the adequacy of intelligible concepts is divorced from a 
subject’s particular experience of the social practices it inhabits.  “Positivism” and 
“metaphysical revivals” thus reflect Horkheimer’s empirical studies on the family: the 
former describes the subject’s increasing inability to contemplate the fittedness between its 
own self-interest and the purposes of the social whole, the latter the subject’s inability to 
judge other ends-in-themselves in accordance with its own sensuous experience.   
This results in a fundamental dissonance in the self-understanding of modern subjects.  
In early modern life, Horkheimer notes in his essays on the family, subjects expected to be 
able to pose the self-reflexive questions: “do the social practices I inhabit stand in continuity 





as an end-in-itself” (in the case of reflective reasoning)?  Put otherwise, subjects did not take 
either the extrinsic purposes of the social whole or the value of ends-in-themselves to be 
self-evident.8  Yet they are increasingly unable to pose these questions, and thus to 
recognize the ends they pursue as reflections of their self-conscious willing.  This inability, 
Horkheimer will argue, is intimately related to a failure to preserve the significance of 
intelligible concepts in modern life.  Moderns need an account of the relation between 
experience and such concepts if they are to judge the ends they pursue as reflecting (or 
failing to reflect) their own self-understanding.  Yet “positivism” names a sensibility that 
denies that the content of such concepts has any relation to experience, whereas revivals of 
metaphysics leave no room for the experience of the subject in their formulation and 
justification.    
Setting aside for the moment the substantive argument Horkheimer wishes to make 
regarding such types of reasoning in Eclipse, let us make an initial observation regarding how 
Horkheimer’s concern is reflected in its form.  Horkheimer does not set metaphysics over 
against positivism in programmatic statements of his critique of instrumental reasoning, but 
portrays the two as intimately related.  In discussing the relationship between positivism and 
the neo-Thomist conception of the “natural law” in Eclipse, Horkheimer notes, 
The positivist command to conform to facts … is not so different from the call to obey 
reality as interpreted by religious institutions. … Both schools are heteronomous in 
character.  One tends to replace autonomous reason by the automatism of streamlined 
methodology, the other by the authority of a dogma.9 
 
                                                 
8 Note our discussion in Ch. 3, section 2.  This formulation of Horkheimer’s concern draws on Terry 
Pinkard’s reflections in Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996).  Pinkard notes that for Hegel, the purpose of “the modern project” is to show that “the enterprise of 
self-grounding goes all the way down” (270).  A very similar concern occupies a central place in Horkheimer’s 
own reflections as we will see.  





Horkheimer thus draws a parallel between a particular understanding of “facts” that equates 
their meaning with the results yielded by the scientific method and an understanding of 
“reality” which equates its meaning with the claims of the church regarding the natural law.  
Both of these kinds of claims are “heteronomous,” insofar as each take “facts” or “reality” 
as givens that should be accepted by subjects apart from an exercise of judgment made on 
the basis of their own particular experience.10  Framing a similar parallel, he notes that the 
relationship between the modern sciences and humanities in the academy reflect that 
“truth” has been “split.”  On the one hand, “the physical sciences are endowed with so 
called objectivity, but emptied of human content” (the products of the scientific method are 
thus not related to the judgment of a social embodied subject regarding reality).  On the 
other, “the humanities preserve the human content, but only as ideology, at the expense of 
truth” (by “ideology,” Horkheimer refers to a value that is abstracted from the judgment of 
the subject made on the basis of its own experience).11   
The ubiquity of the claim regarding Horkheimer’s aporetic return to “metaphysics” 
notwithstanding, it is already clear that he did not view his argument in Eclipse simply as a 
critique of positivism in favor of metaphysics.  In an unpublished letter to the editors of the 
Philosophical Review rebutting this charge, he forcefully insists, “In spite of my critiques of 
‘subjective reason’ and its relapse into a second mythology … I have never advocated a 
return to an even more mythological ‘objective reason’ borrowed from history,” and he 
concludes, “I have attacked enlightenment in the spirit of enlightenment, not of 
                                                 
10 Cf. ibid., 81, where Horkheimer similarly contrasts his critical theory with “both the concept of values and 
the idea of the absolute validity of facts.”   





obscurantism.”12  While this claim to critique both positivism and metaphysics is often 
portrayed as nonsensical, I shall illustrate that it is meaningful when situated by 
Horkheimer’s concern for the preservation of intelligible concepts.   
I will first outline Horkheimer’s understanding of the self-understanding and 
expectations of the modern subject, which he describes in relation to the Enlightenment 
political project (1).  Then I will develop his diagnosis of the way the frustration of this 
project relates to a failure to preserve intelligible concepts in a form appropriate to modern 
life, resulting in the alienation of the subject (2).  Finally, I will introduce his mature work as 
a reflection on another way of understanding such concepts, besides abstract negation 
(positivism) or a-historical reassertion (metaphysical revivals), by examining his portrayal of 
the task of critical theory as “preservation” (3).13  In the final two chapters, I will interpret 
his reflections on theology as a therapeutic attempt to preserve intelligible categories in a 
form adequate to the self-understanding of modern subjects.         
1. The Enlightenment project  
In explaining the Enlightenment project, Horkheimer begins with what he takes to be a 
tension between Kant’s insistence in his political writings that social life should to be 
structured in accordance with the goal of practical reason (the treatment of agents as ends-
in-themselves), and his claim in the second critique that the “ought” presented in the 
                                                 
12 Horkheimer, A Life in Letters: Selected Correspondences, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 271.  Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 332, notes that guarding 
against this construal of Eclipse was a concern Horkheimer shared with Adorno.  James Schmidt goes so far as 
to suggest in “The Eclipse of Reason and the End of the Frankfurt School in America,” New German Critique 34, 
no. 1 (Winter 2007): 67, fn. 80, that Horkheimer may have expressed discomfort with his publisher’s summary 
of his argument for this reason. 
13 If I am correct, Horkheimer should thus be placed amongst a coterie of modern Jewish philosophers 
interested in developing what Steven Kepnes terms (following Paul Ricoeur) in Jewish Liturgical Reasoning 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7, a modern “‘hermeneutic of retrieval’ of philosophy, human 





categorical imperative implies “can.”  The latter insistence implies that one may infer from 
the articulation of a categorical imperative the concrete possibility of its empirical 
realization, so that the latter is merely contingent upon an act of the will.  Yet this appears 
to Horkheimer to stand in no little tension with the former concern in Kant’s political 
writings, for they suppose that structures characterizing the social whole inhibit the exercise 
of this will.  To the extent that there are social preconditions necessary to allow subjects to 
exercise their will in accord with practical reason and these preconditions remain unrealized, 
the formal imperative supposes an implicit substantive commitment to bring about a society 
where the categorical imperative may be practiced.  Thus Horkheimer notes, “The moment 
one infers—as Kant did—that the world should be arranged so that everyone can act like 
this, something has been read into the principle that isn’t there.”14  Kant’s political work 
thus admits a fissure between the imperative and the absence of the preconditions that 
allow its realization.15   
Horkheimer interprets the intelligible postulates of practical reason as an attempt to 
bridge this fissure.  In the present social whole, Kant admits, an individual may well be 
forced to act against its own happiness when it submits to the imperatives of practical 
reason because the social incentives which situate individual willing do not always accord 
with treating others as ends.  For Kant, the reconciliation between the individual and its 
social whole is thus necessarily deferred onto an intelligible horizon.  The possibility of 
                                                 
14 Horkheimer, “On Kant’s Moral Philosophy” (1961-1962), in Dawn and Decline: Notes, 1926-1931 & 1950-
1969, trans. Michael Shaw (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 199, his emphasis.  This late claim parallels the 
initial move in Horkheimer’s early Kant critique, “Materialism and Morality” (1933) in Between Philosophy and 
Social Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 25, “The categorical imperative … runs up against the 
impossibility of its own meaningful realization.” 
15 Horkheimer thus concludes, “What determines how the world would have to look for that kind of action to 
occur? … Even in moral philosophy, the consequence is really already assumed: you must treat man as an end 
because the world in which everyone can act that way is just as much an end as man” (“On Kant’s Moral 





future happiness allowed by the postulates, notes Horkheimer, contains an implicit 
judgment regarding the inadequacy of the temporal empirical conditions which inhibit its 
realization, “The postulate of a transcendental world is identical, in [Kant’s] philosophy, 
with the judgment on the immanent world.”16  God, freedom, and immortality allow Kant 
to suggest that the experience of a fissure between the particular agent and its social whole 
can be soothed by a discursive interior act of the intellect, the idea that happiness may 
eventually come to those who act in accord with the moral law.  Yet for Horkheimer only 
“life,” the concrete activity of subjects, is able to close the fissure, “What mediates between 
the two [the intelligible and empirical worlds] … is not faith alone, nor interiority but 
human life.”17  One cannot equate the cognitive reconciliation of a fragmented life in 
thought with its actual reconciliation in reality.18        
The fact that Kant refuses to conceive of the rational reconciliation between the 
individual and the social whole in terms other than such intellection, does, however, signal a 
decisive step beyond the scholastics.  For the latter conceived of this reconciliation as 
already existing.  By contrast, for Kant, 
It is not in the encompassing order that the unity of reason and reality can evidence 
themselves.  Only in the cognitive effort of the intellect, in the nature and quality of 
living beings, in art, can unity, appropriateness and perfection unfold.  And it is 
therefore consistent that the step from the imperative to action, the concept of mankind 
as end in contrast to mere means, indeed the concept of an end, should also not be 
consistent and valid.  If it were, Kant’s philosophy would lead back to Scholasticism, to 
a time when the world seemed in order.19 
 
                                                 
16 Horkheimer, “The Concept of Man” (1957), Critique of Instrumental Reason: Lectures and Essays since the End of 
World War II (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Cf. Horkheimer, “The Social Function of Philosophy” (1939), in Critical Theory, 269, “Contradictions in 
thought cannot be resolved by purely theoretical reflection.  That requires an historical development beyond 
which we cannot leap in thought.  Knowledge is bound up not only with psychological and moral conditions, 
but also with social conditions.” 





Although they allow only artificial reconciliation, Kant’s postulates continue to portray the 
realization of happiness as deferred.  For Horkheimer, this is both symptomatic of the 
continuing dissatisfaction experienced by modern subjects, as well as an expression of hope 
regarding the possibility of a self-directed human future as a task yet to be accomplished.   
What he terms in the following passage as “the Kantian conclusion” is a striving after 
the social preconditions which would allow for the consistent practice of the categorical 
imperative, preconditions that would enable the task of the Enlightenment, the recognition 
of subjects as ends-in-themselves, to proceed.  Yet Horkheimer notes that this Kantian 
conclusion is in danger of being lost, 
In the historical period after Kant the material conditions needed for a rational 
administration of the world improved to a degree undreamt of.  Yet those who 
inherited these improved conditions are far from drawing the Kantian conclusion. … In 
the century of Enlightenment free thought was the force that knocked the solid 
supports of stability from under institutions which bad conscience had driven to adopt 
terroristic methods; it was the force that gave the bourgeoisie its self-awareness.  In our 
own time, on the contrary, the feeling is abroad that free thought is helpless.  Mastery of 
nature has not brought man to self-realization, on the contrary, the status quo continues 
to exert its objective compulsion.20    
 
For the materialist, the Kantian hope has for its object the realization of a social goal, that 
the subject would recognize the social practices and institutions it inhabits as expressions of 
its will.  Thought is a form of self-consciousness that enables the subject to realize this goal.  
Using Hegelian language, Horkheimer terms this a commitment to the “self-realization” of 
the subject.  In seeking this, he notes, the seminal advocates of the Enlightenment subjected 
all claims to the natural “objectivity” of social practices to critical evaluation, in order, as he 
puts it in an earlier essay, to “impregnate with human purpose those relationships of daily 
                                                 





life that are almost blindly created and maintained.”21  However, its inheritors “are far from 
drawing the Kantian conclusion.”    
In late modern society, the fulfillment of authentic “man” is thus typically discussed 
apart from the concrete analysis of the relation between a subject and its empirical practices.  
For instance, Horkheimer notes, existentialists define humanity by a set of universal traits 
abstracted from socio-historical analysis, and the goal sought by their theorizing is 
disconnected from the political vision of the Enlightenment.  They couple the goal of 
personal authenticity with a notion of transformation that requires inward resolve but not a 
change in social practices,     
Where the word “man” … is still used in a more pregnant sense, it does not imply the 
rights of mankind.  It does not stand for a theory of reason such as once was based on 
the unshakeable belief that a just world could still be brought into existence.  The word 
“man” no longer expresses the power of the subject who can resist the status quo, 
however heavily it may weigh upon him.  Quite differently than in the context of critical 
philosophy, to speak of man today is to engage in the endless question of the ground of 
man and, since, in ontological philosophy ground supplies direction, in the endless quest 
for an image of man that will provide orientation and guidance. … We must note, 
however, that when man is regarded as a spiritual being and not as a biological species, 
he is always a definite individual, not the dimensionless abstraction, distilled from the 
individuals of every social stratum, class, country, and age.22 
 
What Horkheimer terms “ontological philosophy” fixates on an intractable question, the 
“ground of man” lying behind social practices, which may “direct” the individual ethical life.  
Yet the idea that all human reflection is oriented around the individual actualization of 
authenticity in accord with this ground ignores the way thought as an activity is situated by 
social practices for the “definite individual” of a particular “social stratum, class, country, 
and age.”  Existentialism, as we shall see, is but a particular example for Horkheimer of a 
                                                 
21 Horkheimer, “Social Function of Philosophy,” 260.  
22 Horkheimer, “Concept of Man,” 4-5.  This passage parallels precisely Horkheimer’s earlier critique of 





broader tendency to disregard the relationship between socio-historical experience and 
judgment.  This disregard, he argues, is held in common by late modern forms of thought as 
wildly divergent as positivist elevations of the scientific method and modern revivals of 
metaphysics.  The problem with such thought, he insists, is that it is incapable of addressing 
the alienation subject’s experience due to their failure to achieve self-determination in the 
social practices they inhabit, thus the failure to achieve self-satisfaction in terms of a 
fundamental goal defining their own understanding as moderns.  With this in mind, we shall 
now turn to examine the central substantive claims of Eclipse.   
2. The declensions of the Enlightenment 
2.1. The positivist declension:  
Theoretical reasoning and the eclipse of subjectivity 
Horkheimer insists that the contemporary inability to reflect upon the subject in 
positivist thought is not intrinsically tied to the observational method of its empiricist 
forbearers.  In an early essay setting forth the basis for his later critique of positivism which 
we have already examined, “The Latest Attack on Metaphysics” (1937), he thus prefaces his 
criticism by praising the early empiricists for their critique of the social role of intelligible 
concepts,   
In its most flourishing period, positivism did not limit its attack to metaphysical ideas 
about the beyond, but criticized organicist theories of the state and society as well.  
Early in its history it criticized the fetishistic concept of the state together with the 
illusory concept of God as things which hindered the development of man.  This 
clarification is entered on the credit side of modern positivism.23 
 
This assessment of the early empiricists does not change in Horkheimer’s late essays.  A 
quarter of a century later he notes, “Empiricism and the materialism related to it imply 
criticism, not only of the dominant philosophy and the original perfection of things which it 
                                                 





had proclaimed, but also of the conditions of the world, of social and political reality.”24  
The progenitors of positivism continue to be significant, for Horkheimer, insofar as they 
pursued the Enlightenment political project, the desire for the self-realization of the subject 
and the critique of heteronomous social forces that hinder this.  The early empiricist 
emphasis on the relation of the justification of claims to experience was congruent with this 
project, for it forced the legitimating claims of semi-feudal institutions before the tribunal of 
the sensuous experience of those inhabiting the institutions.  
In contrast to this critique, which presupposes, even if implicitly, a commitment to 
particular emancipatory ends, later empiricists embody a purely theoretical nominalism 
which negates the notion of teleology as such.  In its subsequent historical iterations, 
positivism thus loses its concern with the realization of the Enlightenment political project: 
whereas the French encyclopédistes had critiqued the portrayal of the intelligible marshaled by 
institutional authorities to suppress the subject, empiricism in the hands of Comte, with its 
critique of abstract universals like “justice, equality, and fraternity,” became a tool for 
insulating such repressive constellations from scrutiny,   
The eighteenth century philosophy which, defying the funeral pyres for books and 
people, put the fear of death into infamy, joined forces with it under Bonaparte.  Finally, 
the apologetic school of Comte usurped the succession to the uncompromising 
encyclopédistes, extending the hand of friendship to all those whom the latter had opposed.  
Such metamorphoses of critique into affirmation do not leave the theoretical content 
untouched; its truth evaporates.25  
 
In Eclipse Horkheimer assumes this historical background, asserting concisely that 
empiricism “abstracted from its social context and human goal becomes merely an illusion 
                                                 
24 Horkheimer, “Schopenhauer Today” (1961), in Critique of Instrumental Reason, 72. 
25 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (1944), trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), xv.  Cf. Horkheimer’s nearly identical analysis 





of motion, the bad infinity of mechanical repetition.”26  If the self-realization of the 
empirical subject was to be brought about through a frank reckoning which compared the 
claims of institutions with the sense-experience of subjects, the flattening of this “human 
goal” leads to observation for its own sake, the “illusion of motion.” 
Developing this argument with greater precision, Horkheimer notes that for early 
empiricists the relation between subjects and institutions is revealed by controlled 
observation, but the results of the method of observation are not themselves equated with 
truth.  Given the practical context in which empiricism emerged, “truth” referred for early 
theorists to a relation of satisfaction between the subject and the institutions it inhabited.  
The method of observation does not, of course, yield such satisfaction, but provides 
knowledge that can direct the subject towards it.  Later positivists, by contrast, equate the 
results of the scientific method with truth itself, “Instead of interrupting the machine-like 
functioning of research, the mechanisms of fact-finding, verification, classification, et cetera, 
and reflecting on their meaning and relation to truth, the positivists reiterate that science 
proceeds by observation and describe circumstantially how it functions.”27  Thus instead of 
recognizing observation as a self-conscious attempt to illuminate an already existing 
relationship between a subject and its social practices in order to direct the activity of 
subjects, the concepts yielded by observation are understood as representing reality.  By 
contrast, notes Horkheimer, philosophy that is faithful to the Enlightenment project should 
not accept an equation of the outcome of formal procedures with “truth.”  It should rather 
direct and synthesize the implications of practices of observation in relation to the historical 
goal sought by the original empiricists, the self-realization of the subject.  He concludes with 
                                                 
26 Horkheimer, Eclipse, 133-134.  





no little irony that positivists have departed from the original spirit of the empiricists, “By 
compliantly making science the theory of philosophy, positivism disavows the spirit of 
science itself.”28   
Horkheimer concludes these reflections by noting that a theorist cannot avoid the 
necessary relation between contexts of inquiry and formalized practices of observation 
when defining what constitutes “truth.”  The claim that “observation is the proper 
guarantee of truth,” he notes, cannot itself be verified by observation and thus involves a 
“vicious circle.”29  In order to avoid this, one must have reference to a historical context 
that can delimit when observation counts as truth for the inquiring subject in terms of 
projects and desires it has taken in hand.  In postulating a principle that lies beyond any 
relation to the experience of an embodied subject yet is proclaimed as self-evident in its 
immediacy, positivists simply rehearse the mistake of various metaphysicians who attempt 
to appeal behind historical practices to an intuitive self-evident immediacy,   
The impasse into which the ultimate justification of the positivist principle of empirical 
verification leads is an argument against the positivists only because they dub every 
other philosophical principle dogmatic and irrational.  While other dogmatists at least 
try to justify their principles on the basis of what they call revelation, intuition, or 
primary evidence, the positivists try to avoid the fallacy by using such methods naively 
and denouncing those who practice them deliberately.30  
 
While positivism and metaphysical revivals may be wildly different kinds of thought, 
Horkheimer notes, they both assume criterion abstracted from historical contexts of inquiry 
as self-evident immediacies.  The theorist concerned with realizing the Enlightenment 
project, by contrast, is interested not in positing an abstracted immediacy which delimits 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 74. 
29 Ibid., 76. 





what can count as truth no matter the context, but rather with tracing the truth of existing 
social practices as judged by an interested, historical subject.     
When Horkheimer thus turns to articulate his alternative to positivism, he does not do 
so by setting speculative philosophy over against empirical inquiry, but rather by articulating 
a different way of understanding the relation of observational practices to truth,     
If science is to be the authority that stands firm against obscurantism—and in 
demanding this the positivists continue the great tradition of humanism and the 
Enlightenment—philosophers must set up a criterion for the true nature of science.  
Philosophy must formulate the concept of science in a way that expresses human 
resistance to the threatening relapse into mythology and madness, rather than further 
such a relapse by formalizing science and conforming it to the requirements of the 
existing practice.  To be the absolute authority, science must be justified as an 
intellectual principle, not merely deduced from empirical procedures and then made 
absolute truth on the basis of dogmatic criteria of scientific success.31   
 
The key premise of the passage is that a practice of observation “must be justified as an 
intellectual principle, not merely deduced from empirical procedures.”  A way it may be 
justified, Horkheimer notes, is by its ability to realize a historically situated project, the self-
determination of the historical subject.  Thus “the concept of science” itself must be related 
to a concern for “human resistance” against various heteronomous forces, and precisely 
this, Horkheimer notes, was part of the self-understanding of early empiricists who 
employed observation in terms of a social project, as part of “the great tradition of 
humanism and the Enlightenment.”  It becomes particularly clear in this context how 
misguided it is to interpret Horkheimer’s work as a preference for philosophy over against 
empirical inquiry.  He contrasts, rather, two different ways of understanding the relation of 
scientific “observation” to “truth.”  One equates the former with the latter and abstracts 
both from concrete contexts of inquiry while the other situates the meaning of both as 
                                                 





conditioned by a broader historical project (in this case, the ends pursued by Enlightenment 
humanism).  
Instead of either accepting or negating intelligible concepts prima facie in favor of 
scientific practices of observation, the theorist should recognize such concepts as implicit in 
the development of historical scientific practices themselves.  Criticism intent on realizing 
the Enlightenment project should then be offered for the purpose of the self-determination 
of the subject, not as a critique of teleological concepts as such.  In Horkheimer’s 
delineation of the role of the philosopher, a proper concern with subjecting the intelligible 
justification of alienation to critical reflection is, of course, an aspect of such criticism.  
However, this determinate negation becomes abstract when teleology as such is negated.32 
2.2. The metaphysical declension:  
Reflective reasoning and the eclipse of subjectivity 
 
Modern subjects are alienated by the abstract negation of teleological concepts not 
simply because they mourn the loss of traditional metaphysics, but because this negation 
shakes the very foundations of the Enlightenment project itself.  From his earliest writings 
Horkheimer is sensitive to this, noting in his lectures on the history of philosophy from the 
1920s that “the advance of the intellectual efforts, which sought to capture reality free from 
all distortions (free from theology and metaphysics), left a meaningless, abstract, elemental 
material as residue behind.”  Thus, “ideals which had guided the early development of this 
society,” such as “human dignity, morality, [and] freedom” appeared “at best imagined or 
even fictitious.”33  In response to this experience, a temptation is to search for a historical 
                                                 
32 Cf. Horkheimer’s discussion of the role of the philosopher in chapter 2, section 2.3.    
33 Quoted from Horkheimer, Nachgelassene Schriften, 1914-1931, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, vol. 10 of 
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Tauschenbush, 1990), 319-320, 





moment prior to the disenchantment and thus reassert historical practices of thinking 
related to pre-modern forms of life.  However understandable such revivals may be, warns 
Horkheimer, they risk eliding the social and institutional reasons underlying changes in past 
forms of thought and the influence of such changes on the self-conception of modern 
subjects.  The reason Horkheimer critiques such revivals is thus not the bare fact that they 
reassert intelligible concepts.  Rather, it is because they reassert such concepts in a way not 
sensitive to the historical self-consciousness of modern subjects.  He wishes to repair this, 
not by negating such historical concepts, but by illustrating how they might be preserved in 
a form adequate to this self-consciousness.   
Horkheimer notes that justifications offered for pre-modern institutions contained an 
“element of coldness” which was insensitive to the suffering of many who inhabited them.  
For example, in “the harmonious cosmos” of medieval metaphysics, he notes, “personality 
[was] the microcosm corresponding to an immutable social and natural hierarchy.”  Yet the 
supposed fittedness between the subject and reality reflected in the treatment of social roles 
as natural givens offered no voice to many who suffered.  Modern institutions and the 
practices of reasoning which they facilitated arose at least in part as a historical response 
against this coldness, as the attempt to give subjects a voice in reflecting upon and 
determining the social forces shaping their life.  Horkheimer embraces this narrative of the 
emergence of the modern subject in Eclipse,      
Insistence upon any immutable order of the universe, implying a static view of history, 
precludes hope of a progressive emancipation of the subject from eternal childhood in 
both community and nature.  The transition from objective to subjective reason was a 
necessary historical process.34 
 
                                                 





Elsewhere, he explicitly relates this historical process to the way moderns conceive of the 
justification of social practices, “With the decline of the hierarchical order in the 
Renaissance, the certainty of a natural arrangement of humanity faded as well, and the form 
of social relations required justification.”35  The modern notion that authority is a relation 
between subjects that must be justified to those subjects and not a self-evident natural 
arrangement is thus understood by Horkheimer as a political response to a form of 
alienation characterizing pre-modern life.  One may, of course, question the historical 
narrative which moderns tell themselves about the emergence of their political institutions.  
Even so, Horkheimer wishes to note that any attempt to evaluate the significance of past 
metaphysical concepts for moderns should appreciate what is revealed about their self-
understanding by this narrative: modern agents understand the development of their 
political practices as a response to the alienation of subjects in previous forms of life arising 
because of the conflation of social roles with natural exigencies.36   
Horkheimer notes that two prominent features of this self-understanding should be 
appreciated in particular.  First, moderns consider their form of life to be a consistent 
culmination of a concern implicit in pre-modern societies.  The modern idea that a social 
relationship between agents is self-consciously constituted and its continuation justified on 
the basis of the agents’ experience of the relation develops, Horkheimer argues, from a 
concern that is already evident in pre-modern accounts and which is reflected in the 
formulation of their conceptualizations of the intelligible.  Second, moderns evaluate this 
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culmination as an advance.  Self-conscious reflection regarding the relation between the 
justification of a practice and embodied experience is understood by them as a historical 
accomplishment of modern institutions, though one that is imperiled.  It is precipitated by 
the dissatisfaction of past subjects in previous forms of life at their inability to consistently 
recognize their will in their social practices.  It follows, for Horkheimer, that recognition of 
the self-consciousness of moderns need not require the negation of past conceptualizations 
of the intelligible.  It does require, however, that the theorist examine and rearticulate the 
continuing significance of historical concepts of the intelligible in a form sensitive to this 
modern self-consciousness.   
This is not the approach of metaphysical revivals.  Instead of attempting the 
preservation of concepts in a form consistent with the modern concern with the subject’s 
role in constituting its practices, revivals reassert past concepts tell quel as a panacea for 
disenchantment.  A significant difference between pre-critical and modern forms of 
metaphysics may thus be noted: while for modern metaphysical revivals, teleology is known 
by the subject as an intuitive immediacy, such that “valid insight” regarding teleological 
wholes “must confine itself to the realm of the immediately given—the ‘données immédiates de 
la conscience,’”37 for the ancients intelligible wholes could not be known apart from a relation 
to the what we have termed the “sensuous experience” of subjects (experience inflected by 
the affects and projects of the subject).  While pre-modern concepts contain an implicit 
account of the relation of their formulations to such experience, late modern revivals elide 
the relation and treat their conceptualizations as self-evident.  In this, it bears repeating, 
metaphysical revivals mirror the positivist declension: both privilege a self-evident 
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immediacy of some sort over against the judgment of the subject arising from its embodied 
social experience.   
2.2.1. The relation of the subject to the intelligible in pre-modern metaphysics  
Horkheimer marshals numerous examples throughout the history of philosophy which 
he believes illustrate that pre-modern philosophy consistently expresses a tacit relationship 
between intelligible concepts and the social experience of subjects.  His intent, it bears 
repeating, is not to present classical thought as an alternative to modern philosophy, but 
rather to illustrate a point regarding contemporary retrievals of metaphysics: such retrievals 
take a qualitatively distinct approach to the role of the subject in knowing than their pre-
modern antecedents.  In sharp contrast, he maintains that his own explanation of the 
preservation of such concepts contains a clear relation to the subject that makes both 
explicit and consistent what is penultimate and inconsistent in pre-modern accounts.  
Horkheimer thus wishes to claim that his account both stands in closer proximity to 
classical forms of thought than metaphysical revivals as well as that it completes what is 
only inconsistently implicit in these earlier accounts by virtue of its attention to the 
constitutive role of the subject.     
A central case study he offers to illustrate this argument is the relation between medieval 
and neo-Thomism, the latter of which is his primary contemporary object of critique in 
Eclipse.  The interpretation of the history of philosophy he develops is properly understood 
as a background which both illumines and is illumined by this particular case study.  We will 
thus outline Horkheimer’s broader historical narrative of the relation of the subject to 





While “reason in its proper sense of logos, or ratio, has always been essentially related to 
the subject, his faculty of thinking,” notes Horkheimer, in pre-modern accounts “reason” 
also expresses an “absolute objectivity ultimately beyond, though related to, the faculty of 
thinking.”38  Accounts of reason from antiquity thus necessarily involve a relation both to 
empirical subjectivity as well as to the meaning of the whole, which surpasses the discrete 
experiences of empirical conditions by situating them in terms of a purposive totality.  The 
relation between the subject who knows and the intelligible that is known differs markedly, 
Horkheimer notes, in ancient and modern accounts.  For the former, the existence of such 
wholes did not imply that knowledge of them was immediate or intuitively present to 
comprehension.  Rather, such knowledge required the practice of dialectics, influenced both 
by the skill and affective desire of the seeker, “This structure is accessible to him who takes 
upon himself the effort of dialectical thinking, or, identically, who is capable of eros.”39  
Besides skill and affective desire, material well-being was also recognized as a prerequisite 
for philosophical reflection upon the intelligible.40   
This implicit relation is perhaps nowhere better portrayed, Horkheimer notes, than in 
the Funeral Oration of Pericles.  While it is certainly the case that for Pericles, the polis “was 
both superior and antecedent to its citizens,” nevertheless “this predominance … facilitated 
rather than hindered the rise of the individual: it effected a balance between … individual 
freedom and communal welfare.”41  In the oration, a clear distinction is thus drawn between 
the citizen of unique skill and courage and the social totality his skill serves.  Yet while the 
two are distinguished (thus the possibility of conflict remains), Pericles extols, not the 
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obsolescence of the citizen but the harmony between the two as the rational convergence 
that must be maintained if Athens is to prosper.  Horkheimer does not believe that such 
harmony existed in the seamless way presented by such “Athenian ideology,”42 yet he 
concludes that the ideology is symptomatic of the fact that a relation between the happiness 
of the individual and the life of the whole is a goal recognized by antique reflection.   
In reflecting on the vanishing point of this convergence, Horkheimer notes that Plato in 
the Republic similarly “projects an equilibrium between individual liberty and group control 
in the interests of the community,” insofar as “the value of each being is assessed in the 
light of a pre-existing teleology” based on the individual’s role in society.43  However, he too 
recognizes in a partial way that the self-conscious choice of subjects plays a role in 
constituting social life, for “man makes himself at least to this extent, that he fulfils his 
innate potentialities.”44  While Plato limits the potentialities of classes of subjects, 
Horkheimer emphasizes that he recognizes a relation between the subject’s own 
constituting activity and how well it may realize its entelechy.   
Finally, Horkheimer notes that in the dialogues and most supremely the Trial, Socrates’ 
“affirmation of conscience raised the relation between the individual and the universal to a 
new level.”45  Instead of conceiving of the individual as moral to the extent it conforms to 
its entelechy, thus as enveloped by a static political order, Socrates presumes the inverse: the 
conscience of the individual is able to evaluate the order which enables and constrains it.  
The relation between the constituting subject and the ends it pursues is no longer 
understood merely to be one of actualization, but is further one of judgment, “For Socrates, 
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following in the line of the speculations of the great Sophists, to desire or even to do the 
right thing without reflection was not enough.  Conscious choice was a prerequisite of the 
ethical way of life.”46  Socrates is thus exemplary, for Horkheimer, because he is the first to 
locate the justification of the universal in the experience of the sensuous individual.  In a 
contemporaneous essay Horkheimer defines precisely this as the goal of the philosopher, to 
raise the question of the relation “between his particular existence and the general life of 
society,” in order that the life of the society might be reformed to fit the self-conscious 
goals of reflective subjects.47 
According to Horkheimer, this relation between social life and subjectivity is suppressed 
for a time after Socrates during a period of intense social upheaval in favor of self-mastery.48  
Yet if Epicureans and Stoics, for instance, presume the withdrawal of the subject from the 
life of the polis, early Christianity, “in sharp contrast with … Hellenistic ethical 
philosophies,” replaces withdrawal by associating the “mastering of natural drives” on 
which this earlier philosophy is based with an interest in social caritas.49  Christianity did not 
abstractly negate self-mastery as such; rather, the temporal preservation of the self 
motivating such internal restraint is transfigured in Christianity as a concern with “the 
eternal life of the soul.”50  A Christian continues to defer the immediate desires of her ego, 
yet this sacrifice is situated, on the one side, by the goal of temporal caritas and, on the 
other, an eternal, if deferred, self-realization.51  The same narrative that introduces an eternal 
horizon to situate and transfigure the antique account of self-mastery in so doing also 
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recovers and elevates the idea of the individual’s conscience as a seat of judgment (thus the 
following passage mirrors Horkheimer’s approbation of Socrates in an instructive manner).  
At the same time, however, it now presents the individual not merely as the judge of claims 
regarding the intelligible, but further as an end-in-itself, 
The value of the soul was enhanced by the idea of equality implied in God’s creation of 
man in his own image and in Christ’s atonement for all mankind.  The very concept of 
the soul as the inner light, the dwelling place of God, came into being only with 
Christianity, and all antiquity has an element of emptiness and aloofness by contrast.52 
 
Inverting the relation between the sensuous individual and the totality, so that the 
conscience of the former not only stands in judgment on the latter but is the end which the 
latter exists to serve, notes Horkheimer, is a qualitative advance over antique forms of 
metaphysics, for it presents a way of understanding subjects and their ends as intrinsically 
worthwhile apart from their “fit” with the immediacies of temporal preservation.     
Subsequent renaissance humanists deny the eternal horizon with its (supposed) deferral 
of the empirical ego, replacing it with an emphasis on the hic et nunc; at the same time, 
however, they preserve the privileging of the subject whose conscious self-determination in 
this life is portrayed as the purpose which the social order serves.   
Hamlet, often called the first truly modern individual, is the embodiment of the idea of 
individuality for the very reason that he fears the finality of death, the terror of the 
abyss.  The profundity of his metaphysical reflections, the subtle shadings of his mind, 
presuppose the conditioning of Christianity.  Although Hamlet, a good disciple of 
Montaigne, lost his Christian faith, he retained his Christian soul, and in a way this 
marks the origin of the modern individual.  Renaissance humanism preserves the 
infinite value of the individual as conceived by Christianism but absolutizes it, thus fully 
crystallizing it but also preparing its destruction.53 
 
Horkheimer’s description of Renaissance humanism as a form of sublation that negates the 
idea of an eternal horizon but preserves central implications of the Christian “soul” in a 
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distinct form, as the temporal self-determination of the individual, stands in continuity with 
his previous reflections on the growing historical consciousness of the subject.  Yet he 
notes that by “absolutizing” the conscious decisions of the individual apart from any 
account of its social and material antecedents, the humanist has a thoroughgoing blindness 
to the way social practices determine the subject, a blindness which comes to characterize 
bourgeois individualism.54   
In his outline of the history of philosophy, Horkheimer thus presents the self-realization 
of the subject in its social practices as the final stage of the subject’s arising self-
consciousness and the goal of modern life.  This, he argues, is the outcome of a progression 
which is implicitly expressed in past historical moments, yet with various degrees of 
inconsistency that drive subjects to reformulate their self-understanding.  In this way, his 
account mirrors the approach of Hegel’s Phenomenology, with the significant exception that he 
does not believe progression towards the telos of the Enlightenment is inexorable.  Indeed, 
its postulated apex, the self-realization of the subject, has yet to be accomplished.   
Such self-realization, Horkheimer wishes to argue, is threatened by the inability of the 
subject to articulate the continuing significance of historical concepts of the intelligible in a 
form suited to the modern self-understanding.  Positivism, as we have noted, abstractly 
negates every such concept, including the modern goal of the self-determination of the 
subject.  Yet however attractive the attempt to reassert meaning in response to this radical 
disenchantment may appear, Horkheimer insists, by the very form of his argument, that one 
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may not abstract an understanding of intelligible concepts from the history of their use.  To 
demonstrate how this both leads to a distorted interpretation of historical concepts as well 
as an inability to preserve their significance for modern life, Horkheimer turns to examine 
the particular case of neo-Thomism.   
2.2.2. Reading Thomas against the neo-Thomists  
 
Horkheimer notes that Thomas offered a synthesis between theological reflection and 
the science of his time by translating orthodox doctrine using Aristotelian categories,   
Thomas helped the Catholic Church to absorb the new scientific movement by 
reinterpreting the content of Christian religion by the liberal methods of analogy, 
induction, conceptual analysis, deduction from allegedly evident axioms, and through 
the use of Aristotelian categories, which at his time still corresponded to the level 
reached by empirical science.55     
 
For instance, Thomas expressed the “content” of theology without assuming any necessary 
dichotomy between the logical categories by which natural philosophers comprehended the 
cause of particular objects and the categories by which the theologian described the cause of 
human action.  This enabled the former as a discipline to remain “independent of and yet 
compatible with the intellectual progress of urban society,”56 by which Horkheimer means 
that the medieval subject could recognize in Thomas an expression of the significance of 
Christian thought and devotion that, while not reducible to the observations of the 
Aristotelian sciences, was nevertheless conceivable in relation to the logical categories 
employed by the latter.  Consequently, Horkheimer notes, “the truths of religion were as 
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concrete as any scientific truth”57 and “unbelief was considered not only a characteristic of 
sinners but also of fools, whose reason did not function properly.”58   
In particular, moral philosophy was “rational” for the inhabitants of the medieval form 
of life because they believed that the laws guiding human behavior as well as the natural 
behavior of other creatures were not categorically distinct.  Both expressed premises derived 
from observation regarding the sorts of action which would enable respective kinds of 
beings to reach their appointed end in accord with the divine will.  The natural sciences and 
moral philosophy were thus related in an analogous way to the experience of the subject, 
“divine and natural knowledge, divine and natural laws, were one.”59 
Later theologians, facing the challenge presented by the emergence of the new sciences, 
had to reckon with the fact that teleological ends were increasingly distinguished from the 
categories employed by scientific observation.60  At the very least, the teleology supposed by 
Christian theologians could no longer be justified by appealing to its congruence with the 
taken-for-granted empirical observation of formal and final causes.  In response, 
theologians, notes Horkheimer, gradually began distinguishing between principia.  Scientific 
observation could reach certain kind of truths (“natural revelation” described observable 
truth regarding the material and efficient causes of natural laws).  Yet there were other 
truths which were based solely upon the self-authenticating Word of God, “a certain, 
unchanging, separated area of validity [Bereich besonderer Geltung], unassailable by the new 
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natural sciences.”61 Among these were included “special” revelation regarding formal and 
final causes.   
Thomas acknowledged, of course, that there were revealed truths that were inaccessible 
to observation and experience.  He affirmed articles of faith which Aristotle’s scientific 
practices of observations did not assume and which could not be described on the basis of 
experience (such as, most famously, the creation of the world ex nihilo).  However, he 
carefully maintained that such truths were not incompatible with the basic categories 
provided by Aristotelian logic.  Yet while the distinction between kinds of revelation was 
thus not invented by subsequent theologians, they broadened it in ways unthinkable to 
Thomas,  
Up through the time of Thomas Aquinas, the supernatural light was considered as the 
source of only a few dogmas, such as the Trinity and the Immaculate Conception.  
Already however by the end of the 13th century by the time of Duns Scotus, the number 
of unverifiable theological propositions had increased many times over.  Finally, 
Protestantism declared the entirety of biblical teaching as its own spiritual region 
beyond natural knowledge.62     
 
Subtly, a distinct account of two forms of authority, one based in observation and the 
interpretation of sense-experience, the other based in an immediate self-authenticating 
authority began to emerge,     
Religion attempted to evade this threat [the threat presented by the cosmology of the 
new sciences] … by distinguishing itself from the area of knowledge that since the 
Scholastics had been bound together with religion, and establishing itself alongside 
scientifically secure results and useful hypotheses that had yet to be scientifically 
confirmed as a third and independent vast area of knowledge.  In particular, Luther and 
the Reformers heavily stressed the independence of faith when compared to every form 
of knowledge.63 
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The difference between the two kinds of authority, notes Horkheimer, is most evident in 
discussions of moral philosophy. 
Among the Reformers, Horkheimer notes, Luther subjected to scathing criticism the 
idea that one could be as certain about the rational deduction of laws guiding human 
behavior as one might be in deducing the laws of nature based on observation.  One is not 
capable, he maintained, of measuring the fittedness of the act to the human entelechy, for 
moral ends are unknowable to sinful humans on the basis of mere observation.  
The view that men could justify their private or collective lives in theological terms and 
determine whether they were in harmony with the divine seemed to [Luther] sheer pride 
and superstition. … In the end nobody knew what good works were—the church as 
little as a secular board of censors.  Luther’s verdict against theological speculation, 
which anticipated Kant’s limitation of metaphysical speculation, left reason free to roam 
this vale of tears—in empirical research, in commerce, and especially in secular 
government.  The interest of the individual and the state became the criterion of action 
in this world.  Whether the troops waded in the blood of peasants who had arisen from 
hunger, or whether a man sacrificed himself out of political blindness to share his last 
bread with them, one action was as ‘Christian’ as the other, provided each agent 
sincerely believed that he was following the Word.64 
 
While the scientific method yields claims that can be judged “true” or “false” on the basis of 
observation, claims regarding teleological ends are based on something other than such 
experience, thus presenting a second category of knowledge, “ideas that cannot be 
grounded by experience and reason” but may be yet be “considered valid as faith.”65  Such 
“ideas,” once described by Thomas in a way congruent with the practice of the Aristotelian 
sciences, were now understood to be altogether veiled from observation.  
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The emergence of the new sciences and the corresponding end of Aristotelian 
cosmology thus established conditions under which the past intelligible claims of theology 
regarding the origin and good of human life became gradually disconnected from 
observational practices in the sciences.  Conversely, scientific practices were disconnected 
from claims regarding the human good.   
Thus came into being what for many parts of European humanity became decisive, the 
validity of two spheres in human life, belief, and knowledge, regions which were 
independent of one another and which even contradicted each other.  Religion became 
one compartment of spirit [des Geistes], science another.66 
 
During the Enlightenment, this devolves into an abstract critique of metaphysics as such, 
“What transcends the facts, in the sense of eternal meaning, turns into untenable illusion, 
into a field of free speculation, an outmoded explanation of the world [Welterklärung] 
corresponding to the early steps of human development.”67     
Given this survey of the historical landscape, Horkheimer’s conclusion is that to 
continue to appeal to Thomas’ original categories presumes an Aristotelian form of science 
no longer reflective of modern practices of inquiry, “The neo-Thomists’ use of categories 
such as cause, purpose, force, soul, entity is necessarily uncritical.  While for Thomas these 
metaphysical ideas represented scientific knowledge at its peak, their function in modern 
culture has completely changed.”68  The hypostatization of the categories of a past historical 
moment necessarily leads, thinks Horkheimer, to the separation of theological claims from 
taken for granted modern practices of observation, for “the findings of modern science 
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contradict the scholastic ordo and Aristotelian metaphysics too patently.”69  Thus the 
categories of neo-Thomism must be “artificially kept from entering into conflict or even 
interaction with modern science.”70  The preservation of such categories not only no longer 
serves Thomas’ original unitive intent, it requires its adherents to actively distinguish 
between the categories of theology and the practices of observation employed in the 
modern sciences.  The judgments regarding formal and final causes allowed by past 
historical categories are thus insulated as self-evident “first principles,” whose content may 
be taken as authoritative for subjects apart from taken for granted practices of scientific 
observation.        
In a very compact Hegelian judgment summarizing the forgetting of the historicity of 
concepts, Horkheimer concludes, 
The more these artificial renaissances strive to keep intact the letter of the original 
doctrines, the more they distort the original meaning, for truth is forged in an evolution 
of changing and conflicting ideas.  Thought is faithful to itself largely through being 
ready to contradict itself, while preserving, as inherent elements of truth, the memory of 
the processes by which it was reached.71   
 
Abstractly lifting concepts from a historical form of life and reasserting them in a 
contemporary context requires no memory of the concrete problems which the past use of 
concepts intended to address.  Thus while originally Thomism intended to unite the practice 
of theology with the Aristotelian sciences, contemporary reassertions of its categories in fact 
disaggregate the practice of theology from modern scientific categories.  Such retrievals 
“distort the original meaning” instead of engaging in an attempt to judge analogies between 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 64.  This historical claim rests on a contrast between the way Darwinian evolution and Aristotelian 
natural philosophy explain the process and purpose of species development.  An attempt to evaluate the 
significance of his argument in relation to neo-Thomism would need to attend to whether such a sharp 
contrast is justifiable.  My interest, however, is in offering an account of the shape of Horkheimer’s appeal to 
intelligible concepts, not evaluating the cogency of his critique.       
70 Ibid., 68. 





the original setting, which determined the use of concepts, and the present historical 
moment.  Consequently, they are unable to establish what may be “preserved” in the use of 
such concepts for the sake of subjects who have experienced the eclipse of past categories 
as a loss.   
Horkheimer’s argument is thus not that modern self-consciousness requires the 
negation of metaphysical categories as such.  Rather he outlines a feature that should be 
included in the re-articulation of such concepts; namely, they should be justified for a 
subject not as intuitive or self-evident immediacies (as in the case of such “artificial 
renaissances”), but on the basis of the subject’s judgment regarding its own experiences, in 
terms congruent with its self-understanding as a modern.   
3. Critical theory and the fulfillment of the Enlightenment project   
In presenting positivism and metaphysical revivals as two mistaken ways of treating 
intelligible concepts, Horkheimer’s late work focuses on two hermeneutical questions: 
whether the significance of intelligible concepts can in fact be preserved for modern 
subjects and how such preservation might proceed in a way sensitive to their self-
understanding.  I have so far left undeveloped his frequent claim that subjects are presently 
unable to inhabit the modern project with satisfaction precisely due to a failure to preserve 
intelligible concepts.  In this final section, I will begin by noting the argument Horkheimer 
offers for this claim, before developing his account of a proper way of preserving such 
concepts.  This understanding will lay the groundwork for appreciating his late attempt to 
retrieve the significance of theological concepts.   
We have noted that part of the historical self-consciousness of the modern subject 





occurrences.  Moderns thus judge the adequacy of a social practice on the basis of their own 
sensuous experience, not in terms of a meaning whose truth is self-evident.  The ability to 
judge in such a way, notes Horkheimer, supposes a developing distinction between the 
identity of the subject and the social practice it inhabits that is not typical of previous 
historical moments,  
Once [the subject] was through and through a master or a servant, a knight or a 
bondsman: his human substance was defined by the facets of social inequality.  Today 
his place in the social hierarchy does not appear any longer as part of his own nature; he 
knows how to differentiate between himself and his role in society.72    
 
This yields a two-fold result.  On the one hand, differentiation allows moderns to judge 
taken for granted traditional practices according to their own sensuous experience, thus 
giving them a voice in determining the shape of the practices and community life they 
inhabit, “The modern ego in so far as it distinguishes itself clearly from any debasing social 
categories, corresponds more adequately to the idea of humanity than did the self-
consciousness of man in any period of the past.”73  On the other, however, differentiating 
identity from social practices necessarily entails that one’s identity will be characterized by 
“abstractness and inaccessibility.”74  The subject experiences once taken for granted 
practices not as constitutive of its essence but rather as self-chosen, but the self that 
chooses is also abstracted from every social tie that might provide it direction in choosing.  
The abstract subject of modern philosophy thus mirrors the actual social situation of the 
modern subject.75     
                                                 
72 Horkheimer, “Authoritarianism and the Family Today,” in The Family: Its Function and Destiny, ed. R.N. 
Anshem (New York: Harper, 1949), 386-387. 
73 Ibid., 387.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Horkheimer notes, “This ‘self,’ psychologically involved as the personality may be, is the abstract subject of 





In order to address onerous social relations, subjects needed to be able to distinguish 
their identity from repressive institutions and roles they inhabited.  The “enlightened” 
abstract subject with its attendant alienation was thus a necessary step in reforming the 
social life of subjects in accord with their experience.  It was not, however, the only step 
necessary.  Horkheimer thus notes, “Only after the ego has learned to conceive of itself as 
the abstract subject of reason,” that is, only after it has learned to distinguish its own 
identity from the social roles it inhabits, “can it identify itself intelligently with the positive 
forces in humanity and thus regain a new and higher concreteness.”76  If this re-
identification does not occur, the modern subject remains atomized and does not conclude 
a reflective return to self-satisfaction through an identification of the practices defining its 
life as its own.  The simple negation of past forms of life without a corresponding re-
identification and return leads to an overwhelming experience of anomie: claims regarding 
intelligible ends are increasingly judged to be meaningless or relegated to choices regarding 
“private” leisure that have no direct impact on the public reasoning that directs economic 
activity or scientific inquiry.77  The rupture between the individual and the opaque public 
ends it pursues consequently widens, stymieing the political project of the Enlightenment.  
From the preceding, we may note that the content of intelligible concepts, for 
Horkheimer, is not merely an “empty” projection of reason or the imagination (positivism), 
nor an intuition whose authority for the subject is self-evident (metaphysical revivals).  
Rather, such concepts refer to social practices of description and evaluation that are learned 
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within a community, practices which guide members of a community in pursuing ends held 
in common.  As Horkheimer puts it in Eclipse,  
These old forms of life smoldering under the surface of modern civilizations still 
provide, in many cases, the warmth inherent in any delight, in any love of a thing for its 
own sake rather than for that of another thing. … The sense of beauty in both nature 
and art is connected, by a thousand delicate threads, to these old superstitions.  If by 
either flouting or flaunting the threads, modern man cuts them, the pleasure may 
continue for a while but its inner life is extinguished.78 
 
Thus Horkheimer wishes to challenge the claim that pre-modern accounts of teleology are 
merely vestigial traces of a humanity in its infancy that may be dispensed summarily without 
remainder or cost.  
Horkheimer continues by noting that such traditions shape the subject’s experience of 
its world qualitatively.  To demonstrate the point, he proceeds micrologically, noting that 
activities as seemingly mundane as courtesy, culinary taste, sanitation, art, gardening, and 
even hiking once reflected judgments about the goodness of particular experiences for their 
own sake learned by subjects in a particular form of life.79  Far from being hermetically 
sealed off from historical contingency, the enjoyment of such activities as worthwhile “in 
themselves” loses coherence when the intelligible wholes which once provided both the 
concepts and grammar that sustained them fall into disuse.  The negation of the intelligible 
wholes presented in pre-modern narratives thus qualitatively alters the shape of experience 
for agents,   
We cannot credit our enjoyment of a flower or the atmosphere of a room to an 
autonomous aesthetic instinct.  Man’s aesthetic responsiveness relates in its prehistory 
to various forms of idolatry; his belief in the goodness or sacredness of a thing precedes 
his enjoyment of its beauty.  This applies no less to such concepts as freedom and 
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humanity.  What has been said about the dignity of man is certainly applicable to the 
concepts of justice and equality.80  
 
To say that a subject’s “belief in the goodness or sacredness of a thing precedes his 
enjoyment of its beauty” or that this “sense of beauty” far from being an “autonomous 
aesthetic instinct” is shaped by prior judgments regarding ends, is to note not only that the 
basic unit of currency for positivism, sensation, does not get to the bottom of what 
experience actually is for historical subjects (as if the experience of sensation could be 
abstracted from the particular cultural and historical practices of understanding learned by 
the subject in community), it is also to note that the abstract negation of such traditions 
deprives the subject of a way of expressing the meaningfulness of certain experiences.  
Modern subjects who have gained critical distance from traditions thus risk the loss of 
certain qualitative forms of experience which were once deeply meaningful for them.  This 
loss is felt even more acutely when they are unable to identify themselves anew with any 
such whole.    
It might thus appear that Horkheimer wishes to seal off past traditions from any kind of 
critique, as if the only alternative to the risk of the loss of such grammars of experience is to 
treat them as a-historical and invariable.  However, note his conclusion to the passage just 
cited:  
Such ideas [historical convictions regarding the goodness or sacredness of a thing] must 
preserve the negative element, as the negation of the ancient stage of injustice or 
inequality, and at the same time conserve the original absolute significance rooted in 
their dreadful origins.  Otherwise they become not only indifferent but untrue.81 
 
Horkheimer does not call for a simple reassertion of past intelligible concepts.  Rather, he 
notes, theorists must recognize how contemporary judgments regarding the good 
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(expressed for moderns in constellations of concepts like “freedom,” “dignity,” “justice” 
and “equality”) have become intuitive for subjects as the outcome of a historical process, in 
relation to “the negation of [an] ancient stage of injustice or inequality.”  While the 
continuing significance such concepts have for subjects is inextricably bound to accounts of 
intelligible realities (bound together, that is, with mythic notions of “dreadful origins”), their 
use thus remains compelling for subjects only insofar as it is situated as an advance over 
against past historical experiences.   
There is thus a second reason besides the loss of qualitative forms of experience why 
subjects may become alienated at the loss of past intelligible concepts.  Such concepts may 
have embodied for them an advance over what Horkheimer terms a “past stage of 
injustice,” the loss of which appears to threaten regression.   Only as this developing 
relationship between the memory of subjects and historical practices is appreciated can 
changes in the use of concepts over time, as well as the alienation felt by individuals at such 
changes, be fully appreciated.   
Horkheimer offers the following example of the historical development of concepts in 
order to illustrate his argument.  He notes that the egalitarian ideas invoked by the Aufklärer 
had their original genesis in a different historical context as part of an ideology that 
presented economic and social hierarchies as natural.  The idea of dignity, for instance, 
originally arose as an attribute which distinguished the natural superiority of men of nobility 
from the masses.  Yet it was taken up by those struggling against this supposedly natural 
hierarchy and appropriated in a distinct yet related form more adequate to their own 
purposes.   
At all times, the good has shown the traces of the oppression in which it originated.  





domination.  During the most ruthless phases of feudalism, dignity was an attribute of 
might.  Emperors and kings wore halos.  They demanded and received veneration.  
Anyone who was negligent in obeisance was punished, anyone who committed lèse 
majesté was put to death.  Today, freed from its bloody origin, the notion of the dignity 
of the individual is one of the ideas defining a humane organization of society. 
The concepts of law, order, justice, and individuality have had a similar evolution. 
… The value of the individual has been extolled by those who had an opportunity of 
developing their individualities at the expense of others. 
Again and again in history, ideas have cast off their swaddling clothes and struck out 
against the social systems that bore them.  The cause, in large degree, is that spirit, 
language, and all the realms of the mind necessarily stake universal claims.  Even ruling 
groups, intent above all upon defending their particular interests, must stress universal 
motifs in religion, morality, and science.82   
 
When a concept like “human dignity” is taken up and rearticulated by subjects struggling 
against an oppressive social order, it testifies to a universal which is neither an immediately 
observable sense-experience (as the positivists note), nor extricable from an account of 
intelligible wholes (as metaphysicians note).  Yet this does not mean that the concept is 
unconditioned by historical experience.  For it testifies to the relation between historical 
subjects and the social order they inhabit, and expresses the subjects’ judgment regarding 
the form which the social order should take.  In the hands of the noble or, by contrast, the 
leader of a bourgeois political movement, the uses of a concept like “dignity” are quite 
different, yet Horkheimer’s argument is that such uses may be related historically: the latter 
involves an inference regarding the former which arises in response to the historical 
dissatisfaction of subjects, an application of the established attribute of a given group of 
subjects to a more diverse set via a hitherto unexamined analogy, which itself comes to light 
in the midst of the latter subjects’ particular struggle for recognition.  The “dignity of the 
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individual” once reserved for the elite thus becomes catalytic as it is imaginatively extended 
to ever broadening classes and finally to humans as such.83   
Subjects thus appeal to past patterns of concept-use in order to draw analogies that will 
license inferences about their present moment, thereby reshaping the meaning of such 
concepts in the process of evaluating and altering existing conditions.  This is why the 
appropriation of concepts by various historical subjects across time has, paradoxically, both 
a sui generis quality in every new historical moment, as well as very real historical continuity 
with the uses of past generations.  Even though continuity between historical use and 
present application is maintained, due, as Horkheimer notes ambiguously, to the fact that 
language stakes “universal” claims, it is a continuity based in an analogy that is delimited by 
the particular historical circumstances and interests of the diverse subjects which put the 
concept to use, not merely by the repetition of an a-historical past meaning.  Assuming 
mere repetition is the mistake of metaphysical revivals.  “In trying to rescue the permanence 
of concepts,” notes Horkheimer, such appeals “turn every essential trait and intellectual 
manifestation into a genus with such wide meshes that it retains its validity against all 
phenomena.”84  The historical use of the universal concept is thus altered by subsequent 
historical conditions as well as the changing projects of the subjects who use the concept.   
If the contemporary meaning of intelligible concepts is dependent upon a history of use, 
the historical form of such concepts may be understood as the judgment of subjects in a 
past form of life regarding their social experience, a judgment which is developed by 
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subsequent members of a tradition in their use of such categories in the face of new 
experiences.  While the positivist will abstract from the semantic identity of the concept 
employed in what we have termed “a history of use” by, for instance, labeling 
distinguishable uses of the concept in different periods with discrete neologisms, such 
logically neat abstractions do not express the content of the concept without remainder.  In 
particular, inattention to historical development makes impossible recognition of the way 
layers of meaning presumed by the past use of a concept have been lost, preserved, or 
transformed in various historical moments.  Thus Horkheimer notes,    
Definitions acquire their full meanings in the course of a historical process.  They 
cannot be used intelligently unless we humbly concede that their penumbrae are not 
easily penetrated by linguistic short-cuts.  If, through fear of possible 
misunderstandings, we agree to eliminate the historical elements and to offer 
supposedly atemporal sentences as definitions, we deny ourselves the intellectual 
heritage bequeathed to philosophy from the beginning of thought and experience.  The 
impossibility of such a complete disavowal is evidenced in the procedure of the most 
antihistorical ‘physicalist’ philosophy of our times, logical empiricism.  Even its 
protagonists admit some undefinable terms of everyday usage into their dictionary of 
strictly formalized science, thus paying tribute to the historical nature of language.85   
 
Abstracting from a historical pattern of use renders impossible a judgment regarding the 
value of either the loss or preservation of particular historical meanings for the 
contemporary subject.  If the purpose of the theorist is to address the alienation arising for 
subjects due to the loss of historical meaning, positivism obscures from view this very 
experience of “loss.”   
Both metaphysical revivals and positivist definitions of the concept abstract from such 
historical patterns of use; both thereby make the analysis of loss and the project of 
preservation impossible. By contrast, notes Horkheimer, an appreciation of the historical 
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use of the concept in past forms of life illustrates how the concept may be “re-experienced 
and preserved” in a more adequate form in a changed historical moment, thus redressing 
the alienation contemporary subjects experience when past uses are lost.  In a passage which 
is critical for understanding his late work, Horkheimer notes,   
Philosophy must become more sensitive to the muted testimonies of language and 
plumb the layers of experience preserved in it.  Each language carries a meaning 
embodying the thought forms and belief patterns rooted in the evolution of the people 
who speak it. … [The philosopher] cannot talk about man, animal, society, world, mind, 
thought, as the natural scientist talks about a chemical substance: the philosopher does 
not have the formula.   
There is no formula.  Adequate description, unfolding the meaning of any of these 
concepts, with all its shades and its interconnections with other concepts, is still a main 
task.  Here the word with its half-forgotten layers of meaning and association is a 
guiding principle.  These implications have to be re-experienced and preserved, as it 
were, in more enlightened and universal ideas.86 
 
This attempt to preserve the meaning of historical concepts, I will suggest, is Horkheimer’s 
central preoccupation in his late essays on theology.   
In an essay contemporaneous to Eclipse, Horkheimer begins to explain what he means 
by arguing that concepts should be “preserved” in a “more enlightened” form adequate to 
the concerns of new generations of subjects,   
Categories become distorted or meaningless unless they enter new, more adequate 
structures that are required by the particular historical situations in which they play a 
part.  The reason for this is not that each period has its own truth assigned to it, as 
historical and sociological relativism would like us to believe, or that one can dispense 
with philosophic and religious traditions, but rather that intellectual loyalty, without 
which truth cannot exist, consists both in preserving past insights and contradicting and 
transforming them.87   
 
The reason concepts must be preserved in new forms is not, he notes, because the truth of 
ideas are relative to the cultures of their genesis.  Although, of course, there is no 
unmediated knowledge of reality apart from concrete “philosophic and religious traditions” 
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(traditions, note, which Horkheimer already acknowledges are indispensible), truth, notes 
Horkheimer, should not simply be conflated with the explanations of such traditions.  As 
we have noted, Horkheimer believes truth is a historically contingent relation of satisfaction 
between a subject inhabiting a tradition and its world.  One may thus note the truth of a 
concept in terms of a particular history of habits of use, by making comparative judgments 
regarding the satisfaction which the use of various concepts have afforded historically 
situated subjects in the projects they pursue, without either appealing outside contingent 
histories of use to a standpoint free of tradition or treating the truth of a concept as if it 
were exclusively determined by the tradition instead of by a relation between subjects 
inhabiting tradition and the world.   
If the reason why concepts must be preserved in a form sensitive to the concerns of 
new generations is not due to an inflated doctrine of relativism, neither are concepts 
preserved for the sake of a “universal” or “absolute” a-historical truth.  Such formal 
abstractions, Horkheimer continues, have no concrete meaning for subjects in a form of 
life, except perhaps underwriting their already chosen projects, for “abstract formulations of 
the highest values are always adjustable to the practice of stake and guillotine.”88  Rather the 
motivation for preserving concepts in a form adequate to modern life is simply the 
alienation subjects experience at the destruction of a given historical pattern of use, 
“Knowledge really concerned with values does not look to higher realms,” notes 
Horkheimer.  “It rather tries to penetrate the cultural pretences of its time, in order to 
distinguish the features of a frustrated humanity.  Values are to be disclosed by uncovering 






the historical practice that destroys them.”89  Subjects experience alienation at the lapse of 
historical pattern of use, and the theorist must be concerned with a practice of retrieval 
which aims to preserve what is at risk of being lost due to this cessation.  Any such retrieval 
will not be meaningful for such affected subjects, however, unless the concepts retrieved 
“enter new, more adequate structures that are required by the particular historical situations 
in which they play a part.”   
Failure to engage this task, Horkheimer has already implied, risks the loss of the 
historically situated ideals upon which the Enlightenment political project itself is based.  
Thus he concludes Eclipse programmatically by implying that this task of preservation must 
be constitutive of his future theoretical efforts,   
By doing justice to those images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the 
role of absolutes … and that have been relegated in the course of history, philosophy 
can function as a corrective of history, so to speak.   Thus ideological stages of the past 
would not be equated simply with stupidity and fraud—the verdict brought against 
medieval thought by the philosophy of the French Enlightenment.  Sociological and 
psychological explanation of earlier beliefs would be distinct from philosophical 
condemnation and suppression of them.  Though divested of the power they had in 
their contemporary setting, they would serve to cast light upon the current course of 
humanity.  In this function, philosophy would be mankind’s memory and conscience.90   
 
The task of preservation is described in this passage as an intentional effort to repair the 
alienation arising from the loss of past habits of thought “that have been relegated in the 
course of history” due to the modern tendency to separate reasoning about concepts from 
historical traditions of use.  This presumes both that intelligible concepts should not be 
abstractly negated, “equated simply with stupidity and fraud” and subjected to 
“philosophical condemnation and suppression” (the abstract negation of the positivists), 
nor anachronistically reasserted, as if they still contained “the power they had in their 
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contemporary setting” (the mistake of metaphysical revivals), but rather presented to 
moderns in a distinctive form adequate to their own self-consciousness, thus reconstituted 
in such a way that they may “serve to cast light upon the current course of humanity.”  It is 
by engaging this task of preservation that the theorist “can function as a corrective of 
history” and be the “memory and conscience” of a people by redressing the loss of past 
categories of use.  
Horkheimer frequently references this task of the critical theorist in his later work as the 
preservation of past traditions and the experiences that they once enabled in a form 
appropriate to contemporary life.  The following instances are illustrative, 
Critical theory has always had a double assignment: to describe that which needs to 
change and to preserve certain cultural moments.  Beyond this it has to describe the 
process of change, to which our world is subject. …  
… We spoke already about the fact that theology, albeit in another form, may be 
worth preserving and also that liberalism issued forth a positive force which one should 
preserve, even in an administered world.  Many such cultural moments could be 
named.91 
 
One cannot reverse such a process [the total transformation of every area of being into 
a sphere of means].  One can only attempt to preserve something from the [past] 
traditions by also making the changes visible in their negativity.92 
 
The service which philosophy is still able to render to that which is passing [dem 
Vergehenden] consists in showing the process of this passing and its consequences.93 
 
We may conclude on the basis of such programmatic statements that the task of 
preservation for the critical theorist is envisioned by Horkheimer as a two-fold repair of the 
elision of “histories of use,” (the common mistake, we have noted, of both “positivism” 
and “metaphysical revivals”):  
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(1): Preservation should articulate the alienation subjects experience at the loss of 
traditional patterns of reasoning (i.e. “making the changes visible in their negativity,” 
“showing the process of this passing and its consequences,” or put positively, “doing 
justice to those images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the role of 
absolutes”);  
(2): Preservation should guide subjects in retrieving the meaning of past categories in a 
form adequate to their own self-understanding and experience as moderns (i.e. 
“theology, albeit in another form, may be worth preserving” or put broadly 
“sociological and psychological explanation of earlier beliefs would be distinct from 
philosophical condemnation and suppression of them”).   
With these features in mind, we may conclude by noting an instructive relation between 
Horkheimer’s earliest approach to the philosophy of history and this late concern with 
preservation.   
Horkheimer consistently and self-consciously maintains throughout his work that 
traditions may not be rejected simply because they are forms of mediation (sense experience 
is necessarily mediated), and that traditions as forms of mediation may require alteration in 
the face of the dissatisfaction of subjects (early forms of a tradition may prove penultimate 
in relation to the shifting problems and projects of historical subjects).  Horkheimer’s later 
reflections on the philosophy of history, while continuing to maintaining these emphases, 
changes its focus decisively.  In his early work, he presumes that scientific practices 
complete earlier forms of knowing by allowing subjects to relate their present projects to 
reality in a comparably satisfactory way.  Thus, for instance, he notes that religion is a 





roots.”94  In his later essays, however, he tests the idea that the relation between the two 
may also become reversed.  The task of critical theory thus becomes not simply to illustrate 
the way modern science accomplishes the goals inadequately sought by past traditions of 
inquiry, but also an attempt to preserve what is valuable in such past traditions that is in 
danger of being lost in a form adequate to the concerns of modern life.  In the final two 
chapters I will examine Horkheimer’s attempt to address the modern alienation resulting 
from this through the attempted retrieval and preservation of theological concepts.   
                                                 







Theology and the task of preservation: 
The significance of theological concepts for modern life 
 
In the last chapter, I noted two programmatic claims that structure Horkheimer’s late 
work.  First, prominent types of modern reflection (i.e. “positivism” and “metaphysical 
revivals”) have in common that they divorce judgments regarding the significance of 
intelligible concepts from the unfolding history of their use and the sensuous experience of 
the subjects who use them.  This makes the preservation of such concepts in a form suited 
to the self-understanding of moderns impossible.  For moderns expect the use of concepts 
to be justified for them on the basis of their experience (not through an appeal to a 
“heteronomous” authority apart from such experience).  Intelligible concepts thus 
increasingly fall out of use.  Second, subjects are unable to participate in modern life in a 
way that satisfies their own expectations as a result this falling-out-of-use.  For the 
satisfaction of modern subject requires, not the abstract negation of tradition, but a return 
to it characterized by the embrace of the historical practices of a tradition in a form 
congruent with the subject’s own self-understanding.  The question Horkheimer wishes to 
address in his late work is thus how may historical traditions and the accounts of the 
intelligible they present be preserved in a form that will satisfy the self-reflective modern 
subject?   
Horkheimer offers three reflections on this question, noting,  
(1): Why theological concepts in particular must be retrieved if the satisfaction of 
modern subjects is to be realized, 
(2): How the content of theological concepts must be understood, if they are to fit the 





(3): How theological concepts may continue to be preserved in relation to the unfolding 
experience of modern subjects.    
Before describing these reflections, I shall situate my interpretation in relation to a 
ubiquitous portrayal of Horkheimer’s project that I wish to challenge, and preface the 
interpretation by an explanation of Horkheimer’s understanding of the reasoning employed 
by the theologian.  I will then examine his claims regarding the necessity of a retrieval of 
theological categories (section 1), describe his understanding of the content of theological 
concepts, as this finds expression in his critique of Tillich (section 2), and, finally, investigate 
how his late reflections Schopenhauer’s philosophy relate to his account of the possible 
preservation and transformation of theological concepts (section 3).  In the next chapter, I 
shall examine Horkheimer’s attempt to explain how an existing practice, the Jewish liturgy, 
serves as a model for understanding the relationship between intelligible concepts and the 
continuing experience of subjects.  Thus this chapter may be understood as laying out a 
framework for interpreting Horkheimer’s late reflections on the Jewish liturgy, whereas the 
next investigates the significance of the liturgy for moderns as a model for preserving 
intelligible concepts. 
On the occasions when it is paid attention, Horkheimer’s late work is relegated to the 
status of a historical anomaly or treated as a foil for more attractive thinkers, both by the 
circle of critical theorists who have examined his later work in detail, as well as the broader 
philosophical community.  I will attend to two approaches that exemplify this consensus.           
In his survey, Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Christopher Janaway notes that, 





offered an “‘indirect apologetics’ for the political and economic status quo of the time.”1  
Janaway does not relate Horkheimer’s concern with Schopenhauer to his interest in 
theology, and equates his interest in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics with simple approbation.  
This conclusion is drawn from a single installment of Horkheimer’s Schopenhauer Lectures, 
“Schopenhauer Today.”  Yet between 1955 and 1971, Horkheimer considered 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics in a series of five lectures given before the Schopenhauer-
Gesellschaft.2  Though only one is included in the standard English compilation of 
Horkheimer’s late essays, three of the five lectures focus on an interpretation of 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will.3     
Perhaps due to the fact that Horkheimer is perceived as a relatively minor figure in 20th 
century philosophy, there has been little attempt by English-speaking scholars to examine 
his other lectures on Schopenhauer’s metaphysics.  One must turn to the German 
interpretive literature to find such analysis.  In this regard, it is fruitful to compare Alfred 
Schmidt’s review of Horkheimer’s “Schopenhauer and Society” to Janaway.  In his 
comparable survey, Idee und Weltwille: Schopenhauer als Kritiker Hegels, Schmidt notes that the 
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essay “point[s] out insightfully the difficult way critical and reactionary moments in 
Schopenhauerian thought intertwine and are linked with one another.”4  In contrast to 
Janaway, Schmidt at least suggests that Horkheimer’s work involves selective appropriation, 
not mere approbation.     
It would be too simplistic, however, to attribute this way of interpreting Horkheimer to 
factors extrinsic to the content of the texts in question.  Jürgen Habermas’ seminal essay on 
the later Horkheimer, “To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God,” for 
instance, marshals untranslated interviews and essays to support the contention that 
Horkheimer embraced Schopenhuaer’s metaphysics.  This essay, examining “Horkheimer’s 
metaphysical need for religion,” evidences a level of complexity unparalleled in other 
interpreters and has exerted a significant pull on subsequent scholarship in critical theory.5  
Habermas recognizes the intimate relationship between Horkheimer’s essays on 
Schopenhauer and his reflections on theology; further, he offers more than mere critique, 
sympathetically organizing Horkheimer’s late aphorisms and essays in relation to a central 
concern that Habermas maintains directs his late theorizing. 
According to Habermas, Horkheimer’s reflections face an “aporia … in consequence of 
two equally strong convictions.”  On the one hand, he understood his task to be “salvaging 
the truth in religion in the spirit of the Enlightenment.”  On the other, “it was clear to him 
that ‘one cannot secularize religion without giving it up.’”6  There are two notable features 
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of this formulation.  First, “salvaging” and “secularizing” are equated.  They need not be, of 
course: one might, for instance, imagine a selective embrace of past religious norms which 
does not involve the categorical separation of such norms from sacred narratives.  
However, Habermas equates the two.  Second, the “truth” or “essential substance of 
religion” which is to be salvaged is found, according to Habermas, in its unconditional 
“morality.”7  The attempt to salvage, as he describes it, thus involves the two-fold task of 
distinguishing an unconditional moral law from extraneous claims about divine self-
revelation, and setting it on new footings.  If one may not “secularize” or make a distinction 
between the moral “core” and the (figurative) “peripherals” of religion, then the task of 
salvaging will necessarily fail.   
Habermas adds to this his own characteristic note: salvaging also fails if one believes 
there is no other basis for the moral “core” in the absence of revelation.  If reason, left to 
its own devices, is portrayed simply as an instrument of the subject’s libido, and thus no 
longer “maintains a positive relation to the normative contents it uncovers step by step in 
the criticism of unjust conditions,” then, as no alternative exists, critique “must borrow its 
normative orientations from a cultural ethos that has already been superseded—that of a 
metaphysically grounded theology.”8   
Habermas concludes that Horkheimer is in a precarious position: he is committed to the 
task of salvaging yet denies both its preconditions, that one may distinguish the moral core 
of religion from the peripheral, and that one may ground the moral core by the exercise of 
reason.  According to Habermas, this dilemma arises for Horkheimer due to the (mistaken) 
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belief that theological metaphysics and the unconditionality of moral norms are intrinsically 
connected,     
The thoughts of the late Horkheimer circle around the idea of a theology that must be 
‘displaced’ by the critical and self-critical activity of reason, yet which, in its capacity as 
justifying morality’s claim to unconditionality, cannot be replaced by reason.  
Horkheimer’s late philosophy may be understood as wrestling with this dilemma and his 
interpretation of Schopenhauerian metaphysics as a proposal for resolving it.9 
 
Schopenhauer’s account of the will offers Horkheimer an exit strategy in the form of a 
tertium quid.  On the one hand, his metaphysics of the will offers “the prospect of a 
metaphysical justification of morality through insight into the constitution of the world as a 
whole” (i.e., an unconditional basis for morality),10 yet “at the same time” it is “directed 
against central assumptions of metaphysics and coheres with postmetaphysical skepticism 
concerning reason” (it thus allows a critique of both pre-critical theological metaphysics and 
the hidden libido served by reason).11  
Habermas is unsparing in his criticism of this supposed resolution.  Even if one ignores 
the implausible idea that a subject may have a sense-intuition of the whole, the “shadow of 
performative self contradiction that has haunted all negative metaphysics since 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche” looms large; it is impossible that a fundamentally selfish and 
egoistical will can turn reflexively “against itself.”12   
                                                 
9 Ibid., 136, his emphasis.  Cf. Habermas’ explanation of the connection between the unconditioned and 
theological metaphysics at 140.   
10 Ibid., 138.  Cf. our discussion in section 3.2. of Habermas’ textual support of this claim from “Schopenhauers 
Denken, 252.  
11 Ibid.  Habermas terms this Schopenhauer’s “inverted Platonism.” 
12 In “From Utopia to Redemption: Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer,” Journal of Jewish Thought and 
Philosophy 8, no. 1 (1999): 132, Illan Gur-Ze’ev praises this turn towards negative metaphysical grounds without 
considering Habermas’ claim that it involves a performative contradiction.  In a more nuanced manner, 
Gerard Raulet, “What Good is Schopenhauer? Remarks on Horkheimer's Pessimism” Telos, no. 42 (1979-
1980), 104, argues that it serves as a kind of regulative postulate for Horkheimer that allows the whole to be 
understood in a way which is functionally useful for the social critic.  Both share with Habermas the idea that 





Horkheimer is not ignorant of this performative contradiction, notes Habermas.  His 
claims about the futility of meaning without God may thus also be understood, not simply 
as an expression of one side of the aporia, but as a “critique of Schopenhauer.”13  “In the 
final analysis,” notes Habermas, “Horkheimer’s ambiguous formulations vacillate between 
Schopenhauer’s negative metaphysical justification of morality and a return to the faith of 
his forefathers” in an “unresolved argumentative impasse.”14  On Habermas’ reading, there 
are thus two opposing poles between which Horkheimer is torn as he attempts to justify the 
unconditionality of ethical maxims, both of which posit an intelligible certainty existing 
beneath the contingencies of historical practices.  The motivation underlying the too-and-
fro is Horkheimer’s desire to find a defensible “unconditional” standpoint from which to 
measure truth claims.  His late work on both theology and Schopenhauer may thus be 
characterized by an acceptance of the metaphysical idea of a god’s eye view, 
Horkheimer assumes that there cannot be truth without an Absolute, without a world-
transcending power “in which truth is sublated.”  Without ontological anchoring, the 
concept of truth is exposed to the inner-worldly contingencies of mortal men and their 
changing situations; without it, truth is no longer an idea but merely a weapon in the 
struggle of life.  Human knowledge, including moral insight, can lay claim to truth, he 
believes, only if it judges itself in terms of the relations between it and what is as these 
relations are manifested to the divine intelligence alone.15   
 
For Horkheimer, concludes Habermas, “the meaning of truth” must thus include “the 
notion of unconditionality … as one of its moments.”16   
My interpretation differs from Habermas in two significant ways.  First, I shall present a 
different understanding of the problem that motivates Horkheimer’s reflection on 
Schopenhauer and theology, and, consequently a different account of how he relates the 
                                                 
13 Habermas, “To Seek to Salvage,” 138.   
14 Ibid. 
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two.  In sections 1 and 2, I argue that intelligible concepts are not understood by 
Horkheimer as the products of an intuitive experience of the Absolute. Rather, such 
categories are social practices of description learned by subjects as they participate in 
religious communities.  The impetus which motivates reflection for Horkheimer, in keeping 
with the argument we have already observed from Eclipse of Reason, is not the desire to 
secure an unconditional standpoint, but rather an interest in preserving historical practices 
of description in a form appropriate to modern life.   
Second, this altered account of the problem around which Horkheimer’s work 
constellates also produces a different way of relating the works.  I shall illustrate that 
Horkheimer does not affirm Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will uncritically, such that 
his reflections may be set over against his return to theological sources.  Rather, his 
interpretation of Schopenhauer is done in the service of his retrieval of theological 
concepts.  As we shall see, Horkheimer repeatedly juxtaposes Schopenhauer’s style of 
reasoning with his substantive conclusions, thereby distinguishing Schopenhauer’s method 
of reasoning about the intelligible with his judgment regarding its content.  While 
Horkheimer continually emphasizes a critique of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, he focuses 
on recovering aspects of Schopenhauer’s style of reasoning as an example of a proper 
understanding of the relationship between sensuous particular experience and intelligible 
conceptions of the whole. 
Having noted the interpretive questions at stake, I will now outline Horkheimer’s 
understanding of the reasoning employed by the theologian, before examining his three-fold 





Theologians, notes Horkheimer in the late aphorism “Belief and Knowledge,” practice a 
kind of reflective judgment, for they are moved by desire for the “object” that is revealed 
and contemplated in the liturgy as the summum bonum.17  The intent of such reflection is not 
extrinsic purposes taken in hand by the theologian.  Rather, the object of the liturgy is 
contemplated for its own sake.  In this regard, “Theology is the opposite of knowledge. … 
Knowledge is ultimately governed by purposes.  Theology wants to be free of earthly 
ends.”18  Not only is the object of theology desired for its own sake, it may not be known as 
one empirical condition amidst others.  Yet while the object of the theologian’s desire is not 
finally a part of the furniture of experience, reflection upon it nevertheless involves 
descriptions of empirical conditions.  For instance, theology may take the form of reflection 
on the redemptive events recalled in the liturgy.  Yet theology is never the simple depiction 
of an empirical event but always the expression of a relation between this event and the 
desired summum bonum.  Highlighting this affective relation, Horkheimer notes that theology 
“derives from levels of consciousness where perception was complemented by instincts, 
impulses, and emotions which are no longer appropriate to contemporary experience, which 
is served by machines.”  In sum, theology reflects upon empirical experiences which are 
comprehended through the synthetic activity of the understanding (Verstand), yet it aspires 
not merely to reflect upon such experiences qua sensory conditions, but to relate them to its 
                                                 
17 As we shall see in chapter 6, Horkheimer uses the word Gegenstand not Objekt to reference what is revealed 
and contemplated in the liturgy, in order to illustrate that YHWH is not one empirical condition amidst others.  
Neither is God, for Horkheimer, simply “over against” empirical conditions as unknown; rather God is 
revealed in the liturgy as an active Subject.  We will examine these claims in the next chapter. 
18 Horkheimer, “Belief and Knowledge” (1966-1969), in Dawn and Decline, trans. Michael Shaw (New York: 





own longing for the unconditioned.  Horkheimer thus concludes paradoxically that theology 
“is both lower and higher than any form of knowledge.”19     
While it is thus perfectly true that the object of the theologian’s desire “cannot be 
verified” and therefore the language of the theologian “strays about in a labyrinth of pious 
hopes,” this does not entail the abstract negation of theology.  For this straying about, 
Horkheimer continues wryly, happens to be “something it has in common with all men, 
provided they can talk at all.”20  What distinguishes theology from other uses of language is 
not that it contains an affective pull towards a teleological end which exceeds its otherwise 
(supposedly) pure conceptualizations.  Rather, what distinguishes theology is that it self-
consciously reflects upon this pull, which, as it happens, is reflected in all human speech 
insofar as it is human.  Theology thus simply makes an explicit object of reflection out of a 
relation that is already implicit in human speech.   
The unconditioned is not present immediately to the subject through its sense intuition, 
and in this regard, of course, the object of theology may be distinguished from the objects 
of the sciences.  Yet following the trajectory of his reflection on language, Horkheimer 
notes that this does not entail that theological reflection itself is unrelated to the practice of 
the sciences,       
Something … appears in the questions which are supposed to be answered through the 
understanding, knowledge, and the sciences [Verstand, Erkenntnis, Wissenshaft], which is 
particularly characteristic of European culture: namely, that an action may have a 
meaning which is not merely relative, a meaning which we may not be able to examine 
off-hand with our powers of the understanding [Verstandeskräften], but which we also 
need not simply negate.  And it is here I think that the relationship between what 
occupies theology and the sciences cannot merely be dismissed.21       
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Horkheimer, “Against Philosophy” (1957-1958), in Dawn and Decline, 159. 





If inflection regarding the relation of a given examination of conditions to an intelligible 
whole cannot simply be expunged from the use of language, neither can it be expunged, 
notes Horkheimer, from practices of observation.  Yet reflection upon such ends self-
evidently requires a kind of thought which is distinct from the determining judgment of the 
understanding that characterizes the practices of the sciences, for what is contemplated is 
not an empirical condition amidst others.  We will return to delimit this difference more 
precisely; for now it is sufficient to note that, on the one hand, Horkheimer understands 
theological reflection as intimately related to a necessary feature of human speech and 
practice, yet on the other, he wishes to distinguish the kind of judgment involved in 
theology from that which characterizes the sciences, insofar as the two have qualitatively 
distinct objects. 
1. The necessity of retrieving theological concepts 
 
There are two reasons, notes Horkheimer, why the loss of historical theological 
categories leads to alienation, and thus why their retrieval is necessary for modern subjects.  
First, while modern subjects wish to see the accounts of practical maxims found in pre-
modern traditions preserved in a form adequate to their self-understanding, the attempt by 
modern philosophers to accomplish this “translation” by portraying practical maxims as 
products of pure reason has failed (1.1).  Second, while subjects expect that the dictates of 
the sciences will be related to practical ends they have taken as their own, as the use of 
intelligible categories fades, the practice of the sciences is increasingly understood as 
autonomous from any such extrinsic end (1.2).  If modern subjects are to be satisfied with 
the form of life they inhabit, there is a need for a retrieval of historical categories in a form 





1.1. The ends of Enlightenment 
 
The distinction between theoretical practices of observation and theological reflection 
as well as their relation may be fruitfully understood in terms of a distinction between 
“appearance” and “essence,” if what is meant by this is that there is a qualitative difference 
between judgments regarding the causal conditions for a given social relation and judgments 
regarding the way a relation reflects the meaning of the whole.  For an illustration of how 
this kind of distinction informs Horkheimer’s reflections, note the following passage, 
The substance of the individual remains locked up within himself.  His intellectual acts 
are no longer intrinsically connected with his human essence.  They take whatever 
course the situation may dictate. … No matter how expertly public opinion may be 
inquired into, no matter how elaborate the statistical or psychological surroundings, 
what they reach is always a mechanism, never the human essence.22   
     
In this passage, Horkheimer contrasts a kind of knowledge which is generated by analytic 
inquiry into the social psychology of class relations with knowledge regarding the meaning 
of human life, or the human “essence,” that is inhibited by such relations.  The former 
judgment simply requires the operations of Verstand, it is an activity of the social scientist 
that seeks out the psychological causes that condition particular relations between agents in 
a capitalist society.  By way of contrast, the latter judgment postulates the inhibition of the 
purpose of such relations, the realization of “human essence,” which supposes, quite apart 
from any particular account of the psychological conditions underlying a given practice, that 
the practice has a proper end for the subjects who inhabit it that is presently inhibited.  The 
shape of the latter judgment regarding the way “human essence” is inhibited may certainly 
relate to inquiry by the analytic sciences.  To use Horkheimer’s example, social psychology 
may describe symptoms of this inhibition in its analysis of particular empirical conditions.  
                                                 
22 Horkheimer, “Art and Mass Culture” (1941), in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et. 





However the teleological account Horkheimer supposes regarding essence is not reducible 
to any particular analytic description: it contains a speculative surplus, an understanding of 
the whole which surpasses and situates such description as symptomatic of inhibition.  
Though this teleological surplus allows a concerned theorist to structure various empirical 
descriptions of given conditions, the structuring is dependent upon an already presupposed 
account of the meaning of the whole that is not simply the product of sense-experience.   
As we have already noted, the Enlightenment project that Horkheimer is concerned to 
recover presumes judgments regarding the meaning of the whole that situate its 
understanding of the practice of the sciences.  It is concerned with the practical task of 
inquiring into and realizing the self-satisfaction of the subject and relates any given set of 
empirical conditions to this end.  In late notes, Horkheimer often explicitly articulates this 
end,  
Our practical philosophy is humanity.  That men do not suffer misery, that created 
beings can develop, is the purpose of action in general. … [T]here is no higher appeal than 
that to the solidarity with the suffering which must be abolished. 
 
To be intellectually progressive would require a consciousness which, though aware of 
the transitoriness of the individual subject, yet insists on its uniqueness, and develops a 
society where it, though insignificant, would be the purpose of the whole to serve which would 
make sense to it for that very reason.23 
 
Of course, for Horkheimer the meaning of the self-satisfaction of the subject as an end-in-
itself only has content for a subject in relation to a confluence of social and psychological 
factors, and these are themselves dependent on particular historical social constellations.  
This is one reason why Horkheimer is adamant that the materialist dialectic is never fixed.  
Nevertheless, in any given historical moment, he wishes to claim that such self-satisfaction 
                                                 
23 These are two of Horkheimer’s aphorisms from Dawn and Decline, “Humanity” (1957-1958), 152-153 and 
“History and the Future of the Individual” (1959-1960), 169, emphasis mine.  Cf. “Suum Esse Conservare” 





may be sought as the “truth” of the whole, and this commitment to an intelligible account 
of essence structures his critical project. 
Horkheimer notes that modern philosophy, precisely in postulating such a “futile” 
unconditioned end-in-itself, both departs from yet also owes a debt to the theological 
tradition,      
Philosophy is the futile attempt to achieve recognition for a kind of knowledge which is 
more than merely instrumental.  It is the attempt to produce truth which not only has 
no practical purpose but cannot even be used in the ordering and application of the 
knowledge one has.  It is truth as such.  Behind it there lies the theological good of 
eternal salvation which philosophy, the heir of Christianity, made its own.24 
 
Two claims in this passage stand out as particularly relevant for interpreting Horkheimer’s 
late understanding of the relationship between theological reflection and the ends sought by 
the Enlightenment.  On the one hand, the end sought by philosophy must “achieve 
recognition” as a result of the attempt to “produce truth” on the part of subjects; it is not 
merely given to the contemplative subject like a sense-intuition.  On the other, behind this 
fallible pursuit “there lies the theological good of eternal salvation.”  Even though they 
recognize the evolving contingent conditions which situate the content of “self-satisfaction” 
for subjects, moderns continue to pursue self-satisfaction as an unconditioned, an essence 
which stands over against empirical appearance, thereby employing in however attenuated a 
form a distinction once native to the theological tradition.   
An earlier aphorism by Horkheimer, “Thought,” illustrates the fine line he is attempting 
to walk.  “Truth” for dissatisfied subjects, he notes, may not be conflated with a taken for 
granted instrumental end like economic productivity, but neither can it be treated as an 
object of contemplation detached from active subjectivity,  
                                                 





It is of course, mistaken to believe that the truth of a theory is the same as its 
fruitfulness.  There are some, however, who appear to assume the opposite. … They 
misinterpret every utterance as a final profession of belief, an injunction, or a taboo.  
They seek to submit to the idea as to a god or attack it as an idol.  They lack freedom in 
relation to it.  But it is in the nature of truth that one is involved in it as an active 
subject. … 
This fetishism manifests itself in a drastic form today. … For this reason, not only is 
the utterance which attacks power found intolerable but the one which gropes forward 
experimentally, playing with the possibility of error.  Yet to be unfinished and to know 
it is the mark even of the thought which opposes power, and especially of the thought 
for which it would be worth dying.25  
 
Truth is not merely instrumental “fruitfulness” as this is defined by taken for granted social 
ends in society.  Indeed, it may be the purpose of alienated subjects in a context of inquiry 
to fundamentally inhibit practices which society understands to be productive, for the sake 
of their own self-realization.  Yet it is equally the case that if “truth” is portrayed as self-
realization, such an end will not be comprehended merely by passive contemplation.  It is 
the outcome of a process of inquiry and experimentation which discloses a relation between 
a subject and the world, and should thus not be “fetishized” as an eternal object apart from 
this qualified relation.  As Horkheimer encapsulates his understanding in an essay from the 
50s, “Not only does practice depend upon the truth, but truth depends also on the actions 
of man.  This is what the teaching of the primacy of practical reasoning in Kant meant.”26  
On the one hand, his emphasis on the activity of the subject and the corresponding 
definition of truth as a historical relation distinguishes Horkheimer’s understanding of truth 
from the kind of object desired by the theologian, which, as he portrays it in the 
aforementioned aphorism, “Belief and Knowledge,” is an end which is entirely distinct from 
the activity or purposes of the subject.  On the other, this desire to realize the self-
                                                 
25 Horkheimer and Adorno, “Thought,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (1944), trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 203. 





satisfaction of the subject as an end-in-itself itself owes a decisive debt to the theological 
tradition.  For it postulates an “essence” as a meaning of the whole which is distinct from 
the merely conditional determinations of the subject’s understanding (Verstand), even if this 
essence may only be realized through the inquiring activity of a historical subject.  The idea 
that the subject is both inhibited from realizing its proper end, yet that this inhibition will 
itself be overcome in history by the activity of the subject, expressed in the Kantian hope in 
“the progressive awareness of freedom as the motive force behind world history,”27 is itself 
unthinkable apart from this theological antecedent.     
Horkheimer notes that the interest of Enlightenment philosophers in portraying the end 
of social development as the self-realization of the subject is not to overturn the practical 
moral teachings of theology, but to place them on new footing.  The maxims and ends 
portrayed by the theological tradition are, according to such philosophers, deducible from 
self-evident truths by the proper use of reason, understood as faculty autonomous from any 
particular tradition.  As Horkheimer notes,  
The concept of God as the Creator, Legislator, and Supreme Judge – the most 
important maxims for the functioning of society – were to be brought as truths of 
reason into unison with science.  Independent of the endangered thoughts of revelation, 
its postulates posed as eternal maxims based upon the reflection of thought upon itself.  
Through such an effort, the philosophical systems of different schools of thought 
reached an agreement. … However much Descartes, Leibniz, and even Kant, attached 
themselves to the hard sciences, the legitimation of the highest religious principles still 
constituted in their thought a decisive motive, through becoming identified with the 
concept of reason.28  
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Horkheimer frequently references this attempted reconciliation of scientific and theological 
categories in his mature work as characteristic of modern philosophy.29  Yet although the 
advances in empirical concepts produced by the new sciences were, in fact, a success, the 
modern attempt to replace the explanation of intelligible concepts offered by the theological 
tradition with claims regarding their self-evidence failed abjectly.  While “the genius of great 
philosophers … clearly proves itself in the area of epistemology,” Horkheimer notes, their 
strongest arguments “chang[e] into a meager combination of possibilities [in ein bescheidenes 
Kombinationsvermögen] while crossing over into a proof of God’s existence.”30      
The reason for this, notes Horkheimer, is that concepts of the intelligible (and the 
aesthetic and practical judgments they allow), are inextricably related to the social practices 
of memory and anticipation constituting particular religious traditions.  They cannot simply 
be called forth ex nihilo by a rational deduction (as for instance, a postulate whose existence 
is a precondition of the self-evident moral law).  Indeed, Kant’s account of practical 
judgment is problematic, Horkheimer notes, precisely because it abstracts concepts of moral 
action from their dependency on such traditions, “The teaching that finds the categorical 
imperative as a supra-empirical fact [überempirisches Faktum] in every thinking being,” he 
begins, “is an absolutization [verabsolutierung] of the products of tradition.”31  Moral maxims 
regarding experience are thus not inferred by reference to a categorical law that is self-
evident to all rational subjects.  Rather, they depend upon descriptions and related habits of 
judgments which are learned in traditions.   
                                                 
29 For example: “The Soul” (1967), in Critique of Instrumental Reason, 54; “Über den Zweifel” (1969), in Vorträge und 
Aufzeichnungen, 214-215; “Observations on the Liberalization of Religion” (1971), in Frankfurt School on Religion, 
253; “Schopenhauers Denken, 240;“Pessimismus Heute,” 224-225. 
30 Horkheimer, “Pessimismus Heute,” 225.  For Horkheimer’s analysis of the inadequacies of various modern 
proofs, note “Schopenhauer’s Denken,” 241-242; “Über den Zweifel,” 214-215; “Pessimismus Heute,”  225-227; 
“Observations on the Liberalization of Religion,” 253-254. 





There are two problems Horkheimer has with Kant’s attempt to abstract moral 
judgment from tradition-dependent portrayals of the intelligible.  First, Kant’s portrayal of 
the categorical imperative renders problematic the substantive maxims he wishes it to 
endorse, for there is no necessary reason why the features of an action one chooses to 
universalize should correspond to the moral code presumed in bourgeois society.   
The conviction of Voltaire, “que dans le Cœur Dieu se grave lui-même,” has a long pre-history 
and reaches into the meaningful literature of our century.  The beautiful confession, also 
represented by Tolstoy in the Resurrection, of morality as the will written by God on the 
heart, which was called more scientifically “practical reason” by Kant, nevertheless 
rested upon a hasty induction.  Although in every act the educated one is inspired by the 
belief that in his position he must respond to everyone as himself, reason behaves 
neutrally toward the categorical imperative.  Besides morality, it also will justify actions 
whose maxims, however untrue, would be suitable to universalize.  The categorical 
imperative that characterized the civilized mentality, by no means characterized reason 
as such.32 
 
The argument that universalization could apply to immoral as well as moral acts was 
consistently used by Horkheimer throughout his career to illustrate the dependency of the 
judgment of “pure” reason on the character and historical context of the agent doing the 
judging.33  What is interesting about this rendition of the argument, however, is his 
emphasis that the supposedly self-evident correspondence between what is universalizable 
and the moral law “rest[s] upon a hasty induction;” its acceptance has more to do with the 
habits of thought that “the educated one” has learned vis-à-vis the cultural transmission of a 
theological idea than with that which is self-evident to reason.   
                                                 
32 Ibid., 248; trans. modified: “Religion und Philosophie,” 193-194.  
33 For an early instance, note “Materialism and Morality” (1933), in Between Philosophy and Social Science, 22-23.  
Habermas traces the origin of the claim to the excurses on “Juliette and Enlightenment” in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1944), and equates it with a “profound skepticism concerning reason” (“To See to Salvage,” 
134).  However the claim that “universalization” is situated by the social and material conditions of the subject 
is not necessarily skeptical.  It is simply an axiom of Horkheimer’s materialism, as our study has repeatedly 
illustrated.  It can thus be employed in accounts regarding either why attempts to attain the goal of the 
Enlightenment have failed, or accounts of what it would take for this goal to be reached.  In this context, it is 
clear that Horkheimer forwards it in a discussion of how best to preserve historical practices of reasoning, not 





Second, notes Horkheimer, Kant’s abstraction from particular religious traditions 
renders the motive for obedience to the moral law mute, for only such traditions can 
provide ends which are able to motivate the desire of subjects to do the practical reflection 
assumed by Kant.  For instance, a wish to proleptically experience the happiness of the 
coming eschatological age, not an abstract respect for categorical principles as such, situates 
the obedience of faithful Jews to the torah.  
Whoever considers this demand [the categorical imperative] as necessary and true 
cannot reject the trust that is announced in Psalm 91 as mere arbitrariness. … Being 
different from the categorical principles that are ascribed to reason, the thought of 
refuge as it expresses itself in Psalm 91 awakens not merely obedience but the love for 
that which is other than the world and which gives meaning to life and the suffering in 
it.34    
 
Kant’s notion of a “duty” arising from respect for the moral law is thus an anemic form of 
mere obedience where once there had been “love” for the intelligible ends presented by the 
tradition. The categories of moral judgment, concludes Horkheimer, are thus not extricable 
from the affective practices of remembrance and anticipation sustained by a tradition. 
The reason that one cannot abstract practical concepts from the intelligible ideas 
learned in religious traditions is thus not because such ideas provide a supra-empirical 
standpoint (as Habermas supposes), but rather precisely because there is no such standpoint 
to be had.  In “absolutizing” a moral maxim as something other than a “product of 
tradition,” one loses both the teleological descriptions which make sense of the maxim, as 
well as the affective desire necessary to motivate action, rendering the maxim both 
incoherent and ineffectual.  This supposes Horkheimer’s argument in Eclipse: traditions and 
the intelligible categories they allow must be preserved, for without them practical and 
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aesthetic maxims which modern subjects have come to value (such as the idea that the 
social whole exists for the sake of the subject, who is an end-in-herself), begin to fall out of 
use.   
1.2. The purpose of the sciences 
 
In congruence with his previous reflections on the relationship between early 
empiricism and the practical goals of the Enlightenment, Horkheimer continues to maintain 
in his later writing that practical postulates necessarily condition the determinations sought 
by the practice of the sciences.  His concern continues to be that such ends are no longer 
self-consciously taken to be objects of reflection by modern subjects,   
In the progressive specialization not only of the work-life but also of everything 
including even the sciences, it is necessary to be reminded again and again that not only 
skills matter, but also, in the end, the truth, the question which Kant already posed – 
What is truth? What should happen?  What should we do? … There is science 
[Wissenschaft], but there is actually no discipline – indeed, the reasons for this are still too 
little spoken about – which determines the course of science.35   
 
As we have noted, Horkheimer does not believe such practical ends can be meaningfully 
understood if they are abstracted from historical traditions and treated as self-evident.  
Further, practical ends which determine the sciences cannot themselves be scrutinized by 
the synthesizing activity of the understanding, for they are postulates regarding the meaning 
of the whole, thus not based in discrete sensory intuitions.  The sciences are thus not 
autodidactic.   
Presently, the ends pursued by the sciences do not arise from self-conscious reflection 
on the practical questions which Horkheimer lists under the heading “the will to truth” 
(“What is truth? What should happen? What should we do?”).  They are rather determined 
by forces which are unexamined.  For instance, Horkheimer notes,   
                                                 





How is [science] determined, only by the will to truth?  Not at all, but through many 
factors, which are examined too little. … The science of physics, the natural sciences as 
such, even medicine appears to me broadly to be determined by the fact that nations 
must defend themselves against one another and must produce the necessary 
instruments for this.  Science today is broadly the servant of these needs.36   
 
The practice of the sciences supposes practical goals, whether they be “examined” by an 
intentional subject or not, and Horkheimer’s fear is that these goals become heteronymous 
if they remain unexamined or are taken as natural or inevitable.  Such forces, he notes, have 
come to “determin[e] the course of science” thought they remain forces which “science 
does not pay attention to.”37    
The self-realization of the subject requires that the practical ends which situate scientific 
practice be taken up and reflected upon self-consciously.  This, Horkheimer notes, is why 
theology remains important: it provides a model for reflection upon the human purposes 
implicit in the practice of the sciences, “If science serves today as the basis of a critique of 
theology, theology … is able, conversely, to be critical of science and to raise awareness to 
its true impulses.”38  The reason for this is that postulates regarding the meaning and 
purpose of human action, or what self-satisfaction might be for humans, postulates which 
can throw into question the ends presently dictating the practice of the sciences, remain a 
retrievable provenance of theology, despite the fact that the Kantian attempt to preserve 
them as autonomous products of reason has failed.  Horkheimer thus notes elsewhere that 
it is only in reflection upon historical traditions that categories like the “Kantian hope” in 
the realization of a kingdom of ends may be preserved, “What is needed…is a knowledge of 
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the theological tradition, for our grasp of the inextricable meshing of human freedom and 
its conditionings, as well as the Kantian hope, have their historical roots in that tradition.”39      
Such postulates, notes Horkheimer, involve “the will to truth,” which he defines as the 
desire “to anticipate something of that which is not merely relative” (i.e. circumscribed by 
the sense-intuition of given conditions), “but rather is absolute” (i.e., postulates regarding 
the significance of sensory experience for subjects in relation to the meaning of the whole, 
as Horkheimer’s reference to Kant’s three-fold question in the Critique of Pure Reason makes 
evident).40  The ultimate difficulty of retrieval is that the theorist must reflect upon such 
ends in a form suited to their status as conceptualizations of the intelligible.  Horkheimer 
concludes rather ambiguously with this recognition, “While theology also cannot describe 
and determine [beschreiben und bestimmen] ‘the Intelligible,’ it is at least able to say how what 
science does not pay attention to should be observed.”41   
Such ends are thus understood by Horkheimer (following Kant) as practical postulates, 
hopeful or fearful anticipations regarding the meaning of the whole which situate and guide 
human acts, yet (contra Kant) he holds that they may not be abstracted from the practices 
of historical traditions and equated with the products of reason.  On the one hand, they are 
speculative ideas, not themselves particular determinations regarding empirical conditions.  
This is why one may not use practices of observation to “describe” or “determine” an 
intelligible whole in a way analogous to the scientific description of objects of experience.  
On the other, it is equally the case, as Horkheimer notes in his reflections on the use of 
language in “Against Philosophy,” that one is unable to be an embodied acting agent without 
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the implicit postulation of such wholes.  If affective desire or aversion in relation to some 
account of the meaning of a whole is presupposed by those making theoretical judgments, 
reflection on such ends as action guiding postulates remains a necessary task for the subject 
interested in seeing its will reflected in the ends it pursues.  A question we will address in the 
next chapter is how precisely Horkheimer believes that reflection upon such concepts is 
possible, once their distinction from the judgment of particular sense intuitions has been 
appreciated.  
2. The content of theological concepts:  
Horkheimer’s critique of Tillich 
 
In order to develop Horkheimer’s understanding of the way the content of theological 
concepts ought to be understood and preserved by moderns, it is instructive to survey the 
way he considers and then rejects two modern attempts to retrieve the significance of 
theological concepts.  As is typical of his style, Horkheimer chooses two apparently 
diametrically opposed attempts to recover the significance of such concepts, before noting a 
flawed premise they share that is rooted, he thinks, in the way they abstract the meaning of 
concepts from the practices of historical traditions.  One approach presents the intelligible 
as a reflection of the highest good; the other, as a dark force that uses human activity as 
instrumental to its own purposes.  Describing the two in tandem, Horkheimer notes,   
Schopenhauer’s work constituted the last great philosophical attempt to save the core of 
Christianity. …  
… While Tillich wanted to foresee in the unknown other “God above God,” the 
Higher and Highest, the opposite, as it were, to dreadful reality, for Schopenhauer what 
is revealed in the world, the absolute, is denounced as the eternal, blind, insatiable will, 
which everyone serves and belongs to in the end.42 
 
                                                 





No matter how different these conceptualizations of the intelligible, each relies on an 
analogy between a reality revealed by the introspective reflection of the individual and the 
whole.  In Tillich’s case, the individual experiences a “depth” to his empirical relations in 
the world that reflects the unconditioned ground of his existence; for Schopenhauer, the 
individual infers from the insatiable desires at war within him the nature of the 
unconditioned that generates the whole.  In either case, the individual discerns the content 
of such concepts on the basis of its own reflection on experience, not as a social practice of 
description learned in community.  I will first examine the way Horkheimer critiques this 
shared premise in his reflections on Tillich, before turning to his mature critique and 
appropriation of the work of Schopenhauer.   
Before proceeding with an examination of Horkheimer’s relationship to Tillich and 
Schopenhauer, it is worth noting that this strategy stands in basic continuity with 
Horkheimer’s reflection on intelligible concepts in Eclipse.  In that work, Horkheimer 
praises pre-critical accounts of the intelligible insofar as they recognize that an intimate 
relationship exists between the subject’s experience of empirical conditions and the shape of 
its consequent conceptualizations of the intelligible.  Thus, for instance, he admires the way 
Aquinas relates claims regarding the intelligible to the observational practices taken for 
granted by the Aristotelian sciences.  He contrasts this sharply with modern metaphysical 
revivals, which disconnect the disclosure of the intelligible from the experience of empirical 
conditions, by portraying it as an immediate intuition regarding the whole, not an inference 
drawn from the experience of particular conditions.  As we shall see, he holds that both 
Tillich and Schopenhauer have this positive trait in common with pre-critical metaphysics: 





subject as a basis for its account of the whole.  Yet, just as in Eclipse, this appreciation does 
not signal unqualified approbation: concepts of the intelligible, Horkheimer maintains, are 
not self-evident inferences from particular sense-experiences; rather, they are learned social 
practices that rely on the shared self-understanding of the members of a historical tradition.  
This is why intelligible concepts develop in relation to the historical experience of subjects 
and why they may, in fact, be lost.   
Horkheimer’s personal friendship with the Tillichs is well-known.43  Nevertheless he 
repeatedly expresses reservations regarding Tillich’s understanding of theological concepts.  
While Horkheimer agrees with Tillich that the preservation of conceptualizations of the 
intelligible is necessary if the self-satisfaction of the modern subject is to be realized, the 
two do not understand the content of such concepts in the same way.  According to 
Horkheimer, Tillich wishes to treat conceptualizations of the intelligible as reflections of a 
universal human experience that may be separated from their historical development as 
practices of description arising in particular traditions.     
In “Theism and Atheism” (1963), his most developed engagement with Tillich’s ideas, 
Horkheimer begins by developing his own understanding of the content of theological 
categories, before comparing this with John Robinson’s influential popularization of Tillich 
in Honest to God.  Horkheimer intentionally situates his own understanding of theological 
concepts as a repair of a metaphysical “rule” which he believes informs both Protestant 
theism and Enlightenment atheism.  The “metaphysical materialism” of the French 
Enlightenment emerged as a critique, he notes, of the “Absolute of the theologians.”44  Yet 
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its account of the justification of practical action mirrors its original object of critique.  
After quoting the French philosophe d’Holbach at length, Horkheimer concludes that his 
materialism simply replaces the Deus absconditus of the Protestants with “Nature,”  
There is nothing outside her; she is one and all at once.  Man shall discover her laws, 
admire her inexhaustible energy, use his discoveries for his own happiness, and resign 
himself to his ignorance of her last, her ultimate causes, which are impenetrable.  With 
his whole being man belongs to her.  The abstract entity, which, according to such 
materialists, forms the basis of right conduct is as indeterminate as the Deus absconditus 
of the Protestants, and the promise of happiness in this world is as problematical as 
bliss in the next, which is extremely uncertain.45  
 
On the one hand, for d’Holbach “Nature” is self-contained: all creatures depend upon it for 
their particular being, form, and final end, yet it is itself contingent upon nothing.  Yet any 
justification for the outworking of this “abstract entity” is impossible (thus its 
impenetrability to reason parallels the Deus absconditus).  On the other hand, in tension, this 
will is the basis for describing the normative significance of the actions of human beings, 
“In the name of Nature, the enlightened Holbach calls for the defense of one’s country not 
only against external enemies but against internal tyrants.” 46  This rehearses a theological 
assumption, the identification of the highest being with the good, yet it also construes this 
being as finally “impenetrable” in a way that makes this appeal anything but self-evident.   
In drawing the parallel between Enlightenment materialists and the theological object of 
their critique, Horkheimer wishes to highlight the way the equation of the most permanent 
and powerful being with the good is taken for granted by both and used as a self-evident 
basis for practical reasoning, “The naturalistic doctrine agrees with the theological doctrine 
it opposes in identifying what is most permanent and powerful with what is most exalted 
                                                 






and worthy of love—as if this were a matter of course.”47  Echoing Nietzsche, Horkheimer 
flatly denies this equation, 
The ancient materialists were still inclined to stop with a plurality of atoms; the 
worshippers of Nature, like the pantheists, ontologists, and theologians, will hear of 
nothing less than the One.  But Nature does not say anything, as little as Being, which 
has been tried recently and which is supposed to deliver its oracles through the mouths 
of professors.  The place of God is taken in each case by an impersonal concept.  The 
Scholastics had already depersonalized the humanity and individuality of the murdered 
Jesus by multiplying them into the Oneness of God.  The ipsum esse, the true identity of 
the divinity, his humanity could hardly be distinguished any longer from the radiant 
Being of the neo-Platonists, because of the ceaseless interpretation of being and being-
in-the world—the unity of essence and existence—in which all differences disappeared.  
When they build a system, theists and atheists alike posit an entity at the top.  The 
dogma of a Nature which can speak and command—or at least serve as a principle for 
deducing moral truths—was an inadequate attempt to go along with science without 
giving up the age-old longing for an eternal guideline.48 
 
We shall have to leave aside the question of whether Horkheimer is accurate in his sweeping 
characterization of the speculation of the scholastics.  For our purposes, it is only necessary 
to note that his argument supposes that atheist and theist forms of metaphysics have in 
common the idea that what is “natural,” most powerful, or necessary is at the same time the 
good.  Further, this equation is not simply the mistake of atheist critics or modern 
theologians, but is, for Horkheimer, characteristic of the development of theological 
metaphysics itself.   
Horkheimer maintains, by contrast, that this equation is far from self-evident: he 
describes normative values as the ephemeral product of a historical process, not reflections 
of the unconditioned.  Thus he summarizes in a contemporaneous aphorism, “The 
philosophers were wrong to believe that truth is what is most stable, most solid, most 
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dependable.  It is the vanishing moment, appearance, or so it seems to me.”49  Moral truths 
like justice are not rooted in a self-evident fact of reason.  What counts as human “dignity” 
for moderns, as a basis for their judgments of equity, is rather the self-conscious 
appropriation of a concept that had, in a previous historical moment, distinguished nobles 
from the masses and undergirded feudal relations of subjugation.  This is subsequently 
taken up by subjects in a distinct form, who extend it to a broader class of subjects in 
resistance against this institution.50   
Contemporary theists influenced by Tillich, however, embrace the equation of the real 
and the good as well, treating the longing found in religious practices as the experience of 
an intelligible ground of human relations, an origin on which such relations depend that is, 
at the same time, the highest good towards which they are oriented.  Horkheimer thus 
summarizes Robinson’s translation of Tillich’s metaphysics as follows, 
When the New Testament tells us that God was in Christ and that the Word was God, 
this only means according to Robinson that God is the ultimate “depth” of our being, 
the unconditional within the conditioned.  The so-called “transcendent”—God, love, or 
whatever name we might give it—is not “outside” but is to be found in with and below 
the Thou of all finite relationships as their ultimate depth, their ground, their meaning.  
But if we must talk of the ultimate, then Schopenhauer was closer to the truth when he 
denounced it in each creature as the instinct for self-preservation, the will to be and to 
be well.  And even though theism is sacrificed for an anti-dogmatic attitude, the rejected 
view is being presupposed in a perfectly naïve way.51 
 
Horkheimer’s governing interest in the passage is not to contrast Schopenhauer’s account 
of intuitive experience with Robinson’s (though if forced to choose, as we shall see, he 
would undoubtedly prefer the former).  Rather, the passage points out a claim that critics of 
traditional theism like Robinson share in common with their target, the idea that that one 
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may infer from an intuitive experience an “eternal” truth underlying empirical conditions, 
which can serve in turn as a stable basis for practical judgment.  Both Robinson and 
traditional theistic metaphysics hold this premise, which is why Horkheimer concludes that 
“the rejected view” of the latter “is being presupposed in a perfectly naïve way” by the 
former.  
The statement that immediately follows, “Truth—eternal truth outlasting human 
error—cannot as such be separated from theism.  The only alternative is positivism, with 
which the latest theology is in accord irrespective of contradictions,” a formulation which 
many have taken to express Horkheimer’s commitment to classical adequation, should be 
understood in this context.52  It is not a claim intended to defend a classic conception of 
adequation, as if the most basic contrast in the essay were between traditional theological 
metaphysics (on the one hand) and positivism and modern theological liberalism (on the 
other).  If such were the case, Horkheimer would not have prefaced the discussion by a 
history of the recapitulations of a way of conceiving of truth, a way supposed in common 
by medieval forms of philosophical theism, its Enlightenment critics, and modern 
theologians alike.  The center of gravity for the essay is a critique of various attempts to 
discard traditional theological metaphysics, each of which unconsciously reproduces its 
cardinal tenet, the notion that truth depends upon an unconditioned ground.  It is not a 
defense of one particular variation of this metaphysics over the others. 
Thus after the aforementioned either/or between theism and positivism, Horkheimer 
returns to critique the account of the intelligible found in Robinson for reproducing the 
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error of the theism it replaces (much as, according to him, the deus absconditus reproduced 
the error of scholastic metaphysicians), 
Having retreated to their last position, Protestant theologians, unconscious of this 
philosophical dilemma, try to rescue the idea that the life of each individual has its own 
meaning.  It is essential for life in this world to mean something more than this world.  
What more?  Their answer is: Love. … But love as an abstraction—as it appears in 
recent writings—remains as obscure as the hidden God whom it is supposed to 
replace.53   
 
In the broader context, the either/or is thus better understood as a counterfactual: if one 
has assumed the account of normativity Horkheimer has subjected to critique, one may 
either claim with the theist that the truth of an act requires a relation between it and an 
intuited ground of being (in so doing, one will reproduce, however unconsciously, classic 
theistic metaphysics), or one may argue against the theist that the idea of a such normative 
judgment is meaningless because the concept of the unconditioned has no content that may 
be experienced as a sense-intuition (the negation of intelligible concepts offered by the 
positivist).  Yet Horkheimer’s word for this is a “dilemma,” he is not advocating one or the 
other side.   
Horkheimer notes that in either case, the acceptance of theism or the rejection of 
positivism, intelligible concepts are understood to be products of a self-evident universal 
intuition that provides access to that which underlies and directs empirical conditions.  
Instead of accepting this premise, he argues for a different way of conceiving of theological 
concepts of the unconditioned.  Such concepts are not products of immediate intuition, 
rather they are historically developing social practices of description.  As such, they are tied 
to practices of remembrance and hope learned by subjects in a community and are always 
inflected by the projects and affective states of such subjects.  Horkheimer presents his 
                                                 





alternative account in the concluding paragraphs of the essay, terming theological reflection 
“the longing for something other than this world” and “the standing apart from existing 
conditions.”54  In order to clarify what is intended by this ambiguous language, he develops 
a contrast between eschatological “longing” (on the one hand) and both a dominant form of 
atheism (characterizing the communist states of his time) as well as a form of philosophical 
theology that rests upon the self-evidence of immediate intuitions.     
Atheism, during the early Enlightenment, he notes, “was … a sign of inner 
independence and incredible courage, and it continues to be one in authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian countries where it is regarded as a symptom of the hated liberal spirit.”55  Here 
we may recall Horkheimer’s praise of the early empiricists and French encyclopédistes, who 
subjected the justifications of feudal institutions to sustained critique to redress the 
alienation of their subjects.  Yet the significance of “atheism” much like the significance of 
these early progenitors of positivism has changed as the historical conditions informing 
social practices have also changed.  In Horkheimer’s historical moment, “atheism” as a 
doctrine no longer signified the self-reflective critique of institutions for the sake of the 
subjects inhabiting them.  In the Soviet Bloc, it had become the ally of a nationalism which 
broached no dissent; thus it played a part in the ideological justification of institutions that 
repressed their subjects. 
At a time when both the national socialists and the nationalistic communists despised 
the Christian faith, a man like Robespierre, the disciple of Rousseau, but not a man like 
Voltaire, would also have become an atheist and declared nationalism as a religion.  
Nowadays atheism is in fact the attitude of those who follow whatever power happens 
to be dominant, no matter whether they pay lip-service to a religion or whether they can 
afford to disavow it openly.56 
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The parallel with Horkheimer’s analysis of Comte’s conservative transmogrification of the 
earlier Enlightenment goals of empiricism is striking.57   
If one may not speak of the content of the concept “atheism” without historical 
qualification, this is equally so with theism.  Yet much as he refuses to equate past forms of 
atheism with the present content of the concept in totalitarian states, Horkheimer refuses to 
equate the continuing significance of theology in modern life with its earlier forms, thus 
“theism is again an actual force in the period of its decline.”58   
In order to explain this claim, Horkheimer recalls his earlier depiction in Eclipse of the 
sublation of antique self-mastery in the medieval vision of caritas, a vision supposed 
implicitly by the humane critique of the aforementioned Enlightenment atheists.  In Eclipse, 
Horkheimer had argued that the Christian idea of the soul extended the temporal horizon 
supposed by antique self-mastery to eternity and thus enabled the subject to balance the 
immediate sacrifice and self-denial asked of her for the sake of others with the hope of an 
eventual redemption of such suffering in a future where justice and love embrace.59  In 
“Theism and Atheism” he concludes regarding this sublation,    
Such selflessness [expressed by the theistic command to love one’s neighbor and all 
created things], such a sublimation of self-love into love of others had its origin in 
Europe in the Judeo-Christian idea that truth, love and justice were one … . The 
necessary connection between the theistic tradition and the overcoming of self-seeking 
becomes very much clearer to a reflective thinker of our time than it was to the critics 
of religion in by-gone days.60   
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Theists in totalitarian states, notes Horkheimer, remain faithful to this historical vision of 
caritas as well as the infinite worth of the individual it supposes, in the midst of its 
threatened demise,      
Those who resist the prevailing wind are trying to hold on to what was once the 
spiritual basis of the civilization to which they still belong.  This is hardly what the 
philosophical ‘theists’ had in mind: the conception of a divine guarantor of the laws of 
nature.  It is on the contrary the thought of something other than the world, something 
over which the fixed rules of nature, the perennial source of doom, have no dominion.61   
 
The “longing” for that which is other than this world is therefore the hope for future 
justice, as well as the proleptic participation in this future through the practice of caritas.  
This supposes an eschatological dimension lacking in classical philosophical theology: it 
does not reference an intuition arising from the patterns of experience characterizing the 
present age; rather it offers a portrayal and proleptic embodiment of a not-yet realized 
future that is perhaps least evident to subjects on the basis of their immediate experience.  
Thus it may only be maintained, Horkheimer will argue later, through a significant and self-
conscious effort, by liturgical practices of historical remembrance, proleptic participation, 
and future hope.  While this attempt to offer an alternative way of understanding an 
intelligible claim is an unclarified hint in “Theism and Atheism,” it signals an idea that 
Horkheimer will significantly develop in his own reflections on Jewish eschatology. 
Elsewhere the idea is explicitly related by him to a critique of Tillich.  Intelligible 
concepts are not preserved by a people because subjects in subsequent generations 
understand them as symbolic reflections of a universal human condition.  Rather, such 
concepts are preserved because members in a historical form of life continue to hold fast to 
the meaningfulness of such historical concepts in relation to the contemporary experiences 






of the community.  Thus in speaking of his understanding of the Psalms, Horkheimer 
resists attempts to abstract what is communicated regarding the coming of the day of the 
Lord from the past experience of exile and the present situation of persecution faced by the 
Jewish people.  The motive for this kind of abstraction, one towards which he expresses 
significant sympathy, is to “mitigate the crass opposition in the biblical teaching … of the 
antagonism between the goodness of God and the unjust, malevolent horror in reality.”  If 
the Psalms express the continued longing of an exiled and persecuted people, the fact that it 
has yet to be realized is difficult to reconcile with the character of YHWH.  Yet, 
Horkheimer concludes, “Not to speak of the logical problematic of the notion of symbol 
… it seems to me to be decisive that the Psalms witness a need, a devotion to the good, 
which itself is truly not symbolical.”62   The declarations of Psalm 91 thus disclose, not an 
intuited depth behind empirical reality, but rather a hope for the immanent in-breaking of 
justice that is based in the history of a particular people and appropriated in the midst of 
present opposition in anticipation of the future.    
3. Rules for preserving theological concepts:  
Horkheimer’s appropriation of Schopenhauer 
 
From one perspective, notes Horkheimer, Schopenhauer’s thought “corresponds with 
Tillich.”  For instance, in his reflection on biblical myth, Schopenhauer “anticipated the 
symbolism which Tillich unfolded in a differentiated way.”63  Yet, while Horkheimer is 
content to treat Tillich’s work as a polemical foil for his own account of the content of 
intelligible concepts, his relationship to Schopenhauer’s philosophy is considerably more 
complex.  Schopenhauer’s work had a pervasive, if implicit, influence on Horkheimer from 
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his earliest writings.64  Thus it is unsurprising that he handles Schopenhauer’s thought with 
considerably more care, reflecting on his work not merely as an object of critique but also as 
a set of insights regarding the significance of individual experience for preserving concepts 
of the intelligible.  However, this latter set of insights, he maintains, may be distinguished 
from Schopenhauer’s own account of the content of the intelligible.  Suitably understood, 
Schopenhauer’s style may thus be rendered serviceable for those wishing to preserve the 
significance of theological concepts for modern life, even if his own account of the content 
of the intelligible is eschewed.     
3.1. The juxtaposition of style and content 
 
As we have noted, a leitmotif in Horkheimer’s work is his refusal to avert his gaze from 
the alienation of the suffering individual through any appeal that justifies suffering in 
relation to a taken for granted account of the whole.  The point of his critique of 
metaphysics, we have argued, is not to negate intelligible concepts as such, but rather to 
criticize any attempt to treat such concepts as reflections of a self-event authority that 
stands over against the judgment of the subject on the basis of its sensuous experience.  
This “intransigent nominalism,” with its focus on the affective embodied states of subjects, 
is perhaps the central debt Horkheimer owes to Schopenhauer, and he turns to reflects 
upon it at length in his first lecture before the Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft,   
In Schopenhauer’s intransigent nominalism in the face of society … lies at the same 
time the root of his greatness. Just as in nature genera are bare abstractions, he says, ‘so 
in the human race only the individuals and their course of life are real, the nations and 
their lives are mere abstractions.’  He denies the existence of the collective and insists 
on living individual entities, on man and animal with their needs and passions, their 
striving after existence [Dasein] and well-being, and their misery.65   
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Later in the lecture he continues this thought, juxtaposing Schopenhauer’s “tone” and 
“style” with the explicit content of his philosophy,  
No linguistic gesture that feigns at depth in order to render meaninglessness and death 
meaningful by a sleight-of-hand, no theology of Nothingness, no replacement of the 
philosophy of history through a historicization of Being, in which the victims do not 
appear and the hangmen hide themselves – none of this would be compatible with the 
clear tone of Schopenhauer’s writings.  As much as he maintains the thesis of the 
unalterability of suffering and nastiness, and as much as he stresses the uselessness of 
protest, his style forms in equal measure a singular protest against the fact that it is so.66  
 
Despite Horkheimer’s evident appreciation for Schopenhauer, his conclusion is cautious: 
Schopenhauer’s style, his focus on the sensuous individual and his refusal to place the 
absurdity of suffering in relation to a meaningful whole, is worthy of emulation.  Yet this 
style is a “singular protest” against the way Schopenhauer develops his own metaphysics in 
his theoretical philosophy, The World as Will and Representation.  
Horkheimer deftly navigates both sides of the form-content juxtaposition in 
appropriating Schopenhauer for his own concerns.  For instance, in an aphorism which 
turns from Schopenhauer’s theoretical work to examine his practical moral philosophy, 
Horkheimer notes that while he was correct in On the Basis of Morality to postulate 
“compassion” as “the foundation of the good,” the style of his writing belies any 
emancipatory element made possible by the content of this practical axiom, “The evil 
pathos that everything that happens to life is no more than it deserves is a peculiarity of his 
lucid style. … Precisely because it moralizes, his language contradicts the morality it 
proclaims.”67  The juxtaposition of style and content which Horkheimer had used to 
interpret Schopenhauer’s theoretical reflection is thus turned on its head in an analysis of 
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his practical work.  In such passages, Horkheimer’s appropriation of Schopenhauer is 
infused with an irony that betrays a decisively negative attitude towards the latter’s 
metaphysics of the will.   
3.2. Diversity and development in the Schopenhauer Lectures 
In his first lecture, “Schopenhauer and Society,” Horkheimer develops a careful critique 
of the basic premise of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, the notion that there is an analogy 
between the inner states of individuals, known by self-reflection on instinctual and 
biological drives, and the intelligible structure of the whole.  The inner state of a subject, 
Horkheimer notes, does not exist apart from and is in fact always already expressed in a way 
that is mediated by social and political practices.  He thus expresses a preference for Hegel’s 
account of the relation between the social whole and the individual, in which “society 
counts as a sphere of its own structure and energy that mediates state and individual as well 
as individuals among one another.”  At the same time, he notes, Hegel is careful to 
emphasize that social practices are mediated by both the particular embodied states of 
individuals as well as the political institutions characterizing the whole, “each individual is 
no less determined by society than by nature and the state.”68  For Schopenhauer by 
contrast, the object of reflection is not a mutually constitutive relationship between social 
and political practices (on the one hand) and nature (on the other), but is rather simply 
inner nature hypostatized as an ineluctable determinant of the agent and all of her socio-
political practices.69  Schopenhauer thus privileges the inner experience of instinct studied 
                                                 
68 Horkheimer, “Schopenhauer and Society,” 87. 
69 Horkheimer distinguishes between three nodes of a trialectic in Hegel: society, politics, and nature.  Our 
argument focuses on the relationship between “social practices,” more broadly construed as encompassing the 
first two nodes, and “nature.”  Thus we will refer to social and political practices together simply as “social 





by psychology, instead of understanding it as arising from and reflecting back upon the 
intersection between embodiment and social relations.   
As particles of matter are controlled by mechanical laws, so the relation of the individual 
is controlled through psychological ones.  Society is held together through the 
psychological mechanism of anxiety and aggression, in which caution at times come to 
assist  Since education according to Schopenhauer … only concerns the intellect and 
not character, it is clear that this essence of society cannot be changed.  Like all thinkers 
who do not strive to understand the dark sides of the human psyche in their connection 
with the social whole, but rather directly hypostasize them as eternal characteristics, as a 
natural condition, Schopenhauer believes in the endless continuance and naturalness of 
an essentially repressive society.70   
 
While, as we have seen, Horkheimer wants to affirm Schopenhauer’s nominalist concern 
with the experience of individuals as well as the critique of transfiguring teleologies, he 
refuses to accept the notion that the human psyche may be abstracted from the social 
practices which give rise to it, that it may be known as a discrete force apart from such 
social mediation through mere introspection, and that it may, in turn, be conflated as the 
efficient cause of social processes.  Given the way Horkheimer’s later work is often 
misunderstood as a straight-forward affirmation of Schopenhauer, it is worth noting his 
careful attempt to differentiate his own understanding from this mistaken abstraction and 
conflation,       
The totality of social relations currently constitutes itself as a reality with its own 
lawfulness.  It is the society that reproduces itself and changes because of individuals 
joined by social relations and not the thinking individual isolated from this society that 
grants provision and protection in their determined distribution and gradation.  It is 
individuals and groups – which fulfill a function given them arising from the interplay 
of forces determining the whole and, indeed, realize a differentiated effect according to 
their place in society – not independent affects and ideas [unabhängige Affekte und 
Vorstellungen] that underlie the institutions that are decisive for right and wrong. …  
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Just as little as psychological laws are derived from the social … do social laws 
follow from the psychological.  The interplay of both, like that of the individual and 
society, is different in every epoch, indeed, in every historical moment.71 
 
Even in the midst of this critique, Horkheimer is careful to conclude that while there is no 
supra-personal entity that underlies social relations, neither may affective experiences 
themselves simply be reduced to expressions of social relations without noting the way they 
express the particular experience of the agents who inhabit such relations.  Schopenhauer’s 
psychologism, he notes, is no less damaging than a sociological reductionism that claims 
that the biological and psychological states of individuals are merely derivative of the social 
practices they participate in, as if individuals cannot come to feel dissonance arising from 
their own experience of embodied biological and instinctual needs in relation to the 
practices they inhabit, “‘psychologism’ carries as little standing as the social universalism of 
every type.”72     
Horkheimer thus assumes, following Hegel’s account in the Phenomenology, that the 
relationship between the sociality of a practice and the embodied desires of the agent who 
inhabits the practice are mutually constitutive and may be related as equally basic elements 
making up the practice. He therefore concludes the previously cited passage in a way 
reminiscent of his reflections on empirical research as a critical activity in the 40s: the 
“psychic mechanisms” of individuals are mediated “differently in distinct social wholes,” he 
notes, such that this relationship may not be specified ahead of concrete socio-historical 
investigation into the practical activity of subjects in various historical moments.  Without 
such inquiry, all theory, including Schopenhauer’s pessimism, “remains abstract.”73    
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As one appreciates the nuances of this critique, the idea that Horkheimer would wish to 
simply appropriate Schopenhauer’s metaphysics as a ground for social critique becomes 
increasingly implausible.  Yet it would be mistaken to assume that Horkheimer’s perspective 
remains static over the almost two decades during which he offers the other Schopenhauer 
Lectures.  To take a singular example of the tension that becomes evident upon surveying 
the lectures in their entirety, note the way Horkheimer concludes his fifth and final lecture, 
“Schopenhauers Denken im Verhältnis zu Wissenschaft und Religion.”  Rather than repeating his 
earlier critique of Schopenhauer’s conception of the intelligible, Horkheimer notes that “his 
metaphysics offers the deepest basis [Begründung] for morality, without coming into 
contradiction with exact scientific knowledge” and “without the idea of a transcendent, 
eternal, good or evil spirit.”  Sensing the ambiguity inherent in this formulation (for what 
precisely would be Schopenhauer’s basis for morality once one removes the idea of the 
“eternal” will to which Horkheimer alludes?), he clarifies as follows.  Schopenhauer’s idea, 
that “each person is one with the weakest being” may be taken as a “hunch” which “points 
to [Ahnung…weist auf] the identity of living things as such, and may give reason for 
[vermag…zu begründen] the solidarity of all creatures long before death.”74  Notwithstanding 
the care taken by Horkheimer to distinguish Schopenhauer’s account of the will from his 
“hunch” regarding the identification of all with the weakest one, this text has served for 
Habermas as an encapsulation of Horkheimer’s late turn to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics as 
a pessimistic “ontological anchoring of truth.”75  For Horkheimer, he concludes, “only 
insight into the identity of all life, into a unitary ground of being, even if it be irrational, in 
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which all individual appearances are brought into harmony with one another, ‘can ground 
solidarity with all creatures long before death.’”76  
Allowing the dissonance between the first and last Schopenhauer lectures to remain 
unresolved for the moment, it is worth noting a commonality between the lectures.  In 
Horkheimer’s first lecture, we have noted, he argues at length that Schopenhauer 
essentializes social practices as mere reflections of the will.  In later lectures, he does not 
depart from this straightforward critique but continues to affirm that Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics “implies [einschließen] fatalism” and “signifies resignation in a certain sense.”77  
Indeed, in Schopenhauers Denken, Horkheimer goes so far as to note a parallel between 
Schopenhauer’s theoretical philosophy and the bracketing of the experience of the subject 
exemplified by positivist philosophies of science,  
The relationship of Schopenhauerian pessimism to positivism, the philosophical 
absolutization of science, the identification of its knowledge with truth itself, is difficult 
to determine, as much as he himself stressed the difference.  The nullification of the 
human [die menschliche Nichtigkeit] follows from both the scientific knowledge of nature as 
well as from his own philosophy.78 
 
This, he concludes, “translate[s] the nullity of the individual into a transcendental.”79  When 
Horkheimer thus proceeds to conclude the essay by noting that Schopenhauer’s “hunch” 
regarding the unity of all with the weakest one should be preserved in a way distinct from 
his account of an “evil” will, this demonstrates, minimally, that however much he may wish 
to offer an account of intelligible unity that bears a relation to Schopenhauer’s, he also 
wishes to sharply distinguish his own account from a mere affirmation of the latter’s 
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metaphysics.  If there is admiration here, it is certainly qualified.  What then does it signify, 
and how does it relate to Horkheimer’s concern with theological reasoning?   
3.3. Schopenhauer in the service of liturgical reasoning 
Instead of simply subjecting Schopenhauer’s account of the will to a sustained Hegelian 
critique or treating it as a foil for his own account (as in the case of Tillich), Horkheimer 
argues in his late reflections that there are two ways in which the Schopenhauer’s reasoning 
regarding the intelligible may be recovered in a form free from his substantive conclusions.  
Understanding this selective retrieval of Schopenhauer style will enable us to better 
appreciate how the affirmation of Schopenhauer’s “hunch” regarding the basis of morality 
in “Schopenhauers Denken” is congruent with Horkheimer’s persistent critique of the latter’s 
metaphysics of the will.  More importantly, it will illustrate the significance Schopenhauer’s 
style of reasoning holds for attempts to preserve the continuing significance of historical 
categories for subjects in the face of new disruptive experiences.   
In his theoretical philosophy, on the one hand, notes Horkheimer, Schopenhauer 
attempts to place the experience of the suffering one at the center of his reasoning 
regarding the shape of the intelligible instead of subsuming this experience as an instance of 
an already meaningful whole.  This demonstrates, for Horkheimer, how the experience of 
subjects may be related to concepts of the intelligible through a practice of reflective and 
not subsumptive reasoning.  In his practical philosophy, on the other, Schopenhauer severs 
the intuitive equation of the real and the good in conceptualizations of the intelligible, and 
attempts to reason regarding moral maxims instead on the basis of the ephemeral 
experience of affective embodiment.  This demonstrates the fragility of judgments regarding 





Horkheimer thus wishes to affirm Schopenhauer’s unbending focus on the historical 
experience of the suffering one as a basis for disclosing the meaning of the whole and his 
related refusal to countenance a self-evident basis from which to infer practical maxims 
apart from such experience.  His intent is not to affirm Schopenhauer’s particular account 
of the intelligible, but rather to extract in his reflections on Schopenhauer a particular way 
of reasoning regarding the intelligible.      
3.3.1. The relationship between experience and intelligible concepts in 
Schopenhauer’s theoretical philosophy 
 
Horkheimer maintains, in accord with his understanding of Kantian idealism, that 
human concepts are fitted to the task of comprehending sense-intuitions.  The 
unconditioned is not a possible object of experience, thus to conceive of it as if one could 
directly intuit it in a way akin to empirical sensations is a category mistake.  Nevertheless, 
Horkheimer expresses an abiding appreciation for the analogy upon which Schopenhauer’s 
particular variant of this mistake is built when compared to other attempts to postulate the 
immediate experience of the intelligible.  While metaphysicians, he notes, often begin with 
an intuition of an intelligible structure and then infer the meaning of the particular 
according to its relation to this whole, Schopenhauer’s style of reasoning inverts this 
subsumption: it postulates the meaning of the whole on the basis of the sensuous 
experience of the subject.  This allows the stark alienation of the subject in the face of its 
social reality to be emphasized in grotesque form, writ large as it were, as an intelligible 
postulate regarding the falsity of the whole.  In the midst of his critique of the content of 
Schopenhauer’s intelligible in “Schopenhauer in Society,” Horkheimer thus approves of the 
latter’s inversion of traditional methods of reasoning from the meaning of the whole to the 





In the presentation of his doctrine it has been well noted that he describes the will to 
happiness as blind and insatiable.  Fewer, however, have noticed that he did not 
measure merely the universe by this happiness, but also the intelligible order. … 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy … withheld from reality the honor of embedding it in a 
gold-mine of eternity.80   
     
Instead of measuring the universe on the basis of a transfiguring intelligible, Schopenhauer 
measures the intelligible on the basis of the subject’s alienated experience of the universe 
and portrays it as harsh.   
In a later aphorism, “Schopenhauer as Optimist,” Horkheimer similarly characterizes 
Schopenhauer’s attempt to develop an account of the intelligible on the basis of the 
alienated experience of the subject – which he terms the subject’s “interpretation of the 
inner nature of all beings by analogy to the experience of his own” – as “a truly illuminating 
thought,” later put to fruitful use by metaphysicians as diverse as Leibniz and Bergson.81  
Schopenhauer’s style, expressed in his focus on the experience of the sensuous subject as a 
basis for reasoning regarding the intelligible, is thus, Horkheimer thinks, a unique advance 
over previous forms of metaphysics.  Yet he concludes that this advance by no means 
justifies Schopenhauer’s treatment of the intelligible as an object of experience, for “the 
application of categorical structures such as ‘my’ and ‘your’ noumenal character, beginning 
and end, guilt and unity, to the Beyond to which categories have no relevance, is a dream.”82  
Horkheimer thus affirms Schopenhauer’s inversion of Hegel’s famous postulate “the whole 
is the true,” not as a thesis regarding the content of the will in-itself, but rather as a way of 
reasoning about the relation between the experience of a subject and the intelligible. 
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As we will examine in the next chapter, Horkheimer argues that the liturgy of a 
community expresses the relation between the embodied experience of a people and the 
intelligible descriptions they have taken as their own, so that such practices do not simply 
subsume or place the experience of the subject in terms of the meaning of intelligible 
concepts, but facilitate the reflective reconstruction of concepts on the basis of the 
continuing historical experience of the people.  Schopenhauer’s way of conceiving of the 
sensuous experience of the subject as the basis for reasoning regarding the intelligible thus 
presents a rule that will guide Horkheimer in his attempt to recover the significance of the 
liturgy for modern attempts to reason about intelligible concepts, despite the fact that his 
way of conceiving of the intelligible as an object of experience is mistaken.   
3.3.2. The relationship between experience and practical maxims in Schopenhauer’s 
moral philosophy 
 
In a parallel way, Horkheimer argues that the basic recognition underlying 
Schopenhauer’s practical philosophy, the idea that the real and the good are not self-
evidently connected, and the consequent attempt to reason regarding the latter on the basis 
of the ephemeral and contingent experience of compassion, can be separated from 
Schopenhauer’s hypostatization of the real as the product of an irrational will.  Understood 
in this way, his practical philosophy contains valuable insights regarding how to reason 
about the relationship between the intelligible and practical maxims, though it fails in its 
account of the content of the intelligible.  
Schopenhauer’s concept of the intelligible inverts the notion, taken for granted, as 
Horkheimer had noted in “Theism and Atheism,” by thinkers as diverse as modern 
philosophical theologians and their materialist detractors, that what is intuited as the most 





Only good could result from being at one with the most real, the best, the most 
powerful. …  
This is the philosophic conviction and at the same time the function of philosophy 
with which Schopenhauer broke.  The highest, the most real, the metaphysical being to 
which philosophers had directed their view, away from the changing world of existing 
objects, is not at the same time the good.  Degrees of reality are not degrees of 
perfection.  Looking at the positively infinite, at the unconditional does not teach man 
how he should act; it is impossible to refer to the authority of being when one wishes a 
guide toward a decent course of action.83 
   
Schopenhauer thus severs any intrinsic link between the “real” and the “good”: the latter 
may not be understood as an intuitively evident characteristic of the former, and the former 
cannot thereby serve as a self-evident basis for practical maxims.  In severing the link, 
Horkheimer specifies, Schopenhauer breaks decisively not simply with the content of past 
conceptualizations of the intelligible but also with the “function of philosophy” in its 
attempt to reason from the intelligible as a self-evident ground to practical maxims 
regarding the good.   
Instead of presuming that the function of philosophy is to justify practical maxims in 
this way, Horkheimer continues, Schopenhauer’s reflections aim to uncover embodied 
instinctual and biological drives, which he takes to be the actual reasons behind practical 
activity that are often obscured by such reasoning.  The “real,” for Schopenhauer, is thus 
presented as “the insatiable desire for well being and enjoyment, a desire which wells up 
every time it has been satisfied, and not the reasons the intellect finds for such strivings.”84  
Yet, in a strikingly counterintuitive move, Schopenhauer claims in his work of moral 
philosophy, On the Basis of Morality, that this does not mean that all practical action may be 
reduced to the libido dominandi.  Despite his presentation of the will as rapacious, he asserts 
in reflecting on the formulation of practical maxims that, for certain subjects at least, 
                                                 






compassion may indeed become a possible way that the affective strivings of the will can be 
mediated.  As Horkheimer notes, compassion for Schopenhauer is thus the “foundation of 
the good” and “the source of insight which is more profound than knowledge.”85   
A second element of Schopenhauer’s way of reasoning regarding practical maxims is 
thus revealed.  For Schopenhauer, while the good may not be analytically inferred from the 
immediate experience of “nature” or “being,” it may be glimpsed in the contingent and 
ephemeral experience of compassion for another, “For Schopenhauer the good is far more 
the ephemeral, thought, and appearance, than that which keeps reproducing itself.”86  The 
good life requires a sublation of instinct and desire in the form of compassion, yet this 
sublation is by no means assured as self-evident on the basis of a cognitive examination of 
reality in-itself.  Compassion arises as one contingent possible mediation of experience 
among others, and appeals for a compassionate response to suffering may thus stand in 
significant tension with what seems self-evident to the subject in an antagonistic society.   
Horkheimer’s critique of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will is, of course, not 
incompatible with an appreciation of his practical philosophy.  For the latter simply requires 
the acknowledgment that intelligible structure may not be read off the face of sensory 
experience, a premise Horkheimer readily grants.  As is evident from the aforementioned 
passage in Schopenhauers Denken, however, Horkheimer wishes not merely to affirm 
Schopenhauer’s severing of the link, but also his hunch that “each person is one with the 
weakest being” as, in all actuality, “the deepest basis for morality.”  By this, he suggests that 
Schopenhauer displays the most fundamental kind of reason humans can offer for practical 
action, thus drawing a qualitative distinction with an unnamed foil.  What other kinds of 
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bases might he have in mind?  Horkheimer repeatedly appeals to Schopenhauer’s account 
of universal solidarity in both his early and late work, and a careful examination of the 
parallels between such references and this later passage both confirm his interest in drawing 
a qualitative distinction, as well as illustrating the other kind of ground he envisions as a foil.   
As we have noted, from his earliest writings, Horkheimer favors the idea that affective 
inclinations are the most basic (though certainly not the only) reasons agents may offer for 
the pursuit of practical maxims.  For instance, in “Materialism and Metaphysics” (1933) he 
notes,        
This materialist view has the negative significance that it rejects a metaphysically 
grounded morality.  But in addition it has always meant to materialists that man’s 
striving for happiness is to be recognized as a natural fact requiring no justification. The 
extent to which a naïve, economically oriented psychologically can interpret this striving 
as a desire for satisfaction of gross material needs has been expounded in detail in the 
works of Erich Fromm.  The structure of needs in various forms of society, in particular 
social groups, and in individuals is changeable and can be explained only in relation to a 
specific time and a concrete situation. …  
… Materialism refuses, however, to distinguish between happiness and pleasure, 
because the satisfaction of desire, unlike “higher” motives, requires no reasons, excuses, 
or justifications.  Justifications may indeed be quite appropriate in a particular society 
for particular actions, but only to a particular authority and not because of some 
unconditional order of things.87 
 
As this passage illustrates, claiming that affective inclinations are the most basic or “natural” 
reasons one may appeal to in warranting practical maxims does not imply, for the early 
Horkheimer, that the content of such inclinations is either self-evident to all agents because 
rooted in “an unconditional order” (they are mediated historically and socially), nor that 
they are self-sufficient reasons for acting (there may be other justifications offered for action 
that are context-dependent).  Rather, in the passage Horkheimer wishes to assert that such 
                                                 





affective states form properly basic reasons for acting, and he contrasts this with the idea 
that one must appeal to a more fundamental intelligible basis to justify action.   
In the same year Horkheimer pens this passage, it is not coincidental that he openly 
praises Schopenhauer’s account of compassion as rooted in a universal solidarity between 
finite beings.  “The solidarity of human beings,” Horkheimer notes in “Materialism and 
Morality,” “is part of the solidarity of life in general.”  Thus, “animals need human beings” 
and “it is the accomplishment of Schopenhauer’s philosophy to have wholly illuminated the 
unity between us and them.”88  Coupling these reflections, we may note that Horkheimer 
considered Schopenhauer’s understanding of solidarity to be a fit description of one of the 
most basic affective reasons that might be offered for moral maxims, yet he by no means 
concluded from this that such solidarity was either self-evident or that it should be set 
against other kinds of justifications, which appeal to the way particular historical practices 
mediate affective desire.  We may note that Horkheimer’s critique of Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics in his first Schopenhauer lecture is similarly coupled in a contemporaneous 
aphorism with an explicit affirmation that there is not a more basic kind of reason for moral 
maxims than affective solidarity.  “Compassion,” as he notes approvingly in an aphorism we 
have already examined, is “the foundation of the good.”   
Turning then, to Horkheimer’s affirmation of Schopenhauer’s “hunch” that identity 
with the suffering one is the most basic basis for moral action, we may conclude that he is 
not making a naïve statement regarding ontology.  What he is, in fact, affirming is a way of 
reasoning about moral action which does not skip past the affective experience of the 
                                                 





subject on its way to invoke more basic reasons for acting.  Compassionate solidarity, in this 
regard, is the “deepest basis for morality.” 
Admittedly, this does not clarify every appeal Horkheimer makes to universal solidarity.  
Thus in an argument regarding Horkheimer’s implicit ontology based on a reading of the 
late interview “Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen,” Carlebach notes that while Horkheimer 
does not assume Schopenhauer’s particular account of the will, he does postulate a universal 
solidarity arising from the experience of finitude and embodiment (thus paralleling, 
according to Carlebach, Heidegger’s early existentialism).  He thus concludes that, for 
Horkheimer, the moral significance of this solidarity may be grasped intuitively by all 
subjects on the basis of their embodied experience, quite apart from the mediation of 
historical traditions.89  Horkheimer does indeed encapsulate his understanding of solidarity 
in Die Sehnsucht in a way that lends support to Carlebach’s claim, for he makes not a 
qualitative distinction between kinds of grounds for moral action but rather a claim 
regarding the extent of the solidarity which arises from finitude, “There is a solidarity … 
that is not the naked solidarity of a certain class but which connects all people.  I mean the 
solidarity which arises because people must suffer, because they die, because they are finite 
beings.”90  Yet it is important to note that he revisits this appeal to solidarity at the end of 
the interview by situating it explicitly as an interpretation of experience offered by the 
Jewish tradition, 
We come again to the reason why Judaism is so interesting for me.  The identification 
not with the other, but with the others.  I am interested in the fate of the others, I know 
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myself as an indispensible member of humanity in which I will live on.  When I think 
about myself, I think about myself as a member of this humanity.91 
 
While this awaits our study in the next chapter for detailed confirmation, it appears that 
Horkheimer wishes to preserve a conception of solidarity, not as an interpretation of the 
self-evident meaning of embodied experience but rather as a response to experience which 
is learned by participation in the practices of a community.  Just as he acknowledges in his 
reflections on Schopenhauer that compassion is by no means the only or “natural” response 
an agent may have to the experience of finitude, so he recognizes that there is a relationship 
between compassionate solidarity and the way human commonality is understood in the 
Jewish tradition.  As we shall see, Horkheimer maintains that the good as presented in the 
Jewish liturgy signifies one way in which affect and desire could in fact be mediated by 
those for whom compassion for the suffering is learned as a properly basic motive, though 
this may well be endangered if the contingent practices which foster this interpretation fall 
out of use.   
The problem with modern conceptualizations of the intelligible, Horkheimer has 
argued, is that they are often presented as disclosures intuited by a passive subject instead of 
as a social practice of description learned in community.  The justification of concept-use is 
thereby disconnected from the self-conscious judgment of subjects regarding the fittedness 
between such concepts and their continuing experience.  Compounding this, they are 
understood as simply subsumptive and not reflective of the experience of subjects.  This is 
why those who insist on “the permanence of concepts turn every essential trait and 
intellectual manifestation into a genus with such wide meshes that it retains its validity 
                                                 





against all phenomena…which fall under it.”92  Such concepts remain unaffected in the face 
of the genuinely new or disruptive experience.  The question Horkheimer wishes to raise in 
his late work is thus whether the relation of theological concepts to experience can be 
understood in a manner that is both sensitive to the way concept-use relates to the subject’s 
continuing experience and is open to the possibility of reformulation on the basis of 
qualitatively unique experiences.  Horkheimer believes such an account of the retrieval and 
preservation of intelligible concepts is possible, and he argues how in a series of late 
reflections on liturgical reasoning in the Jewish tradition.
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Horkheimer’s Liturgical Turn: 
Liturgical reasoning and the pursuit of the modern project 
 
Horkheimer’s mature theorizing addresses the fact that accounts of the intelligible are 
no longer taken up by moderns as self-evident disclosures of the structure of reality, yet 
neither are subjects able to leave intelligible concepts behind.  The attempts to revive pre-
critical explanations of the intelligible or to negate the meaningfulness of such concepts 
altogether are related responses to this phenomena.  Both hold in common the idea that 
such concepts are a product of reason or the imagination.   Horkheimer contests this shared 
premise by reasoning that such concepts are in actuality social practices of description 
learned by subjects inhabiting a historical tradition.  It follows that they may be preserved, 
transformed, or fall out of use altogether, depending on how their continuing use relates to 
the self-understanding and projects of subjects in a form of life.  He then reasons that the 
continued use of intelligible concepts is possible and can in fact be justified for modern 
subjects, if such concepts are self-consciously taken up by subjects as justified on the basis 
of their experience.  This leaves a final detail unaddressed, however: what sort of practice is 
required to preserve intelligible concepts in a form suitable to this modern understanding of 
justification, and do any existing models of the practice exist?   
It is worth prefacing Horkheimer’s attempt to answer this question by recalling that 
positivism and metaphysical revivals are not understood by him simply as introspective 
practices for individuals.  Rather, they are changes in learned practices of reasoning, which 
arise in reaction to shifts in the political economy and family-life characterizing the social 
whole.  When Horkheimer thus turns in his late work to present an alternative to these 





shapes the reasoning patterns of subjects in contradistinction to such patterns of 
socialization, the practice of the liturgy.   
In the liturgy of Jewish communities, notes Horkheimer, intelligible concepts are related 
by a social practice of reflection to their genesis in the shared experience of members of the 
community.  Liturgical traditions publicly reflect back to their participants how the 
intelligible categories they employ reflect their shared historical remembrance and hopeful 
anticipation of the future.  Therefore, the liturgy not only provides subjects with categories 
for interpreting the present, it facilitates the self-conscious reflection of subjects on the 
relationship between such categories and their own experience.  The claim Horkheimer 
wishes to make is thus that participation in the liturgy enables a subject to identify itself with 
the contemporary use of the historical categories of a tradition on the basis of a self-
conscious judgment regarding its own experience.  
In considering Horkheimer’s claim, I begin broadly by noting the way he relates the 
content of theological concepts to the experience of subjects in religious communities.  I 
then examine his description of the relationship existing between concept-use and the 
experiences of remembrance and anticipation as this is embodied in the particular liturgical 
practices of the Jewish community (1).  I then examine his portrayal of the relationship 
between historical categories and contemporary experience by noting his description of how 
the disruptive experience of exile forces the Jewish community to reflectively reconstruct its 
understanding of the intelligible (2.1.).  I develop his account of what is entailed about the 
truth of intelligible concepts once the necessity of their reflective reconstruction is granted, 
by examining his understanding of the relationship between apophatic theology and the 





liturgical reasoning for the goal of his theorizing, that the modern subject might be enabled 
to inhabit its tradition reflexively in a self-satisfied way (3). 
This chapter thus concludes the line of reasoning I have pursued in the three parts of 
this work.  Horkheimer’s late turn to theology, far from signaling a radical departure from 
either his materialist understanding of inquiry (in favor of philosophy), or a regression to 
pre-critical metaphysics (as an alternative to a pessimistic philosophy of history), is a 
therapeutic effort to address a form of alienation characterizing late modern life.  It presents 
an account of how historical concepts of the intelligible may be preserved in a form suited 
to the self-understanding of modern subjects, as well as an already existing practice which 
models such preservation. 
1. Horkheimer’s description of liturgical practices.   
In his late work, Horkheimer treats theological concepts as the consequence of the 
shared experiences of particular communities.  For instance, in examining the role of 
mimesis in shaping the neophyte of a religious community, he notes that the propositional 
content of the teachings that shape subjects are inextricable from the particular historical 
life they share in community.  On the one hand, the propositions learned are not the only or 
even the primary purveyor of the content conveyed to the neophyte, 
The specific character of an ethnic or religious group does not depend solely on the 
conscious principles or the rules for life and conduct which the group may accept or 
reject.  Along with all the doctrines proper to the Catholic or Protestant as well as to the 
Jewish religion, certain patterns of thought, associations, inclinations, and repugnances 
have developed, and these extend to non-religious matters; the same holds analogously 
for groups whose cohesion depends on something other than a religious faith.  Think, 
for example, of the German dialectic groups: Rhinelanders, Schwabians, or Saxons.  
What distinguishes such groups … is not simply the dialect, but all that goes with the 
speech: the concrete thought-forms, the gestures, the emotional reactions which have 
been developed along with the language in the course of history, the ways in which 





a natural inheritance (as a mistaken theory would have it); rather in his earliest years he 
sees all this exemplified in mother and father and makes it his own.1 
 
One cannot limit what is learned cognitively in a religious community merely to the 
propositions communicated, the texts read, or the doctrines taught.  For the form and 
content of propositions are two aspects of a singular practice which both constitute its 
meaning: in learning a language, one internalizes not merely vocabulary and grammar, but 
gesture, tone, mood, and patterns of association.  Beckonings of invitation and hospitality, 
affective tone and facial expression, and the concrete physical links to place and time are all 
supposed by and condition the distinctive content of thought even as they do dialects.  
Affect and discursion, historical particularity and the universality of the spoken proposition 
cannot be so easily disentangled, particularly for the neophyte who stumbles at learned 
practices it has not yet come to take for granted.   
Yet if explicit content is related to non-discursive habits that are internalized 
mimetically, so that meaning is never “pure” of such historical traces of particularity, it is 
equally the case that the content of propositions and doctrinal development are significant 
in the life of the subject.  While Horkheimer thus begins his thought in another reflection in 
the same manner as the passage above, “The substantive moment in a spiritual whole is 
abstract.  Taken by itself, the doctrine of a religion tells us little about it.  Torquemada and 
Victor Hugo professed the identical faith which was yet something else, its own 
contradiction,”2 he concludes in a distinctive way,  
It is no less untrue to deny that content has significance in the meaning of an intellectual 
structure.  The child that does not experience the happiness of having its mother’s 
                                                 
1 Horkheimer, “The German Jews” (1961), in Critique of Instrumental Reason: Lectures and Essays since the End of 
World War II, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell et. al. (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 106. 






words and gestures impart to it a teaching for which heaven is not merely a space for 
rockets but a promise of salvation will get to know new friends and substitutes only in 
atrophied embodiments.3 
   
If the propositional aspect of a religious practice cannot be divorced from the particularities 
of gesture, tone, mood, and association, it is equally the case that such non-discursive 
relations are shaped by content.  There is no possible description of the unconditioned that 
is a product of “pure” reason or unmediated intuition, for affect and cognition are always 
related in thought.    
As Horkheimer turns to describe the Jewish liturgy in particular, he is thus careful to 
relate its content to the social and historical life of a people.  He notes that he learned to 
hope for an immanent historical salvation from how his mother faced harrowing tragedy.  
After quoting Psalm 91, he notes, 
The first verse is engraved on the grave of my parents: “Who lives in the shelter of the 
Most High is in the safety of the shadow of the Almighty.”  My mother loved that 
Psalm; I am not able even today to separate it from my remembrance of the gleam in 
her eyes whenever she spoke it.  It was the expression of her certainty of a divine 
homeland in the face of the misery and the horror of reality.  “My refuge and my 
fortress, my God, in whom I trust,” states the second verse.  Such confidence prevailed 
throughout her life in spite of a full consciousness of the disaster on the European 
horizon.  
… Jewish thinking, as it is my tradition, neither confronted the accidental with an 
existing fear, nor luck and misfortunate in this life with a future in the world to come.  
Longing for safety in the midst of daily dangers, in the presence of shame and ruin and 
chaos, is the thought of an immanent God. “You do not need to be afraid of the terror 
of the night, or of the arrow that flies by day, or of the plague that moves in the 
darkness, of the epidemic that devastates at Noon.  Because your confidence is in the 
Lord, the Highest One you have made your refuge.”4 
 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 197. 
4 Horkheimer, “Psalm 91” (1968), trans. Michael Ott, in Marx, Critical Theory, and Religion, ed. Warren S. 
Goldstein (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 116; trans. modified: “Psalm 91,” in Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen, 1949-1973, ed. 
Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, vol. 7 of Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: 





This recollection is instructive: the longing learned from his mother is not expressed as an 
intuited experience of the ground of being.  It cannot be divorced from the sensuous 
experience of particular conditions, her remembrance of suffering and her hope for 
redemption.  It is not an attempt to express the meaning or significance this suffering will 
have when it is transfigured against an eternal horizon.  Rather, it is an expression of a 
historical hope for an immanent in-breaking, a divine intervention that will overturn the 
present experience of injustice that threatens the peace of Israel.   
The intelligible longed for by his mother in the midst of her experience of tragedy, her 
vision of in-breaking immanent justice, notes Horkheimer, is not simply a natural response 
to tragedy.  It is mediated by categories that are learned liturgically by the Jewish people in 
practices of remembrance and anticipation.  On the one hand, longing takes the form of 
remembrance.  The daily observance of torah unites the individual with past generations of 
eternal Israel.5  This continuity is also recalled in the recitation of the history of the people, 
as both the faithfulness of YHWH in redeeming Israel from slavery as well as the agonies of 
those who have died in exile is recounted.  Reflecting upon the Jewish martyr, Horkheimer 
thus notes that she faced death rather than conversion in the anticipation that her suffering 
obedience would be remembered by the people as a faithful witness to the immanent arrival 
of the day of the Lord, “The Jewish lawbreaker of the late Middle Ages, who refused to buy 
an easier death or even his freedom by conversion, was faithful to something powerless.  
                                                 
5 I borrow the phrase “eternal Israel” from Jacob Neusner, A Rabbi Talks with Jesus (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2000), 52, “I … take exception to a teaching that pertains to me personally, but not to my 





The concept of God and people merged with the desire to be remembered by the people.  
The Jew knew of no other reward.”6   
On the other hand, in the liturgy a future day of safety and justice is anticipated, and in 
the observance of torah the coming age is reflected in the present life of the people, so that 
the eschatological vision of the prophets is, in some sense, embodied now.  Thus, 
obedience to the torah not only relates the Jew to historical “eternal Israel,” such 
observance enables her to proleptically participate in the coming day of the Lord as a 
foretaste of justice and mercy before the nations.  
Through millennia of persecution, the Jews held together for the sake of justice.  Their 
rituals, marriage and circumcision, dietary laws and holy days were moments of 
cohesion, of continuity.  Jewry was not a powerful state but the hope for justice at the 
end of the world.  They were a people and its opposite, a rebuke to all peoples.7 
 
Remembrance and anticipation as these are embodied in the liturgical practices of Jewish 
communities may thus be understood as dual expressions of the longing for the 
eschatological day of YHWH, both of which provide a continuing motive for obedience to 
torah.   
Horkheimer thus draws the themes of remembrance and proleptic anticipation together 
in relation to this obedience,  
By conforming to the torah, life is provided to the individual, who spends his days, 
months, and years in obedience to the law.  The individual thereby becomes so united 
with the others in spite of differences, that after his own death he continues to exist 
through their practice of tradition, the love of family and of the faithful ancestry in the 
expectation that it will once become good in the world.  To bear witness to and stand 
                                                 
6 Horkheimer, “German Jews,” 114.  Later Horkheimer thus notes, “The idea of a life after death means first 
of all not the hereafter but the bond with the nation, which has its prehistory in the Bible, and which has 
crassly been distorted by modern nationalism” (118).   
7 Horkheimer, “The State of Israel” (1961-1962), in Dawn and Decline. 206.  Cf. “German Jews,” 114, Jews 
remained “faithful to a law after the disappearance of the state that might have enforced the law, solely 





up for this is the meaning of belonging to the chosen people, which determines the 
conviction of the martyrs.8 
 
This raises the question of how these elements of the liturgy relate to the judgment of the 
participant in the liturgy.  
One may distinguish two ways, corresponding to remembrance and anticipation, that 
liturgical rehearsal relates to the contemporary experience of the people.  In the form of 
memory, subjects re-experience past events which have shaped the understanding of their 
community regarding the meaning and purpose of its existence.  Conversely, through 
envisioning the coming of the day of the Lord in worship, and then participating 
proleptically in this day by observing torah, subjects have an experience of the coming 
consummation of the future in the present moment.  In both ways, the individual is 
challenged to understand anew its contemporary life as this is related to the categories of a 
community whose self-understanding it has come to take as its own.   
Yet the interpretive relationship moves in both directions.  The experience of the 
genuinely novel also calls for reflection upon the significance and continued use of such 
historical categories.  Thus, as they are self-consciously related to the continuing experience 
of a people, historical concepts may, indeed, fail to satisfy subjects.  As the practices and 
problems of historical agents develop and new constellations of experience are encountered, 
the challenge of the theologian is thus both to preserve the shared remembrance and 
anticipation of the people and to rearticulate this in a conceptual form adequate to the 
genuinely novel experiences faced by members of the community.  While, as Horkheimer 
avers in a late interview, “Theological ideas are formulated today in terminology which no 
longer expresses what was meant originally and corresponds rather to relationships of an 
                                                 





earlier period” (recalling, it is worth noting, his critique of the anachronistic reassertion of 
Thomistic categories in Eclipse of Reason), he continues by emphasizing that this is not a 
necessary outcome, because “one may be able to express meaning in a new and nevertheless 
identical way.”9   
In a late lecture addressed to Christian theologians, Horkheimer thus contrasts his 
understanding of the relationship between theological concepts and historical experience 
not merely with attempts to discern a universal common depth underlying the language of 
faith communities, but also with accounts that rely on the immediate relevance of concepts 
formulated in past historical periods for modern life, as if the usefulness of past concepts 
may be taken for granted and is not itself revealed and tested in each particular historical 
moment,       
The liberal outlook which inclines to symbolic interpretation as a way of rescuing the 
idea of eternal truth … is opposed by the conservative outlook which clings to the old 
and traditional in the most literal fashion.  To concessions to enlightened views and 
compromise with rational thought the conservative opposes the piety that repeats 
verbatim the text of the Bible and traditional ideas. … Such men, in refusing to be 
budged, forget that the meaning behind spiritual attitudes can survive only if it can find 
a new expression which is adequate to changing historical reality.  Fidelity to the old is 
not proved by repeating it but by giving it new expression in word and deed at each 
historical juncture.  If it is to continue to have its original meaning, the traditional must 
ever anew take a form that is geared to the age and appropriate to it while also 
contradicting it.  Fidelity that does not take the changing world into account is not 
fidelity at all.10 
 
While this contrast remains overly vague and is merely a programmatic sketch of sorts, the 
central point Horkheimer wishes to make is clear: both “liberal” and “conservative” 
approaches to theological concepts have in common an attempt to understand such 
concepts apart from their history of use.  In contrast to the symbolism of the former, 
                                                 
9 Horkheimer, “Die Funktion der Theologie in der Gesellschaft” (1969) in Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen, 1949-1973, vol. 
7 of Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Tauschenbush, 1985), 315. 





faithful renderings of theological categories must have a genetic relationship to the memory 
and anticipation of those inhabiting the liturgical tradition, so that the meaning of the 
concept in relation to the historical experience of the people displayed in the liturgy may be 
preserved.  Yet contrary to the anachronistic reassertion exemplified by the latter, fidelity to 
this historical experience may not simply be equated with past concept use; rather, the 
adequacy of past historical expressions of a tradition must be reexamined and articulated 
anew in relation to the developing experience of subjects.  If such concepts are taken as a-
historical, the contingent threads that connect their appropriation and use to the experience 
of a people are equally as threatened as they might have been by more liberal forms of 
symbolism. Articulating what it means to preserve remembrance and anticipation in the face 
of present suffering, and explaining what longing for the day of the Lord entails for subjects 
living in this hic et nunc, this remains the continual task.     
Admittedly, as I have already noted, the above reflections remain overly abstract.  In 
reflections on Psalm 91, Horkheimer demonstrates the proper preservation of historical 
categories more concretely by relating the vision of the coming of YHWH presented in the 
Psalm to both the experience of past generations of “eternal Israel” in exile, as well as to the 
contemporary experience of the Holocaust.  While intelligible categories are accounts of the 
meaning and direction of history, they may not, notes Horkheimer, be abstracted from or 
set over against the particular historical experience of the subject.  Rather, the meaning of 
an intelligible concept is constituted and its continuing use justified in relation to this 
developing historical experience.  Horkheimer’s reflections thus endeavor to demonstrate 
how past intelligible ends may be reflectively related to qualitatively new experiences by the 





between the past and present uses of historical concepts may arise, he demonstrates that 
such analogies and the consequent continued use of a concept must be the product of self-
conscious reflection by subjects.  This task of self-reflection, notes Horkheimer, may not be 
circumvented by the mere reassertion of past conceptual forms as if their continuing 
significance were self-evident or by claims that equate particular historical concepts with the 
unconditioned itself.  Let us turn to examine these claims.  
2. Liturgy and the preservation of intelligible concepts  
 
2.1. Exile  
    
In the face of experiences like exile, Horkheimer notes, the Jewish liturgy does not 
simply invest the suffering of subjects with meaning in relation to an already taken for 
granted account of the whole.  That is, the liturgy does not simply serve as a practice of 
subsumption which levels the challenge to accepted categories by placing the disruptive 
experiences of suffering in relation to already given explanations.  It also enables a practice 
of reflective reasoning: the liturgy allows subjects to juxtapose received conceptualizations of 
the whole alongside the alienation resulting from their own experience.  Indeed, the Psalms 
themselves are a record of the self-conscious struggle of a people with this juxtaposition.  
Intelligible concepts arising in the liturgy do not merely interpret but may themselves be 
interpreted in response to the suffering of the subject.   
As Horkheimer attempts to relate the remembrance and anticipation embodied in his 
liturgical tradition to the experience of exile, he begins by noting that there are two ways 
members of the tradition may relate such intelligible concepts to suffering.  Which way 
should be chosen, or how a subject should go about “inhabiting” the tradition of Judaism 





persecution and suffering but rather involves self-conscious reflection, which the subject 
conducts on the basis of its historical experience.  The crucial point which Horkheimer’s 
reflections illustrate is that the give-and-take of this process, whereby subjects inhabiting a 
liturgy come to be at home and take as their own the intelligible concepts expressed in their 
tradition, does not begin from a place clear of the organizing influence of traditioned 
concepts, by assuming a posture of abstract negation.  Yet neither does it assume the 
authority of such concepts as self-evident apart from the judgment of the individuals 
inhabiting the tradition.  Rather, the liturgy exhibits the already existing relationship 
between intelligible concepts and the historical experience of subjects, inviting a subject to 
identify itself in a judgment regarding the social practices of the community, rather than 
living without such concepts altogether or accepting them as self-evident or natural 
immediacies.   
At various points in their history, Horkheimer notes, Jews have understood exile as a 
judgment meted out in accord with the character of YHWH.  Rather than abandon hope 
that YHWH will restore justice and save the righteous in history, they reason that the fate of 
those who die in exile is a reflection of divine justice and thus, in some sense, deserved.     
The Jews, who sang the Psalms through the millennia, knew that all too often they 
themselves were counted as sacrifices to the swords of barbarians, to the torture 
chambers, to the funeral pile.  However, rather than renounce the love, exuberance, and 
praise of God, who will finally rescue the just of all nations, they calculated their own 
dead, their own people, individual as well as collective, among those who had been 
punished justly.11 
   
This exemplifies one way of relating historical experience to the liturgical presentation of 
the intelligible.  Reflection on the relationship between the category of justice and the 
experience of exile involves a subsumptive practice that equates all instances of suffering-in-
                                                 





exile as a reflection of divine equity.  Horkheimer is, as one might expect, deeply dissatisfied 
with this.  Thus he prefaces the preceding with an incredulous question, “The downfall of 
countless is counted as the ‘reward of the godless.’ … Should the terror that happens in the 
world every day … be called well-deserved punishment?”12  The accusation of 
unrighteousness placed retrospectively upon ones who have died in exile causes an affective 
revulsion in Horkheimer that threatens to overwhelm the coherence of the tradition itself.  
Such liturgical reasoning, he concludes, stands in stark contrast “to common sense, to the 
plausible.”13   
If the content of the intelligible idea of justice is understood as self-evident or intuitive, 
then this subsumption of suffering will be the last word.  However, Horkheimer notes, the 
Jewish liturgical tradition remains vital because an alternative way of relating experience to 
concepts of the intelligible develops.  “Those who persevered [die Unbeirrbarkeit],” that is, 
the ones who faithfully continued practicing the liturgy in the face of persecution,   
were relieved, it appears to me, by the fact that in Judaism the teaching of the individual 
soul did not develop the meaning that it has in Christianity.  When it states in the Psalm, 
“you make the Highest your refuge.  He has commanded his angel to protect you on all 
your ways,” this concerns the protection of all as well as the individual.  The people, 
bound together through the practice of the divine commandments even though spread 
throughout the diaspora [in der Zerstreuung], were considered as a whole, not only in the 
present or in a past historical moment, but as one until the end of time.14   
     
If the locus of divine justice were the individual, Horkheimer notes, present suffering would 
either be deserved retribution (which he denies), or perhaps an injustice that may only be 
rectified in eternity, which, according to Horkheimer, relies upon a developed conception of 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 117; trans. modified: “Psalm 91,” 209. 
13 Horkheimer, “Psalm 91,” 209.  Ott’s translation of the relevant sentence (“Psalm 91,” 117) requires 
significant modification.  Here is my translation of the relevant context: “Other than resignation to a terrifying 
existence, to the irrationality of reality … I know only powerlessness as an explanation for this contradiction 
to common sense, to the plausible.” 





the eternity of the individual soul, and is thus a uniquely Christian theodicy.15  However, as 
the Jewish tradition develops, the locus of in-breaking justice is not understood to be the 
individual but eternal Israel.  Thus neither the ascription of an individual guilt which might 
justify temporal persecution as punishment, nor claims that the unjust suffering of the 
individual will be rectified in eternity, are acceptable as resolutions of the experience of 
exile.  Rather, Horkheimer notes, Psalm 91 expresses the hope of a people, who are “bound 
together through the practice of the divine commandments,” which unify them across space 
and time as a foretaste and anticipation of the coming day of the Lord.  Thus, for instance, 
the hope of the martyr who dies in exile is not for personal life after death.  Rather, it is that 
her memory will be taken up into the life of her people through remembrance, so that one 
day, as a part of eternal Israel, she will be vindicated at the coming of the day of YHWH, 
“[The Jewish martryr] did not … believe in something attainable for himself personally, 
rather he was of the conviction that he would live on in his people.  The Jewish martyrs 
sacrificed their life, not for their own salvation, but for the salvation of their people.”16     
Thus union with the people opens itself outward into a hope for reunion with the just 
of every nation, 
In Judaism, the religion I myself profess, such love was far less connected than in 
Christianity with the idea of the individual soul and a life after death.  Expectation 
centered rather on the Messiah who would appear on earth some day and lead the just 
men of every nation to Zion.  This belief was constantly reinvigorated by the experience 
of earthly injustice; it determined both the orthodox Jew’s scrupulous observance of all 
rites and the liberal Jew’s adherence to his religion. The expectation that against all 
probabilities and despite the previous course of history paradise would some day come, 
                                                 
15 Cf. Horkheimer’s portrayal of Aquinas’ eschatology in “The Soul,” (1967), Critique of Instrumental Reasoning, 
52-54.  For his critique of this theodicy, note “Schopenhauers Denken im Verhältnis zu Wissenschaft und Religion” 
(1971), in Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen, 242; “Religion and Philosophy,” trans. by Eduardo Mendieta, in The 
Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Routledge, 
2005), 244; “What is Religion?” (1957-1958), in Dawn and Decline, 163; “Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen” 
(1970), in Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen, 398.  





as the Torah and the prophets had promised, was the source of solidarity among Jews 
and between Jews and outsiders who were upright men.17   
 
The particular rites and commandments making up the observance of torah, far from 
merely distinguishing the diasporic Jew from the nations, formed her in the hope of this 
coming universal justice, thus shaping her sense of solidarity with others awaiting justice.   
A conception of a future eschatological consummation thus structures the self-
understanding of the Jewish people, and this understanding is constituted in relation to the 
historical experience of exile.  The result of the exile, the reality that “injustice has … 
become a mode of experience” for the Jewish people, has shaped the way subjects have 
come to relate the intelligible to their experience; it has formed a strong aversion within the 
tradition to any attempt to subsume the meaning of suffering as individual judgment.  
Rather than subsuming the experience of suffering as an instance of justice, “Suffering and 
hope have become inseparable.”18  Those who have suffered in exile live on in the 
contingent historical memory of the people as faithful witnesses to the coming day of the 
Lord, whose witness will one day be vindicated.  Whereas, according to Horkheimer, 
Christian theology presents the temporal experience of suffering as instrumental to 
redemption, Jewish theology expresses a reticence to understand suffering itself as necessary 
(or less tragic) when placed against an intelligible background.   
In an illuminating contrast, Horkheimer thus concludes, after noting that “Suffering and 
hope have become inseparable,” that   
At one point in their history the European people became aware of this connection and, 
in their confession of the martyred redeemer, introduced into the godhead itself the 
torments which Jews were willing to suffer for the sake of that ultimate future they 
could not abandon. … Jews, however, are not ascetical people as the first Christians 
                                                 
17 Horkheimer, “Threats to Freedom,” 149-150. 





were; they have never glorified or worshipped or sought or praised suffering but only 
experienced it.  Yet more than for other peoples suffering is inextricably intertwined 
with their memory of the dead. According to the Jewish law men cannot become saints 
through suffering, as in Christianity; suffering simply colors remembrance of the dead 
with an infinite tenderness that does not depend on the consoling thought of eternal 
life.19   
 
Suffering is thus not justified either as an instance of divine justice or as necessary for 
individual redemption, but is a faithful witness that is preserved in the memory of the 
people that will be vindicated by the coming day of the Lord.  
Horkheimer illustrates how the suffering of the individual in exile may be understood, 
not as an instance to be subsumed by the concept of the intelligible presented in the liturgy, 
but as a moment which allows the reflective reconstruction of the concept on the basis of 
experience.  Subjects participating in the Jewish tradition self-consciously reconceive and 
reorder existing patterns of concept-use on the basis of the experience of exile in order to 
allow the tragedy of suffering and the dignity of the dead to be preserved.  It is evident 
therefore that Horkheimer is not concerned with the abstract negation or affirmation of 
concepts of the intelligible, construed as reflections of a realm existing apart from historical 
experience.  Rather, he wishes to note how intelligible concepts and historical experience 
are interdependent, insofar as the former both arises from as well as interprets historical 
experience.  This emphasis on the mutual dependency of intelligible claims and contingent 
experience reflects a repair of modern treatments of the intelligible which abstract its 
conceptualization from the sensuous experience of historical communities, and 
consequently portray the function of such conceptualizations as simply subsumptive.  
                                                 





2.2. Apophatic theology 
If intelligible concepts are always related in the liturgy to the concrete historical 
experience and eschatological anticipation of a people, such that they are open to 
reconstruction on the basis of disruptive experiences through a process of reflective 
reasoning, is it possible to understand the content of such concepts in a way that both 
recognizes the truth of existing statements regarding the intelligible yet also does not 
foreclose the attempt to reconstruct such conceptualizations in the face of qualitatively 
unique experiences?   
In his mature work, Horkheimer presents apophatic theology as a way of understanding 
how these claims, regarding both the truth content of existing concepts as well as the 
dependency of such concept on the continuing experience of subjects, may be upheld. 
Horkheimer’s reflections on apophatic theology are sometimes interpreted as a response to 
critical theory’s search for a transcendent standpoint.20  But in discussing apophatic 
theology, Horkheimer does not present the Absolute as the negation of all merely finite 
claims.  Rather, he uses it to illustrate how one may claim that judgments regarding the 
intelligible are “true” while at the same time holding that such concepts develop historically.  
In other words, given his account of the reconstruction of intelligible concepts in relation to 
historical experience, he wishes to account for how the historical contingency of such 
concepts is congruent with their continuing truth for members in a community of faith.   
We have already noted Horkheimer’s circuitous attempt to address this question in the 
interview “Die Funktion der Theologie,” “While theology … cannot describe and determine 
‘the Intelligible,’ it is at least able to say how what science does not pay attention to should 
                                                 
20 For instance, Christopher Craig Brittain, “Social Theory and the Premise of all Criticism: Max Horkheimer 





be observed.”21  This is ambiguous: how is it possible to suggest what science does not pay 
attention to without “describing” and “determining” it?  In what sense may one describe 
and determine it without thereby speaking falsely?  Apophatic theology provides a way of 
addressing this ambiguity for Horkheimer.  
Horkheimer begins his analysis by outlining the affinity of apophatic theology with 
Kant’s critique of metaphysical ideas.22  When one speaks of God through the negation of 
creaturely limitation or imperfection, he notes, the result is always a speculative act of the 
imagination which surpasses what a subject may possibly comprehend on the basis of the 
ordering of sense-intuitions by its faculty of understanding.  The reason for this is that the 
intelligible object is not a condition amidst others that might be experienced.  Or as 
Horkheimer puts it, “the … truth which is supposed to come to expression in religion 
cannot enter into the human language or conceptual world.” 23  To even speak regarding the 
intelligible indirectly, via negation, supposes an analogy between creation and Creator which 
itself is not given in experience, however much it may be supposed by the interpretive 
habits of a religious community.  Consequently, the subject’s ordering of such discrete 
sensations and its “knowledge of the relations between appearances in this world” is “not 
the final explanation of reality, not an absolute.” 24  Yet this does not mean, notes 
Horkheimer, that all such talk is empty, only that, “God … becomes an object [Gegenstand] 
                                                 
21 Horkheimer, Die Funktion der Theologie, 315. 
22 Horkheimer thus prefaces his thoughts on apophatic theology in “Observations on the Liberalization of 
Religion” (1971), trans. by Eduardo Mendieta, in The Frankfurt School on Religion, 255; trans. modified: 
“Bemerkungen Zur Liberalizierung der Religion,” in Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen, 238, with a central premise of 
transcendental idealism , “Our subjective organization is the reason why the world is encountered as objective 
reality; it is not a pure “in-itself” but rather a function [of our faculty of understanding].” 
23 Ibid., 255; trans. modified: “Bemerkungen Zur Liberalizierung,” 238. 





of human longing and veneration; he ceases to be an object [Objekt] of knowledge and 
possession.”25   
What Horkheimer understands as the “truth” of intelligible concepts hinges on this 
contrast.  The intelligible, if presented as an Objekt, could be comprehended on the basis of 
sense-experience.  It may, of course, be the case that the subject’s understanding would 
organize various sense-intuitions in a mistaken way and thus misunderstands this Objekt.  
Nevertheless, the Objekt is, in principle, experienced.  By contrast, the apophatic tradition 
understands the intelligible as a presentation of that which is, in an ultimate sense, 
Gegenstand, that which stands “over against” any created thing insofar as it is not a discrete 
object of possible experience and is thus qualitatively distinct from any Objekt.   
Yet this does not make talk of the intelligible meaningless.  Rather, this distinction 
allows self-conscious reflection upon the role of the historically situated subject in speaking 
of the intelligible.  When Horkheimer concludes that “human thought is able to order the 
facts of sense-perception, not move beyond them, except as the longing arising from 
theology for that which is other than this world,”26 he is not engaging in sentimentality, but 
rather recognizing that one may not postulate regarding that which is beyond sense-
experience except in a particular mode.  That mode is a form of longing which arises and is 
expressed in terms of the historical practices of a people.  Or as Horkheimer puts it, 
“humans that have this same longing, this same basic conviction that something about 
existence is unjust … have shared customs, ensuring that awareness about this, their 
longing, is understandable.”27   
                                                 
25 Ibid.; trans. modified: “Bemerkungen Zur Liberalizierung,” 238-239. 
26 Horkheimer, “Schopenhauers Denken,” 241. 





This “longing” for the Jew is not an individual existential state.  Rather, expressions of 
worship regarding the intelligible are rooted in an analogy with the historical experiences of 
the community, presented to the subject vis-à-vis the particular practices of remembrance 
and anticipation rehearsed in the liturgy.  But it is precisely because longing for the 
intelligible arises in relation to an account of redemptive history that concepts of the 
intelligible must remain open to historical development and revision on the basis of 
unfolding experiences in the life of a worshipping people.   
Apophatic reasoning provides, Horkheimer notes, a model for understanding the 
relationship between intelligible concepts and historical experience.  Such concepts are  
(1): rooted in historical experience,  
(2): a precondition for the pursuit of meaning in the present and  
(3): the proleptic embodiment of hoped for future states.  
In each of these modes they express the convictions of a people regarding the truth of that 
people’s existence.  Yet because such concepts are also dependent on history, they remain, 
at the same time, open to reflection and reformulation on the basis of the unfolding 
experience of the people.  Thus Horkheimer presents apophatic reflection as a way that 
subjects may recognize both the truth and the historical contingency of the concepts which 
direct their practical action. 
The Jewish prohibition against portraying God, or Kant’s against straying into the 
noumenal world both recognize the absolute whose determination is impossible.  This 
also applies to Critical Theory when it states that evil, primarily in the social sphere, but 
also in individuals, can be identified, but that the good can not.  The concept of the 
negative—be it that of the relative or of evil—contains the positive as its opposite.  
Practically speaking, the denunciation of an act as evil at least suggests the direction a 
better one would take.  The insistence on the difference in the truth of the two 
judgments rests on many elements.  One of the most important of these lies in the 
relation to history, to time generally.  Evil largely refers to the present; the good has to 





person making the judgment, represents the absolutization of a hypothesis—and this 
quite apart from the metaphysical impossibility which such absolutization involves.  The 
critical analysis of society points to the prevailing injustice.  The attempt to overcome it 
has repeatedly led to greater injustice. To torture a person to death is purely and simply 
an outrage: to save him if possible, a human duty.  If one wishes to define the good as 
the attempt to abolish evil, it can be determined.  And this is the teaching of Critical 
Theory.  But the opposite—to define evil by the good—would be an impossibility, even 
in morality.28 
 
In response to the experience of suffering, subjects may name their experience of 
abhorrence.  Such abhorrence indeed contains the beginning of a response, the felt 
obligation to alleviate the horror.  Implicit in this response is, further, a set of related beliefs 
regarding the dignity and proper flourishing of the human, as well as regarding the 
conditions which would allow its realization, which serve as a basis for the judgment of the 
act as abhorrent (“the negative … contains the positive as its opposite … the denunciation 
of an act as evil at least suggests the direction a better one would take”).  Yet a distinction 
may be drawn between the expression of abhorrence, an expression that is based upon 
discrete sense-experiences in the here and now, and the expression of an implicit vision of 
the world in which the particular conditions allowing suffering are overcome.  Learning this 
latter vision in the context of some community is a precondition for having the experience 
of abhorrence in the first place.  Yet this attendant thought of the intelligible meaning of the 
whole is not based in the sense-experience which elicits the judgment, though it is integral 
to the ability to have the experience in such a way that one can render a judgment about it.  
Rather than being anchored in the sensation, it speculates regarding that which is beyond it, 
the concrete realization of a better society.  As such, it may be understood in itself as a kind 
of “postulate,” a description that places discrete experiences in relation to a speculative 
                                                 
28 Horkheimer, “On Critical Theory” (1966-1969), Dawn and Decline, 236-237.  Cf. Horkheimer, “A Weakness 
of Theology” (1961-1962), in Dawn and Decline, 219, “To the extent that something other than what is can be 





whole, a whole which is itself dependent upon the historical experience and anticipation a 
subject has learned in community.   
Horkheimer does not distinguish the two kinds of judgments by noting that the first 
relates to sense-experience whereas the second is meaningless.  On the contrary, the first 
statement is a judgment which is by no means a “pure” description for it already calls forth 
a response which assumes a whole set of preconceptions regarding practical ends.  Rather, 
he distinguishes the two kinds of judgment in an altogether different manner, by noting 
their “relation to history, to time generally.”  Even if the first judgment is taken for granted 
as true, its implicit intelligible preconditions – notions of the realization of dignity, proper 
flourishing, etc. – remain open to reformulation on the basis of the continuing experience 
of the subject.  This is not because such preconditions have nothing to do with experience, 
but because they are postulates which do not remain unaffected by different forms of 
historical experience.  This is why elsewhere Horkheimer asserts that in the case of 
intelligible concepts, there can be no such thing as “truth without question marks [Wahrheit 
ohne Fragezeichen].”29  Judgments regarding the intelligible are analogies drawn from 
experience which both enable experience yet overreach it, which shape and continue to be 
shaped by historical development in fluid relation to the memory and anticipation of the 
subject.  The prohibition on naming the absolute thus recognizes the contingency and 
dependency of attempts preserved in the liturgy to portray intelligible ends, as well as of 
every striving to proleptically realize this future in the life of the people.  It is a recognition 
of both the necessity of such concepts to contexts of inquiry, as well as their fallibility. 
                                                 





Horkheimer’s contrast between “longing” and “dogma” in his late writing should be 
understood in this context as an attempt to distinguish two ways of understanding the status 
of the intelligible concepts learned in the liturgy.  In a late interview with Der Spiegel 
Horkheimer attempts to explain his notion of longing by noting what it is not: he does not 
intend, he notes, to set forth the concept of longing as a competitor to traditional religious 
categories, nor does he wish to understand such categories as symbolic representations of 
an underlying intuition of the intelligible.   
HORKHEIMER: I would say that one should renovate [erneuern30] theology. …   
 
SPIEGEL: So, a new religion? 
 
HORKHEIMER: No, we cannot establish a new religion.  The old confessions may 
continue to exist and be effective provided they admit that they put into words a 
longing and not dogma.   
 
SPIEGEL: Do you mean the liberalization of religion, as it is progressing today? 
 
HORKHEIMER: Hardly.  The modern liberalization of religion leads, as far as I am 
concerned, to the end of religion.31 
 
Elsewhere, in a more precise manner, Horkheimer lays out positively the contrast between 
“longing” and “dogma” as follows,   
If the tradition, the religious categories, particularly the justice and goodness of God, are 
not mediated as dogma, as absolute truth, but as a longing for these things that allows 
for authentic grief [die zu wahrer Trauer fähig sind]–precisely because the teachings are 
unable to be proven and doubt in them remains—theological meaning is able to 
preserve at least its basis in an adequate form. … To include doubt in religion is a 
moment in its salvation.32 
 
Horkheimer’s references here two ways of taking “religious categories,” one of which 
understands them as referencing a reality behind the empirical, an unconditioned 
                                                 
30 Erneuern has a semantic range that is strikingly similar to aufheben (“sublation”): the latter includes “abolish,” 
“preserve,” and “transcend;” the former, “replace,” “renovate,” and “renew.”   
31 Horkheimer, “Was wir ‘Sinn’ nennen, wird verschwinden” (1970), in Vorträge und Aufzeichnungen, 350-351. 





“absolute,” and another which offers such categories as objects of hope in recognition that 
they exceed sense-intuition and are thus endeavors to explain the significance of the whole 
by way of an analogy with experience.  This latter understanding, he notes, neither 
circumscribes the expression of the intelligible nor treats such judgments as final.  In basic 
continuity with his reflection on the way such concepts were reconstructed by the Jewish 
community in response to the experience of exile, he notes rather that they are not immune 
from doubt and must constantly be related to contingent experience, thus allowing 
“authentic grief” in the face of suffering.  
In a comparison of the relationship between Judaism and Hegelian idealism, 
Horkheimer  concludes in way that further clarifies this reflection,  
In both cases [Judaism and Hegelian idealism], the issue is a truth which cannot be 
isolated and positively stated, but which is there nonetheless.  This element of 
contradiction is inherent in the Jewish tradition as it is in dialectical philosophy where it 
becomes explicit as a moment in the process of thought as it strives toward the truth.33 
 
Judaism, like idealism, presumes that there is such a thing as “truth” which is not “beyond” 
history but bears an immanent relation to the development of historical conditions.  Yet, for 
the former, the “truth” of the whole may only be portrayed via its absence in terms of 
concrete historical contexts, by way of mediated analogies to the very objects of experience 
from which it is supposedly distinguished as qualitatively distinct!  The prohibition on 
naming the absolute recognizes the contingency and dependency of the attempts preserved 
in the liturgy to portray such ends, as well as of every striving to proleptically realize this 
future in the life of the people.  It is a recognition of both the necessity of such concepts to 
contexts of inquiry, as well as their fallibility. 
                                                 





The preservation of intelligible categories thus cannot depend on the certainty that the 
categories of human thought are beyond any doubt or alteration.  Apophatic reflection self-
consciously refuses the idea of the self-contained concept: human thought itself cannot be 
identified with the mind of God as a presentation of the unconditioned.  However such 
concepts are not meaningless or baseless due to this situated dependency.  For the 
remembrance of redemptive history that is rehearsed in the liturgy, the anticipation of the 
day to come which is experienced proleptically in obedience to torah, and the eschatological 
anticipation of the future day, provide a basis to members in the community of faith for 
accepting the intelligible categories which inform their own practical activity.  Such 
categories, Horkheimer has argued, may be preserved in a self-conscious way as they are 
related to the liturgical practices of historical traditions.    
3. Liturgical reasoning and the self-realization of the subject 
Instead of disconnecting the intelligible from any notion of history or hypostasizing 
such “ends” as reflections of self-evident immediacies, Horkheimer presents liturgical 
reasoning as a way subjects may self-consciously reflect on the relation of intelligible ends to 
their own developing historical experience. This enables previously alienated subjects to 
identify themselves anew with traditional practices by understanding the meaning of such 
practices as justified in relation to historical experience.  The Enlightenment goal of the self-
realization of the subject may therefore be realized, Horkheimer argues, not as the abstract 
negation of traditions, but rather as a way of re-inhabiting traditions in a form adequate to 
this modern concern.  
In an instructive late aphorism, Horkheimer compares his own approach to the 





The dialectic which leads to no positive result only seems to be a way out.  It is true that 
it is the meaning of the determinate negation that a negated thought becomes the 
inhering moment in a differentiated, richer intellectual structure.  But if such structure 
has no chance to prove that it is superior to reality, there is no certainty, indeed no 
likelihood whatever that it is more than the originally negated thought.  Validation may 
be sociological or psychological, that more complex structure may increase the capacity 
for pleasure, provide a better overview, win the consent of individuals or entire groups, 
but in and of itself, it has no truth, however seductive it may sound. … What remains is 
insight into the impotence of all that is spirit and is not content with mere power.  That 
is the truth, and at this point, materialism and serious theology converge.34   
  
The practice of negative dialectics, Horkheimer notes, cannot itself break through the limits 
of discursivity.  Its outcome, the richer. more differentiated thought it purports to offer 
subjects, must itself be subjected to concrete testing in the historical life of subjects.  The 
dialectic is an act of thought that must be situated in relation to the practical experience of 
subjects.  If the distance between the concept and the non-conceptual can only be 
experienced discursively as a limit, it is only in subjecting the adequacy of the concept to 
reflection on the basis of historical experience that the subject comes to realize the distance 
between the adequacy of the concept to which they have grown accustomed and their own 
sensuous experience.  
This distance cannot itself be overcome by an act of thought.  That which is merely 
“spirit,” the desire for that which is unrealized by present conditions and unsupported by 
present institutional practices, the eschatological horizon invoked in liturgical remembrance 
and anticipation, is “impotent,” for it is pursued as a receding horizon that is always 
glimpsed in a way that is provisional and subject to the continuing historical development of 
the tradition which subjects inhabit.  Its “final” form cannot be realized by an act of 
thought.  It is precisely in presenting a conception of the intelligible as ever just beyond the 
                                                 
34 Horkheimer, “Against Philosophy” (1957-1958) in Dawn and Decline, 159-160.  Cf. “Pessimismus Heute,” in 






vanishing point of discursive conceptuality, Horkheimer notes, that materialism and 
theology agree in a form of reflection regarding the naming of the good that recognizes the 








Inquiry and Public Theology: 
Horkheimer Reconsidered 
 
In the introduction, I noted that Horkheimer’s mature work is often portrayed as 
travelling through diverse stages.  His early theorizing, according to this portrayal, is marked 
by an interest in the way empirical inquiry relates to cognitive reflection and social critique.  
Yet he gradually comes to abandon this concern with empirical inquiry, concluding his 
career with a marked interest in theology.1  This turn is explained by interpreters as a desire 
on Horkheimer’s part to remedy the lack of a normative standpoint in his own critical 
theory.  His appeal to theology, it is supposed, is an attempt by him to recover a viewpoint 
apart from compromised social practices, upon which the critique of such practices might 
proceed.  The more pessimistic Horkheimer becomes, the more solace he seeks in the idea 
that there is a theocentric standpoint beyond the earthly veil of tears, characterized as the 
latter is by man’s insatiable libido domini.  
This turn is judged a failure by second-generation theorists because the standpoint to 
which it appeals is “metaphysical.”  What such critics mean by this criticism is that, for 
Horkheimer’s standpoint to be true, it would require inferences that depart from what may 
be warranted by the sense experience of situated historical subjects.  Agents cannot escape 
the contingencies of their own historical and social location to attain an unmediated god’s 
eye view of the whole.  But Horkheimer’s late work, according to such interpreters, is 
marked by precisely such a view, and is thus characterized by “the metaphysics that not only 
                                                 
1 For a review of this interpretation and an analysis of the central role of Helmut Dubiel’s 
Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung in shaping the present scholarly consensus that I am contesting, 
note the Introduction.  Here I summarize what I term stages (1) and (4) in this dominant theory of 





philosophers but even theologians themselves must today get along without.”2  His mature 
reflections on theology, according to this heuristic, are no longer concerned with the study 
of actually existing empirical relations.  They appeal, rather, to an illicit “intelligible” object, 
God, to underwrite the critique of empirical practices.    
My research illustrates that this portrayal of Horkheimer’s turn to theology 
misunderstands two crucial elements in his mature work: how he understands religious 
concepts like “God” and the purpose of his appeal to such concepts in his reflections on 
the Jewish liturgy.  I shall discuss each, before turning to the implications this research has 
for present discussions in critical theory on the relationship between religion and reason. 
1. The concept of God  
It is well-known that Horkheimer challenges the idea that religious concepts like “God” 
have no relation to possible sensory experience throughout his career.3  In noting the 
common object of Horkheimer’s critique in his early and later work, however, one may not 
minimize the way his own conception of religious concepts also change.  In his early essays 
on religion, Horkheimer is content to argue that the rational content of such concepts 
resides in their expression of human longing and desire.  He thus notes in “Thoughts on 
                                                 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning Without God Is a Futile Undertaking: 
Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer,” in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, tr. 
Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1993), 134.  For a detailed discussion of 
Habermas’ essay and a critical evaluation of his textual support for this claim, note Chapter 5.  
3 We have noted that Horkheimer’s early and later essays alike take aim at “positivism,” by which he 
references ideas such as those expressed by A.J. Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic,  
 
I require of an empirical hypothesis, not indeed that it should be conclusively verifiable, but that some 
possible sense-experience should be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood.  If a putative 
proposition fails to satisfy this principle, and is not a tautology, then I hold that it is metaphysical, and 
that, being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally senseless. 
 
Among “senseless” concepts, Ayer includes “that there is a non-empirical world of values, or that men have 
immortal souls, or that there is a transcendent God,” (“Language, Truth, and Logic,” in Classics of Philosophy, 





Religion” (1935), for instance, that the “productive kind of criticism of the status quo,” 
which at one time was expressed by religious belief, is today expressed by those who 
“struggle for a more rational form of societal life.”  He terms this the “transition from 
religious longing to conscious social practice.”4  The experiential content of the religious 
concept is, for the early Horkheimer, a common human experience of dissatisfaction and 
desire arising from economic oppression, which may be freed from its mythical religious 
trappings in order to serve as an impetus for rational social action.   
It may thus be said that Horkheimer both attributes real experiential content to religious 
concepts (in contrast, say, to positivists) and also attempts to extricate this content from its 
relationship to orthodox claims about God, humanity, sin, and salvation.  Both of these 
moments, “attribution” and “extrication,” constitute the naturalist philosophy of religion 
characteristic of many Enlightenment critics of religion. 5  Horkheimer self-consciously 
situates his own work in the Marxist stream of this critique.6      
In his mature writings, however, Horkheimer’s view of the religious concept begins to 
develop in a manner that puts him at sharp odds with this earlier perspective.  On the one 
hand, he continues to affirm that religious concepts give voice to meaningful human 
experiences and desires.  However, he is no longer satisfied with the idea that this human 
experience can be understood without remainder, “objectively,” so to speak, if one abstracts 
                                                 
4 Horkheimer, “Thoughts on Religion,” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et. al. 
(repr., 1972; New York: Continuum, 1999), 129. 
5 Terry Eagleton cleverly summarizes precisely this demythologizing project of ‘old’ Enlightenment atheists in 
his response to the ‘new’ atheists in Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), 34, noting, “What [religious belief] has going for it, to be sure, may not be what those 
who hold the doctrine consider it to be; but there are many possibilities between this and pure garbage.  It 
ought always to be possible to extract the rational kernel from the mystical shell.”      
6 In “Thoughts on Religion,” Horkheimer thus repeats Marx’s own analysis of religion with little modification, 
“Dissatisfaction with earthly destiny is the strongest motive for acceptance of a transcendent being.  If justice 
resides with God, then it is not to be found in the same measure in the world.  Religion is the record of the 





the meaning of the experience from the self-understanding of the subject who experiences 
it, the participant in the religious community.  Horkheimer thus begins, particularly in his 
essays on Jewish theology and his addresses to Christian theologians, to root his account of 
the meaning of theological concepts in relation to the actual self-understanding of a 
religious community, the subjects of whom comprehend the liturgical practices they 
participate in as expressing a response to redemptive history and an eschatological anticipation 
of the future coming of the day of the Lord.  One cannot extricate an interpretation of 
“human experience” from liturgical claims about what has generated this experience, 
Horkheimer notes, without thereby offering a qualitatively different account of 
“experience” itself.   
In my investigation of Horkheimer’s essays on the Jewish religion, I noted how his late 
reflections on the Jewish liturgy are shaped by three practices in particular:  
(1) The remembrance of the acts of YHWH in the historical life of the people of Israel.  
This includes the public recitation of the Psalms and the recollection of the history of 
Israel, with a particular focus upon the way Israel has been delivered by YHWH from 
her enemies before the nations.  Horkheimer devotes an entire essay, “Psalm 91,” to 
exploring this theme.  
 
(2) The anticipation of the fulfillment of Israel’s history at the coming of the day of the 
Lord.  This is presented by the prophets, Horkheimer notes in a passage we shall 
explore below, as a day on which Israel and the righteous of all nations will be 
vindicated in the face of those who have opposed them.  
 
(3) The proleptic participation in the future day of YHWH through the people’s obedience 
to the torah. The tension between the realization of the future day, embodied, for 
instance, in the paradigmatic act of Sabbath-keeping, and the penultimate nature of the 
present age is kept taut in the mind of the people, Horkheimer notes, through the 
memory of the stories of the martyrs.7  
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Horkheimer’s account of the three-fold form of the liturgical response to divine action, and 
his focus on the redemptive-historical and eschatological background that informs this 
three-fold response, puts his mature work at sharp odds with his early attempt to extricate 
human meaning from religious categories.   
Yet in defining the content of religious concepts in precisely this way, he also self-
consciously separates himself from those who would attempt to define the response 
structure of religious concepts apart from a recounting of redemptive history and concrete 
eschatology, as we noted in our discussion of Horkheimer’s critique of Tillich in “Theism 
and Atheism” and “Psalm 91”.8  If the concept is shaped as a response to redemptive 
history and eschatological anticipation, and its response-structure is intimately linked to the 
meaning the concept continues to have for its users, such removal would change the 
essential meaning of the concept itself.  An important element constituting the “human” 
significance of such concepts, Horkheimer concludes, far from being extricable from claims 
about divine action in history, is itself lost if the structure of the liturgy as a response to 
divine action is eclipsed.  Instead of moving behind claims regarding the revelation of God 
in history and the consequent eschatological anticipation of the day of the Lord, to give an 
account of a more fundamental reality that lies concealed by such language, Horkheimer 
thus begins to entertain the possibility that such language actually expresses a relationship 
between humans and the divine.   
 Horkheimer begins to portray “God,” not as an idea of pure reason that provides a 
standpoint apart from empirical reality, but as an agent in the life of a people that is known 
in the redemptive history and eschatological anticipation which are expressed in the 
                                                 





liturgical life of the Jewish community.  His portrayal of God, precisely because it is a 
historically and eschatologically qualified portrayal, is not an appeal to god’s eye view, a 
metaphysical Absolute, as the dominant portrayal supposes.9     
This understanding of “God” as an agent in history may appear to stand in no little 
tension with Horkheimer’s own examination of apophatic theology.  For the latter, at least 
as Horkheimer portrays it, presents “God” as the unconditioned which cannot be named, 
whereas the former frames the character of God in relation to God’s actions in history.  We 
will return in a moment to examine a proposed resolution to this apparent tension.  
2. The purpose of Horkheimer’s reflection on the liturgy 
In addition to the concept of “God,” the dominant portrayal of Horkheimer’s turn to 
theology misunderstands the purpose of his appeal to theological categories.  It is supposed 
by interpreters that Horkheimer sets out in his mature work to secure a transcendent 
standpoint from which oppressive social relations might be critiqued.  Yet my research 
illustrates that critics invert the way Horkheimer’s theorizing actually develops.  Their 
critique gains significant traction only so long as it is limited in its object to Horkheimer’s 
early work. 
However “non-foundationalist” Horkheimer’s early essays on method may have been, it 
is hard to deny that his initial theorizing supposes a binary opposition between traditional 
communities (who are the preservers of anachronistic and oppressive societal relationships) 
and the autonomous subject (who, through the power of inquiry and critique, frees herself 
from such constraint in the pursuit of self-realization).  Both the subject to be realized, 
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Marx’s homo laborans, and the traditions that inhibit self-realization, are strikingly uniform.  
The sympathetic critic may thus suggest that the project Horkheimer sets out to realize by 
the activity of critique, the self-realization of the subject, itself assumes the idea of a 
universal human essence that might be released from oppressive societal constraints, 
thereby relying on “the legacy of a past that could still speak unperturbedly of the nature of 
human beings.”10   
This criticism has the ring of truth, so long as it is applied to Horkheimer’s early 
reflections.  Horkheimer’s mature work, however, is a less suitable target.  For in his later 
work he abandons the postulate that self-realization replaces traditions, and attempts instead 
to connect “subjectivity” and “self-realization” as concepts to an analysis of how a subject 
that has lost its naivety about the intuitive plausibility of its tradition might return self-
consciously to embrace that tradition.  His late thought thus comprehends self-realization, 
not in relation to a monolithic agent abstracted from every tradition, but rather as the 
fulfillment of a tradition dependent subject, or perhaps better, the fulfillment of subjects 
inhabiting diverse traditions.   
Self-realization is no longer coupled with the attempt to replace historical traditions (as 
in the case of his early Marxism), nor is it portrayed as a value pursued by one tradition, 
such as political liberalism, in competition with others.  “Self-realization,” according to 
Horkheimer in his later work, need not be characterized as a caesura, a break with tradition.  
It may be understood, rather, as the modern subject’s successful return to a tradition, in 
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which the tradition is reinhabited in a form adequate to the subject’s self-conception as a 
modern person.   If an ineluctable feature of modern life is the fact that the “givenness” of 
a tradition for the subject that inhabits it is no longer naively taken for granted, and the 
subject instead recognizes that her commitment to a tradition is a choice that is not intuitive 
or self-evident to everyone in her society, Horkheimer wishes to give an account of the 
successful embrace of a tradition for a subject in this historically unique situation.11  His 
account specifies how the concepts presented by a tradition may be reflexively accepted, not 
as an intuitive given, but on the basis of experiences the subject has come to recognize as 
her own.   
What Horkheimer attempts to secure in his late work is thus not a standpoint free from 
empirical social practices, but rather an account of the way a subject may reflexively 
embrace the practices of her tradition.  His purpose is to address the alienation modern 
subjects feel when categories describing ends-in-themselves that they once took for granted 
are no longer understood to be self-evident.12  How might a subject reflexively embrace a 
tradition and its account of ends after the loss of this naïveté?  It is in the context of this 
attempt to justify the continuing significance of actual historical traditions for the modern 
                                                 
11 This feature of modern life is at the center of recent prominent analyses of our age.  For instance, the 
Charles Taylor notes in A Secular Age (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2007) that whereas people in pre-
modern societies had a presumptive belief in the existence of God, such that this was their starting point, in 
modern life this has shifted for many.  We no longer live in a time where faith appears self-evident to its 
adherents.   
It is this shift in background, in the whole context in which we experience and search for fullness, that I 
am calling the coming of a secular age….  How did we move from a condition where, in Christendom, 
people lived naively within a theistic construal, to one in which we all shunt between two stances, in 
which everyone’s construal shows up as such; and in which moreover, unbelief has become for many the 
major default option?  This is the transformation that I want to describe, and perhaps also (very partially) 
explain….  (14) 
 
12 For a discussion of Horkheimer’s analysis of the way subjects’ reasoning about ends depends upon 
communal practices learned in a tradition and his diagnosis of why such traditions are no longer accepted as 





subject that the importance of the liturgy, and what we have termed “liturgical reasoning,” 
becomes a central preoccupation for Horkheimer.  I will first describe what I have termed 
Horkheimer’s conception of “liturgical reasoning” and then explain his understanding of 
how such reasoning helps the modern subject to reflexively embrace to her tradition.   
Horkheimer’s late reflections on the liturgy are not, it should be emphasized, concerned 
with the kinds of instrumental reasons one might offer for achieving taken for granted 
ends-in-themselves.  That is, it is not his concern to relate the practice of the liturgy to 
pragmatic reflection regarding the best way to realize an already taken for granted end.  
Rather, his reflections address the most basic reasons a person may offer to justify her 
understanding of what an end-in-itself like justice must entail.  His concern is thus with the 
role of the liturgy in shaping what we have termed “reflective” (as opposed to “theoretical”) 
reasoning.13     
He recognizes that without the accounts rehearsed and woven together into a cogent 
whole by the liturgical practices of a community, the self-understanding and thus the 
reasoning of agents regarding ends-in-themselves is impossible.14  This recognition is not, of 
course, unique to him.  For instance, the notion that human reasoning about ends is 
fundamentally shaped by the historical self-understanding of agents, and is thus dependent 
upon the narratives religious communities rehearse in the liturgy, is a centerpiece of post-
liberal theological discussion.15  Yet, Horkheimer suggests, further, that the liturgy of a 
                                                 
13 For an explanation of this distinction between faculties and a description of how it operates in 
Horkheimer’s work, note in particular Chapter 3, section 2.  
14 Note Chapter 4, section 3 for an analysis of the relevant texts in Eclipse of Reason where he makes this claim.    
15 Stanley Hauerwas has argued that liturgical practices in the Christian community are central to the formation 
of the Christian subject and thereby to the specific loci of ethics.  Each chapter in The Blackwell Companion to 
Christian Ethics, 2nd ed., ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), which 
he edited, thus centers on an aspect or feature of the Christian liturgy.  In explaining this method Hauerwas 





community is not simply the carrier that preserves the narrative material which will be used 
by reasoning agents to license inferences about ends.  It is also a practice that can itself 
therapeutically address the subject’s loss of naïveté about such ends.  For according to 
Horkheimer, the liturgy itself implies a way of reasoning about ends.16  It does not simply 
preserve a repository of descriptions that are useful for reasoning; it exemplifies a way 
subjects should reason.   
The liturgy is a practice wherein the historical experience and eschatological anticipation 
that constitute reasons for a community’s acceptance of ends-in-themselves are rehearsed 
back to the community.  It is thus not merely a reservoir of description; it serves as a mirror 
that expresses the historical relationship between experience, anticipation, and the 
conceptualization of ends-in-themselves.  Or put otherwise, the liturgy makes explicit a 
relationship that otherwise remains intuitive or implicit in the subjects’ naïve acceptance of 
ends-in-themselves, and thereby it exemplifies a form of inter-subjective reason giving 
about why ends which are held by the community are acceptable to those who embrace 
them.  Once reflexively grasped, this relationship between experience and concept may in 
turn be related to the ongoing experiences of subjects, so that concepts may be 
reformulated or built anew in relation to this experience.  Thus modern subjects may come 
to embrace the claims of a tradition in a reflexive way.   
                                                                                                                                                
“The liturgy offers ethics a series of ordered practices that shape the character and assumptions of Christians 
and suggest habits and models that inform every aspect of corporate life” (7).  Thus, “The overall objective [of 
this volume on ethics] is to take worship from being a curiosity in ethical discussion to being considered so 
significant that it is taken for granted in every debate and permitted to generate questions that shape the whole 
discipline” (10).   
16 For an examination of the texts that demonstrate the way that the liturgy makes explicit the connections 
between ends-in-themselves and the reasons subjects have for taking such ends as their own, note chapter 6, 
section 1.  For an example of the way the liturgy facilitates the development of the concept of “justice” 
through the practice of reflective reasoning, note section 2.1.  The following draws from and develops the 





Horkheimer takes as an example of this reflexive process the way the intensified 
historical experience of persecution in exile affected the intuitive use of theological concepts 
in the Jewish community.  The question the experience of exile raised for the Jewish 
community, he notes, was whether it was possible to subsume the historical experience of 
suffering-in-exile under already existing theological categories, as if the only question in 
such matters for the faithful was the proper application of the taken for granted categories 
learned in the liturgy to new experience. The reconstruction of categories and not merely 
the subsumption of experience under existing categories, was necessary, Horkheimer notes, 
because as the suffering of the people reached a particularly egregious and qualitatively 
distinct point, a decisive challenge was issued by this experience to already existing 
categories themselves.  At one point in the history of the Jewish people, it might have been 
enough to describe suffering as YHWH’s “just” retribution on unrighteousness, rather than 
to countenance the idea that YHWH had abandoned his followers.  Yet this theological 
account of divine providence required that the experience of suffering be subsumed under 
the category of retributive justice.  This subsumption ceased to appear to subjects who 
experienced unjust suffering in exile.     
The challenge to theological categories, however, did not lead finally to the diremption 
of the categories themselves, or the abandonment of the tradition, but rather to an attempt 
to reconstruct the categories of the tradition in relation to the contemporary experience of 
the people.  This, notes Horkheimer, produced a faithful improvisation: YHWH would 
prove faithful in preserving eternal Israel corporately as a witness among the nations, 
despite the wrongful suffering of the individual martyr.  Indeed, the suffering one who 





vindicated at the coming of the day of the Lord.  The reconceptualization of the death of 
the Jew in exile as “martyrdom” instead of “punishment,” as a righteous witness to the 
coming day of the Lord instead of as the justified object of wrath, and the connection of 
this suffering to the continued preservation of eternal Israel instead of simply to the 
justified demise of the wicked one, all of these improvisations in the Jewish tradition were 
ways of reconceptualizing divine activity using resources already existing within the 
tradition.  Yet this new synthesis took on a distinct force and necessity in the face of the 
unique absurdity of suffering in exile.  Such reconceptualization described the qualitatively 
“new” using resources that were resident in a tradition.  Yet it equally required, in some 
sense, the qualitatively new historical experience, as the precipitating factor in the 
appreciation and use of these resources.  
This reconceptualization may be understood as a practice of reflective reasoning, insofar 
as it seeks to reformulate concepts of a particular end-in-itself (divine justice) using 
resources that are native to the tradition in question, in response to the genuinely new.  
Such reasoning is able to proceed, Horkheimer notes, when participants in a tradition have 
a reflexive awareness of the relationship between the categories they use and their 
experience, so that the latter is not merely subsumed by, but may disrupt, the former.  
Liturgy displays this relationship to participants in a tradition, insofar as it requires 
participants to relate their taken for granted categories to historical and contemporary 
experience.  Thus it may rightly be understood as a condition for the possibility of reflective 
reasoning for members within a tradition.     
But Horkheimer argues, further, that the liturgy is not merely a condition for the 





liturgy brings theological categories into juxtaposition with historical and contemporary 
experiences, situating concepts in relation to the experience which informs their use.  This 
suggests not merely that concepts interpret experience but that they must be reconstructed 
in the face of disruption when they fail to do justice to this experience.  Liturgical reasoning 
preserves concepts like justice which characterize the fundamental commitments of 
participants in a form of life, without forfeiting the awareness that such theological 
categories are a conditioned response to historical experience.  It thus models for subjects 
how they can inhabit traditions in a reflexive way, accepting or reformulating the ends 
presented by those traditions in relation to their experience on the basis of their judgment.    
Apophatic theology, notes Horkheimer, self-consciously articulates the responsive 
structure of such reflective reasoning to experience.  Its purpose is to draw attention to the 
way theological concepts are related to the situated subject, and it holds forth both the truth 
of such concepts for a people and their historical dependency on the developing experience 
of subjects.  By noting that concepts about the unconditioned are themselves historically 
situated, such reflection holds forth the possibility that the genuinely novel historical 
experience will shed light upon the adequacy and meaning of theological concepts, allowing 
the rearticulation of a tradition without the abstract negation of concepts themselves, or the 
mere repetition of past uses of the concept.  In this regard, apophatic theology articulates 
the necessarily open relation between conceptualizations regarding the intelligible that arise 
on the basis of historical experience (i.e. the experiences of redemptive history), and the 
ongoing experience of subjects in a tradition that qualifies and reconstructs such concepts.17   
                                                 
17 For an analysis of Horkheimer’s writings on apophatic theology as they relate to his reflections on the 





Previously, it was noted that Horkheimer’s presentation of “God” as an agent in history 
appeared to stand in no little tension with the idea expressed in his apophatic theology that 
“God” is an unconditioned which may not be named.  Now we are in a position to return 
to this tension and propose a resolution on the basis of Horkheimer’s concern to relate the 
truth of theological concepts to history.  Far from postulating an “unknown” intelligible, it 
may be noted that apophatic reflection, by refusing to equate human concepts with an 
unconditioned standing beyond history, displays precisely the open-ended willingness to 
reformulate concepts that must characterize a tradition intent upon affirming that the truth 
content of its concepts is intimately related to an ongoing historical disclosure of the divine 
in history, which cannot be known a-priori apart from historical development. 
Having addressed two mistakes interpreters make in interpreting Horkheimer’s 
approach to theological concepts, I will conclude by noting how his understanding of the 
public significance of such concepts provides a preferable alternative to the way religious 
traditions are related to public reasoning in Habermas’ recent reflections on the philosophy 
of religion.    
3. The public status of religious claims 
   
What is striking about Horkheimer’s mature work is not only his insistence that modern 
subjects will not reach self-satisfaction without returning to historical traditions, nor his 
resistance to attempts to extricate theological concepts from the response structure of the 
liturgy, but the further claim, in contradistinction to his early Marxist attempt to “extricate” 
the rational human content of religion from its supposedly mythical entrapment, that such 





modern public discourse about social ends-in-themselves.18  The central question his mature 
work raises is why public concepts of ends should retain their reference to theology at all, 
shaped as theology is by the particular history and anticipations rehearsed in liturgical 
practices.  Put otherwise, Horkheimer’s mature work challenges the idea that the closer one 
moves towards accounts of redemptive history and eschatological anticipation as these are 
developed in the life of a particular community, the farther one moves from anything 
resembling a ‘public’ argument.  His way of conceiving of reasoning, I shall argue, offers an 
account of the role theological premises play in public reasoning that is preferable to the 
present model offered by second-generation critical theorists.      
Horkheimer’s early critique of the positivist dismissal of religious concepts as 
meaningless is not unique among Frankfurt School theorists, who focus on describing the 
rational content of religious concepts as expressions of human need and value.19  In his 
recent reflections on secularism, the method of such theorists is summarized cogently by 
Jürgen Habermas, when he notes, “Philosophy has repeatedly learned through its 
encounters with religious traditions…that it receives innovative impulses when it succeeds 
in freeing cognitive contents from their dogmatic encapsulation in the crucible of rational 
discourse.”20  Habermas supposes in this description that it possible to free the “cognitive” 
or “rational” meaning of religious concepts from a “dogmatic” reference to divine activity.  
                                                 
18 For the development of Horkheimer’s argument that concepts of the intelligible, and the aesthetic and 
practical judgments such concepts allow, are dependent upon the social practices of particular religious 
traditions, note Chapter 4, section 3 and Chapter 5, section 1.  
19 In the titular essay of An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age, tr. Ciaran Cronin 
(Malden, Cambridge: 2010), 18, Habermas explicitly rejects a “blinkered enlightenment which is unenlightened 
about itself and which denies religion any rational content.”  This critique of the dismissal of religious 
concepts characterizes the work of many members of the school as Eduardo Mendieta notes in his overview, 
“Religion as Critique: Theology as Social Critique and Enlightened Reason,” in The Frankfurt School on Religion, 
ed. Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Routledge, 2005), 8-11. 
20 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the ‘Public Use of Reason’ by 
Religious and Secular Citizens,” in Between Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity 





In stating the argument in this manner, he, like the early Horkheimer, places himself in a 
broader Enlightenment tradition that understands religious concepts as expressive of 
human existential states, the universal social meaning of which is veiled from the subjects 
who use them by their supposed religious meaning.  As we shall see, Habermas wishes to 
modify this hermeneutical tradition in the face of criticisms from members of religious 
traditions, who object to the way it disregards their own self-understanding of what they are 
doing when they employ such concepts.  Yet he wishes to do so without altering the 
fundamental notion that the content of such concepts may be extricated from dogmatic 
claims regarding the divine.   
Habermas’ philosophy of religion has a Janus-faced relationship to the practice of 
actually existing religions traditions, insofar as it recognizes itself as both their fulfillment and 
negation.  From a formal perspective, the replacement of mythical narratives by a rational, 
“law-based,” account of the functioning of natural and social life is understood by 
Habermas as the pinnacle of a form of reasoning begun by historical religious traditions 
themselves.   Thus, “mosaic monotheism,” he notes, facilitated “the cognitive advance from 
mythos to logos,” for it “made it possible to take a synoptic view of the world as a whole from 
a transcendent point of view and to distinguish the flood of phenomena from the 
underlying essences.”21  From this perspective, the modern project of extricating the 
                                                 
21 Habermas, “Awareness of What is Missing,” 17.  Elsewhere, in “‘The Political’: The Rational Meaning of a 
Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,” in The Power of Religion in the Public Square, eds. Eduardo 
Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 18-19, he notes more 
concretely that monotheistic conceptions of a divine nomos enabled individuals to differentiate human rulers 
from a law to which they should be held accountable, opening up the possibility for prophetic critique. “Once 
this transformation has taken place the political ruler can no longer be perceived as the manifestation of the 
divine but only as its human representative.  From now on, he, as a human person, is also subordinated to the 





“rational” core of religious rituals from their “mythic” trappings is merely a late flowering 
inheritance of a practice of thinking shaped by earlier religious traditions.22   
Yet if there is a sense in which the modern practice of demythologizing brings to 
fulfillment a project begun by monotheism, it is equally the case that this project breaks 
sharply with the self-understanding of members of the monotheistic traditions.  For modern 
demythologizing was first formulated by modern social theorists as a critique of the self-
understanding of members of such communities.  Habermas recognizes that the hard edge 
of methodological naturalism implicit in this account, which equates the underlying 
“rational” essence of religious concepts with human states and relegates the divine reference 
of such language to “mythical” ephemera, is hardly reflective of the self-understanding of 
members of historical religious communities.23   
Thus, in his recent attempts to dialogue with Catholic philosophers about the 
relationship between religious traditions and reasoning, he offers a subtle modification of 
this method.  Secular theorists, he notes, may not judge the validity of the claims of religious 
communities regarding the divine.  Strong assertions like, “religious claims about the divine 
in actuality express human experience” are unacceptable.  When this claim is simply 
assumed a-priori as the basis for demythologization it becomes as speculative as claims 
                                                 
22 Habermas concludes this explicitly in “Faith and Knowledge,” trans. Helen Beister and William Rehy, in The 
Frankfurt School on Religion, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Routledge, 2005), 335, “[Profane reason] knows 
that the profanation of the sacred begins with those world religions which disenchanted magic, overcame 
myth, sublimated sacrifice, and disclosed the secret…Postsecular society continues the work, for religion itself, 
that religion did for myth.” 
23 In an instructive aside in “Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State,” in The Dialectics 
of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 42, he thus notes, “The respect 
that accompanies [the] refusal to utter a cognitive judgment [about the content of religious concepts] is based 
on the respect due to persons and ways of life that obviously derive their integrity and authenticity from 





religious interlocutors may advance about the supernatural.  Thus, Habermas concludes in a 
Kantian vein, “secular reason may not set itself up as the judge concerning truths of faith.”24 
A strong version of methodological naturalism which attempts to judge what part of a 
religious claim may be considered “true” and what part “false,” in order to determine finally 
the unalloyed meaning of such claims, is replaced by Habermas with an account of features 
that any public appeal to an interlocutor about the truth content of a claim must possess.  
Indeed, he explicitly distinguishes this account from the aforementioned strong version of 
naturalism, “this act of drawing the grammatical borders does not make a philosophical 
claim to determine what…may be true or false in the contents of a religious tradition.”25  
Rather than looking at whether and in what sense religious claims are true or false, he 
wishes to examine the necessary conditions under which any such claims may be made 
intelligible to a modern audience.  Thus Habermas notes, “The truth of religious validity 
claims is not in question here, but rather the potentially translatable truth content of religious 
utterances.”26   
The premises of his argument are as follows:   
(1): Three features of modern life are taken for granted by “religious” and “non-
religious” persons when they reason together in public.  These features are:  
(a): “the secularization of knowledge,”  
(b): “the neutralization of the state authorities” with regard to the practice of 
religion,  
                                                 
24 Habermas, “Awareness of What is Missing,” 16.  In “Pre-political Foundations,” 51, Habermas concludes 
that naturalist convictions have in common with religious world views the fact that they “owe their genesis to 
a speculative assimilation of scientific information.”  Thus, in the political arena, they “do not in the least enjoy a 
prima facie advantage over competing world views or religious understandings.” 
25 Habermas, “Pre-political Foundations,” 42. 





(c): “the universalization of religious freedom.”27   
(2): These features necessarily constrain the intelligibility of religious claims in the public 
square.   
The second two features (b-c) are portrayed by Habermas as related elements of a 
classically liberal political order (though one can, of course, imagine [c] without [b] and we 
shall return to this).  They express an official neutrality towards diverse religious beliefs, as 
well as protection of the freedom of conscious.  Habermas further defines (a) “the 
secularization of knowledge” as the fact that there are “universally accessible discourses” in 
modern society, which he specifies as “the fallible results of the institutionalized sciences 
and the basic principles of universalistic egalitarianism in law and morality.”28 Both the 
exercise of theoretical reason in the sciences and that of practical reason in law and 
morality, he concludes, are based on “the authority of ‘natural’ reason,”29 which he defines 
as reason “that relies exclusively on public arguments that claim to be equally accessible to all 
persons.”30  These universal discourses, notes Habermas, have significantly limited the 
direct role religious language plays in public discourse.31        
                                                 
27 Habermas, “Pre-political Foundations,” 48. 
28 Habermas, “An Awareness of What is Missing,” 16.  In “Faith and Knowledge,” 329, he notes,  
 
Religious consciousness must first, come to terms with the cognitive dissonance of encountering other 
denominations and religions [i.e. it must accept “the neutralization of the state authorities, and the 
universalization of religious freedom”].  It must, second, adapt to the authority of the sciences which hold 
the societal monopoly of secular knowledge [i.e. it must accept “the fallible results of the institutionalized 
sciences”] .  It must, last, agree to the premises of a constitutional state grounded in profane morality [i.e. 
it must accept “the basic principles of universalistic egalitarianism in law and morality”].    
  
29 Ibid.   
30 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 120, emphasis his. 
31 Habermas, “Prepolitical Foundations,” 48, “With the functional differentiation of social subsystems, the life 
of the religious fellowship also becomes separated from the social milieus in which it exists.  The role of the 





Habermas notes that the recognition of (a) - (c) requires a qualitative shift away from 
the claims of religious traditions to structure public life and towards another more basic 
structural principle, the requirements of reason, themselves deduced from an examination 
of the formal qualities of the communicative act.      
In its origins, every religion is a “world view” or a “comprehensive doctrine” in the 
sense that it claims authority to give structure to an entire way of life.  Under conditions 
created by the secularization of knowledge, the neutralization of the state authorities, 
and the universalization of religious freedom, religion was compelled to abandon this 
claim to a monopoly on interpretation and to a comprehensive structuring of human 
life.32 
 
He also claims that the more basic structural principle, the formal requirements of reason as 
these are revealed in the communicative act, provide “a stock of arguments that are 
independent of religious and metaphysical traditions.”33 
Religious persons come to accept (a) insofar as they present public claims in a form 
which accords with the “universally accessible discourses” of science and morality.  
Translation is thus integral to participating in public life for the religious person, for without 
it the religious believer is appealing to warrants that her fellow citizens will not recognize as 
binding.  In a modern society, religious persons are, of course, free to use “religious 
language” in public.  But if they wish to present reasons for societal action to others, then 
they must translate such language into the lingua franca of the universally accessible 
discourses.  As Habermas puts it,  
All citizens should be free to decide whether they want to use religious language in the 
public sphere.  Were they to do so, they would, however, have to accept that the 
potential truth contents of religious utterances must be translated into a generally 
                                                 
32 Habermas, “Pre-political Foundations,” 48. 





accessible language before they can find their way onto the agendas or parliaments, 
courts, or administrative bodies and influence their decisions.34   
 
It might be objected that this requirement imposes an undue burden on the religious; the 
nonreligious, after all, are not required to translate their fundamental commitments.35  
However, Habermas argues that there is an obligation arising from these requirements for 
both the religious and non-religious alike.   
For the religious, adaptation to (a)-(c) ought not be seen as a matter of mere 
accommodation, but should be accepted ex animo on the basis of reasons internal to the 
religious tradition itself.  Thus Habermas notes,  
Instead of grudging accommodation to externally imposed constraints, the content of 
religion must open itself up to the normatively grounded expectation that it should 
recognize for reasons of its own the neutrality of the state towards worldviews, the equal 
freedom of all religious communities, and the independence of the institutionalized 
sciences.36 
   
The task for the theologian is thus to reflect upon a properly theological justification for state 
neutrality, toleration, and the autonomy of natural reason which is necessary to translation.  
As an example of a religious account of translation, Habermas cites “the Catholic tradition” 
which “is comfortable with the lumen naturale” and “has no problem in principle with an 
autonomous justification of morality and law.”37   
                                                 
34 Habermas, “The ‘Political,’” 25-26.  Habermas thus notes that religious people have the right to formulate 
and “justify” their stances “in the political arena” using reasons particular to the beliefs of their religious 
community.  However, these reasons must be translated into “a worldview-neutral language” if they are to be 
proposed as reasons for a policy by those in an official governing capacity (“Awareness of What is Missing,” 
21). 
35 Habermas acknowledges this in “Faith and Knowledge,” 332, “The democratic common sense insists on 
reasons which are acceptable not just for members of one religious community.  Therefore, the liberal state 
makes believers suspect that occidental secularization might be a one-way street bypassing religion as 
marginal.” 
36 Habermas, “Awareness of What is Missing,” 21, my emphasis.  Cf, Habermas, “Religious Tolerance as a 
Pacemaker for Cultural Rights,” in Between Naturalism and Religion, 261-262, “The major religions must 
reappropriate the normative foundations of the liberal state on their own premises even if, as in the case of the 
Judeo-Christian legacy in Europe, a genealogical connection exists between the two.” 





For the non-religious, translation requires they take seriously the reasons given by the 
religious on the basis of their particular beliefs, not dismissing them out of hand as 
nonsense but working together with the religious to translate possible “suppressed or 
untapped moral intuitions” contained in religious belief into the lingua franca.38  Given “the 
religious origins” of Western society, it may be the case that resources from this inheritance 
will cast light on societal issues and require translation into a universally understood form.39  
Habermas thus notes.    
For secular citizens, the same ethics of citizenship entails a complementary burden.  By 
the duty of reciprocal accountability toward all citizens, including religious ones, they 
are obliged not to publicly dismiss religious contributions to political opinion and will 
formation as mere noise, or even nonsense, from the start.40  
 
Thus, according to Habermas, translation is a two-sided endeavor, “which requires both 
sides to take on the perspective of the other.”41  That Habermas counsels from the religious 
the relinquishment of the world-formative character of their claims, while counseling the non-
religious to aid them in this with civility, casts doubt on whether the burdens placed on both 
are really of the same kind.  I shall return to this momentarily.    
Habermas concludes that he has replaced a “strong” version of methodological 
naturalism, a version which extricates or “filters” the rational core from the non-rational 
                                                 
38 Habermas, “’The Political,’” 27.  At the conclusion of the essay, Habermas calls this the “recovery of 
semantic potentials from religious traditions for the wider political culture.”  
39 See Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge, 333. 
40 Habermas, “’The Political,’” 26.  In “Faith and Knowledge,” 332, he similarly notes, “Only if the secular 
side, too, remains sensitive to the force of articulation inherent in religious languages will the search for 
reasons that aim at universal acceptability not lead to an unfair exclusion of religions from the public sphere, 
nor sever secular society from important resources of meaning.”  





mythic elements of religion in an a-priori manner, with a method that merely “redirects the 
flow of tradition” so that it can reenter public life in a universally accessible form.42 
Yet both of these moves, the claim that a religion must relinquish its self-conception as 
a comprehensive doctrine, and the idea that the common stock of reasons which replaces 
religion and structures modern life can be freed of “religious” and “metaphysical” baggage,  
are hardly innocuous.   
First, it is worth noting that religious traditions did not require modern pluralism to 
make them aware of the need to translate their truth claims into a language that outsiders 
could understand, even during the historical moment when, according to Habermas, they 
conceived of themselves as providing a “comprehensive doctrine” that structured public 
life.  The Christian tradition itself, in its account of the natural law, provides an 
understanding of “translation,” in comparison to which Habermas’ own account is revealed 
to be less neutral than he would suppose.  I shall develop this claim by reexamining 
Habermas’ account of the constants defining modern life (1a-c).  Then I will note how 
Horkheimer’s mature thoughts on religion offer an alternative account of the relationship 
between religious premises and public reasoning, without relying on the questionable idea 
that religious premises should loose their comprehensive status in favor of Habermas’ 
account of communicative reason.  
Let us begin by noting that (c), “the universalization of religious freedom,” is a project 
which may in fact be pursued by individuals on the basis of reasons internal to their own 
religious traditions, without necessarily entailing the activity of translation (as Habermas 
                                                 
42 Habermas, “Awareness of What’s Missing,” 18, “Secularization functions less as a filter separating out the 
contents of traditions than as a transformer which redirects the flow of tradition.”  His version of secularism, 
he concludes, provides a basis for respectful exchanges with communities of faith. “The mode for nondestructive 





notes in his own historical reflections on how religious liberty arose in America43).  In the 
case of the American experiment, persecution due to the coupling of state power with 
church authority prompted individuals within a religious tradition to reflect upon their own 
concept of freedom of conscious.  Thus (c) does not require the “abandonment” of the 
claim of religious world views to provide a “comprehensive structuring of human life.”  
Nor does it require for its implementation the activity of “translation” into a stock of 
reasons common to all.  One can conceive, for instance, of a public polity wherein the 
majority is self-consciously committed to a Christian world view, yet whose commitment to 
such entails toleration towards religious minorities. 
It is, in fact, (a) “the secularization of knowledge” that requires translation as well as 
theological justifications “internal” to a tradition which can motivate such translation.  The 
supposition that a common stock of reasons underlies translation then raises the possibility 
that (b) “the neutralization of the state authorities” is possible, such that a state may act on 
reasons which are not rooted in premises that are particular to religious traditions.    
Habermas cites the lumen naturale as an instance of a theological basis for the translation 
work of (a).  This presents an instructive ambiguity.  When speaking of the natural law, 
theologians certainly recognize that reason may proceed on premises drawn solely from 
observations all humans may have, thus not by direct appeal to propositions which will only 
be acceptable to those within a particular religious community.  Yet they do not draw the 
conclusion from this that reason is “autonomous,” at least in the sense that Habermas 
suggests.  The very ability to infer from the observation of nature is a gift of God, and the 
capacity for reason to outline the laws behind natural processes may only occur because 
                                                 





there is an intelligibility to creation that reflects the mind who has created.    There is thus, 
for the natural lawyer, a religious reason that is properly basic (i.e. it may not itself be 
translated) underlying the Christian account of the condition for the possibility of 
translation into universally accessible discourses.  The theologian may, of course, concede 
that subjects can use reason without appealing to such theological premises, but not that 
they may account for such natural use in a way that brackets questions regarding the existence 
of God as a giver of gifts and an intelligent mind.44   
This illustrates two problems with Habermas’ account.  First, he presents the idea of 
“translation” as if it were enabled by the same “universal discourses” that replaced religion 
as purveyors of a comprehensive world view.  This, however, is hardly self-evident to those 
in religious communities.  Habermas is correct that many have an account of translation 
which may be justified by appeal to religious convictions.  But he is wrong to assume that 
this entails any easy acceptance of the autonomy of the translation process from religious 
convictions.  In the case of the aforementioned natural lawyer, there is a belief that both 
“universal discourses” as well as the translations they allow are only possible because of truths 
affirmed by a “comprehensive” religious world view.  Far from displacing the public status 
of religion, for the natural lawyer translation supposes it.  Instead of determining a-priori 
                                                 
44 Benedict XVI notes as much in a response to Habermas found in his famous address, “Faith, Reason and 
the University: Memories and Reflections” (lecture presented at the University of Regensberg, September 12 
2006),  http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html,  
Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the 
correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its 
methodology has to be based. Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has 






the content of religious concepts, Habermas moves the conflict to a different level by 
determining a-priori the basis for the possibility of translation.  Yet the conflict remains: the 
idea that the believer should relinquish her tradition as a “comprehensive doctrine” in favor 
of the formal requirements of reason understood as an inter-subjective communicative act 
hardly escapes the a-priori assertion of naturalism that Habermas rightly originally wished to 
avoid when approaching dialogue with religious communities.   
Habermas understands the pattern of reasoning that occurs within religious 
communities as parochial.  Let us take the case of practical reason as an example.  Members 
of a community draw inferences that move:  
(a): from experiences which are particular to their community, such as, for instance, the 
remembrance of particular divine acts of salvation in history (we shall call these 
“tradition-specific” experiences),  
 
(b): to a set of practical rules for their own activity.   
 
For instance, for the faithful Jew, “I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the 
Land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery” recalls a tradition-specific experience 
remembered in liturgical rites like Passover.  This tradition-specific experience warrants a 
practical rule, “You shall have no other gods before me.”45  This rule will not necessarily be 
accepted or understood by those outside of the community of faith, insofar as they do not 
recognize the authority of the tradition-specific experience that licenses the practical 
conclusion.   
For Habermas, the rule “You shall have no other gods before me” will be 
understandable only for those within the closed circle of the community.  For practical rules 
to be rational to a broader public, one must appeal to experiences that exist, or theoretically 
                                                 





could possibly exist, for all subjects regardless of the traditions they inhabit (we shall call 
these “shared” experiences).  Such shared experiences must then be reflected upon using 
rules that are not-tradition specific (i.e. “universal discourses”). 
This raises the second difficulty.  A conclusion drawn from premises that are based on 
“shared” not “tradition-specific” experiences does not itself ensure that the conclusion will 
be unencumbered by the inferential moves licensed by a tradition.  Traditions in actuality 
inform reasoning from “tradition-specific” experiences and “shared” experiences alike.   
For the natural lawyer, experiences may indeed be “shared” by all, but the conclusions 
drawn from this common stock of experiences would not necessarily be self-evident to all.  
The natural lawyer is guided by a history of philosophical reflection on teleology in nature 
which is congruent with the narratives particular to the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures.  
She would hold that her conclusions, ex hypothesai, could be recognized by all, should they 
have the intellectual and moral stature and formation to do so.  But the conclusions drawn 
are not themselves intuitive.  They are aided by a tradition of inquiry and recourse to the 
Scriptures and thus are indirectly reliant upon a religious tradition.  This illustrates that the 
relation of religious traditions and reasoning is more complicated than Habermas assumes.  
It is not, after all, the scope of the experience reflected upon that distinguishes religious 
reasoning from reasoning based on universal discourses, but rather differences in the 
“universal” laws that the natural lawyer and the critical philosopher employ.     
Reasoning from “shared” experiences to practical maxims will inevitably be informed by 
a tradition of reflection that situates the “universal” rules employed, whether this 
exemplified by Aristotle and Aquinas or more recent theorists like Kant.  The conclusions 





lumen naturale as if it were equivalent to the idea of autonomous reason.  But the more there 
are open questions between critical theorists and natural lawyers regarding what counts as a 
“shared experience” determined by a rule and what “universal” rules to employ (as there 
undoubtedly will be on controverted issues such as homosexuality and abortion), the more 
the implicit way that traditions of reflection have shaped reasoning about “shared” 
experience come into play.  In moments like this, the indirect and implicit role of tradition 
in shaping public reasoning needs to be made explicit.  This is not to say that there are not 
such things as “shared” experiences or “universal rules” which when reflected upon may 
license practical action across traditions; it is only to recognize that reflection on the role of 
traditions of inquiry in shaping reasoning about such experiences will need to become 
publicly explicit in order for progress to be made in clarifying and extending these rules.  
When too little agreement exists regarding “shared” experiences and universal “rules” to 
allow consensus between traditions, it is necessary, not to abstract from the “tradition-
specific” reasons which members of religions traditions have for holding their convictions 
in favor of an account that has no genetic relation to the historical practices that have 
shaped reasoning, but rather to make explicit how historical traditions influence an analysis of 
“shared” experience, so that participants can empathetically inhabit the perspective of their 
interlocutor and learn to reason with them regarding controverted questions.  Consensus in 
such situations should be understood as presenting a practical task to be accomplished, not 
a theoretical difficulty that can be resolved a-priori by formal standards known apart from 
any tradition.46   
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Second generation critical theory, in its desire to provide a set of tradition independent 
criteria for resolving conflict, disengages traditions at just this crucial point, leading one 
sympathetic critic to note rightly,  
Critical theorists begin by embracing the hope that genuinely democratic discourse will 
flourish among us.  They set out to serve this hope by systematically diagnosing the 
sources of distortion that arise within our discourse as it is.  But they end up by 
explaining away, instead of entering into conversation with, nearly everything that real 
people think, say, and feel.47  
 
In the case we have been have been exploring, the point at which actual traditions speak up 
publicly about the reasons they have for interpreting “shared” experiences the way they 
have come to interpret them is precisely the point at which such traditions are told to be 
silent and to offer up the claim of their religion to “comprehensively structure” life.  
Yet, in the face of such disagreement one needs, it seems to me, a conception of public 
reasoning that does not limit discussion regarding the way religious (and secular) traditions 
alike inform and influence descriptions of experiences and rules which inform common life.  
This should not be coupled with attempts by the state to require the acceptance of a 
particular religious tradition, (b) and (c) may in fact be decoupled as I note above, yet it does 
require that public officials in a pluralist polity be allowed to discuss how traditions shape 
their understanding, and it recognizes explicitly that interpretations of ends can owe a debt 
to religious traditions.   
Neither the mere existence of “shared” experiences, nor the structuring of public life 
around universal discourses that reflect upon such experiences, require the thesis that 
universal discourses or the consequent public life they foster must (or indeed can) be free of 
                                                 





the influence of tradition.  If this is so, then we should hesitate before limiting public 
exchange when addressing issues where differences between traditions matter.   
Horkheimer’s account of the relation of the liturgy to reflective reasoning about ends 
describes a way that the implicit premises which shape such differences may come to light 
and be made explicit.  Noting the way concepts of public ends are historically and 
eschatologically qualified by the “tradition specific” experiences of a community opens up 
the reasoning of members of a community to self-reflective examination, as well as the 
examination of outsiders.  Such recognition is crucial to inculcating reflexivity amongst 
those inhabiting religious traditions, as well as empathy amongst those who do not.48  Yet 
we need not treat this inside/outside distinction as final.  For as Horkheimer’s description 
of the reconstruction of theological concepts in the face of exile illustrates, the theologian 
who relates redemptive history to the present moment in the life of the people situates 
“tradition specific” experience vis-à-vis wider patterns of “shared” experience in the life of a 
society as a whole.  Horkheimer’s turn towards liturgical reasoning both suggests how 
implicit theological commitments which inform subjects accounts of the common good 
may be made explicit and may be opened up to concrete challenge and reconstruction from 
outwith the community of faith.   
Horkheimer recognizes how the liturgies of traditions affect “public” reasoning about 
taken for granted universal discourses, such as morality and the sciences.  If I am correct 
that what is needed in the case of public conflict over morality (to take the case of practical 
reasoning) is not the requirement that the religious cede the world-formative power of their 
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purely abstract regard for potential rational agency.  It tends in fact to be much more specific than that.  It is 
nourished by our recognition that much of what our neighbors believe is what any reasonable person would 





belief in favor of a tradition-free vantage point, but rather that either side in the 
disagreement make more explicit the tradition specific reasons they have for disagreeing 
with one another, then returning to Horkheimer’s mature account of the relationship 
between reasoning and the liturgy may be a worthwhile task for critical theorists who wish 
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